Psychological Reductionism About Persons: A Critical Development |
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Baggini (Julian) |
Source: PhD thesis, University College London, 1996 |
Paper - Abstract |
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Author’s Abstract
This second question does not presuppose that the survivor is numerically identical with her predecessor and is the question considered in this thesis.
I suggest that psychological connectedness and continuity must be between persons-at-a-time, not individual thoughts, and that a unified mental life over time is not just a product of enough connections, as Parfit argues, but is determined by the kind of connectedness there is.
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