Personal Identity and the Formal Self
Lybaert (Fauve)
Source: PhD thesis, KU Leuven, Humanities and Social Sciences Group, Institute of Philosophy, December 2013
Paper - Abstract

Paper StatisticsBooks / Papers Citing this PaperNotes Citing this PaperDisclaimer


Contents

    Introduction – 1
  1. What Constitutes Our Numerical Identity? – 13
  2. The Mental Fails To Constitute Diachronic Personal Identity – 43
  3. The Role of the Body Here Considered – 71
  4. Material Bodies and Persons as Primary Particulars – 93
  5. Self-Consciousness’s Source Is Not Just Internal – 119
  6. Ascribing Sensations and Thoughts To Oneself – 147
  7. Which Image of the Self Corresponds to Our Ascription of Diachronic Personal Identity? – 185
    Bibliography – 215

Comment:

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)

  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2022
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



© Theo Todman, June 2007 - Sept 2022. Please address any comments on this page to theo@theotodman.com. File output:
Website Maintenance Dashboard
Return to Top of this Page Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page Return to Theo Todman's Home Page