- This thesis is a survey of metaphysical theories of persistence through time. For each of the theories considered, I concisely state the theory, describe the positive arguments in its favour, suggest ways in which that theory could reply to positive arguments for other theories, discuss some outstanding problems for that theory as stated, and describe some variants on it. In the course of this, I stake out my own distinctive view about persistence, which is a version of endurantism.
- I also argue for some preliminary results that are needed for the discussion of persistence. These involve issues in metaphysics that I regard as foundational with regard to the debates over persistence: intrinsic properties and the part-whole relation. I take the views: that the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties is orthogonal to that between non relational and relational properties; that, strictly speaking, properties are neither relational nor non-relational; and that intrinsicality is unanalysable. In discussing part-whole, I defend a certain attitude to mereology, which I call "mereological realism"; and assuming mereological realism, I defend the controversial features of classical mereology.
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