- This paper introduces a framework for thinking about ontological questions — in particular, the Special Composition Question — and shows how the framework might help support something like an account of restricted composition.
- The framework takes the form of an account of natural objects, in analogy with David Lewis’s account of natural properties.
- Objects, like properties, come in various metaphysical grades, from the fundamental, fully objective, perfectly natural objects to the nomologically otiose, maximally gerrymandered, perfectly non-natural objects.
- The perfectly natural objects, I argue, are the mereological simples, and (roughly) a collection composes an object of degree-n naturalness if and only if its members are arranged F-wise, for some property F that appears in the degree-n natural laws.
- Arbitrary composites turn out to be perfectly non-natural objects and are metaphysical bystanders. Ordinary composite objects fall in between. Some — e.g., atoms — are very (though not perfectly) natural; others — e.g., tables — are highly non-natural.
- For the full text, follow this link (Local website only): PDF File1.
- Downloaded from Cambridge Core.
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