Personal Identity, Bodily Continuity and Resurrection
Quinn (Philip L.)
Source: International Journal for Philosophy of Religion , 1978, Vol. 9, No. 2 (1978), pp. 101-113
Paper - Abstract

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Author's Abstract

  1. In a recent paper, "Mavrodes (George I.) - The Life Everlasting and the Bodily Criterion of Identity", George Mavrodes concerns himself with defending, that is, with arguing for the logical possibility of, the orthodox Christian doctrine that at least some persons who undergo bodily death in this world will be resurrected and live everlastingly in world to come.
  2. He considers in detail an objection to this doctrine which has been raised by philosophers who hold a bodily criterion of personal identity. His argument is designed to show that certain ways of explaining this criterion of personal identity open up plausible, or at least tenable, positions for one who believes in resurrection to occupy.
  3. I agree with his conclusion, though I would argue it in ways rather different from those he uses.
  4. So rather than trying merely to score critical points against his arguments, I shall construct some parallel arguments of my own. I hope that the philosophical issues will be illuminated by both the similarities and the differences between my arguments and his.

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