Theo Todman's Web Page - Paper Abstracts

Publisher’s Abstract

• How many individuals are present where we see a pregnant individual?
• Within a substance ontological framework, there are exactly two possible answers to this question.
  1. The standard answer — two individuals — is typically championed by scholars endorsing the predominant Containment View of pregnancy, according to which the foetus resides in the gestating organism like in a container.
  2. The alternative answer — one individual — has recently found support in the Parthood View, according to which the foetus is a part of the gestating organism.
• Here I propose a third answer:
  3. A pregnant individual is neither two individuals nor one individual but something in between one and two. This is because organisms are better understood as processes than as substances.
• With a special focus on the Parthood View, I explain why a Process View of pregnancy, according to which a pregnant individual is a bifurcating hypercomplex process, surpasses the substance ontological approaches.