Author's Introduction
- Why do countries go to war? International relations scholars are increasingly pointing to national humiliation as a key factor. Evelin Lindner observes in Making Enemies (2006) that ‘Humiliated hearts and minds may represent the only “real” weapons of mass destruction.’ Likewise, Joslyn Barnhart argues in The Consequences of Humiliation (2020) that ‘Humiliating international events on average increase individual support for assertive foreign policy actions.’ When citizens of a nation feel humiliated, they become more likely to support aggressive foreign policy initiatives.
- This argument has featured prominently in discussions about Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. The Kremlin’s official justifications have included unfounded claims about Ukrainian Nazis committing genocide, as well as the threat of NATO expansion. But a recurring theme in explanations for the war is also the humiliation supposedly felt by everyday Russians.
- We see this in the rhetoric of the Kremlin. On the morning of the invasion, the Russian president Vladimir Putin framed the war as a response to humiliation, declaring that its purpose was to protect those who had ‘been facing humiliation and genocide perpetrated by the Kiev regime’. Similar explanations appear in Western commentary. As Thomas Friedman noted in The New York Times in 2022: ‘When Putin felt humiliated by the West after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the expansion of NATO, he responded: “I’ll show you. I’ll beat up Ukraine.”’
- This idea extends beyond Russia. Emmanuel Macron, the French president, has warned against humiliating Russia in efforts to aid Ukraine, implying that further humiliation could prolong the conflict. Looking further back, the humiliation of Germany by the Treaty of Versailles (1919) is often cited as a key driver of Hitler’s rise to power. And China’s so-called ‘century of humiliation’ – spanning from the Opium Wars to the end of the Second World War – is frequently invoked to explain China’s aggressive stance towards the West today.
- Scholars of international relations have given a name to this phenomenon: national humiliation. As Barnhart writes:
A state of ‘national humiliation’ arises when individuals who identify as members of the state experience humiliation as the overwhelming emotional response to an international event, which they believe has undeservedly threatened the state’s image on the world stage.
- But what exactly is national humiliation? And is it really such a clear cause of war?
Author's Conclusion
- Humiliation narratives do not emerge spontaneously. They are cultivated by political leaders, state institutions and media outlets that frame historical events in ways that sustain a sense of victimhood. These narratives serve strategic purposes, often justifying aggressive foreign policy.
- Consider Russia. Putin frequently portrays the collapse of the Soviet Union as a national humiliation inflicted by the West. By consistently framing history this way, he keeps the humiliation narrative alive, and uses it to justify actions such as the annexation of Crimea and the full-blown invasion of Ukraine.
- Does this mean that ordinary Russians walk around feeling humiliated every day? It is difficult to say – especially given the challenges of collecting reliable data in Russia. But, in a way, that question is secondary. Even if most Russians do not personally feel humiliated, the humiliation narrative is sufficient to provide political cover for war.
- One major lesson of shifting our focus from humiliating emotions to humiliation narratives is that it challenges the inevitability of war. The conventional explanation suggests that, once a country’s citizens feel humiliated, they will almost always support aggressive foreign policies to restore their national pride. But if we instead see humiliation as a narrative – a constructed story rather than a raw emotional reaction – we recognise that these narratives can be rewritten, reframed, or even rejected.
- Germany’s post-Second World War reconciliation with its neighbours illustrates this. When the German chancellor Willy Brandt, on a state visit to Warsaw in 1970, spontaneously knelt before a memorial to Polish victims of the Nazis, many Germans initially saw the gesture as humiliating. Yet, over time, it became a cornerstone of Germany’s postwar identity – an act of humility rather than humiliation. This shift in narrative helped Germany move beyond its history of conflict.
- What does this mean for Russia? Much of the justification for its war on Ukraine hinges on a humiliation narrative. But alternative voices – both within and outside Russia – challenge this interpretation. They argue that Russia’s struggles stem not from Western aggression but from internal problems such as economic mismanagement, corruption and demographic decline. Elevating these alternative narratives could help reduce tensions, and open pathways to peace.
- Ultimately, understanding how humiliation narratives function gives us a sharper analytical tool for assessing international conflict. It reminds us that the stories nations tell about themselves matter just as much as – if not more than – the emotions their citizens feel. And, crucially, it shows that those stories can be rewritten – erasing the justifications for war along with them.
Author Narrative
- Raamy Majeed is a lecturer in philosophy at the University of Manchester, who works on the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. He is also an associate editor for the Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
Notes
- This is another annoying Paper; an exercise in Russia-bashing. It is important, though.
- The Paper is very brief and I've cited about 2 / 3 of it. I thought of citing it all and adding footnotes.
- Firstly, it's a nation's elite and its 'nation builders' that - in general - are those that 'naturally' feel humiliated. The average citizen just gets on with things, unless the 'humiliation' directly affects them (as it would have in post WW2 Germany - had the alternative to the Marshall Plan - de-industrialising Germany - been implemented). The general populace may be persuaded to share the view of the elite by setting a narrative and promoting it. Propaganda when performed by our enemies, though not so by us. All nations need a - probably fictitious and doubtless inlated - narrative to keep them going and together during difficult times. In the UK, because things are stable and going well, we - or the elite (those that in other circumstances would feel the humiliation) feel happy to sneer at and unravel our own national story, as though everything we ever did was a sin.
- In my view, war is entered into to avoid humiliation as much as in response to it. Surely the Falklands War was in response to an affront as much as the protection of a tiny community and a few sheep. The second war against Iraq was a direct response to 9/11. The US's nose had been tweaked and someone had to pay, even if they weren't guilty. The numerous current border-dispute wars (the Russia-Ukraine war is hardly the only one) are driven by both sides refusing to back down and be humiliated.
- I consider the reference to Willy Brandt's 'act of humility / humiliation' to be absurd. Germany had been - almost entirely - responsible for one of the most disgraceful episodes in history. A little kneeling goes nowhere near reparation.
- That said, Germany had been humiliated at Versailles and the German populace could easily be persuaded to share the outrage of the Nazis and other nationalists.
- Likewise, Russia had been a Great Power - both under the Czars and the Communists - and the West did little to help them recover from the collapse of the Soviet Union but - unlike with Germany after WW2 - continued to treat them as enemies to be suppressed.
- There are no Aeon Comments.
- This relates to my Note on Narrative Identity.
Comment:
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