Simple Mindedness: In Defense of Naïve Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mind
Hornsby (Jennifer)
This Page provides (where held) the Abstract of the above Book and those of all the Papers contained in it.
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BOOK ABSTRACT:

Back Cover Blurb

  1. How is perception affected by our counting ourselves as inhabitants of the natural world? How do our actions fit into a world that is altered through our agency? And how do we accommodate our understanding of one another as fellow subjects of experience — as beings with thoughts and wants and hopes and fears? To answer these questions, Jennifer Hornsby offers a distinctive position in philosophy of mind: naive naturalism, which opposes the whole drift of the last thirty or forty years' philosophy of mind in the English-speaking world. Hornsby sets naive naturalism against dualism, but without advancing the claims of "materialism1," "physicalism2," or "naturalism" as these have come to be known. She shows how we can, and why we should, abandon the view that thoughts and actions, to be seen as real, must be subject to scientific explanation.
  2. "Hornsby disagrees with both Descartes and materialists3 . . . She denies that people are composed of a material and an immaterial substance . . . [but also] denies that mental properties reduce to physical properties...There is much an orthodox materialist4 can learn from the heretical Hornsby."
    —Michael Smith, Times Literary Supplement

BOOK COMMENT:

Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1997



"Mele (Alfred) - The Philosophy of Action: Introduction"

Source: Mele - The Philosophy of Action - Oxford Readings
COMMENT: Also in "Hornsby (Jennifer) - Simple Mindedness: In Defense of Naïve Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mind"



"Hornsby (Jennifer) - Simple Mindedness - Introduction"

Source: Hornsby - Simple Mindedness



"Hornsby (Jennifer) - Ontological Questions - Introduction: Persons and Their States, and Events"

Source: Hornsby - Simple Mindedness
COMMENT: Part I - Ontological Questions; Chapter 1



"Hornsby (Jennifer) - Descartes, Rorty and the Mind-Body Fiction"

Source: Malachowski - Reading Rorty - Critical Responses to Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (and Beyond)
COMMENT: Also in "Hornsby (Jennifer) - Simple Mindedness: In Defense of Naïve Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mind", Chapter 2



"Hornsby (Jennifer) - Rorty on Anomalous Monism"

Source: Hornsby - Simple Mindedness
COMMENT: Part I - Ontological Questions; Appendix to Chapter 2



"Hornsby (Jennifer) - Physicalism, Events and Part-Whole Relations"

Source: Hornsby - Simple Mindedness
COMMENT: Part I - Ontological Questions; Chapter 3



"Hornsby (Jennifer) - Which Physical Events Are Mental Events"

Source: Hornsby - Simple Mindedness
COMMENT: Part I - Ontological Questions; Chapter 4



"Hornsby (Jennifer) - The Nomological Character of Causality"

Source: Hornsby - Simple Mindedness
COMMENT: Part I - Ontological Questions; Appendix to Chapter 4



"Hornsby (Jennifer) - Agency - Introduction: Action and the Mental-Physical Divide"

Source: Hornsby - Simple Mindedness
COMMENT: Part II - Agency; Chapter 5



"Hornsby (Jennifer) - Bodily Movements, Actions and Epistemology"

Source: Hornsby - Simple Mindedness
COMMENT: Part II - Agency; Chapter 6



"Hornsby (Jennifer) - A Disjunctive Conception of Bodily Movements"

Source: Hornsby - Simple Mindedness
COMMENT: Part II - Agency; Appendix to Chapter 6



"Hornsby (Jennifer) - Physicalist Thinking and Conceptions of Behaviour"

Source: Hornsby - Simple Mindedness


Philosophers Index Abstract
    A presumption that beliefs and desires are internal states of people can be created by comparing the causal properties of a brain with those of a person. The grounds for the presumption are challenged. In particular, errors are found in a conception of behavior supposedly subsuming both the brain's outputs and a person's outputs.


COMMENT: Part II - Agency; Chapter 7



"Hornsby (Jennifer) - Agency and Causal Explanation"

Source: Mele - The Philosophy of Action - Oxford Readings
COMMENT: Also in "Hornsby (Jennifer) - Simple Mindedness: In Defense of Naïve Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mind", Chapter 8



"Hornsby (Jennifer) - Mind, Causation and Explanation - Introduction: Personal and Subpersonal Levels"

Source: Hornsby - Simple Mindedness
COMMENT: Part III - Mind, Causation1 and Explanation; Chapter 9



"Hornsby (Jennifer) - Dennett's Naturalism"

Source: Hornsby - Simple Mindedness
COMMENT: Part III - Mind, Causation1 and Explanation; Chapter 10



"Hornsby (Jennifer) - Causation in Intuitive Physics and in Commonsense Psychology"

Source: Hornsby - Simple Mindedness
COMMENT: Part III - Mind, Causation1 and Explanation; Chapter 11



"Hornsby (Jennifer) - Semantic Innocence and Psychological Understanding"

Source: Hornsby - Simple Mindedness


Philosophers Index Abstract
    The paper attempts to dislodge the idea that accounts of propositional attitude explanation can be separated from accounts of sentential content (or meaning). The claim is that by seeing how a theory of truth can serve as a theory of sense, one sees the errors of methodological solipsism, and can provide an alternative philosophical understanding of psychological understanding.


COMMENT: Part III - Mind, Causation1 and Explanation; Chapter 12



"Hornsby (Jennifer) - Simple Mindedness - Postscript: Externalism"

Source: Hornsby - Simple Mindedness
COMMENT: Part III - Mind, Causation1 and Explanation; Appendix to Chapter 12



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  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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