<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Problems from Locke (Mackie (J.L.)) - Theo Todman's Book Collection (Book-Paper Abstracts)</title> <link href="../../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../../TT_ICO.png" /> </head> <a name="Top"></a> <BODY> <div id="header"> <HR><H1>Theo Todman's Book Collection (Book-Paper Abstracts)</H1></div> <hr><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950><tr><td colspan =3><A HREF = "../BookSummary_119.htm">Problems from Locke</A></td></tr><tr><td colspan =3><A HREF = "../../../Authors/M/Author_Mackie (J.L.).htm">Mackie (J.L.)</a></td></tr><tr><td colspan =3>This Page provides (where held) the <b>Abstract</b> of the above <b>Book</b> and those of all the <b>Papers</b> contained in it.</td></tr><tr><td><A HREF="#ColourConventions">Text Colour-Conventions</a></td><td><A HREF = "../BookCitings_119.htm">Books / Papers Citing this Book</A></td><td><A HREF = "../BooksToNotes_119.htm">Notes Citing this Book</A></td></tr></tr></TABLE></CENTER><hr> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>BOOK ABSTRACT: </B><BR><BR><u>Cover Blurb</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>In this book, J. L. Mackie selects for critical discussion six related topics which are prominent in John Locke's <em>Essay Concerning Human Understanding</em>: <ul type="disc"><li>the distinction between primary and secondary qualities; </li><li>representative theories of perception; </li><li>substance, real essence, and nominal essence; </li><li>abstract ideas, <a name="1"></a><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>1</SUP>, and the meaning of general terms; </li><li>identity, especially personal identity; and </li><li>the conflict between empiricism and the doctrine of innate ideas. </li></ul>He examines Locke's arguments carefully, but his chief interest is in the problems themselves, which are important for our attempt to decide what sort of world we live in and how we can defend our claim to know about it.</li><li>The book shows that on most of these topics, views close to Locke's are more defensible than has commonly been supposed, but that there is nonetheless a tension in Locke's thought between extreme empiricism and common-sense or scientific realism. Whereas Locke's immediate successors, Berkeley and Hume, and many later thinkers, have stressed the empiricism at the expense of the realism, this book argues against the more extreme empiricist doctrines but supports the more moderate ones, especially the claims that innate ideas cannot be a source of necessary truth and that authoritative, autonomous knowledge of synthetic truths requires empirical support. The position J. L. Mackie advocates thus reconciles realism with moderate empiricism. </li><li>There is a growing tendency of philosophers to pay closer attention to Locke s work and, as a result, to treat his views with greater respect. This book will support and encourage this tendency. It also provides some epistemological backing for the logical and metaphysical views presented in J. L. Mackie s two earlier books:- <ul type="disc"><li><a name="2"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_02/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_2070.htm">Mackie (J.L.) - Truth, Probability and Paradox: Studies in Philosophical Logic</A>", and </li><li><a name="3"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_342.htm">Mackie (J.L.) - The Cement of the Universe</A>". </li></ul> </li></ol> </FONT><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><B>BOOK COMMENT: </B><BR><BR>Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1976. Background reading for Seminar (on McDowell's 'Values and Secondary Qualities'; also Identity, Mind, etc.)</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3724.htm">Mackie (J.L.) - Problems from Locke: Introduction</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Mackie - Problems from Locke<BR></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3246.htm">Mackie (J.L.) - Primary and Secondary Qualities</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Mackie - Problems from Locke, Chapter 1<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Sections</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Locke's distinction and the representative theory of perception  7</li><li>Arguments for the distinction  17</li><li>Arguments against the distinction  24</li><li>Aristotle's distinction and Molyneux's problem  common and special sensibles  28</li><li>Bennett's distinction  33 </li></ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>Photocopy filed in "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_05/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_5979.htm">Various - Papers on Ethics Boxes: Vol 2 (G-N)</A>".</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3725.htm">Mackie (J.L.) - Representative Theories of Perception</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Mackie - Problems from Locke, Chapter 2<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Sections</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Did Locke hold a representative theory?  37</li><li>Picture-original theory: (i) physically real intermediates  41</li><li>Picture-original theory: (ii) intentional objects  47</li><li>The veil-of-perception problem, and a Berkeleian argument  51</li><li>Verification and constructive theories of meaning  56</li><li>Solution of the problem of meaning  60</li><li>The problem of justification  62</li><li>Is naivety indispensable?  67</li><li>Conclusions  70 </li></ol></FONT></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3726.htm">Mackie (J.L.) - Substance and Essence</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Mackie - Problems from Locke, Chapter 3<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Sections</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Berkeley's criticism of 'material substance'  72</li><li>Locke's account of substance  73</li><li>Substance and real essence  76</li><li>Material substance and reality  83</li><li>Real essence and nominal essence  85</li><li>Essences of non-substances  88</li><li>Locke's anticipation of Kripke  93</li><li>The possibility of explanatory science  100</li><li>The essentiality of essences  104</li><li>Conclusion  105 </li></ol></FONT></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3727.htm">Mackie (J.L.) - Abstract Ideas and Universals</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Mackie - Problems from Locke, Chapter 4<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Sections</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Locke's basic account of abstraction  107</li><li>Complex abstract ideas  112</li><li>Berkeley's theory of generalization  118</li><li>Abstract ideas of numbers  121</li><li>The indeterminacy of images  123</li><li>Realism about <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>1</SUP>  125</li><li>Conceptualism and nominalism  130</li><li>The resemblance theory  134</li><li><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">Universals</A><SUP>2</SUP> and the work of the mind  136 </li></ol></FONT></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3728.htm">Mackie (J.L.) - Identity and Diversity</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Mackie - Problems from Locke, Chapter 5<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Philosopher s Index Abstract</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Mackie sets out Locke's general theory of identity and raises some difficulties with the account. </li><li>Hume's claim that the notion of identity is a fiction is critically assessed. </li><li>Mackie argues that there is a relation between Locke's notion of identity and the notion that individuals can have essences. He presents an argument for what he calls Locke's thesis about the relativity of identity. </li><li>The relevance of Kripke's discussion of identity and named individuals is examined. It is argued that Locke's thesis about the relativity of identity can provide a means of understanding some problems concerning identity through time. </li></ol></FONT><BR><U>Sections</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Locke's general theory of identity  140</li><li>Hume's account of identity  145</li><li>Essences of individuals  150</li><li>The relativity of identity  160</li><li>Identity across kinds  161</li><li>Answers and decisions  169</li></ol></FONT></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3729.htm">Mackie (J.L.) - Personal Identity</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Mackie - Problems from Locke, Chapter 6<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Philosopher s Index Abstract</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Mackie attempts to revise Locke's theory of the identity of persons. </li><li>Locke's equation of personal identity with the unity of consciousness is set out. Mackie examines various objections to Locke's theory and his use of puzzle cases is highlighted. </li><li>Recent theories of personal identity, such as Parfit's, are critically discussed. </li><li>Mackie suggests that the equation of personal identity with the continuity of neurophysiological structure would resolve some of the difficulties associated with an account of personal identity.</li></ol></FONT><BR><U>Sections</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Locke and the unity of consciousness  173</li><li>Objections and difficulties  177</li><li>Conceptual analysis and evidence  189</li><li>Factual analysis and reinterpretations  195 </li></ol></FONT></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3730.htm">Mackie (J.L.) - Empiricism and Innate Notions</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Mackie - Problems from Locke, Chapter 7<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Sections</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Realism versus empiricism  204</li><li>The case against innate notions  205</li><li>The established opinion that there are innate principles  206</li><li>Interpretations of the empiricist programme  209</li><li>Leibniz s reply to Locke  212 </li><li>The possibility of innate knowledge  215 </li><li>Actual innate knowledge  222 </li><li>Innateness and necessity  223 </li></ol></FONT></P> <a name="ColourConventions"></a><hr><br><B><U>Text Colour Conventions</U> (see <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</B><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL> </center> <BR><HR><BR><center> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-02T02:21" pubdate>02/08/2018 02:21:19</time> <br><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A> </TD></TR><TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>