<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>The Human Animal - Personal Identity Without Psychology (Olson (Eric)) - Theo Todman's Book Collection (Book-Paper Abstracts)</title> <link href="../../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../../TT_ICO.png" /> </head> <a name="Top"></a> <BODY> <div id="header"> <HR><H1>Theo Todman's Book Collection (Book-Paper Abstracts)</H1></div> <hr><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950><tr><td colspan =3><A HREF = "../BookSummary_130.htm">The Human Animal - Personal Identity Without Psychology</A></td></tr><tr><td colspan =3><A HREF = "../../../Authors/O/Author_Olson (Eric).htm">Olson (Eric)</a></td></tr><tr><td colspan =3>This Page provides (where held) the <b>Abstract</b> of the above <b>Book</b> and those of all the <b>Papers</b> contained in it.</td></tr><tr><td><A HREF="#ColourConventions">Text Colour-Conventions</a></td><td><A HREF = "../BookCitings_130.htm">Books / Papers Citing this Book</A></td><td><A HREF = "../BooksToNotes_130.htm">Notes Citing this Book</A></td></tr></tr></TABLE></CENTER><hr> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>BOOK ABSTRACT: </B><BR><BR><U>Oxford Scholarship Online</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">This book argues that our identity over time involves no psychological facts. Psychological accounts of personal identity lead to grave metaphysical problems, and the arguments for them are inconclusive. The book argues that we are animals, and thus have the purely biological identity conditions of animals.</ol></FONT><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><B>BOOK COMMENT: </B><BR><BR>Oxford University Press, 1997</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_04/PaperSummary_4340.htm">Dainton (Barry) - Review of Eric Olson's 'The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology'</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Mind 107/427 (July 1998), pp. 679-682<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Author s Introduction</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Although Darwinian explanatory strategies are being employed ever more widely, in areas as diverse as culture and cosmology, there remains a wide-spread reluctance to subscribe to a central tenet of Darwinism, namely the thesis that we ourselves are animals. This reluctance does not, for the most part, stem from a belief that we are immaterial souls, but from a doctrine about objects and their identity conditions. We may be wholly material beings, but are nonetheless material beings of a distinctive sort, namely <em>persons</em>. Whereas animals have biological identity conditions, persons have mentalistic identity conditions, from which it follows that persons and animals are numerically distinct. </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_130.htm">Olson (Eric) - The Human Animal - Personal Identity Without Psychology</A>" is a sustained vigorous assault on this way of thinking. Olson's contention is that the Lockean or "Psychological Approach", irrespective of how it is developed in detail, is metaphysically flawed, and he urges us to accept in its stead a Biological Approach, according to which we human persons are organisms of a particular kind, members of the biological species <em>Homo sapiens</em>, entities whose persistence conditions are entirely independent of mentality.</li></ol></FONT><BR><U>Author s Conclusion</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>The book as a whole is admirably succinct, clear, and forcefully argued, and is a fresh and enjoyable read. It also contains a number of arguments I have not mentioned. Although some of these struck me as being less potent than the argument discussed above, they are far from negligible  though I did at times wonder how the author intended to reconcile his hostility to coincident entities with his commitment to Wiggins's account of substance concepts.</li><li> And, lest I leave the wrong impression, the book is not entirely negative: chapter six introduces a provocative proposal concerning the persistence conditions of organisms. </li><li>Those who have long harboured suspicions that the Psychological Approach has problems of an ontological sort will welcome this attempt to show that such suspicions are well-founded; those who are more sympathetic to the Lockean view can look forward to encountering some interesting challenges, and some awkward moments. </li></ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B><ul type="disc"><li>Review of "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_130.htm">Olson (Eric) - The Human Animal - Personal Identity Without Psychology</A>"; </li><li>Annotated printout filed in "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6296.htm">Various - Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 05 (D-E)</A>". </li></ul></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_04/PaperSummary_4720.htm">Shoemaker (Sydney) - Review of Eric Olson's 'The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology'</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Nous, Sep99, Vol. 33 Issue 3, p496, 9p; <BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Philosopher s Index Abstract</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Presents a critique of the book "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_130.htm">Olson (Eric) - The Human Animal - Personal Identity Without Psychology</A>". </li><li>Olson's opposition to the 'Psychological Approach,' to the topic of personal identity; </li><li>Lockean definition of 'person'; </li><li>Olson's view on the attempts to reconcile the Psychological Approach with the view that people are, in the sense of being identical with, living animals. </li></ol> </FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>Review of "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_130.htm">Olson (Eric) - The Human Animal - Personal Identity Without Psychology</A>".</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_14/PaperSummary_14447.htm">Olson (Eric) - Precis of 'The Human Animal'</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Abstracta Special Issue I  2008 (Brazil)<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Write-up <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_8/Notes_835.htm">Note</A><SUP>1</SUP><ul type="disc"><li>Introductory paper for a Symposium on "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_130.htm">Olson (Eric) - The Human Animal - Personal Identity Without Psychology</A>",</li><li>For a review and critique, <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_8/Notes_835.htm">Click here for Note</A></li></ul><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B><ul type="disc"><li>Printout filed in "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_05/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_5972.htm">Olson (Eric) - Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 13 (Olson)</A>",</li><li>Part of a Symposium on "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_130.htm">Olson (Eric) - The Human Animal - Personal Identity Without Psychology</A>",</li><li>See <A HREF = "http://www.abstracta.pro.br/english/journal/SpecialIssueI/01_Olson.pdf" TARGET = "_top">Link</A> (Defunct) for the text on-line. </li></ul></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3506.htm">Olson (Eric) - The Human Animal: Introduction</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: The Human Animal, September 1999, Introduction, pp. 3-7<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3506_1">Notes</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3506_1"></A></u><BR><BR>Olson sees 3 main issues in the <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3506_2">recent</A></U><SUB>2</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3506_2"></A> philosophy of personal identity. <ol type="1"><li>Informative Criteria of Personal Identity.</li><li>What physical continuity is required for a person to persist?</li><li><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_108.htm">What matters</A><SUP>3</SUP> in survival? </li></ol>Olson is not interested in these questions. However, & <BR><ol type="1"><li><b>Criteria</b>:<ul type="disc"><li>The first question is defined here by Olson in the <em>Narrow</em> sense  criteria for Person-A at time t1 to be the same person as Person B at t2. But this has embedded in it the assumption that persons, as such, are the sort of things that have persistence conditions. But  as Olson points out elsewhere  if there are human persons and divine, or angelic, persons then there is no single set of criteria, since human beings and gods or angels have different persistence conditions. But this may still be to confuse the  person with its  host and to beg the question against the claim that PERSON is a kind term (rather than a classification of individuals belonging to kinds).</li><li>The <em>Wide</em> question of personal identity is of identity criteria for individuals, that are classified as persons at various stages of their existence. So, is Individual-A at t1 (who may or may not be classified as a person at t1) is the same individual as Individual-B at time t2 (where Individual-B, etc.). But we can t ask questions of sameness of individual (says Wiggins) unless we know what kind the individual falls under, as persistence conditions are specific to kinds rather than just things. </li><li>Olson states that those who claim that there are no non-trivial identity conditions for persons are dualists who thing that persons  you and I  are not material objects. Olson s concern is with  our identity conditions  whatever kind of things we are; and his further claim is that we are <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animals</A><SUP>4</SUP>. Of course we  are also persons  at least most of the time for most of us  but this  are isn t the  are of identity but that of property-possession. The division is between those  the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_50.htm">animalists</A><SUP>5</SUP>  that take this view and between the personalists who say that we are (identical to) persons who have the properties (maybe occasional) of being instantiated (or constituted) by <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animals</A><SUP>6</SUP>. </li><li>There s a further distinction between the dualists  who think that we are (identical to) immaterial souls which  have bodies that the materialists who deny the existence of souls but who may still not agree that we are (identical to) animals. This is a divide roughly between hardware-theorists and software-theorists. <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_50.htm">Animalists</A><SUP>7</SUP> (and maybe others) claim that we are hardware, whereas the other camp claims (effectively) that we are software that can run on various hardware platforms. </li></ul></li><li><b>Physical Continuity</b>:<ul type="disc"><li>Taking the second question, the question might be asked whether <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_16.htm">psychological continuity</A><SUP>8</SUP> has to be realized in the same functioning brain, for instance. Or will any brain do, or some inorganic substitute? Can I be shifted around from one platform to another via a  Brain State Transfer device?</li><li>All this presumes some variant of the psychological criterion of personal identity. At first sight, it seems important that the psychology that is preserved is numerically identical to my own, rather than just qualitatively identical, or even qualitatively similar, but read on & </li></ul></li><li><b><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_108.htm">What Matters</A><SUP>9</SUP></b>: <ul type="disc"><li>We have a special attitude to <em>our own</em> futures as against those we have to those of others, however much we might care about them. </li><li>Some philosophers have denied that this special prudential concern is <em>essentially</em> tied to identity  ie. is essentially concern for oneself. Exceptionally, it might be proper to have this concern for someone else; or even not to have prudential concern for <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3506_10">oneself</A></U><SUB>10</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3506_10"></A>. </li><li>These special cases  where we have prudential concern for others  arise from the possibility of fission. Fission is problematical because of the logic of identity, but the  problem case is probably undermined by <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3506_11">4-dimensionalism</A></U><SUB>11</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3506_11"></A>, where I (now, and unbeknownst to me) might share my present and past stages with another hitherto co-located individual, from whom I may fission in due course. But, this seems to imply not that it is rational to feel prudential concern for someone else, but that the fission cases don t prove what they seem to prove  a metaphysical objection. Instead it is just an epistemological objection. My present stage is shared with some other 4-D individual, but I don t know which of the two 4-D worms I am, so it would be rational for me to be concerned with both of them, even though I can only be one of them.</li><li>As with all TEs, these fission cases need to be adequately described to be persuasive. An <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm">animalist</A><SUP>12</SUP> would have no truck with psychological fission  multiple teletransportation, for instance. But maybe there could be physical fission  <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3506_13">amoeba-like</A></U><SUB>13</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3506_13"></A>  of <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animals</A><SUP>14</SUP>, where it wouldn t be obvious beforehand which fission product would be me.</li><li>But, I suspect that such cases are best resolved grammatically.  I refers to both co-located individuals who share their past experiences, and have identical current experiences, but will subsequently diverge. I  in in the sense of my FPP  will follow both paths, so I should be prudentially-concerned for both of them. I am in fact (pre-fission) two exactly similar co-located beings that share <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3506_15">experiences</A></U><SUB>15</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3506_15"></A>. </li></ul> </li></ol>Olson s concern is to argue that <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_16.htm">psychological continuity</A><SUP>16</SUP> is neither necessary nor sufficient for our persistence. <ol type="1"><li><b>Necessity</b>: this is clearly correct  though controversial. I started out as a <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_71.htm">fetus</A><SUP>17</SUP> without any person-required psychological properties, and may end up in a PVS. Of course, this assumes that I am an animal, and not  most fundamentally a person. </li><li><b>Sufficiency</b>: this is less clear. Olson wants to deny that mere <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_16.htm">psychological continuity</A><SUP>18</SUP> is not sufficient  and I agree  because of the reduplication cases (despite 4D). But I think that if my FPP was maintained, by whatever manner, then I would have <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3506_19">survived</A></U><SUB>19</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3506_19"></A>. </li></ol>Olson makes two basic assumptions, because these are necessary for his argument to get off the ground. They are not uncontroversial, but to argue for them would be a diversion, and he has little original to say:- <ol type="1"><li>There is an answer to what it is for  <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3506_20">us</A></U><SUB>20</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3506_20"></A> to persist.</li><li>Materialism is true. That is, we are  material objects made up entirely of material particles . Hence <ul type="disc"><li>We are not events or processes happening to human organisms. </li><li>Not property instances,</li><li>Not abstract objects like computer programs. </li></ul>Olson claims that if any of the above were the case, then <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animals</A><SUP>21</SUP> would not themselves be intelligent or conscious, but just associated with something else that was. </li></ol>Olson doesn t intend to address <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3506_22">ethical</A></U><SUB>22</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3506_22"></A> questions  so though he will argue that we were once <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_71.htm">fetuses</A><SUP>23</SUP> and might end up as human vegetables, he ll leave the ethical consequences of this stance for others more competent. <BR><BR>Olson has makes three further assumptions  in rejecting three controversial doctrines  justification for which is reserved until the final <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3506_24">Chapter</A></U><SUB>24</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3506_24"></A> for review:- <ol type="1"><li><b><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_87.htm">Nihilism</A><SUP>25</SUP></b> ( Are There Any People? )</b>: Olson assumes there are  people (the plural of  person ), glossed as  rational, conscious beings , and that they literally <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3506_26">persist</A></U><SUB>26</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3506_26"></A> through time. </li><li><b>Relative Identity</b>: Olson insists on the traditional understanding of identity. So it is either true, false or indefinite whether  a being is the same being as  another a week later. But what Olson denies is that such a being can be the same animal, but not the same person (say)  at least unless either term is (say) an honorific like  president , and office that can be held by numerically different individuals. </li><li><b>Temporal Parts</b>: Olson explicitly rejects 4-dimensionalism of any sort. <ul type="disc"><li>He thinks that we are enduring concrete <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3506_27">substances</A></U><SUB>27</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3506_27"></A> that are wholly present at different times. </li><li>While your <em>career</em> may be extended in time, you yourself are not. </li><li>He seems to think that having temporal parts would make us like events. </li><li>He states that most philosophers reject 4D (as well as <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_87.htm">nihilism</A><SUP>28</SUP> and relative identity, much less controversial rejections). </li><li>He claims that if this (or either of the other two claims) is true, then there are no <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3506_29">non-semantic</A></U><SUB>29</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3506_29"></A> problems of personal identity. </li></ul></li></ol>Olson finishes with some terminology and some distinctions. <ol type="1"><li><b>Organism</b>: is used in its standard biological sense.</li><li><b><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">Human animal</A><SUP>30</SUP></b>: is synonymous (for Olson) with  human organism , and means  member of the biological species <em>Homo sapiens</em> . It is <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3506_31">NOT</A></U><SUB>31</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3506_31"></A> synonymous (for Olson) with the term  Human Body . </li><li><b>People</b>: <ul type="disc"><li>For Olson is just the plural of  person . He says he has no philosophical axe to grind here, and has rejected the use of  persons for purely stylistic reasons. We are allowed to read  persons <em>passim</em> for  people if we so wish. </li><li>However, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3506_32">friends</A></U><SUB>32</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3506_32"></A> have tried to persuade him that  people is the plural of  human being , and that appropriate aliens might be persons but not people, whereas human vegetables would be people but not persons. </li></ul> </li></ol></P><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U> ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3506.htm">Olson (Eric) - The Human Animal: Introduction</A>")</B><a name="On-Page_Link_P3506_1"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3506_1"><B>Footnote 1</B></A></U>: In these Notes, I ve not been especially careful to distinguish Olson s points from my own, nor even Olson s points here from those he makes elsewhere. See also the general disclaimer (<A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_8/Notes_843.htm">Click here for Note</A>). <a name="On-Page_Link_P3506_2"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3506_2"><B>Footnote 2</B></A></U>: He says  in the last 25 years , prior to 1997.<a name="On-Page_Link_P3506_10"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3506_10"><B>Footnote 10</B></A></U>: Presumably in cases of extreme dementia, or PVS. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3506_11"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3506_11"><B>Footnote 11</B></A></U>: Olson rejects this, but will discuss it in the last Chapter. See later. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3506_13"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3506_13"><B>Footnote 13</B></A></U>: Better than <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">half-brain transplant</a>, in the case where an <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm">animalist</a> denies that a brain is a maximally-mutilated <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animal</a>, but claims that it is just an organ. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3506_15"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3506_15"><B>Footnote 15</B></A></U>: This is a new idea of mine  is it coherent?<a name="On-Page_Link_P3506_19"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3506_19"><B>Footnote 19</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>I m still not clear whether  survival and  persistence are synonymous.</li><li>However, Olson will use the terms interchangeably. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3506_20"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3506_20"><B>Footnote 20</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>I suppose Olson just assumes that we are animals, or  following his  <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_8/Notes_872.htm">Master Argument </a>  that we must be, on pain of there being <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_8/Notes_872.htm">too many thinkers</a>. </li><li>But he takes the matter up more seriously in his later "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_02/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_2710.htm">Olson (Eric) - What are We?</A>".</li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3506_22"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3506_22"><B>Footnote 22</B></A></U>: This remark appears under the head of  <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_108.htm">what matters </a>, but while Parfit does have major ethical concerns, is this central to his use of the term  <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_108.htm">what matters </a>?<a name="On-Page_Link_P3506_24"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3506_24"><B>Footnote 24</B></A></U>: See "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3513.htm">Olson (Eric) - The Human Animal: Alternatives</A>". <a name="On-Page_Link_P3506_26"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3506_26"><B>Footnote 26</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>The way Olson describes the situation is that a  person has existed for 30 years. But what Olson really believes (as do I) is that it s the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animal</a> that has persisted 30 years, and that that <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animal</a> has been a person throughout that period. Or so I think.</li><li>Later, Olson admits that for him,  people is also the plural of  human being . So, just wht does his admission mean? </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3506_27"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3506_27"><B>Footnote 27</B></A></U>: So, we are animals, which fall under substance <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_10.htm">sortals</a>; we are also, most of the time, persons, which fall under a <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_29.htm">phase sortal</a>. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3506_29"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3506_29"><B>Footnote 29</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>I partly agree (as I stated above). But this needs some spelling out (maybe it is, in the last Chapter). </li><li>But the question of <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_734.htm">what we are</a> remains, and  if we <u>were to</u> find a solution to the problems of personal identity (as 4D appears to be)  then there <u>would be</u> no outstanding problems. Olson acknowledges this, but thinks his arguments are sufficiently interesting to justify the book in any case. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3506_31"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3506_31"><B>Footnote 31</B></A></U>: I agree with Olson s terminology on (1) and (2) above, and agree that organisms and bodies have different persistence criteria, so are non-identical and should not be confused. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3506_32"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3506_32"><B>Footnote 32</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>I agree with these friends, and suspect there s something underhand  or at least tendentious  in his philosophically-unorthodox use of the term  people . </li><li>I m not fully sure what his metaphysical understanding of  person is. If  people are just  human beings , then his acceptance of the existence of  people (as in his assumption 1 in the first set of assumptions above) is unremarkable and uninformative. </li><li>Also, I don t yet know whether Olson makes a distinction between  <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animal </a> and  human being . I assume not, though others (eg. <A HREF = "../../../Authors/J/Author_Johnston (Mark).htm">Mark Johnston</A>) might. </li></ul> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3507.htm">Olson (Eric) - Psychology and Personal Identity</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: The Human Animal, September 1999, Chapter 1, pp. 7-21<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Oxford Scholarship Online</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Most philosophers agree that some sort of <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_16.htm">psychological continuity</A><SUP>1</SUP> is necessary or sufficient for us to persist  the Psychological Approach to personal identity. </li><li>Some implications of this view are sketched. </li><li>The Biological Approach, by contrast, says that our identity, over time, consists in brute biological continuity. </li></ol></FONT><BR><U>Sections</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="I"><li>Human Vegetables and <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">Cerebrum Transplants</A><SUP>2</SUP></li><li>The Psychological Approach</li><li>The Biological Approach</li></ol></FONT><BR><u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_3">Annotations</A></U><SUB>3</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_3"></A></u><BR><ol type="I"><li><b>Human Vegetables and <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">Cerebrum Transplants</A><SUP>4</SUP></b><ul type="disc"><li>Olson wants to consider  our identity over time, without at this stage deciding what  we are. </li><li>To do this, he will consider some  puzzle cases (ie. <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_32.htm">TEs</A><SUP>5</SUP>). <ol type="A"><li>The first is the  Vegetable Case (ie. <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_111.htm">PVS</A><SUP>6</SUP>). <ul type="square"><li>The cells in the cerebral cortex have died of anoxia. Claims: <ol type="i"><li>Brain cells don t regenerate; </li><li>Consciousness and thought are cortex-based, so are irretrievably lost. </li><li>So  <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_7">you</A></U><SUB>7</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_7"></A> are irretrievably non-cognitive. </li></ol></li><li>However, the parts of the <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_8">brain</A></U><SUB>8</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_8"></A> (thalamus, basal ganglia, cerebellum, brain-stem) that support your vegetative functions are more resistant to oxygen starvation and might survive intact. </li><li>Olson mentions Karen Quinlan (<A HREF = "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karen_Ann_Quinlan" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>), who continued in a PVS for 10 years <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_9">after</A></U><SUB>9</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_9"></A> her respirator was switched off.</li><li>Olson claims that the <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_10">entity</A></U><SUB>10</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_10"></A> in a PVS is  a <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animal</A><SUP>11</SUP> as much like you as anything could be without having a mind . </li><li>The <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animal</A><SUP>12</SUP> in a PVS is not in a coma but  is awake but unaware ;  the lights are on, but no-one s at home . Various reflexes remain, but there s no behavioral <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_13">responsiveness</A></U><SUB>13</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_13"></A>. </li><li>Nor is the animal brain-dead  what Olson describes as a  ventilated <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_14">corpse</A></U><SUB>14</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_14"></A>  because the brain still performs its regulative functions. The patient is alive in the sense that  oak trees and <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_15">oysters</A></U><SUB>15</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_15"></A> are alive .</li><li>Olson admits there is room for doubt as to whether in a PVS you have really lost all cognitive function, and that the loss is permanent  though this is the medical consensus. But this is effectively a TE, so <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_16">for the sake of the argument</A></U><SUB>16</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_16"></A> we assume that both these assumptions are correct. </li><li>There are lots of ethical questions about what to do with individuals in a PVS, but these aren t Olson s concern here. Rather, he wants to know what happened to  you in this story. He doesn t care about lots of legal issues, or quality-of-life issues either. All he wants to know is whether  you are still there in that pathetic state. Has your existence been brought to an end as in ordinary cases of death, or have you survived?</li><li>Olson considers the case where you die and are cremated, and a memorial statue is erected in your honour. Now, you are not that statue. If you had said that one day you would be that statue, you would have made a false statement in a way that is not so obviously false in the case of the PVS-individual. Whereas in the first case you have been clearly replaced by something else, has this happened in the <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_17">PVS-case</A></U><SUB>17</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_17"></A>? </li></ul></li><li>We now move on to a <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_18">second TE</A></U><SUB>18</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_18"></A>  <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">Cerebrum Transplants</A><SUP>19</SUP>. <ul type="square"><li>Olson refers to  that organ (which is most responsible for your higher cognitive functions), so is presumably thinking of both hemispheres at this stage. The supposition is that the technical wiring difficulties can be <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_20">overcome</A></U><SUB>20</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_20"></A>, so that  it is able to function properly inside its new head just as it once functioned inside yours . </li><li>Olson assumes various things about the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">post-transplant</A><SUP>21</SUP> recipient of your <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1013.htm">cerebrum</A><SUP>22</SUP>:- <ol type="1"><li>She is a <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_74.htm">human being</A><SUP>23</SUP>, & </li><li>Psychologically more or less exactly like you, </li><li><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_24">Appears</A></U><SUB>24</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_24"></A> to remember your past, </li><li><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_25">Apparently</A></U><SUB>25</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_25"></A> acts on your intentions,</li><li>May be physically very unlike you,</li><li>Initially, her personality, tastes and affections are just like yours,</li><li>She <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_26">thinks</A></U><SUB>26</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_26"></A> she is you, </li><li>She does not <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_27">remember</A></U><SUB>27</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_27"></A> anything that happened to the person into whose head the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1013.htm">cerebrum</A><SUP>28</SUP> was implanted, nor does she <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_29">initially</A></U><SUB>29</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_29"></A> acquire any of that person s character. </li></ol></li><li>What about the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1013.htm">cerebrum</A><SUP>30</SUP> donor? Olson correctly adduces evidence from the survival of PVS-victims, anencephalics (<A HREF = "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anencephaly" TARGET = "_top">Wikipedia: Anencephaly</A>) and <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1013.htm">single-cerebrum</A><SUP>31</SUP> <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_32">excision</A></U><SUB>32</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_32"></A> to show that the donor would remain a living, but irreversibly non-cognitive, <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animal</A><SUP>33</SUP> whose biological functions continue as before. </li><li>In a footnote, Olson admits that <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">cerebrum-transplants</A><SUP>34</SUP> are science fiction, and their possibility might be questioned. However, he thinks there are no <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_35">further</A></U><SUB>35</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_35"></A> difficulties than for <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">WBTs</A><SUP>36</SUP>, and adduces the following in support of the theoretical possibility of the latter:- <ol type="1"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6028.htm">Puccetti (Roland) - Brain Transplants and Personal Identity</A>", </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2637.htm">Snowdon (Paul) - Personal Identity and Brain Transplants</A>" (pp. 114-7), and</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3666.htm">Wilkes (Kathleen) - Thought Experiments</A>", p. 37.</li></ol></li><li>Olson asks what has become of <u>you</u> in the  <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">Transplant</A><SUP>37</SUP> Case ? He <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_38">only</A></U><SUB>38</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_38"></A> considers 3 possibilities:- <ol type="1"><li>You are the donor, or</li><li>You  go along with your <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1013.htm">cerebrum</A><SUP>39</SUP>, or</li><li>You <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_40">cease</A></U><SUB>40</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_40"></A> to exist. </li></ol></li><li>The key question Olson asks is whether one of your <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_41">organs</A></U><SUB>41</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_41"></A> has been <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">transplanted</A><SUP>42</SUP> (as a liver might have been) leaving you in situ, or whether you have been pared down to a <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1013.htm">cerebrum</A><SUP>43</SUP> and rehoused, the surgeon grafting the rest of the recipient s body (and brain) onto you. Olson s answer will no doubt <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_44">appear later on</A></U><SUB>44</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_44"></A>. </li></ul></ol> </li></ul></li><li><b>The Psychological Approach </b><ul type="disc"><li>Olson sees two sorts of considerations that might answer questions of personal identity raised by the puzzle cases:- <ol type="1"><li>Phychological continuity, and </li><li>Biological continuity </li></ol></li><li>He gives the usual arguments that you are psychologically continuous with the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1013.htm">cerebrum</A><SUP>45</SUP> recipient, but not the PVS-victim, or the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1013.htm">cerebrum</A><SUP>46</SUP> donor.</li><li>But you are biologically-related to the PVS-victim, and to the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1013.htm">cerebrum</A><SUP>47</SUP> donor, who each preserve your biological <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_48">life</A></U><SUB>48</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_48"></A>. </li><li>We are referred to Chapter 2 ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3509.htm">Olson (Eric) - Why We Need Not Accept the Psychological Approach</A>"), Section II ( <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">Whole-Brain Transplants )</A><SUP>49</SUP>, for why a <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">WBT</A><SUP>50</SUP> is entirely different to a CT. In the case of a CT, the recipient does <u>not</u> receive your life-sustaining functions, but  <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_51">just an organ</A></U><SUB>51</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_51"></A> . From the biological perspective, <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">transplanting a cerebrum</A><SUP>52</SUP> is no different to <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">transplanting</A><SUP>53</SUP> a kidney, or any other organ you could live without.</li><li>Olson claims there is no biological continuity between you and the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1013.htm">cerebrum</A><SUP>54</SUP> recipient, but this seems to me to go too <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_55">far</A></U><SUB>55</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_55"></A>.</li><li>Olson thinks these two sorts of continuity have not received equal attention, with the case defaulting to the PV. Biology is deemed irrelevant, with nothing continuing in either the PVS case or on the donor-side of the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">transplant</A><SUP>56</SUP> case being <u>you</u>. Olson cites "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5910.htm">Lockwood (Michael) - When Does a Life Begin?</A>", p. 11, as describing this view as  scientifically-educated common sense . </li><li>However, a footnote gives other equally-scientifically-educated dissenting views. "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3955.htm">Ayers (Michael R.) - Locke on Living Things</A>", p. 224, claims not only that you could survive the destruction of your mind but that you would continue to exist as a <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_57">corpse</A></U><SUB>57</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_57"></A>. Olson also cites "<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_04/PaperSummary_4924.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - Philosophers and the Words 'Human Body'</A>", p. 295. </li><li>So, most philosophers adopt the <em>Psychological Approach</em>, whereby one survives if one s mind does. Olson quotes "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_262.htm">Johnston (Mark) - Human Beings</A>", p. 77 to the effect that it s a <em><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_58">conceptual truth</A></U><SUB>58</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_58"></A></em> that a person cannot be outlived by what was once his mind. </li><li>Olson seems to agree that the TEs show that biological and <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_16.htm">psychological continuity</A><SUP>59</SUP> can <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_60">come apart</A></U><SUB>60</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_60"></A>. </li><li>While biological continuity is usually good <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_61">evidence</A></U><SUB>61</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_61"></A> for one s survival, it is not what that survival consists in, according to & </li><li>The <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_62">Psychological Approach</A></U><SUB>62</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_62"></A>, which claims that some  interesting connections between psychological states are both necessary and sufficient for my persistence. Roughly speaking, any past or future being that has <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_63">my mind</A></U><SUB>63</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_63"></A> is me. </li><li>The traditional problem of PID is  on the assumption that the PV is correct  just which version of it is the right one. What are these psychological connections? Olson will go on to consider versions that give priority to mental <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_64">contents</A></U><SUB>64</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_64"></A>, and those that focus on mental <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_65">capacities</A></U><SUB>65</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_65"></A> before considering whether any <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_15.htm">physical continuity</A><SUP>66</SUP> is also considered necessary. </li><li><b>Mental Contents</b>: <ul type="square"><li>These are memories, beliefs, desires and the like. Mental contents at a later time are continuous with those at an earlier time if they are caused by them. If there are enough of these connections, then the possessor of the later contents is the same person as the possessor of the earlier set. </li><li>Olson has a couple of footnotes at this point:- <ol type="i"><li>He cites "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_41.htm">Parfit (Derek) - Reasons and Persons</A>", p. 206 (ie. "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3572.htm">Parfit (Derek) - What We Believe Ourselves To Be</A>") as an example of those who take (something like) this causal relation as constitutive of <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_16.htm">psychological continuity</A><SUP>67</SUP>. Olson, however,  uses the term more broadly , but doesn t (here) explain how. He also  pretends that the relation is symmetric, claiming that it would be a simple but tedious exercise to <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_68">eliminate the pretension</A></U><SUB>68</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_68"></A>. </li><li>Olson points out that even opponents of the PV agree that it s analytic (from the meaning of  memory ) that if I remember the deeds of some past person, then I am that person. He therefore introduces the concept of <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_8/Notes_897.htm">quasi-memory</A><SUP>69</SUP>, which is just like memory but does not presuppose identity, only appropriate <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_39.htm">causation</A><SUP>70</SUP>. We are referred to <BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2409.htm">Shoemaker (Sydney) - Persons and Their Pasts</A>", <BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_150.htm">Shoemaker (Sydney) & Swinburne (Richard) - Personal Identity</A>" (Chapter 4  ie. "<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3703.htm">Shoemaker (Sydney) - Reply to Swinburne</A>"), and <BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_40.htm">Noonan (Harold) - Personal Identity</A>" (Chapter 8  ie "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3970.htm">Noonan (Harold) - Quasi-Memory</A>") </li></ol></li><li>We re referred to "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15846.htm">Schechtman (Marya) - The Same and the Same: Two Views of Psychological Continuity</A>" for  an interesting variation on the traditional account of the continuity of mental contents . </li><li>We would have to allow that I can be some past person at a time even if I remember nothing of that time. Even if I can t remember what happened at time x, I can remember a time when I <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_71">could</A></U><SUB>71</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_71"></A>. </li><li>There are periods of my existence  for instance of dreamless sleep  of which I have never had any memories. However, Olson concedes that I (presumably) retained my unconscious intentions when asleep. Consequently he agrees that there are overlapping chains of mental contents that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_72">connect</A></U><SUB>72</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_72"></A> me to this past person. </li><li>However, according to the PV, one cannot survive  total oblivion (maybe as the result of degenerative brain damage) whereby your past memories and intentions are destroyed (rather than merely inaccessible or garbled)  no therapy can recover them. This is in spite of the fact that the residual being might still be conscious and rational, with many residual abilities. His mind is discontinuous with yours, so you have ceased to exist and have been replaced by a <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_73">numerically different being</A></U><SUB>73</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_73"></A>. </li><li>A footnote adds realism to this scenario  similar to <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_74">Korsakoff s syndrome</A></U><SUB>74</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_74"></A>. We are referred to <BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_253.htm">Sacks (Oliver) - The Man who Mistook his Wife for a Hat</A>", sections 2 & 12 (ie. "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_08/Abstract_8095.htm">Sacks (Oliver) - The Lost Mariner</A>" & "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_08/Abstract_8105.htm">Sacks (Oliver) - A Matter of Identity</A>"), <BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5402.htm">Perry (John) - Review of Bernard Williams' 'Problems of the Self'</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_75">p. 421</A></U><SUB>75</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_75"></A> and<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_49.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - Material Beings</A>", p. 183 (ie. "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3548.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - Two Problems About Personal Identity: Memory and Commissurotomy</A>"). </li></ul></li><li><b>Mental Capacities</b>: <ul type="square"><li>Those who support this view point out that even if all memories and other mental contents are wiped out, there might still be <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_16.htm">psychological continuity</A><SUP>76</SUP> based on mental capacities  your (now contentless) mind has not been destroyed. </li><li>Olson quotes "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_156.htm">Unger (Peter) - Identity, Consciousness and Value</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_77">p. 116</A></U><SUB>77</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_77"></A>, though it looks to me as though this is <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_78">not the focus</A></U><SUB>78</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_78"></A> of Unger s claim. However, he thinks <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_79">various others share this view</A></U><SUB>79</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_79"></A>. </li><li>Olson thinks  correctly in my view  that this distinction between contents and capacities may be a red herring, in that without any content, all my capacities might vanish. </li></ul></li><li><b>Physical Continuity</b>: <ul type="square"><li>Advocates of the PV differ on whether any <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_80">material</A></U><SUB>80</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_80"></A> continuity is required:- <ol type="i"><li>Some insist that you survive only if (enough of) your <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1013.htm">cerebrum</A><SUP>81</SUP> survives so as to <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_82">support conscious, rational thought</A></U><SUB>82</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_82"></A>. </li><li>Others only require some physical structure spatio-temporally continuous with your <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1013.htm">cerebrum</A><SUP>83</SUP> as the realizer of your mental capacities. </li></ol></li><li>Alternatively, consider a brain zap alloyed to the transfer of information  in an  unspecified but reliable way  to a <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_84">remote recipient brain</A></U><SUB>84</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_84"></A>. Some philosophers think that person, who thinks she s you and (quasi-)remembers your experiences <u>is</u> you, even though there s no material continuity and a period mid-transfer when your mental contents and capacities were nowhere physically realized in a <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_85">functioning organ of thought</A></U><SUB>85</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_85"></A>. Supporters of the material continuity requirement would deny this. </li><li>Olson considers two reduplication objections, which he thinks show that <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_16.htm">psychological continuity</A><SUP>86</SUP> is insufficient for <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_87">survival</A></U><SUB>87</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_87"></A>:- <ol type="i"><li>The brain-state transfer can be repeated into multiple recipient brains, which the material-continuity view would say are you  but <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_88">they can t all be</A></U><SUB>88</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_88"></A>. </li><li>Even if the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">cerebrum is transplanted</A><SUP>89</SUP>, we could <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">transplant</A><SUP>90</SUP> each one into a different brain, with duplication again. This case is considered inn "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3509.htm">Olson (Eric) - Why We Need Not Accept the Psychological Approach</A>", Section 3 ( Fission and Hemispherectomy ). </li></ol></li></ul></li><li>Reduplication objections encourage supporters of the PV to add a <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_91">Uniqueness Condition</A></U><SUB>91</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_91"></A>. </li><li>Thus, the PV represents a wide spectrum of opinions that agree that some sort of mental continuity is necessary for our persistence, with some rider like uniqueness or material continuity to provide <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_92">sufficiency</A></U><SUB>92</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_92"></A>. </li><li>When Olson subsequently refers to the PV, he ll not specify <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_93">which of these variants he has in mind</A></U><SUB>93</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_93"></A>. The reader is asked to substitute his preferred version. </li></ul></li><li><b>The Biological Approach </b><ul type="disc"><li>The claim of this book is that the PV is false  or at least in serious difficulties  and that <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_16.htm">psychological continuity</A><SUP>94</SUP> is neither necessary nor sufficient for us to survive. He argues for this claim in Chapters 4 & 5, ie. in <BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3510.htm">Olson (Eric) - Was I Ever a Fetus? (Human Animal)</A>", and<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3511.htm">Olson (Eric) - Are People Animals?</A>"</li><li>In place of the PV, Olson will adopt a radically non-psychological account of our identity, involving biological continuity  one survives just in case one s purely animal functions continue. Biology replaces psychology. </li><li><b>The Two Claims of the Biological Approach</b>: <ol type="i"><li>We are animals, members of the species <em>homo sapiens</em>. <ul type="square"><li>Olson mentions his debt to "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2637.htm">Snowdon (Paul) - Personal Identity and Brain Transplants</A>" for pointing this out!</li><li>Olson <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_95">doesn t claim that all</A></U><SUB>95</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_95"></A> <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_96">persons</A></U><SUB>96</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_96"></A> are <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animals</A><SUP>97</SUP>. For all he knows there might be (rational and conscious)  organisms of other species, & Martians, gods, angels, & computers who <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_98">qualify</A></U><SUB>98</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_98"></A> as persons. </li><li>But, all <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_75.htm">human persons</A><SUP>99</SUP> are <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_30.htm">animals</A><SUP>100</SUP>. </li><li>We are what <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_83.htm">Locke</A><SUP>101</SUP> called  <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_102">men</A></U><SUB>102</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_102"></A> . </li><li>Olson now clarifies his position, as there are various views that sound similar, but are not at all the same:- <ol type="a"><li>You are not merely intimately connected with a <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animal</A><SUP>103</SUP>, you are numerically identical to one. </li><li>So, the claim is more than that  your <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_18.htm">body</A><SUP>104</SUP> is a <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animal</A><SUP>105</SUP>, or that you are <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_25.htm">constituted by</A><SUP>106</SUP> a <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animal</A><SUP>107</SUP>. </li><li>While it seems indisputable that we are identical to <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animals</A><SUP>108</SUP>, once we re agreed that we re material beings,  legions of materialist philosophers deny that we are identical to  our bodies  by which it is tempting to think that they mean  human organisms . </li><li>Some materialist philosophers claim that  my body is distinct from the human organism, which is consistent with my being a <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animal</A><SUP>109</SUP> and yet not identical to my body. </li><li>But, many materialists explicitly deny that we are animals. </li><li>A footnote refers us to:- <BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_53.htm">Wiggins (David) - Identity & Spatio-temporal Continuity</A>", p. 57f<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_262.htm">Johnston (Mark) - Human Beings</A>", p. 64. <BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5910.htm">Lockwood (Michael) - When Does a Life Begin?</A>", p. 11<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2636.htm">Lowe (E.J.) - Real Selves: Persons as a Substantial Kind</A>", p. 106<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1791.htm">Shoemaker (Sydney) - Personal Identity: a Materialist Account</A>", p. 113<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5884.htm">Chisholm (Roderick) - Coming Into Being and Passing Away: Can the Metaphysician Help?</A>", p. 171<BR></ol></li></ul></li><li><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_16.htm">Psychological continuity</A><SUP>110</SUP> is neither <u>necessary</u> nor <u>sufficient</u> for the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animal s</A><SUP>111</SUP> persistence. <ul type="square"><li><b>Vegetable Case</b>: defeats <b>necessity</b> &rarr;<ol type="a"><li>Your associated <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animal</A><SUP>112</SUP> survives when you lapse into a PVS. </li><li>This animal survives with its life-sustaining functions even when it has irrevocably lost all psychological features.</li><li>While alive, this animal doesn t have much of a  life ; there is nothing it is <em>like</em> to be that animal. Yet, it is alive as a goldfish or rosebush is alive. </li><li>It is not the case that one animal has been replaced by a numerically different one. </li><li>So, if you are an animal, you are <u>that</u> animal, and can therefore survive without any <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_16.htm">psychological continuity</A><SUP>113</SUP>.</li><li>Maybe the vegetating animal is not a <em>person</em>, since it possesses none of the psychological properties that distinguish <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_114">persons</A></U><SUB>114</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_114"></A> from non-persons. </li><li>All this shows  and this is the punch line  is that you can continue to exist without being a person, just as you would do so without being a philosopher, a student or <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_115">a fancier of fast cars</A></U><SUB>115</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_115"></A>. </li><li>Olson has a footnote in which he sites "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21854.htm">Brody (Baruch) - Ethical Questions Raised by the Persistent Vegetative Patient</A>" as supporting the view that the patient in the PVS is the very same being that entered it  and that consequently one can survive without being a person. </ol></li><li><b><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">Cerebrum Transplants</A><SUP>116</SUP></b>: defeat <b>sufficiency</b> &rarr; <ol type="a"><li>Whatever happens to <em>you</em>, no <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animal</A><SUP>117</SUP> gets transferred along with your <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1013.htm">cerebrum</A><SUP>118</SUP>. </li><li>in particular, the surgeons do not <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_119">pare down</A></U><SUB>119</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_119"></A> the animal until only a <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1013.htm">cerebrum</A><SUP>120</SUP> is left, and then attach a new complement of parts to that animal. </li><li>The (now) empty-headed animal was there all along, not recently created by the surgeons.</li><li>As far as the animal is concerned, a <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">cerebrum transplant</A><SUP>121</SUP> is like a liver <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_122">transplant</A></U><SUB>122</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_122"></A>. You lose an organ and the capacities  in this case psychological  that go with it. </li><li>You lose the capacity to think and feel  <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_123">just as</A></U><SUB>123</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_123"></A> you would lose the capacity to purify your blood if your <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_124">liver</A></U><SUB>124</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_124"></A> were removed. </li><li>Someone else  another <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animal</A><SUP>125</SUP>  gets your psychology  including your personality and <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_126">apparent</A></U><SUB>126</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_126"></A> memories. </li><li>Hence, <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_16.htm">psychological continuity</A><SUP>127</SUP> isn t sufficient for PID as some unique individual perfectly psychologically continuous with you and with as much physical continuity as might be desired  isn t you!</li><li>We re referred to "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3511.htm">Olson (Eric) - Are People Animals?</A>" (Chapter 5) for further discussion. </ol> </li></ul></li></ol></li><li><b>A Similar Claim</b>: <ol type="i"><li>The claim that <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animals</A><SUP>128</SUP> don t persist in virtue of <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_16.htm">psychological continuity</A><SUP>129</SUP> is similar to the view that a <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animal</A><SUP>130</SUP> persists <em> by virtue of</em> being a <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animal</A><SUP>131</SUP> (or being a living organism, or an animal in general), and NOT by being a person, a human body or anything else. </li><li>Olson s key point is that all <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animals</A><SUP>132</SUP> ought to have the same persistence conditions. <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">Human animals</A><SUP>133</SUP> include those  human vegetables, <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1243.htm">embryos</A><SUP>134</SUP>, anencephalic babies  with no psychological properties. So, all <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animals</A><SUP>135</SUP> have the same persistence conditions as such beings. We re referred to "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3510.htm">Olson (Eric) - Was I Ever a Fetus? (Human Animal)</A>" (Chapter 4). </li><li>So  if <em>we</em> are <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animals</A><SUP>136</SUP>, and all <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animals</A><SUP>137</SUP> have non-psychological persistence conditions  then <em>we</em> have non-psychological persistence conditions. </li><li>The contrasting view is that our persistence conditions  despite the fact that we are animals  include <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_16.htm">psychological continuity</A><SUP>138</SUP>. Hence, some animals have radically different persistence conditions to others. Hence, our persistence conditions are not in virtue of our being <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animals</A><SUP>139</SUP>, but by virtue of being members of some other <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_80.htm">kind</A><SUP>140</SUP>; <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_9.htm">person</A><SUP>141</SUP>, perhaps. Olson will discuss this further in "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3508.htm">Olson (Eric) - Persistence</A>" (Chapter 2). </li></ol></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3509.htm">Olson (Eric) - Why We Need Not Accept the Psychological Approach</A>" (Chapter 3) will deal with the motivating factors for the PV, why philosophers have been misled by intuitions about the Vegetable and <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">Transplant</A><SUP>142</SUP> cases and how the BV can accommodate many of the insights that motivate the PV just as well. </li><li><b>Contrast with the  Physical Criterion </b>: <ol type="i"><li>The BV is by no means the same as the  physical criterion (PC), which is a variant of the PV. </li><li>The <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_143">PC</A></U><SUB>143</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_143"></A> is the view that I persist as some future person just in case some person has enough of my brain for it to be the brain of a living person. </li><li>So, according to this view, I would go along with my <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">transplanted cerebrum</A><SUP>144</SUP>, and would cease to exist were my brain to be so badly damaged that I were no longer a person, even though my life-sustaining functions continued.</li><li>We re referred to:- <BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_41.htm">Parfit (Derek) - Reasons and Persons</A>", p. 204 (ie. "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3572.htm">Parfit (Derek) - What We Believe Ourselves To Be</A>"), <BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_40.htm">Noonan (Harold) - Personal Identity</A>", p. 7 (ie. "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3963.htm">Noonan (Harold) - An Initial Survey</A>") and<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_156.htm">Unger (Peter) - Identity, Consciousness and Value</A>", p. 109 (ie. "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3619.htm">Unger (Peter) - The Physical Approach To Our Survival</A>"). </li></ol></li><li><b>Contrast with the  Bodily Criterion </b>: <ol type="i"><li>The  Body View it that we are identical to our bodies  we persist just in case our bodies do. </li><li>This view has received more attention than the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_53.htm">Biological View</A><SUP>145</SUP>, and is usually taken to be the main materialist rival to the PV. </li><li>There are important differences between the Biological and Bodily views, but  because they are complex  Olson will defer them until "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3512.htm">Olson (Eric) - The Biological Approach</A>" (Chapter 6, Section 6  The Bodily Criterion ). </li><li>Olson claims that those who espouse the  Bodily Criterion usually claim that we are organisms whose persistence criteria have nothing to do with psychology, so we can take this view as a special case of the Biological Approach. </li><li>Olson cites as <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_146">supporters of the view</A></U><SUB>146</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_146"></A> in question:-<BR>&rarr; <A HREF = "../../../Authors/T/Author_Thomson (Judith Jarvis).htm">Judith Jarvis Thomson</A> ,and <BR>&rarr; <A HREF = "../../../Authors/W/Author_Williams (Bernard).htm">Bernard Williams</A>. </li><li>While one <em>could</em> say that I am my body, or go where my body goes, yet deny that I am an animal, Olson thinks this view has little going for it, and will ignore it. </li></ol></li><li><b>Neglect of the Biological Approach</b>: <ol type="i"><li>Olson claims that the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_53.htm">Biological View</A><SUP>147</SUP> <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_148">has been</A></U><SUB>148</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_148"></A>  strangely neglected in the literature. </li><li>He cites  in addition to Thomson and Williams  <A HREF = "../../../Authors/A/Author_Ayers (Michael R.).htm">Michael R. Ayers</A>, <A HREF = "../../../Authors/S/Author_Snowdon (Paul).htm">Paul Snowdon</A> and <A HREF = "../../../Authors/v/Author_Van Inwagen (Peter).htm">Peter Van Inwagen</A>  as amongst the  <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_149">few advocates</A></U><SUB>149</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_149"></A> of the Biological Approach. </li><li>He claims the view is rarely taken seriously, quoting "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1338.htm">Pollock (John L.) - How to Build a Person: A Prolegomenon</A>", p. 30 ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4954.htm">Pollock (John L.) - Persons and Bodies</A>"), as saying  in 1989  that taking it as a conceptual truth that people are re-identified in terms of their bodies, though much discussed, is a straw man supported by no recent philosopher, and that the only genuinely popular criteria are mentalistic. </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3963.htm">Noonan (Harold) - An Initial Survey</A>", hailing from 1989, dispenses with the Bodily Criterion by p.5, and never mentions the more general Biological Approach. On p. 3 Noonan claims that TEs undermine the common-sense view that our identity is constituted by bodily continuity. </li><li>Some argue that we could not be bodies, because such objects to not write books, and that one s body  like Lenin s  may continue to <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_150">exist long after one s death</A></U><SUB>150</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_150"></A>. Whether or not this is a valid criticism of the Bodily Criterion, it doesn t obviously apply to the view that we are <em>animals</em>. We are again referred to "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3512.htm">Olson (Eric) - The Biological Approach</A>" (Chapter 6). </li></ol></li><li><b>Supporters of the PV</b>: <ol type="a"><li>Olson describes "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5555.htm">Locke (John) - Of Identity and Diversity</A>" as  notorious , with  special problems of its own . </li><li>He identifies the following authors (whose relevant works are given in a footnote) as some of the  big names accepting one version or another of the Psychological Approach:-<ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_228.htm">Grice (H. Paul) - Personal Identity</A>", 1941</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_05/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_5719.htm">Hospers (John) - An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis - Second Edition</A>", 1967, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_151">pp. 410-414</A></U><SUB>151</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_151"></A> </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_262.htm">Johnston (Mark) - Human Beings</A>", 1987 </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4320.htm">Johnston (Mark) - Fission and the Facts</A>", 1989 </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_113.htm">Lewis (David) - Survival and Identity</A>", 1976 </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3729.htm">Mackie (J.L.) - Personal Identity</A>" , 1976, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_152">p. 202f</A></U><SUB>152</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_152"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3635.htm">Nagel (Thomas) - Mind and Body</A>", 1986, p. 40 </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_40.htm">Noonan (Harold) - Personal Identity</A>", 1989, especially "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3963.htm">Noonan (Harold) - An Initial Survey</A>", p. 13 </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_552.htm">Nozick (Robert) - Personal Identity Through Time</A>", 1981 </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_325.htm">Parfit (Derek) - Personal Identity</A>", 1971 </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3572.htm">Parfit (Derek) - What We Believe Ourselves To Be</A>", 1984, p. 207 </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_328.htm">Perry (John) - Can the Self Divide?</A>", 1972 </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4954.htm">Pollock (John L.) - Persons and Bodies</A>", 1989 </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_21/PaperSummary_21875.htm">Price (H.H.) - Two conceptions of the Next World</A>", 1972, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_153">p. 104f</A></U><SUB>153</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_153"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_12/PaperSummary_12609.htm">Price (H.H.) - Survival and the Idea of 'Another World'</A>", 1973, p. 27 </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_534.htm">Quinton (Anthony) - The Soul</A>", 1962</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1344.htm">Rosenberg (Jay) - Thinking Clearly About Death</A>", 1983, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_154">pp. 92ff, 223</A></U><SUB>154</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_154"></A> </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2800.htm">Russell (Bertrand) - Do We Survive Death?</A>", 1936, p. 73 </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2409.htm">Shoemaker (Sydney) - Persons and Their Pasts</A>", 1970 </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1791.htm">Shoemaker (Sydney) - Personal Identity: a Materialist Account</A>", 1984, p. 90 </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11985.htm">Strawson (Peter) - Comments on Some Aspects of Peter Unger's Identity, Consciousness and Value</A>", 1992</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3620.htm">Unger (Peter) - A Physically Based Approach To Our Survival</A>", 1990 </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_544.htm">Wiggins (David) - Locke, Butler and the Stream of Consciousness: And Men as Natural Kind</A>", 1976, pp. 168 & 173n.44 </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3496.htm">Wiggins (David) - Personal Identity (S&S)</A>", 1980, pp. 160, 162, 163 </li></ol></li><li>He also supplies a further list, the philosophers presumably not being  big names :- <ol type="i"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21855.htm">Agich (George J.) & Jones (Royce P.) - Personal Identity and Brain Death: A Critical Response</A>", 1986, p. 273</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20552.htm">Aune (Bruce) - Changing Things</A>", 1985, p. 93</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_568.htm">Brennan (Andrew) - Conditions of Identity</A>", 1988: "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3950.htm">Brennan (Andrew) - Memories, Bodies, and Survival</A>", p. 275; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3952.htm">Brennan (Andrew) - Concepts of a Person</A>", p. 336</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_70.htm">Carruthers (Peter) - Introducing Persons: Theories and Arguments in the Philosophy of Mind</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_155">p. 194ff</A></U><SUB>155</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_155"></A></li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5501.htm">Gert (Bernard) - Personal Identity and the Body</A>", 1971</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5249.htm">Green (Michael) & Wikler (Daniel) - Brain Death and Personal Identity</A>", 1980</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20564.htm">Hamlyn (D.W.) - Persons and Personal Identity</A>", 1984, pp. 206-211</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21857.htm">Lizza (John) - Persons And Death: What's Metaphysically Wrong With Our Current Statutory Definition Of Death?</A>", 1993</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5910.htm">Lockwood (Michael) - When Does a Life Begin?</A>", 1985, p. 19</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_05/PaperSummary_5976.htm">MacIntosh (J.J.) - A Problem About Identity</A>", 1974</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6028.htm">Puccetti (Roland) - Brain Transplants and Personal Identity</A>", 1969</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_09/Abstract_9221.htm">Robinson (John) - Personal Identity and Survival</A>", 1988</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15846.htm">Schechtman (Marya) - The Same and the Same: Two Views of Psychological Continuity</A>", 1994</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21858.htm">Wikler (Daniel) - Not Dead, Not Dying? Ethical Categories and Persistent Vegetative State</A>", 1988. </li></ol> </ol> </li><li><b>False Friends</b>: Olson thinks that  despite attractive elements (where understood!)  and despite their popularly being supposed to be supporters of the Biological Approach  both David Wiggins and Jay Rosenberg are really supporters of the PV. <ol type="i"><li><A HREF = "../../../Authors/W/Author_Wiggins (David).htm">David Wiggins</A>: <ul type="square"><li>According to Olson, Wiggins was then (in 1997) the name most associated with the Biological Approach. </li><li>Although (Olson says) Wiggins had once denied that we are organisms, the  later Wiggins had argued for the opposite view and criticized Lockean accounts that would make our persistence solely a matter of memory. </li><li>However, even this  later Wiggins stops short of what Olson understands by the Biological Approach  which is that psychology is completely irrelevant  <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_156">except derivatively</A></U><SUB>156</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_156"></A>  to our persistence. </li><li>In contrast, Wiggins thinks that  certain broadly mental capacities  sentience, desire, belief, motion, memory etc  are part of what it is for a person to remain alive, and so to continue existing. We are referred to "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3496.htm">Wiggins (David) - Personal Identity (S&S)</A>", pp. 160, 180, and "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_544.htm">Wiggins (David) - Locke, Butler and the Stream of Consciousness: And Men as Natural Kind</A>", p. 168. </li><li>Although  for Wiggins  memory doesn t determine our persistence on its own, it is  <FONT COLOR = "800080"><em>crucially relevant</em> to our choice of continuity principle for determining the biographies of persons</FONT> , "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3496.htm">Wiggins (David) - Personal Identity (S&S)</A>", pp. 162. It  & <FONT COLOR = "800080">informs and regulates the continuity condition of personal identity, and holds it apart from mere continuity of body</FONT> &  (p. 163). </li><li>This is contrary to Olson s view, which treats memory as irrelevant to our persistence, which instead relies on the  distinctive physicalist criterion of life-sustaining vegetative functions. </li><li>Olson thinks Wiggins s view is that if I were to lapse into a PVS, I  the animal  would  perish and only my body would survive. </li><li>Another of Olson s claims is that  while Wiggins doesn t pronounce on <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">Brain Transplants</A><SUP>157</SUP>, "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_544.htm">Wiggins (David) - Locke, Butler and the Stream of Consciousness: And Men as Natural Kind</A>", p. 173n.44 suggests that it is plausible that <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_16.htm">psychological continuity</A><SUP>158</SUP> could be sufficient for one to persist. </li><li>Olson admits that there s much in Wiggins s work that he <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_159">doesn t understand</A></U><SUB>159</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_159"></A>, but thinks it s a sophisticated version of the PV. </li></ul> </li><li><A HREF = "../../../Authors/R/Author_Rosenberg (Jay).htm">Jay Rosenberg</A>: <ul type="square"><li>Olson agrees with Rosenberg that  death is the end because a person just is a  uniquely competent living organism . </li><li>However, he disagrees with Rosenberg that  <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3507_160">one goes where one s organ of thought goes</A></U><SUB>160</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3507_160"></A> as  he claims  this implies we are not living organisms at all.</li><li>He says that Rosenberg recognises this, as he allows a disjunction  & <em>or</em> a functionally selected part of a living organism . </li><li>Consequently Rosenberg is also consigned to the ranks of the crypto-Psychological Approachers </li><li>We re referred to pp. 96-7 of the first (1983) edition of "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1344.htm">Rosenberg (Jay) - Thinking Clearly About Death</A>". </li></ul> </li></ol> </li></ul> </li></ol> <BR><u><b>End Notes</b></u> <BR><BR>I made a few hand-written notes at the end of the Chapter, which are reproduced here for what little they are worth. <ol type="1"><li>Throughout, when Olson talks about  our persistence, his choice is that it refers to the living human organism. This seems to make the term  person either redundant / irrelevant or of identical reference to  human organism . </li><li>What does Olson understand by  person ?</li><li>Is consciousness of  self essential to being a person?</li><li>Is Stephen Hawking (say, or a more diminished individual on a heart-lung machine & drip) a <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_56.htm">BIV</A><SUP>161</SUP>?</li><li>The brain as an organ: it was certainly possible to view it so (eg. in Aristotle s time) before its functions were understood, but no longer? </li><li>It seems to me that the regulatory functions of the brain are essential to life, so if we <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">transplant</A><SUP>162</SUP> these  and get them to regulate another body  we have moved the animal to another body, irrespective of the mental aspects. </li><li>Note different forms of <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1172.htm">Sorites</A><SUP>163</SUP> arguments.  Paring down atom by atom isn t the same as gradual replacement of parts while maintaining (or gradually evolving) function. </li><li>If we have a story to tell, we are in a better situation to maintain persistence. </li></ol></P><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U> ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3507.htm">Olson (Eric) - Psychology and Personal Identity</A>")</B><a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_3"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_3"><B>Footnote 3</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>My copy of this Chapter of the book is very heavily covered with hand-written notes, most of which are reproduced and refined here. </li><li>In these Notes, I ve not been especially careful to distinguish Olson s points from my own, nor even Olson s points here from those he makes elsewhere. </li><li>See also the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_8/Notes_843.htm">general disclaimer</a>. </li><li>This write-up is logged as a Paper Abstract rather than a Write-up Note. This is contrary to my current standard, and I will make the appropriate adjustment when I ve completed annotating the whole book. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_7"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_7"><B>Footnote 7</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>This usage is, of course, tendentious as a personalist who claims  you are essentially a person would (or might) claim that  you then cease to exist.</li><li>There is opportunity to quibble over the assumptions / claims  just which parts of the brain are responsible for what? But, I suppose, the case could always be patched up according to the contingencies of actual brain function  this is an empirical matter. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_8"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_8"><B>Footnote 8</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Again, what does what is an empirical matter, but it is important as we are not talking about persons in general, but  us who have a specific physical structure. </li><li>As the brain is important to all theories of personal identity, it is important to understand how it works, eg. Via:- <ol type="1"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1169.htm">Andrewes (David) - Neuropsychology: From Theory to Practice</A>",</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1165.htm">Bear (Mark), Connors (Barry) & Paradiso (Michael) - Neuroscience</A>", </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1163.htm">Bennett (M.R.) & Hacker (P.M.S.) - Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience</A>", </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1357.htm">DeMyer (William) - Neuroanatomy</A>", </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1340.htm">Churchland (Patricia) - Brain-wise: Studies in Neurophilosophy</A>", </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_191.htm">Churchland (Patricia) - Neurophilosophy - Towards a Unified Science of the Mind/Brain</A>", </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_212.htm">Graham (George) & Stephens (G. Lynn) - Philosophical Psychopathology</A>",</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_04/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_4276.htm">Le Fanu (James) - Why Us? How Science Rediscovered the Mystery of Ourselves</A>", </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_653.htm">Restak (Richard) - The Modular Brain</A>", and</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_02/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_2921.htm">Russell (Robert John), Murphy (Nancey), Meyering (Theo C.), Arbib (Michael A.) - Neuroscience and the Person</A>". </li></ol> </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_9"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_9"><B>Footnote 9</B></A></U>: This is correct. She was initially put on a respirator, but taken off after a court battle  presumably to die, but she lived on for the reasons Olson gives. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_10"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_10"><B>Footnote 10</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>It is difficult to know what to call KQ. </li><li>One is tempted to say  person but this is tendentious. </li><li> <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">Human animal </a> is correct, though some will say it s equally tendentious, as insufficient.</li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_13"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_13"><B>Footnote 13</B></A></U>: This seems to be the definition of (at least the VS part of) a PVS; note the sharp contrast between PVS and brain-death. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_14"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_14"><B>Footnote 14</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>So, presumably, Olson considers brain-dead individuals to be dead. </li><li>Yet, while the body cannot breathe unaided, it must be carrying on a lot of its vegetative functions, metabolizing food and maintaining its body temperature, etc. Presumably only the autonomic nervous system is required for this.</li><li>Olson uses the politically-incorrect term  human vegetable for the individual in the PVS, but this seems better reserved for a brain-dead individual. </li><li>That is, if Olson wants to claim that the individual in the PVS is still an animal, even though it cannot perform any of the (Aristotelian) animalian functions. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_15"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_15"><B>Footnote 15</B></A></U>: Oysters are animals, while oak trees are vegetables. A person in a PVS cannot display any goal-directed behavior in the sense that (even) oysters can. So, can they be said to be displaying animalian characteristics? <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_16"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_16"><B>Footnote 16</B></A></U>: But we re (going to be) interested in <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_734.htm">what we are</a> (maybe not in this chapter) so we can t assume too much that is counter-factual. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_17"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_17"><B>Footnote 17</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>I have some final hand-written footnotes asking <ol type="i"><li>whether identity and non-identity are the only <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_12.htm">alternatives</a>, </li><li>whether there are degrees of <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_60.htm">connectedness</a>, and </li><li>what is the situation with <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_65.htm">corpses</a>, biological human beings being <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_66.htm">cyborgised</a> and bones becoming fossils. </li></ol> </li><li>Presumably, I ought to follow these points up later? </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_18"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_18"><B>Footnote 18</B></A></U>: This may be a simpler case  for the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm">animalist</a>  than the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">WBT</a>. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_20"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_20"><B>Footnote 20</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>This is a big ask, conceptually as well as practically. </li><li>The supposition that brains  or brain-parts  can be rehoused in a new head and make sense of their new bodies  or be integrated with the host brain-part  is very moot. </li><li>For example, the sensory homunculus covers the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1013.htm">cerebrum</a>, so how would this map to the new body?</li><li>Connections are reinforced using  connectionist principles, so how could these  even in principle  be surgically applied  or even known without destroying what is to be <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">transplanted</a>. </li><li>As always, these are empirical matters  cerebra might have been more  modular  but we are talking about  us .</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6414.htm">Claxton (Guy) - Intelligence in the Flesh: Why Your Mind Needs Your Body Much More Than it Thinks</A>" argues that the entire body is involved in thought. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_24"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_24"><B>Footnote 24</B></A></U>: She does  recall your past, but  memory  as distinct from  quasi-memory  assumes the identity of the recaller with the individual whose experiences are recalled. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_25"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_25"><B>Footnote 25</B></A></U>: I m not sure of Olson s grammar here, as to whether the  apparently caries through. Maybe it s just that intentions are private to the intender, deduced from the actions. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_26"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_26"><B>Footnote 26</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Baker would say that she has your <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_22.htm">FPP</a>. She probably has. </li><li>But, this is very unlike the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_46.htm">teletransportation</a> case, as the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1013.htm">cerebrum-recipient</a> (like Locke s prince and cobbler) has lots of physical evidence that she is not who she thinks she is, or has at the very least been subject to very radical change. </li><li>Yet, if Baker is right, and persons are individuated by FPPs, then she is right to consider herself you. </li><li>But, there is room for doubt that the FPP <u>has</u> been transferred  it may depend on how the case is described  eg. as in "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_423.htm">Williams (Bernard) - The Self and the Future</A>". </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_27"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_27"><B>Footnote 27</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>To avoid tendentiousness, this probably ought to read  recall ,</li><li>Is all memory <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1013.htm">cerebrum-based</a>? </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_29"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_29"><B>Footnote 29</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Maybe she would over time, having the body-donor s body and environment, presumably. </li><li>It s an empirical matter whether she would retain / lose / acquire any skills that might be (substantially) enabled by non-cerebral parts of the CNS / PNS. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_32"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_32"><B>Footnote 32</B></A></U>: Not the same as a lobotomy (<A HREF = "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lobotomy" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>). <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_35"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_35"><B>Footnote 35</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Philosophically, <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">WBTs</a> are entirely different to CTs, but here we are talking about practical issues. </li><li>For <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">WBTs</a>, presumably, the  only technical problem is wiring up the nerves in the spinal cord. Even this is doubtful, as there might (for all I know) be a mismatch for different bodies  ie. would we have any  nerves or  connectors left over? </li><li>But for cerebra, it s not clear what would be wired to what. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_38"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_38"><B>Footnote 38</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>He doesn t consider the possibility  coherent under a 4D account of persistence  that you might have <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_33.htm">fissioned</a>, or that the transfer is a case of <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_34.htm">fusion</a>.</li><li>He doesn t seem to specify what happened to the recipient s <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1013.htm">cerebrum</a>. I presume it is taken to have been destroyed. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_40"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_40"><B>Footnote 40</B></A></U>: This is hard to believe  on any account of PID  because:- <ul type="disc"><li>If you are a <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animal</a>, you would have survived even if the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1013.htm">cerebrum</a> had not been re-housed (analogously to the PVS case). </li><li>If you are a <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_9.htm">person</a>, and the resulting fusion is <u>not</u> you, then admittedly you <u>would</u> have ceased to exist. </li><li>But if you <u>are</u> a person, then the recipient would have ceased to exist (or had moved) when its <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1013.htm">cerebrum</a> was removed, so there is no principled reason for doubting that you would continue to exist, rehoused, as the recipient is the unique individual enjoying (we suppose) your psychological properties, with appropriate spatio-temporal continuity, etc. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_41"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_41"><B>Footnote 41</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>I have a hand-written footnote asking how the situation changes if your whole brain, or even your head, is <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">transplanted</a>. </li><li>My note says that  someone  who?  claims that you remain as the headless individual , but that <A HREF = "../../../Authors/H/Author_Hershenov (David).htm">David Hershenov</A> (maybe in "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4546.htm">Hershenov (David) - Countering the Appeal of the Psychological Approach to Personal Identity</A>"?) denies that Olson thinks this. </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5028.htm">Mackie (David) - Going Topless</A>", by another <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm">animalist</a>, is the likely source for the  who . </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_44"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_44"><B>Footnote 44</B></A></U>: Check that it does, and amend this footnote! <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_48"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_48"><B>Footnote 48</B></A></U>: So, Olson points out that this biological continuity is more intimate than that which you would bear to your <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_65.htm">corpse</a>. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_51"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_51"><B>Footnote 51</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>This distinction between cerebra and whole brains is important. </li><li>The controlling function of the brain-stem and higher brain means that it would be unconvincing to describe this as  just another organ , while  despite the popularity of the PV  this seems much more reasonable for cerebra. </li><li>That said, most  organs have clearly defined boundaries and connections, whereas this isn t so  or not to the same degree  for the cerebral hemispheres. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_55"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_55"><B>Footnote 55</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>There is enough physical continuity to satisfy the holder of the psychological view that there s sufficient causal continuity for the recipient s psychology to be (initially) identical to your own (rather than a copy). </li><li>And there is biological continuity at the cellular level  you could describe the situation as your most important part having moved from one life-support machine to another. </li><li>I have a (probably confused) footnote to the effect that Olson may well (as I do) consider a (human) person to be a <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_29.htm">phase sortal</a> of a <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animal</a>. But, if so, is it possible for that (very same) <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_29.htm">phase sortal</a> to hop from one animal to another? I suspect not. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_57"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_57"><B>Footnote 57</B></A></U>: So, I might add, does <A HREF = "../../../Authors/F/Author_Feldman (Fred).htm">Fred Feldman</A>, though not Olson himself. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_58"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_58"><B>Footnote 58</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Johnston s view is that each of us is a  Locus of Mental Life , and that this locus is the brain  so we go where our brain goes. </li><li>If we are such a locus  wherever this is instantiated  then it would be a conceptual truth that we can t be outlived by that life. </li><li>I ve now written up Johnston s paper  which deserves the close reading I ve given it. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_60"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_60"><B>Footnote 60</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>It seems to me that, it would at least beg the question  and may even be incoherent  to say that <u>one s</u> biological and <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_16.htm">psychological continuity</a> can come apart.</li><li>Still, it s an interesting question  on the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm">animalist</a> view  who owns the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_16.htm">psychological continuity</a>. I m not sure what Olson s answer is. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_61"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_61"><B>Footnote 61</B></A></U>: This is an example of the distinction between epistemological and metaphysical questions. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_62"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_62"><B>Footnote 62</B></A></U>: I usually refer to this as the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_114.htm">PV</a>. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_63"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_63"><B>Footnote 63</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>This is a weaker claim than that I am (identical to) my mind, or that minds can exist <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_69.htm">disembodied</a>, and the like. </li><li>Quite what makes a bundle of mental states  my mind is a difficult question for a holder of the PV to answer, as are the reduplication objections. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_64"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_64"><B>Footnote 64</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>I don t have a Note on Content  maybe I should!</li><li>I have a collection of papers on the sub-topic  Content (see <a href="../../../PaperCatalogPhilosophyFullCategorisedSubTopic_811.htm">this link</a>). However, most will be associated with slightly different topic in the philosophy of Mind. I do need a Note to sort this out! </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_65"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_65"><B>Footnote 65</B></A></U>: I don t have a Note on this either!<a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_68"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_68"><B>Footnote 68</B></A></U>: Is he therefore saying that the relation isn t symmetric? Does it matter?<a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_71"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_71"><B>Footnote 71</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Or, a time when I remembered a time & This is the <u>ancestral</u> of memory, though Olson doesn t use the term.</li><li>I ve dealt with this in an <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_8/Notes_876.htm">essay on Locke</a>. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_72"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_72"><B>Footnote 72</B></A></U>: Olson draws no distinction between <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_60.htm">continuity and connectedness</a>. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_73"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_73"><B>Footnote 73</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>This is a consequence of the  contents-based PV, but seems very counter-intuitive. </li><li>The main challenge  from the psychological perspective  is from the presumed continuity of the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_22.htm">FPP</a>. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_74"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_74"><B>Footnote 74</B></A></U>: See <A HREF = "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korsakoff%27s_syndrome" TARGET = "_top">Korsakoff's Syndrome</A>, etc. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_75"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_75"><B>Footnote 75</B></A></U>: Perry contrasts a  brain zap  where memories are totally removed  with  amnesia in which they are present, but inaccessible. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_77"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_77"><B>Footnote 77</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>See "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3619.htm">Unger (Peter) - The Physical Approach To Our Survival</A>". </li><li>As the above title indicates  and this is explicit in the quotation Olson gives  this claim of Unger s assumes physical continuity of some sort. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_78"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_78"><B>Footnote 78</B></A></U>: Indeed, he says Unger  qualifies it in pp. 147-52, ie. in "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3620.htm">Unger (Peter) - A Physically Based Approach To Our Survival</A>". <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_79"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_79"><B>Footnote 79</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>He lists them as:- <BR>&rarr; <A HREF = "../../../Authors/G/Author_Gert (Bernard).htm">Bernard Gert</A>, <BR>&rarr; <A HREF = "../../../Authors/J/Author_Johnston (Mark).htm">Mark Johnston</A>, <BR>&rarr; <A HREF = "../../../Authors/L/Author_Lockwood (Michael).htm">Michael Lockwood</A>, <BR>&rarr; <A HREF = "../../../Authors/M/Author_Mackie (J.L.).htm">J.L. Mackie</A>, <BR>&rarr; <A HREF = "../../../Authors/N/Author_Nagel (Thomas).htm">Thomas Nagel</A>, <BR>&rarr; <A HREF = "../../../Authors/R/Author_Rosenberg (Jay).htm">Jay Rosenberg</A>, and <BR>&rarr; <A HREF = "../../../Authors/W/Author_Wiggins (David).htm">David Wiggins</A>; </li><li>I d thought the references would be given in the section on the PV alloyed to Physical Continuity, as Olson had said  see below for references . However, since they weren t, I presume he ll reference them as he treats of the PV throughout the book. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_80"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_80"><B>Footnote 80</B></A></U>: Olson (like many) oscillates between  material and  physical . There s a technical distinction between the two concepts, but not so as to cause a problem in the present context. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_82"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_82"><B>Footnote 82</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>That, is, so you continue to be a <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_9.htm">person</a>. </li><li>One could quibble about whether more than a <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1013.htm">cerebrum</a> is needed to support <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_61.htm">consciousness</a>. </li><li>Of course, Olson will challenge whether this is even sufficient, as he treats the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1013.htm">cerebrum</a> as  just another organ , which can be replaced without affecting our (numerical) identity, and certainly doesn t take  us with it if <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">transplanted</a>. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_84"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_84"><B>Footnote 84</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>This is a <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_48.htm">Brain-state Transfer</a>. </li><li>So, it is a slightly different TE to <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_46.htm">Teletransportation</a>, but just as open to <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1003.htm">reduplication objections</a>. </li><li>It is also open to Williams-like objections that the recipient just suffers a massive personality change. </li><li>We are referred  in a footnote  to:-<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1791.htm">Shoemaker (Sydney) - Personal Identity: a Materialist Account</A>", p. 108ff (ie. Section 10,  The Brain-State Transfer Device ) <BR>&rarr; <A HREF = "../../../Authors/H/Author_Hick (John).htm">John Hick</A>, <em>Philosophy of Religion</em>, 1990  p. 122ff. <BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_04/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_4060.htm">Davies (Brian) - An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion</A>", p. 125f<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_58.htm">Lewis (David) - The Paradoxes of Time Travel</A>". </li><li>The Shoemaker section  indeed the whole of his Chapter  is important and addresses some of my immediate questions, even if it doesn t exactly answer them. </li><li>It is surprising to have two references to Philosophy of Religion. I don t have Hick, and my edition of Davies is the Second (later) edition, and the pagination doesn t seem to match up  nor could I see anything relevant in the Contents or Index, except perhaps Chapter 11   <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">Life After Death </a>. I doubt it s worth following up. </li><li>The Lewis reference is surprising. Maybe "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_113.htm">Lewis (David) - Survival and Identity</A>" was intended, as both were published in 1976 and feature in Olson s bibliography?</li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_85"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_85"><B>Footnote 85</B></A></U>: This is important  your mental contents (and maybe your mental capacities) might be physically preserved  as Olson suggests  in a big book and posted rather than being transmitted telegraphically. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_87"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_87"><B>Footnote 87</B></A></U>: Is this just sloppiness? <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_14.htm">Survival</a> may or may not be equivalent to persistence. See <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_89.htm">Parfit</a>. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_88"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_88"><B>Footnote 88</B></A></U>: In the absence of a <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_42.htm">Perdurantist</a> account of persistence. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_91"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_91"><B>Footnote 91</B></A></U>: Olson doesn t here mention the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_41.htm">Closest Continuer</a> theory. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_92"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_92"><B>Footnote 92</B></A></U>: Olson doesn t quite put matters like that. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_93"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_93"><B>Footnote 93</B></A></U>: This statement shows that the book is intended as a positive statement of <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm">Animalism</a>, rather than a refutation of the PV. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_95"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_95"><B>Footnote 95</B></A></U>: I have a footnote questioning whether this strictly makes Olson not an <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm">animalist</a>. I need to check the strict usage of this term. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_96"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_96"><B>Footnote 96</B></A></U>: Olson irritatingly uses the term  people rather than the accepted term of art  persons . I will use  <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_9.htm">persons</a> . <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_98"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_98"><B>Footnote 98</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>I don t think Olson says what he understands a person  or  people in his terms  to be. </li><li>However, intelligence, rationality and consciousness seem to be on his list of required attributes. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_102"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_102"><B>Footnote 102</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Thus, Olson seems to dismiss out of hand Locke s main claim to fame in this area  the distinction between  persons and  men . </li><li>However, the distinction can be maintained by the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm">Animalist</a>  by taking  person to be a non-substance term, but rather an honorific applied to the substances, <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animals</a> (and other substances that deserve it). </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_114"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_114"><B>Footnote 114</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Olson says  people , again when he really ought to say  persons . </li><li>He gives a couple of sample attributes: rationality and the capacity for self-consciousness. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_115"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_115"><B>Footnote 115</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>The two others seem to be candidates for being <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_29.htm">Phase Sortals</a>, while this one seems rather flippant. </li><li>The important point is that students (say) are not separate individuals from the persons (or animals) that are students, but pick them out during phases of their careers. </li><li>This is also my  line on what human persons are  <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_29.htm">phase sortals</a> of <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animals</a>. </li><li>The important point is that  if this is what persons are  then we are not persons; Olson s view is that we are animals, full stop, though we may be persons for periods of our existence. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_119"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_119"><B>Footnote 119</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>This is an interesting alternative description of what is supposed to take place. </li><li>I agree that it is inappropriate in this case; the reasons being:- <BR>&rarr; A <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1013.htm">cerebrum</a> is not an animal, and<BR>&rarr; There are two <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1013.htm">cerebrums</a>, so there are reduplication objections (though maybe Olson means both <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1013.htm">cerebrums</a> to avoid this objection).</li><li>However, it is more appropriate in the case of a <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">WBT</a>. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_122"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_122"><B>Footnote 122</B></A></U>: This reads oddly. Rather, it s like an organ donation  eg. of a kidney to a sibling. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_123"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_123"><B>Footnote 123</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>This is the key claim. </li><li>There would be o temptation to say that you had ceased to exist, or  were no longer the same person if you lost your liver, but many would claim this if you lost all mental capacity. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_124"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_124"><B>Footnote 124</B></A></U>: Shouldn t this be  kidneys , though removing toxins from the blood is one of the many functions of the liver?<a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_126"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_126"><B>Footnote 126</B></A></U>: These memories are your memories, but only apparent memories for the recipient of your <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1013.htm">cerebrum</a> if that person isn t you. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_143"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_143"><B>Footnote 143</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>I don t seem to have a Note on the  physical criterion , though I do have one on <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_15.htm">physical continuity</a>, and also on the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_910.htm">psychological criterion</a>. I need to create an extra Note. </li><li>However, I m not sure there is any one such view.</li><li>What Olson describes sounds to me like the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_909.htm">Brain Criterion</a>. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_146"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_146"><B>Footnote 146</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Olson doesn t give references here, but <BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1328.htm">Thomson (Judith Jarvis) - People and Their Bodies</A>", and <BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2438.htm">Williams (Bernard) - Are Persons Bodies?</A>" <BR>Look relevant & useful.</li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_148"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_148"><B>Footnote 148</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>This was back in 1997; since then, <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm">Animalism</a> has become more popular. </li><li>See my <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_50.htm">Note on Animalists</a>. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_149"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_149"><B>Footnote 149</B></A></U>: I have my doubts about van Inwagen in this regard. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_150"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_150"><B>Footnote 150</B></A></U>: See the discussion on <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_65.htm">Corpses</a>. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_151"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_151"><B>Footnote 151</B></A></U>: I have the right edition, and this is the start of the section on Personal Identity in Chapter 20 ( Mind and Body ). <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_152"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_152"><B>Footnote 152</B></A></U>: This would be just the last two pages of the Chapter, so the pagination may be wrong. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_153"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_153"><B>Footnote 153</B></A></U>: The Section on  <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_69.htm">Disembodied</a> Survival . <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_154"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_154"><B>Footnote 154</B></A></U>: I have the second edition from 1998 and the pagination is different. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_155"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_155"><B>Footnote 155</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>I have the right edition, but I m not convinced that this is the right page  it s part of "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3521.htm">Carruthers (Peter) - After-Life for Materialists</A>", section 1 ( Resurrection , entitled  D. Is Bodily Identity Sufficient ).</li><li>This book was superseded, in 2004, by "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_72.htm">Carruthers (Peter) - The Nature of the Mind: An Introduction</A>". </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_156"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_156"><B>Footnote 156</B></A></U>: I don t know what this caveat is supposed to mean. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_159"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_159"><B>Footnote 159</B></A></U>: Several things here:- <ol type="1"><li>I agree that Wiggins s work is  difficult , and wonder whether Olson has him right. </li><li>Saying that <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animals</a>  as distinct from human persons   perish when lapsing into a PVS seems clearly incorrect. </li><li>It looks to me as though Wiggins is taking the person as the substance term, a person being a <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_29.htm">phase sortal</a> of a <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animal</a>. In contrast Olson  as do I  takes the animal as the substance, so I am identical to the animal, but have the property of being a person for stages of my existence. </li><li>Wiggins updated his views in "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1312.htm">Wiggins (David) - Sameness and Substance Renewed</A>", 2001, after Olson was writing.</li><li>He had earlier (1996) clarified his views in an interchange - "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1220.htm">Snowdon (Paul) - Persons and Personal Identity</A>" & "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4191.htm">Wiggins (David) - Reply to Snowdon (Persons and Personal Identity)</A>" - recorded in "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_38.htm">Lovibond (Sabina) & Williams (S.G.) - Identity, Truth & Value: Essays for David Wiggins</A>", though Olson makes no mention of this. </li></ol> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3507_160"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3507_160"><B>Footnote 160</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>This is what Olson refers to elsewhere as the  <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">brain transplant</a> intuition .</li><li>It is really hard to resist  so much so that saying that a brain is a  maximally mutilated (or  pared down ) human organism may be the way to go. </li><li>We don t need to include psychology as the motivator for this intuition  the regulatory function may do  but have the psychological  <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_22.htm">first person perspective</a> benefits come along for the ride. </li><li>That said, the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">brain transplantee</a> would consider himself to have swapped bodies, there would be a principled reason why he has, no rival candidates and little objection in either the philosophical or wider community. What more could you want?</li></ul> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3508.htm">Olson (Eric) - Persistence</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: The Human Animal, September 1999, Chapter 2, pp. 22-41<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Oxford Scholarship Online</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>This chapter is about how to state the question of personal identity over time. </li><li>The question is often put in a way that assumes a person cannot start out or end up as a nonperson. </li><li>This prejudges an important metaphysical question, and rules out the Biological Approach. </li><li>The chapter then turns to the language of identity over time in general. </li></ol></FONT><BR><U>Sections</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="I"><li>Criteria of Personal Identity</li><li>Substance Concepts</li><li>Movers and Thinkers</li><li> Person P<SUB>1</SUB> and Time t<SUB>1</SUB> </li></ol></FONT><BR><u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3508_1">Annotations</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3508_1"></A></u><BR><ol type="I"><li><b>Criteria of Personal Identity</b><ul type="disc"><li>The Psychological Approach is a proposed criterion of personal identity  what it takes for a person to exist at two different times. </li><li>Olson sees two problems with making the claim sufficiently precise to be accepted by both supporters and detractors:- <ol type="i"><li>Confusion about persistence through time in general  to be treated in Section 4 of this Chapter. </li><li>What is it to give a criterion of identity for <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3508_2">people</A></U><SUB>2</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3508_2"></A> as opposed to other things?</li></ol></li><li>Olson has a couple of stabs at the <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3508_3">criterion in logical form</A></U><SUB>3</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3508_3"></A>. <ol type="i"><li>The first is a psychological relation R between a person at one time, and another individual at another time. There is no explicit pre-requisite that this  second individual be a person, but it clearly must be capable of entertaining a psychology such that R holds. </li><li>The second version  just an example  makes R explicit. Requirements are psychological <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3508_4">continuity</A></U><SUB>4</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3508_4"></A> and uniqueness at each time between the end-times of identification. </li></ol></li><li>Olson s preferred understanding of the question is to take someone who is a person at a time and ask under what conditions is something   anything at all  existing at another time numerically identical to that person. </li><li>There is  however  an objection, which Olson <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3508_5">dismisses</A></U><SUB>5</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3508_5"></A>. Some say that you can t say anything of a  thing without saying what sort of thing you are referring to. In <A HREF = "../../../Authors/W/Author_Wiggins (David).htm">David Wiggins</A> s terms, a  thing is  not an adequate <u>covering concept</u> . </li><li>Olson stresses  with an allusion to "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3492.htm">Wiggins (David) - Outline of a Theory of Individuation (S&S)</A>", p. 53 ( Proposition D and the rationale of the  same what? question )  that such  criteria are constitutive rather than epistemic  they are about what  our identity through time consists in not about how  we find out whether a person has survived or perished . </li><li>Olson points out the radical distinction between his formulation of the criterion for a person s persistence through time and that proposed by the majority of philosophers: Olson has the later individual unconstrained in <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3508_6">kind</A></U><SUB>6</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3508_6"></A>, while the majority view is that both putative identicals have to be persons. </li><li>Olson thinks there are several reasons why the majority view is objectionable:- <ol type="i"><li>A quibble:  same person is ambiguous. While taken by philosophers to require <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_977.htm">numerical identity</A><SUP>7</SUP>, there are alternative understandings of  sameness relations :- <ol type="a"><li>Numerically distinct individuals can be the same K, for some K: eg. Bill Clinton and Robert Reagan were the same official. </li><li><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3508_8">Analogously</A></U><SUB>8</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3508_8"></A>, non-philosophers may understand  being the same person as a resemblance or continuity that neither entails nor is entailed by numerical identity. Someone may no longer  be the same person since she underwent some major psychological change (such as a religious conversion). Olson will discuss this further in the next Chapter ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3509.htm">Olson (Eric) - Why We Need Not Accept the Psychological Approach</A>"). </ol></li><li>We can satisfy the previous objection by using the expression  being one and the same as rather than  being the same person as . However, this raises a deeper issue & </li><li>The  same person relation relies on you persisting as a person  but this prejudges the issue.</li><li>The term  person is usually used by philosophers to imply the capacities of rationality and self-consciousness  so that  you and I are  <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3508_9">people</A></U><SUB>9</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3508_9"></A> whereas dogs and cats aren t .</li><li>Olson notes that not all philosophers agree with this definition of  <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3508_10">person</A></U><SUB>10</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3508_10"></A> . We re referred to two:- <ol type="a"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5884.htm">Chisholm (Roderick) - Coming Into Being and Passing Away: Can the Metaphysician Help?</A>", p. 181: Chisholm says that a person is anything that can <u>come to be</u> rational and conscious. Olson claims this is  no more than a verbal disagreement  but it strikes me as substantive, as it would make <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_71.htm">fetuses</A><SUP>11</SUP> persons, which many deny. </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_544.htm">Wiggins (David) - Locke, Butler and the Stream of Consciousness: And Men as Natural Kind</A>", p. 164ff: Wiggins  for reasons Olson finds  <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3508_12">obscure</A></U><SUB>12</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3508_12"></A>  thinks that the Lockean definition of  person is  morally and politically pernicious . </ol></li><li>It is at least arguable  on this definition of  person  that <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_71.htm">fetuses</A><SUP>13</SUP> are not persons, and that those in a <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_111.htm">PVS</A><SUP>14</SUP> are not persons. So, each of us  <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3508_15">it might be argued</A></U><SUB>15</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3508_15"></A>  might not be or remain a person throughout the full period of our existence. </li><li>Even if  for some reason  this is not so, it is a question for philosophical investigation, and should not be decided merely by our definition of persistence for persons. </li></ol></li><li>Olson rejects the view that it is in some sense paradoxical that a person can exist while not yet being, or no longer being, a person. His analogy is with  infant . When an infant grows up, he is no longer an infant, but that infant continues to exist  as an adult or a philosopher. Olson wants us to treat  person <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3508_16">just as we treat</A></U><SUB>16</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3508_16"></A>  infant (or  adult or  philosopher ). He ll address this matter further in Section II ( Substance Concepts ). </li><li>Olson considers whether his proposal is purely verbal. If personal identity is about persons, then either:- <ol type="i"><li>He s disagreeing with his opponents about the meaning of the words  personal identity , or |</li><li>He s refusing to discuss the topic of personal identity and talking about something else instead. </li></ol>In support of this contention, we are referred to <BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5501.htm">Gert (Bernard) - Personal Identity and the Body</A>", p. 475 ff,  the question of personal identity does not arise if the body has no psychological features , and<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5497.htm">Johnston (Mark) - Relativism and the Self</A>", p. 449 </li><li>He admits that there are indeed two questions  the <b>broad</b> one he wants to consider, where one end-point is unconstrained, and the <b>narrow</b> one restricted to persons at both ends. Both questions are legitimate, but  Olson claims  philosophers often mistakenly ask the narrow question when they mean to be asking the broad one. He thinks the narrow question <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3508_17">uninteresting</A></U><SUB>17</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3508_17"></A>. <ol type="i"><li>In support of this contention, Olson points out that  while a standard psychological criterion answering the narrow question would agree that if your <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">cerebrum is transplanted</A><SUP>18</SUP>, the recipient would be you, thereby ruling out the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_53.htm">BV</a> as an answer to the <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3508_19">broad</A></U><SUB>19</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3508_19"></A> question, it is silent on other questions. </li><li>So, in the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">transplant</A><SUP>20</SUP> case where your <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1013.htm">cerebrum</A><SUP>21</SUP> is destroyed, it says nothing about whether you survive  other than if you do, it s not as a person. Similarly with the vegetable case. </li></ol></li><li>Olson thinks that supporters of the PV intend their answers to be of the <b>broad</b> question. They claim that you cease to exist when your mind is destroyed  not just that you cease to be a person. </li><li>If it were a necessary truth that  <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_9.htm">person</A><SUP>22</SUP> is a <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_101.htm">substance</A><SUP>23</SUP> concept, then the broad and narrow questions would be equivalent, which is why they are so often run together. This will be addressed in the next section. </li><li>If I could start as a person and end as a non-person, isn t it misleading to describe the problem of my persistence as  <em>personal</em> identity ? </li><li>Olson s response is that we are people, and he s interested in our identity, just the same as has historically been the case. </li><li>However, he denies that there is any single criterion of identity suitable for all and only people ( persons )  he runs through the usual list of potential persons  as they have <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3508_24">different persistence conditions</A></U><SUB>24</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3508_24"></A>. </li><li>However, according to Olson s version of the BV, the question of <em>our</em> identity boils down to  <FONT COLOR = "800080">under what possible circumstances is something that is a <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animal</A><SUP>25</SUP> at one time the same <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3508_26">animal</A></U><SUB>26</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3508_26"></A> as a <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animal</A><SUP>27</SUP> at another time?</FONT> . Yet, stating the question of <em>our</em> identity this way is as <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3508_28">tendentious</A></U><SUB>28</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3508_28"></A> as the narrow statement of the PV. </li><li>So, in summary  Olson claims  there is no such thing as  personal identity and more than  philosopher identity . We can ask what it takes for a philosopher to persist through time, but not <em>as</em> a philosopher. The same goes for infants and  Olson claims   people . </li></ul></li><li><b>Substance Concepts</b><ul type="disc"><li>Supporters of the PV typically assume without question that personhood is what Wiggins (in "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_53.htm">Wiggins (David) - Identity & Spatio-temporal Continuity</A>"  ie. "<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3734.htm">Wiggins (David) - Identity & Spatio-temporal Continuity: Parts 1.3-8: Five Ways to be Wrong About Relative Identity</A>", p. 7  and "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3491.htm">Wiggins (David) - The Absoluteness of Sameness (S&S)</A>", p. 24) calls a <em>substance concept</em>. While I may also be an adult, a human being, a club member, being a person is a more privileged position because  a person is <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_734.htm">what I am</A><SUP>29</SUP> most fundamentally, and it is this  it is assumed  that determines my persistence conditions. I m a person first and everything else second. </li><li>Olson gives an extensive quotation from "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3491.htm">Wiggins (David) - The Absoluteness of Sameness (S&S)</A>", p. 15 to the effect that:- <ol type="i"><li>Every particular object falls under some kind or <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_23.htm">concept</A><SUP>30</SUP> that tells us  or would tell us if we knew it  what that object is, as distinct from describing some accidental features of it, and </li><li>This concept determines the persistence conditions that necessarily apply to things of this kind. </li></ol></li><li>Olson claims that this view  hailing originally from Aristotle (says Wiggins)  is too fundamental to argue for against a detractor, but is one that he will rely on throughout this book. </li><li>However, the theory of substance doesn t tell us what substance concept we fall under. </li><li>Olson claims that treating <em>person</em> as a substance concept has two interesting consequences:- <ol type="i"><li>All persons would have the same persistence conditions  and if not we d have to invent further substance concepts like A-people and B-people. </li><li>Once a person, always a person. It would be incoherent to talk about former people or potential people. A non-person doesn t have its persistence criteria in virtue of being a person, and a thing cannot <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3508_31">change its persistence criteria</A></U><SUB>31</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3508_31"></A> partway through its career. This will be discussed further in Chapter 4 ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3510.htm">Olson (Eric) - Was I Ever a Fetus? (Human Animal)</A>"). </li></ol></li><li>So, if I was once a non-person, and survived the transition from non-person to person, there must be some other substance-concept under which I fall. Olson also claims that this would show that <em>person</em> is <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3508_32">not a substance-concept</A></U><SUB>32</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3508_32"></A>. </li><li>We need to distinguish substance concepts from what Wiggins  in the same two references cited at the start of this Section  calls <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_29.htm">phase sortals</A><SUP>33</SUP>, such as  child , which are kinds that something can belong to temporarily. <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_29.htm">Phase sortals</A><SUP>34</SUP> <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3508_35">as such</A></U><SUB>35</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3508_35"></A> don t have persistence criteria, and to become a philosopher is not to come into existence <em>simpliciter</em>. </li><li>Olson has an extensive footnote on  a complication that he shall ignore :- <ol type="i"><li>In "<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3734.htm">Wiggins (David) - Identity & Spatio-temporal Continuity: Parts 1.3-8: Five Ways to be Wrong About Relative Identity</A>", p. 7, Wiggins:- <ol type="a"><li>Defines <em>substance concepts</em> as  <FONT COLOR = "800080"><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_10.htm">sortal</A><SUP>36</SUP> concepts which present-tensedly apply to an individual x at every moment throughout x s existence</FONT> , and </li><li>Claims that these  <FONT COLOR = "800080">give the privileged and (unless context makes it otherwise) the most fundamental answer to the question  what is x? </FONT> </ol></li><li>However, it might be possible for something to be a substance concept in sense (a) without being so in sense (b). </li><li>Sense (a) is  an abiding sort in "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3395.htm">Snowdon (Paul) - Persons, Animals, and Ourselves</A>", p. 87 or a  temporally essential attribute in "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5910.htm">Lockwood (Michael) - When Does a Life Begin?</A>", p. 12. </li><li>Olson equates sense (b) with  determining the persistence conditions for all and only things of that kind , but I don t see why he makes this leap. He calls sense (b) an  ultimate sort .</li><li>This theory appears after a fairly long motivating example: if people shared all their persistence conditions with some non-people  such as gorillas  then they would have their persistence criteria in virtue of falling under some kind that included both people and gorillas - <em>thinking being</em> maybe. While it would be true that we are people  and true (for the sake of the argument) that we are people throughout our careers, a more fundamental answer to the  <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_734.htm">what are we</A><SUP>37</SUP>? question would be  a member of the wider class that includes both people and gorillas . I <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3508_38">didn t see the cogency</A></U><SUB>38</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3508_38"></A> of this argument at all. </li></ol></li><li>So, anyone who takes <em>person</em> to be a substance concept can argue for the PV as follows:- <ol type="i"><li>The concept of a person is at least partly a psychological concept: any person has to be rational and self-aware, for instance. </li><li>Because people have their persistence conditions in virtue of their being people, we should expect their persistence conditions to have something to do with psychology. </li><li>So, at the least, we can expect a person not to survive in a PVS, or as the relict following a <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">cerebrum transplant</A><SUP>39</SUP>, as such beings aren t people. </li></ol></li><li>Olson claims, therefore, that anyone who takes <em>person</em> to be a substance concept in effect <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3508_40">assumes the PV</A></U><SUB>40</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3508_40"></A>.</li><li>If <em>person</em> is only a <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_29.htm">phase sortal</A><SUP>41</SUP>, then the above argument is no more convincing than would be one of the same form that claimed that an <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3508_42">athlete</A></U><SUB>42</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3508_42"></A> could not survive the loss of his athletic abilities. Such an argument is invalid because <em>athlete</em> is not a substance concept  because athletes do not have their persistence conditions in virtue of being athletes. </li><li>So, according to the BV, <em>person</em> is not a substance concept but a <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_29.htm">phase sortal</A><SUP>43</SUP> like <em>athlete</em>. </li><li>Olson rehearses the usual examples of non-biological persons with different persistence conditions to human persons and that biological people have the same persistence conditions some as non-persons <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_71.htm">(fetuses</A><SUP>44</SUP> or those in a PVS). </li><li>He adds that it is likely that our persistence conditions are the <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3508_45">same as aardvarks</A></U><SUB>45</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3508_45"></A>, oysters or animals in general. </li><li>So, our substance concept  what we most fundamentally are  is not <em>person</em> but rather <em>Homo Sapiens</em>, <em>animal</em> <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3508_46">or</A></U><SUB>46</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3508_46"></A> <em>living organism</em>. </li><li><A HREF = "../../../Authors/P/Author_Parfit (Derek).htm">Derek Parfit</A> has suggested to Olson that  person is ambiguous and can be used either as a <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_29.htm">phase sortal</A><SUP>47</SUP> or as a substance concept. This might reduce discussion to arguments about words  what is the primary English usage of the word  person , say. However, Olson thinks the suggestion gets us into  deep waters : both these terms cannot apply to a person at the same time, because a <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_29.htm">phase sortal</A><SUP>48</SUP> person would fall under a substance-concept other than <em>Person</em>  <em>Animal</em> for instance  that has persistence conditions inconsistent with the substance concept <em>Person</em>. A <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_29.htm">phase sortal</A><SUP>49</SUP> person would have <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_121.htm">modal</A><SUP>50</SUP> and possibility historical properties impossible for a substance-concept <em>Person</em>. </li><li>So, in what sense of <em>Person</em> are we people? <ol type="i"><li>If we are <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_29.htm">phase sortal</A><SUP>51</SUP> people, the PV is false, as we might once have been non-people, and so could survive radical psychological discontinuity. </li><li>If we are people in the substance-concept sense, the PV is true. </li></ol></li><li>But, the issue is non-verbal:- <ol type="i"><li>If the PV is true, there could not be any people of the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_29.htm">phase sortal</A><SUP>52</SUP> sort for if there were they would be rational, self-conscious agents of whom the PV is false. We are referred to Chapter 5 ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3511.htm">Olson (Eric) - Are People Animals?</A>"), Section V ( Why We Are Animals ).</li><li>If the BV is true, there are <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3508_53">presumably no people</A></U><SUB>53</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3508_53"></A> in the substance-concept sense <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3508_54">even if there is such a substance-concept</A></U><SUB>54</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3508_54"></A>. </li></ol></li><li>In the next section Olson will consider an argument that there is <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3508_55">no substance-concept sense</A></U><SUB>55</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3508_55"></A> of  person .</li></ul></li><li><b>Movers and Thinkers</b><ul type="disc"><li>If <em>person</em> is a substance-concept, it s easy to argue that the PV is true. However, if not, it s hard to see how the PV could be true. If we are animals, say, in that our persistence conditions are those of animals, then those persistence conditions cannot be psychological, as many animals persist without any psychology at all. </li><li>This raises a difficult challenge for the PV, because it s not clear that <em>person</em> (or <em><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3508_56">thinker</A></U><SUB>56</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3508_56"></A></em>, or similar) <u>could</u> be a substance concept. </li><li>Olson reminds us of the difference between substance-concepts, that answer  what is it? questions, and other concepts that answer attributive questions ( where is it? ,  what does it weigh? , & ). </li><li>Olson thinks that  person  in the sense considered by the PV  focuses on what an individual <em>does</em>, rather than what it <em>is</em>. Such a person can ordinarily think in a certain way  it is rational, conscious, self-aware, <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3508_57">morally accountable</A></U><SUB>57</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3508_57"></A>, and the like. But this capacity doesn t tell us what it <em>is</em>  it might <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3508_58">be</A></U><SUB>58</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3508_58"></A> a <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animal</A><SUP>59</SUP>, an angel Cartesian ego, & </li><li>Olson attempts to show the difficulty by <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3508_60">his  locomotor analogy</A></U><SUB>60</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3508_60"></A>:- <ol type="i"><li>We are to imagine a philosopher impressed by  locomotive capacities  the ability to move under one s own steam, a capacity shared by human beings and lots of other things. Such beings are  locomotors . </li><li>By analogy with TEs involving <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">cerebrum transplants</A><SUP>61</SUP> according to the PV, we are to imagine that:- <ol type="a"><li>A ship with a broken engine ceases to exist; </li><li>Adding a motor to a prior non-locomotor creates a numerically different individual;</li><li>Moving the engine from one ship to another makes the recipient identical to the donor.</li><li>If locomotor has two engines  by analogy with the two cerebral hemispheres  fission paradoxes arise if they are <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">transplanted</A><SUP>62</SUP>. </li><li>If a locomotor (eg. Stephen Hawking) loses its means of locomotion, it perishes, even though it is otherwise fully functional </ol></li><li>Why is the locomotor theory so daft? <ol type="a"><li>Compare crabs and barnacles. Our theory is unimpressed by evolutionary proximity and similar physiology but insists that they  and even crabs that cannot move  belong to different substantial kinds. </li><li>Juvenile barnacles are locomotors  pending their attachment to their rock  so are numerically distinct from their sessile adults, having  on this theory  different persistence conditions. </li><li>If we compare a healthy crab with a model airplane they are anatomically utterly distinct and have different ways of maintaining themselves  or being maintained  in existence. But our locomotor theorist is unimpressed  the fact that they are both locomotors is sufficient for them to form a kind. </li><li>If  somehow  crabs and battleships did have the same persistence conditions  different to barnacles and rowboats  we would not expect this to be because the former are locomotors and the latter not, but because  contrary to all expectation  crabs and battleships turned out to have some more significant feature in common. </li><li>Self-locomotion is just not the sort of feature that <em>could</em> determine an object s persistence conditions. <em>Locomotor</em> could not be a substance-concept. </ol></li><li>Further:- <ol type="a"><li>If you ask  what s that pointing to a crab, and get the answer  a locomotor , this doesn t answer your question. Lots of things can move, but what is this one? So, what s wrong with the  locomotor answer?</li><li>Olson thinks this is a difficult matter, but that part of the problem is that locomotion is dispositional or functional property realized in a wide variety of intrinsic structures. Locomotors may have little in common beyond the ability to perform a certain task  and even that may be grounded in completely different internal structures. </li><li>Morover, some non-locomotors have more in common with some locomotors than different locomotors have with one another. </li><li>So, locomotion appears to be a <em>superficial</em> similarity. A difference or similarity in one particular ability need have no wider significance. </li><li>locomotion is a mere capacity  and one that is not closely connected to a thing s internal structure. Anything whatever that is functionally-equivalent will do. <BR>Hence, <em>Locomotor</em> is a functional kind, rather than a substance-concept. </ol></li><li>Assuming that this is a correct diagnosis of the problems with  locomotors , Olson now makes the explicit comparison with way the PV takes  person to be a substance-concept:- <ol type="a"><li><em>Person</em> also seems to be a functional kind rather than a substance-concept. To be a person is to have certain mental properties, and  according to a <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3508_63">widely-accepted theory</A></U><SUB>63</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3508_63"></A>  these are essentially dispositions. Mental states have causal powers, and there s no a priori reason why these have to be grounded in brain-states. Other structures  in Martians or computers  might do just as well, so such beings might also be people. </li><li> Personhood is  like locomotion  <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3508_64">merely</A></U><SUB>64</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3508_64"></A> a capacity of a thing. Olson claims  maybe improbably  that the various candidate persons have less in common than crabs and battleships (candidate locomotors). So, saying someone is a person tells us even less about them than calling them a locomotor. </li><li>Olson points out the PV analogies to the  daft consequences of the locomotor theory given above. While the analogies are fairly obvious, some of what he has to say is sufficiently contentious to be worth remarking on. </ol></li><li> Daft consequences:- <ol type="a"><li>Olson claims that just as a barnacle larva would cease to exist on losing its locomotive capacity, so would a human organism cease to exist on losing its mental capacities  and both are numerically distinct from the sessile / non-cognitive beings that supersede them. <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3508_65">This seems a conceptual error to me</A></U><SUB>65</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3508_65"></A>. </li><li>He also points out the intended analogy that a <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1013.htm">cerebrum</A><SUP>66</SUP> transfer extinguishes the recipient animal. I think this is open to the same objection. </li><li>Both theories claim that different members of the <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3508_67">same biological species</A></U><SUB>67</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3508_67"></A> may fall under different substance concepts, and have completely different persistence conditions. </li><li>Olson will consider these matters further in <BR>&rarr; Chapter 4: "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3510.htm">Olson (Eric) - Was I Ever a Fetus? (Human Animal)</A>", and<BR>&rarr; Chapter 5: "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3511.htm">Olson (Eric) - Are People Animals?</A>"</ol></li><li>So, supporters of the PV need to explain why <em>person</em> is a substance-concept, while <em>locomotor</em> isn t. </li><li>The BV doesn t have this problem, as <em><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animal</A><SUP>68</SUP></em> and similar variants are paradigm-cases of substance-concepts, and an <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3508_69">excellent answer</A></U><SUB>69</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3508_69"></A> to the question  what is it that thinks . </li></ol></li><li>Olson now considers the objection that personhood is more than a mere dispositional property and having certain psychological capacities. Maybe it is more like <em>animal</em> or <em>immaterial substance</em> than <em>locomotor</em>. <ol type="i"><li>It s hard to evaluate this claim without an <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3508_70">actual proposal</A></U><SUB>70</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3508_70"></A>. </li><li>However, Olson doesn t think it ll be possible because the difference between persons and non-persons of the same ((human) species is simply a matter of what they can <em>do</em>  one can think and act and the other  an anencephalic infant, say  cannot. </li><li>Of course, these abilities  or the lack thereof  are grounded in neural structures, but these are not part of the concept of a person since non-human, non-biological persons can be such without any biological brains at all. It s only what the brain can <em>do</em> that s important. </li></ol></li><li>Can t we <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3508_71">restrict</A></U><SUB>71</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3508_71"></A> the scope of the PV to <em>human</em> people? <ol type="i"><li>Olson thinks it would be  surprising if the PV only applied to human people. </li><li>Even if there are in fact only human people, there might have been non-human ones. </li><li>Such non-human-persons  whether angels or aliens  would have the same reasons for accepting the PV as human persons. Why should they be mistaken and we correct? </li><li>It seems that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3508_72">some versions of the PV</A></U><SUB>72</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3508_72"></A>  eg. <A HREF = "../../../Authors/U/Author_Unger (Peter).htm">Peter Unger</A> s  require physical as well as <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_16.htm">psychological continuity</A><SUP>73</SUP>, so cannot apply to immaterial people. </li><li>But  says Olson  we should not expect such an account to be true of material people unless some generalization were true of immaterial people. </li><li>That is, if <em>we</em> survive just in case our mental capacities are preserved in a physically continuous way  we should expect <em>any</em> person to survive just in case her mental capacities are preserved in <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3508_74">some analogous way</A></U><SUB>74</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3508_74"></A>. </li></ol> </li></ul></li><li><b> Person P<SUB>1</SUB> and Time t<SUB>1</SUB> </b><ul type="disc"><li>Olson now turns to a technical matter that he says deserves more attention than it has received, though it  may never have led anyone astray so the bored are <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3508_75">encouraged to skip</A></U><SUB>75</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3508_75"></A>!</li><li>The problem of PID is usually stated as the filling in of the dots in a statement like <ul type="square"><b>A</b>: x at time t is identical to y at time t* iff & </ul>with a criterion of identity. </li><li>But, how are we to understand the variables and times? Should we make substitutions like in the formulation below? <ul type="square"><b>B</b>: Tom today is identical to Tim tomorrow iff & </ul></li><li>How are we to understand the <b>temporal</b> qualifications? <ol type="i"><li>They seem to be adverbs telling us <em>when</em> the predicates are true of the subjects. So, is <b>B</b> telling us that the identity holds between Tom and Tim at two different times, just like Tom might visit Tim at two different times? In that case, the formulation would be <ul type="square"><b>C</b>: Tom and Tim are one, both today and tomorrow, iff & </ul></li><li>Olson thinks this cannot be right. There is no point qualifying a predicate with an adverb unless different adverbs can change the truth value of the sentence. Tom doesn t visit Tim all the time, but if Tom and Tim are one, they are <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3508_76">necessarily</A></U><SUB>76</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3508_76"></A> so and not just identical at certain times. It s as odd as saying  5 is greater than 3 in Cleveland . </li><li>However, a possibility is that the temporal predicates merely indicate that Tom and Tim exist at the times in question. This would lead to <ul type="square"><b>D</b>: Tom and Tim are identical, and exist today and tomorrow, iff & </ul></li><li><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3508_77">Hence</A></U><SUB>77</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3508_77"></A>, the temporal adverbs in <b>A</b> and <b>B</b> modify the predicate  exists  which appears in the  deep structure of the sentences  rather than  is identical with . If so, it is at best misleading to use them to talk of identity through time. Additionally, the order of the temporal adverbs could be reversed without affecting the sense, and one could be omitted while leaving a meaningful sentence. </li><li>Olson doesn t think this is what philosophers want to say when using  x at t . When we fill out <b>A</b> to become <ul type="square">x at t is identical to y at t* iff x at t is psychologically continuous with y at t*</ul>we cannot simply reverse the times or leave one out without changing the meaning. </li></ol></li><li>Some have argued against the adverbial use of the temporal predicates, saying what is meant by  Tom today is a noun phrase signifying the temporal part of Tom that occurs today. <ul type="square"><li>We are referred to "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3662.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - Plantinga on Trans-world Identity</A>" (1985) and to Chapter 7 ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3513.htm">Olson (Eric) - The Human Animal: Alternatives</A>"), Section III. </li><li>This proposal seems to give us an awkward choice. Either:-<ol type="i"><li>The  identity statement is not talking about identity at all, but is saying that the  today part of Tom is part of the same person as the  tomorrow part of Tim, or </li><li>If it <em>is</em> talking about identity, it s making a false statement as temporal parts even of the same individual cannot be identical unless they are the very same part, though "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3662.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - Plantinga on Trans-world Identity</A>", p. 106 shows how the temporal-part theorist can avoid this. </li></ol> </li><li>In any case, this option is only open to those who espouse the  contentious doctrine of temporal parts. Olson will discuss this in Chapter 7 (see reference above). </li><li>However, there is a kernel of truth in this proposal & </li></ul> </li><li>How are we to understand the <b>relata</b> of the identity predicate? <ol type="i"><li>The temporal adverbs do not modify the identity predicate. Rather, they determine the <em>relata</em> of that predicate:  they are components of complex noun phrases . </li><li> Tom and  Tim are bad examples as their reference cannot be modified by temporal qualification: they are <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3508_78">rigid designators</A></U><SUB>78</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3508_78"></A>. </li><li>A better example would be of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3508_79">Definite Descriptions</A></U><SUB>79</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3508_79"></A>;  the sapling back then &  the tree today . </li><li>So, Schema <b>A</b> is  if interpreted in the usual way  both semantically and grammatically confused. A better attempt would be:- <ul type="square">The x that is F at t is the y that is G at t*</ul> </li></ol></li><li>So, if we interpret the temporal expressions in identity statements as closet Definite Descriptions, what are we+XX+ to make of the conditions of identity? <ol type="i"><li>We are referred to "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_40.htm">Noonan (Harold) - Personal Identity</A>", Chapter 1 - "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3963.htm">Noonan (Harold) - An Initial Survey</A>" p. 13 ( The revised <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_16.htm">psychological continuity</A><SUP>80</SUP> criterion ) <ul type="square">P2 at t2 is the same person as P1 at t1 iff <b>P2 at t2 is psychologically continuous with P1 at t1</b></ul></li><li><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_16.htm">Psychological continuity</A><SUP>81</SUP> is a 4-place relation between two people and two times. </li><li>Olson gives an example of someone who suffered some radical psychological change (then) 10 years ago. She is now psychologically continuous with herself following this change, but not with herself before the change  as is agreed by both those who say she survived the change and <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3508_82">those who deny it</A></U><SUB>82</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3508_82"></A>. We cannot leave out the times. </li><li>So, Olson claims that the least misleading way of claiming that <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_16.htm">psychological continuity</A><SUP>83</SUP> is <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3508_84">necessary</A></U><SUB>84</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3508_84"></A> for a person to persist is:- <ul type="square">Necessarily, for any x that is a person at t, and any y that exists at another time t*, x=y only if x is at t psychologically continuous with y as she is at t*. </ul> </li></ol> </li></ul> </li></ol></P><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U> ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3508.htm">Olson (Eric) - Persistence</A>")</B><a name="On-Page_Link_P3508_1"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3508_1"><B>Footnote 1</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>In these Notes, I ve not been especially careful to distinguish Olson s points from my own, nor even Olson s points here from those he makes elsewhere. </li><li>See also the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_8/Notes_843.htm">general disclaimer</a>. </li><li>This write-up is logged as a Paper Abstract rather than a Write-up Note. This is contrary to my current standard, and I will make the appropriate adjustment when I ve completed annotating the whole book. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3508_2"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3508_2"><B>Footnote 2</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>As always, Olson says  people rather than  persons . </li><li>Maybe he means by  people specifically <em>human</em> persons, but I doubt it. </li><li>I will usually restrain myself from complaining about this usage further, and will often follow Olson s usage without comment. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3508_3"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3508_3"><B>Footnote 3</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>I won t repeat the formalism here, but just draw out salient points. </li><li>Olson s preferred formulation is given at the end of Section 4 of this Chapter. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3508_4"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3508_4"><B>Footnote 4</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Olson refers to continuity rather than connectedness, which is open to objection. </li><li>See my Note on <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_60.htm">Continuity versus Connectedness</a>. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P3508_5"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3508_5"><B>Footnote 5</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>He gives a formula, and says that nothing Wiggins says would make it  illegitimate, incomplete or incomprehensible . </li><li>This may be the case, but the reason for this is that when the comparison is made, the  thing would have a covering concept applied  for instance  is this <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animal</a> in a PVS numerically identical to this person? . Olson just wants to keep the covering concept of the later individual open  and I agree. </li><li>It would have been helpful if Olson had supplied a reference to Wiggins. I ll add this later. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P3508_6"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3508_6"><B>Footnote 6</B></A></U>: Several issues here:- <ol type="1"><li>Olson doesn t use the term  Kind immediately, but does so when he gets to shared office-holders forming a kind. </li><li>Do  persons as such form a kind? This  presumably  depends what we mean by  kind . Olson seems to use it where others might use  sort or <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_10.htm">Sortal</a>. </li><li>Can the very same individual change its kind? Again, this depends whether it s a substance-kind or not. </li><li>See my notes on <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_80.htm">Kinds</a>, <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">Natural Kinds</a> and <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_37.htm">Metamorphosis</a>. </li></ol><a name="On-Page_Link_P3508_8"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3508_8"><B>Footnote 8</B></A></U>: I don t really see the analogy, but agree with what Olson says. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3508_9"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3508_9"><B>Footnote 9</B></A></U>: Olson s usual annoying usage. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3508_10"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3508_10"><B>Footnote 10</B></A></U>: Also, see my <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_9.htm">Note</a>. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3508_12"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3508_12"><B>Footnote 12</B></A></U>: I need to re-read this paper by Wiggins to determine what he means. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3508_15"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3508_15"><B>Footnote 15</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>It seems impossible not to be tendentious here. </li><li>Olson  rightly  says that the traditional account of personal identity stacks the deck against the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm">animalist</a> by insisting that the individual under consideration remain a person. </li><li>But saying that  we might survive in a PVS assumes that we are <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animals</a>. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3508_16"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3508_16"><B>Footnote 16</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>This will be as <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_29.htm">phase sortals</a>. </li><li>Alternatively as properties, or honorifics. </li><li>The important point is that  person  and the other kinds  are not substance kinds but are phases or categories of things that are substance kinds. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3508_17"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3508_17"><B>Footnote 17</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>He would, wouldn t he! </li><li>Upholders of the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_114.htm">PV</a>  particularly those willing to contemplate <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_86.htm">MPD</a>  no doubt find the narrow question of great interest. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P3508_19"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3508_19"><B>Footnote 19</B></A></U>: This is an important point, which is that  given that on this view you survive the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">transplant</a> in the form of the recipient, the  brainless relict cannot be you, as the BV claims. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3508_24"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3508_24"><B>Footnote 24</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>This seems to beg the question against the supporters of the PV, at least at this point in the argument.</li><li>If  person turns out to be a substance concept, then all persons might have the same persistence-conditions  qua person , though an intelligent computer  qua computer  would have different persistence conditions to a <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animal</a>. </li><li>Also, if the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_25.htm">Constitution View</a> is correct, the very same person might be constituted by individuals with very different persistence conditions (mortal and immortal bodies, for instance). </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3508_26"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3508_26"><B>Footnote 26</B></A></U>: The omission of  human here is benign, as the animals being compared are both human. Olson doesn t contemplate the possibility of princes turning into frogs. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3508_28"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3508_28"><B>Footnote 28</B></A></U>: Because it assumes that <em>we</em> are <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animals</a>, just as the PV assumes that we are persons. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3508_31"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3508_31"><B>Footnote 31</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>I suspect this is more complicated than is said here.</li><li>Hares and rabbits  or even rabbits and foxes  probably have the same persistence conditions, but we can t have rabbits metamorphosing into foxes. </li><li>That said, maybe they may share all their persistence conditions bar one   being a hare (or what have you). </li><li>However, in the cases we re considering in the book, the persistence conditions between persons and non-persons are different. Something that has no mental contents or capacities cannot have its persistence conditions in virtue of these qualities; so the persistence conditions of <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_71.htm">fetuses</a> and persons (assuming both to be substance-concepts  though  <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_71.htm">fetus </a> is a <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_29.htm">phase sortal</a> of  animal ) must differ. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3508_32"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3508_32"><B>Footnote 32</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>This claim presumably relies on the further claim  disputed by holders of the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_25.htm">constitution view</a>  that exemplifiers of two different substance-concepts cannot be in the same place at the same time (ie.  person and  human body , in Baker s formulation). </li><li>See "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_422.htm">Wiggins (David) - On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time</A>", the write-up of which I need to complete! </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3508_35"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3508_35"><B>Footnote 35</B></A></U>: They do have persistence criteria, of course, but these criteria are derivative of the substance concept under which they fall   <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animal </a> or  human being in the case of human children. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3508_38"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3508_38"><B>Footnote 38</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Surely the narrower category takes precedence?</li><li>Gorillas are primates, mammals, chordates, & but they are most fundamentally gorillas. </li><li>I need to think about this a bit harder  the issue isn t just about classification, but about persistence conditions, and visualizing what s supposed to be going on is difficult because of the counter-factual nature of it all   person isn t a substance concept, and persons and gorillas don t share all their persistence conditions. </li><li>Presumably the argument is that the  has the same persistence conditions as relation forms equivalence classes, which are the  abiding sorts . </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P3508_40"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3508_40"><B>Footnote 40</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>I agree, even though it seems to be an argument for the PV. </li><li>Certainly the motivation for holding that <em>person</em> is a substance concept is the PV. </li><li>But maybe all it shows is that if you don t think that <em>person</em> is a substance concept, then a good argument for the PV disappears. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3508_42"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3508_42"><B>Footnote 42</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>As always, it depends on the referent of the term. </li><li>It might be inappropriate to call a human being with lost athletic abilities  an athlete , so in that sense, the athlete doesn t persist. </li><li>But, of course, the human being does. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3508_45"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3508_45"><B>Footnote 45</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>I m confused by this.</li><li>See an earlier footnote on <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_37.htm">metamorphosis</a>. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P3508_46"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3508_46"><B>Footnote 46</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>See the earlier comments on hierarchies of substance terms.</li><li>Isn t what we  most fundamentally are the term with narrowest scope that includes all of us, and none that aren t of us? </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3508_53"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3508_53"><B>Footnote 53</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>What is Olson s evidence for this? </li><li>There might still be computers or angels that are persons of whom the BV is irrelevant. </li><li>This seems to show how easy it is to slide from using  people for  persons to thinking or saying that  people are all and only human beings. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P3508_54"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3508_54"><B>Footnote 54</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Olson says the same of phase-sorts people. </li><li>He seems at this point to allow that there might be a concept that necessarily has no members  ie. that is incoherent. </li><li>But read on ...! </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3508_55"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3508_55"><B>Footnote 55</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>See the previous note.</li><li>So  presumably  Olson will argue that not only are there no persons that fall under this concept, but that it is incoherent and that even the supposed concept doesn t exist. </li><li>If so, the argument is probably unsound. </li><li>It s probably the case that there can be no <u>biological</u> persons who fall under the substance-person concept, but there might be non-biological persons that do. </li><li>In which case we  in that we are persons  would have to be persons in a different sense to those putative substance-concept persons. We d temporarily share some attributes of those who have these attributes essentially. </li><li>Let s see! </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3508_56"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3508_56"><B>Footnote 56</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>We need to watch out for this suggestion that  person and  thinker are similar concepts. </li><li> Thinker is obviously an individual of any kind that thinks  ie. has an ability and inclination to perform a particular action. </li><li>Olson can validly rubbish the idea that  thinker might be a substance-concept & by comparing it to  locomoter  one who moves  but this won t necessarily work with  person . </li><li> Person is a much more complex concept, and is taken to have moral content  in particular a moral status that is fairly independent of attributes. </li><li><A HREF = "../../../Authors/B/Author_Baker (Lynne Rudder).htm">Lynne Rudder Baker</A>  who Olson tends to ignore in irritation  argues (albeit unsoundly, in my view) that when a person  defined as a being with a <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_22.htm">FPP</a>  comes into existence, there is an ontological change, rather than just an attribute change. </li><li>Olson (and I) need to engage with her arguments carefully, and not set up straw men. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3508_57"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3508_57"><B>Footnote 57</B></A></U>: This is a bit slippery  a person is not just supposed to <u>think</u> they are morally accountable, but to actually <u>have</u> a moral status  an ontological claim. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3508_58"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3508_58"><B>Footnote 58</B></A></U>: As usual, Olson takes this as indicating  numerically identical to rather than  as Baker would argue   <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_25.htm">constituted by</a> . <a name="On-Page_Link_P3508_60"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3508_60"><B>Footnote 60</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21108.htm">Hershenov (David) - Olson's Account of Function and Substance Concepts</A>" considers this argument carefully, and finds it wanting. </li><li>For now I ll ignore Hershenov s objections and focus on Olson s arguments myself. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P3508_63"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3508_63"><B>Footnote 63</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>I m not sure how important one s particular theory of mind is here  and whether acceptance of a materialist theory, as distinct from thinking of the mind as dualistically distinct from matter, is critical to the argument. </li><li>A <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_124.htm">dualist</a> might well believe there to be a single mental substance that interacts somehow with a variety of material infrastructures, if required by thought in material beings; immaterial beings would be pure thinking things. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3508_64"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3508_64"><B>Footnote 64</B></A></U>: This exposes Olson to Baker s complaint that he (and others)  <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_28.htm">don t take persons seriously</a> . <a name="On-Page_Link_P3508_65"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3508_65"><B>Footnote 65</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>What is said to cease to exist is the locomotor / person, not the barnacle / <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animal</a>. </li><li>These substance theories would need to explain how their preferred substance could be co-located with another. </li><li>Olson recognizes this later with his  <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_8/Notes_872.htm">thinking animal</a> argument. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3508_67"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3508_67"><B>Footnote 67</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Again, I think this is wrong  the theories both claim that the person / locomotor is numerically distinct from the coincident constituting individual. </li><li>There is no claim that species-members  qua species-members  have different persistence conditions depending on the their cognitive / locomotive capacities. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3508_69"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3508_69"><B>Footnote 69</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>I agree absolutely.</li><li>In general, I agree with Olson s conclusions; I m just not sure of some of his arguments. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3508_70"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3508_70"><B>Footnote 70</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_66.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View</A>" wasn t published until 2000, a year after "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_130.htm">Olson (Eric) - The Human Animal - Personal Identity Without Psychology</A>".</li><li>However, in that book s Preface, Baker notes that she d recently published:-<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5632.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - The First-Person Perspective: A Test For Naturalism</A>" (1998), <BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4282.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - What Am I?</A>" (1999), and<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5161.htm">Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Unity without Identity: A New Look at Material Constitution</A>" (1999)</li><li>However, these may also have been too late for Olson to have had to hand.</li><li>His References include no reference to Baker. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3508_71"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3508_71"><B>Footnote 71</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>The suggestion and ensuing discussion is similar to that in the philosophy of mind to the debate between identity-theorists ( pain is a brain state ) and functionalists ( pain is an avoidance disposition ). </li><li>Just what is it that makes human-pain and octopus-pain (or alien pain) both pain is pain is a brain state? </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3508_72"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3508_72"><B>Footnote 72</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Unger was (or pretended to be) once a <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_87.htm">nihilist</a>, but changed his mind. </li><li>Olson discusses Unger fairly extensively in pp. 82-84 of "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3510.htm">Olson (Eric) - Was I Ever a Fetus? (Human Animal)</A>". </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3508_74"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3508_74"><B>Footnote 74</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>This strikes me as a bit quick!</li><li>Just what would the  analogous way be for immaterial people?</li><li>Continuity of immaterial substance, presumably. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3508_75"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3508_75"><B>Footnote 75</B></A></U>: I ve analyzed what Olson has to say  in my usual plodding way  to make sure I ve  got it . <a name="On-Page_Link_P3508_76"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3508_76"><B>Footnote 76</B></A></U>: This assumes the standard account of Identity (<A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_12.htm">Click here for Note</A>) rather than  say  <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_63.htm">contingent identity</a>. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3508_77"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3508_77"><B>Footnote 77</B></A></U>: Olson doesn t make the logical transition to this bullet explicit, but I think this is what he intends. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3508_78"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3508_78"><B>Footnote 78</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Olson doesn t use this technical term, but that s what he means. </li><li>I ve always been suspicious of the use of names (Goliath and Lump1) in "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_444.htm">Gibbard (Allan) - Contingent Identity</A>".</li><li>But, I now note, "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20390.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Gibbard,  Contingent Identity </A>" has it that  (the paper) is supposed to serve as a counter-example to Kripke s claim that all true identity statements between proper names are necessary. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P3508_79"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3508_79"><B>Footnote 79</B></A></U>: Comment initially as above, though Olson does use it shortly!<a name="On-Page_Link_P3508_82"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3508_82"><B>Footnote 82</B></A></U>: This story is difficult to relate without pre-judging the issue of identity. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3508_84"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3508_84"><B>Footnote 84</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Olson omits the sufficiency claim, for some reason. </li><li>He also omits the condition that y be a person at t*, though maybe this is implied by the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_16.htm">psychological continuity</a> condition. </li><li>Note my usual caveat about <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_60.htm">continuity versus connectedness</a>. People say  the stodgy conservative now is not the same person as the radical revolutionary of 60 years ago , even though the views might have changed  continuously , rather than by some Damascus event. This sort of case arises where  future directives are to be taken into account (or not). This is the sort of issue <A HREF = "../../../Authors/P/Author_Parfit (Derek).htm">Derek Parfit</A> raises. </li></ul> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3509.htm">Olson (Eric) - Why We Need Not Accept the Psychological Approach</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: The Human Animal, September 1999, Chapter 3, pp. 42-72<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Oxford Scholarship Online</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Most arguments for the Psychological Approach are based on the conviction that anyone who got your psychological features would be you. </li><li>The possibility of fission proves this conviction false. </li><li>Those who think that identity has no practical importance will find it even more difficult to argue for the Psychological Approach. </li></ol></FONT><U>Sections</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="I"><li>The <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">Transplant</A><SUP>1</SUP> Intuition</li><li><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">Whole-Brain Transplants</A><SUP>2</SUP></li><li>Fission and Hemispherectomy</li><li>Prudential Concern</li><li>Moral Responsibility</li><li>The Treatment Argument</li><li>The Same Person</li><li>Practical Consequences of the Biological Approach </li></ol></FONT><BR><u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3509_3">Annotations</A></U><SUB>3</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3509_3"></A></u><ol type="I"><li><b>The <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">Transplant</A><SUP>4</SUP> Intuition</b> <ul type="disc"><li>Olson wants to give the arguments in favour of the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_114.htm">PV</A><SUP>5</SUP> for two reasons:- <ol type="i"><li>If there are compelling arguments for a theory, difficulties are merely opportunities for further research. So, Olson must show that the arguments for the PV are unpersuasive. </li><li>It would be  gratifying to find what has led astray  the great many thoughtful and intelligent philosophers who have accepted the PV. </li></ol></li><li>Olson will attempt both  by arguing that the PV rests on practical considerations that:- <ol type="i"><li>Do not provide clear support for the PV, and</li><li>May well be compatible with the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_53.htm">BV</A><SUP>6</SUP>. </li></ol></li><li>Olson rehearses a variant of the sort of story that  he says  most arguments for the PV are based on:- <ol type="i"><li>The story is a variant of Locke s  Prince and Cobbler , but in this case <b>Prince</b> s psychology is transferred to <b>Cobbler</b> s head by means of a <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1013.htm">cerebrum</A><SUP>7</SUP> <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">transplant</A><SUP>8</SUP>, Cobbler s <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3509_9">cerebrum being destroyed</A></U><SUB>9</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3509_9"></A>. </li><li>Two <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3509_10">human beings</A></U><SUB>10</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3509_10"></A> result from this  <b>Brainy</b> and <b>Brainless</b>. </li><li><b>Brainy</b>: Has Cobbler s body  so looks like him, but has Prince s memories and character, but remembers nothing of Cobbler s past. </li><li><b>Brainless</b>: has Cobbler s body, is alive, but has no psychology  he s effectively in a <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_111.htm">PVS</A><SUP>11</SUP>. </li></ol></li><li>So, what has happened to Prince? <ol type="i"><li>Many  intuit that he goes with his organ of cognition. Despite physical appearances to the contrary, Brainy is Prince, and believes  indeed  himself so to be. </li><li>The first thing Brainy will want to know <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3509_12">when he wakes up</A></U><SUB>12</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3509_12"></A> is why his new body is strange to him, and what happened to his old one. </li></ol> </li><li>And what has happened to Cobbler? <ol type="i"><li>Olson doesn t  at this point  discuss this. </li><li>But  since Prince occupies Cobbler s body  we may presume Cobbler is no more  he ceased to exist when his <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3509_13">cerebrum was destroyed</A></U><SUB>13</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3509_13"></A>. </li></ol></li><li>Who is Brainless? <ol type="i"><li>Brainless looks like Prince, but has little of what made Prince  Prince . Indeed, he s not a person at all if personhood requires certain mental powers. </li><li>If Prince s <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1013.htm">cerebrum</A><SUP>14</SUP> had not been <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">transplanted</A><SUP>15</SUP> but simply destroyed, that would have been the end of Prince  who would be just like Brainless in our story. </li></ol> </li><li>So, Olson constructs an <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3509_16">argument for the PV</A></U><SUB>16</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3509_16"></A> as follows:- <ol type="i"><li>Prince  in the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">transplant</A><SUP>17</SUP> story  is Brainy.</li><li>So, one survives over time iff one s mental contents and capacities are preserved (perhaps with <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3509_18">further constraints</A></U><SUB>18</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3509_18"></A>). </li></ol></li><li>Olson calls the inclination  the hunch or <em>pull</em> to say that Prince survives as Brainy the <em><b><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">Transplant</A><SUP>19</SUP> Intuition</b></em> (hereafter TI). <ol type="i"><li>One could also argue for the PV from the intuition that Prince does not survive as Brainless  the <em><b>Vegetable Intuition</b></em>.</li><li>However, Olson will focus on the TI because it has <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3509_20">received more attention</A></U><SUB>20</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3509_20"></A>  and if we can resist this intuition, the other will be easy pickings. </li></ol></li><li>Olson rejects the PV despite feeling the pull of the TI:- <ol type="i"><li>Because he accepts the BV, he is committed to rejecting the premise of the TI  you do not  go with your <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1013.htm">cerebrum </A><SUP>21</SUP>, but simply lose your organ of thought as you would your liver. Prince is not Brainy but Brainless.</li><li>He rejects the intuition because he believes  for other theoretical reasons to be laid out in later chapters  that Prince is a living organism, and that no living organism was once Prince and later Brainy. </li><li>In addition, supporters of the PV have to defend their intuition against counter-intuitive consequences. </li></ol> </li><li>Olson now provides  in summary  some excellent arguments as to why the TI has a  pull . It relies on some principles that may well be true, but which the BV can also accommodate:- <ol type="i"><li>Prince should be providentially concerned about what happens to Brainy rather than Brainless.</li><li>Brainy is morally responsible for Prince s actions, but not for Cobbler s.</li><li>Everyone would feel compelled to treat Brainy as Prince. </li></ol></li><li>All these practical concerns are perfectly valid, but don t require numerical identity. Olson will postpone their discussion until Section IV.</li><li>He will now proceed to:- <ol type="i"><li>Section II: Discuss why the version of the TI just presented differs from that usually offered, and then</li><li>Section III: Argue that the conclusion of the TI argument for the PV doesn t follow from its premise. </li></ol> </li></ul></li><li><b><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">Whole-Brain Transplants</A><SUP>22</SUP></b> <ul type="disc"><li>Why has Olson used a <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">cerebrum transplant</A><SUP>23</SUP> rather than a <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">WBT</A><SUP>24</SUP> as his TE? We re referred to "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3547.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - Brain Transplants</A>".</li><li>His reason  of course  is that a <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">cerebrum transplant</A><SUP>25</SUP> differentiates supporters of the PV from those of the BV. </li><li>When the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1013.htm">cerebrum</A><SUP>26</SUP> is removed, the relict is clearly a living animal, but this is not so when the whole <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_55.htm">brain</A><SUP>27</SUP>  including the brain-stem  is removed. The whole brain is not  just another organ  because of its regulatory function. Without it, the animal is dead  a corpse. </li><li>This has led to some to argue that the whole brain is  once removed  a <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3509_28">maximally-mutilated animal</A></U><SUB>28</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3509_28"></A>  still alive, initially at least. </li><li>So, the <em>Whole <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">Brain Transplant</A><SUP>29</SUP> Intuition</em>  that  you would go with your brain might be consistent with <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm">Animalism</A><SUP>30</SUP>. </li><li>However, this intuition is commonly held for the wrong reason. We don t  go with our brain because it is the bearer of our psychology, and the recipient of my brain is psychologically continuous with me, but because it is a pared-down animal. </li><li>Because of this confusion  and because anyone who holds the <em>Whole <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">Brain Transplant</A><SUP>31</SUP> Intuition</em> for psychological reasons will also hold the <em><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1013.htm">(Cerebrum)</A><SUP>32</SUP> <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">Transplant</A><SUP>33</SUP> Intuition</em> to the same degree, Olson is right to focus on the latter. </li></ul></li><li><b>Fission and Hemispherectomy</b> <ul type="disc"><li>The TE in the previous section is varied so that <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3509_34">the two hemispheres</A></U><SUB>34</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3509_34"></A> are <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">transplanted</A><SUP>35</SUP> into different skulls  resulting in Lefty and Righty. <ol type="i"><li>Since both Lefty and Righty are psychologically and physically continuous with the donor, they are both perfect candidates for being that person. </li><li>However, as they are not identical to one another, the transitivity of identity says that they cannot both be identical to the donor. </li><li>There seems to be no principled reason why you should be one rather than the other. </li><li>So, you are neither, contrary to the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">transplant</A><SUP>36</SUP> intuition, unless there is some brute fact that says you are one rather than the other. </li></ol></li><li>Some claim there is such a fact:- <ol type="i"><li>The suggestion is that the two hemispheres aren t equipollent, but are differently specialized, so that one might be more closely psychologically continuous with the donor than the other, who might persist as the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_41.htm">closest continuer</A><SUP>37</SUP>.</li><li>Olson s response is that the division of labour between the hemispheres is an <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3509_38">accidental feature</A></U><SUB>38</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3509_38"></A> of the case, and is differently marked in some people than others. Some might be equipollent. </li></ol></li><li>Another response is that  while agreeing that Lefty and Righty are indeed distinct individuals  we should insist that both existed before the operation. <ol type="i"><li>We are referred to:-<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_328.htm">Perry (John) - Can the Self Divide?</A>"<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_113.htm">Lewis (David) - Survival and Identity</A>"<BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_40.htm">Noonan (Harold) - Personal Identity</A>", <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3509_39">p. 153f</A></U><SUB>39</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3509_39"></A><BR>&rarr; "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_09/Abstract_9221.htm">Robinson (John) - Personal Identity and Survival</A>"</li><li>Olson thinks that this view  that there  always two of you  whatever it s theoretical merits  undermines some of our most fundamental beliefs about ourselves. </li><li>He claims that  if you are to fission in the future  then there was never  you but only Lefty and Righty all along  two people who were <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3509_40">exactly like you</A></U><SUB>40</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3509_40"></A>. He claims that  on <A HREF = "../../../Authors/P/Author_Perry (John).htm">John Perry</A> s view  there were always three individuals, one of which becomes a <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_123.htm">scattered object</A><SUP>41</SUP> after the fission. </li><li>Olson claims that before the fission, the reference of  I is both Lefty and Righty, so that any future claim where Lefty and Righty s actions differ is <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3509_42">false</A></U><SUB>42</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3509_42"></A>. </li></ol></li><li></li><li></li><li> </li></ul></li><li><b>Prudential Concern</b> <ul type="disc"><li></li><li></li><li> </li></ul></li><li><b>Moral Responsibility</b> <ul type="disc"><li></li><li></li><li> </li></ul></li><li><b>The Treatment Argument</b> <ul type="disc"><li></li><li></li><li> </li></ul></li><li><b>The Same Person</b> <ul type="disc"><li></li><li></li><li> </li></ul></li><li><b>Practical Consequences of the Biological Approach</b> <ul type="disc"><li></li><li></li><li> </li></ul><BR> </li></ol></P><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U> ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3509.htm">Olson (Eric) - Why We Need Not Accept the Psychological Approach</A>")</B><a name="On-Page_Link_P3509_3"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3509_3"><B>Footnote 3</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>In these Notes, I ve not been especially careful to distinguish Olson s points from my own, nor even Olson s points here from those he makes elsewhere. </li><li>See also the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_8/Notes_843.htm">general disclaimer</a>. </li><li>This write-up is logged as a Paper Abstract rather than a Write-up Note. This is contrary to my current standard, and I will make the appropriate adjustment when I ve completed annotating the whole book. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3509_9"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3509_9"><B>Footnote 9</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>The <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">transplant</a> intuition would be strengthened were Cobbler s <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1013.htm">cerebrum</a> removed to a <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_56.htm">vat of nutrients</a> so that his mental life continues. We d then be even less insistent that Brainy is Cobbler. </li><li>Olson follows the standard usage of referring to both cerebral hemispheres as  the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1013.htm">cerebrum </a>. </li><li><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">Transplanting</a> single hemispheres raised the possibility of fission, but that comes later! See Section III. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P3509_10"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3509_10"><B>Footnote 10</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>I d prefer the usage  <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_30.htm">human animal</a> as  <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_74.htm">human being</a> has various meanings, one a term of art used by <A HREF = "../../../Authors/J/Author_Johnston (Mark).htm">Mark Johnston</A>.</li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3509_12"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3509_12"><B>Footnote 12</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>Since we re in the realms of Sci-Fi, and operations on the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1013.htm">cerebrum</a> are usually undertaken using only local anaesthetic, might we not imagine that Prince remains conscious throughout?</li><li>Would this strengthen the intuition? </li><li>Of course, Prince would not see or hear  and therefore not really know  what has been going on in the operation  but would remain fully conscious throughout, and therefore would not be so easily persuaded that he is not who he thinks he is when the lights come on in Cobbler s body. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3509_13"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3509_13"><B>Footnote 13</B></A></U>: See the earlier footnote. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3509_16"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3509_16"><B>Footnote 16</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>It s a bit quick, and Olson will attack it in Section III.</li><li>So, it may not be the best effort for the PV. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3509_18"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3509_18"><B>Footnote 18</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>These will include non-branching conditions, the logic of which prohibit identity-preservation. </li><li><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_121.htm">Modal</a> considerations along these lines make some insist on some physical continuity as well. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3509_20"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3509_20"><B>Footnote 20</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>OK  but it has received more attention because it is the stronger intuition - we're <u>certain</u> that we'd go with our <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1013.htm">cerebrum</a>. </li><li>However, we re less certain that we d cease to exist as Brainless  especially were it to come to being switched off. </li><li>Olson also says that we could argue for the PV based on the intuition that Cobbler does not survive as Brainy: but this is even less secure  see "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_423.htm">Williams (Bernard) - The Self and the Future</A>", though this uses a <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_48.htm">BST</a> rather than a <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">cerebrum transplant</a>. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3509_28"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3509_28"><B>Footnote 28</B></A></U>: There s lots that could be said here, but I ve covered it  or will have soon  in my various brain-related Notes:- <ul type="disc"><li><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_55.htm">Brain</a></li><li><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_909.htm">Brain Criterion</a></li><li><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_56.htm">Brains in Vats</a></li><li><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">Brain Transplants</a></li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3509_34"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3509_34"><B>Footnote 34</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>I had added  and the corpus callosum is cut , not in Olson s text, but this is not necessary. </li><li>It does appear in examples where  it is claimed  fission can be achieved by having two persons resident in the same skull without the need for practically unachievable <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">transplants</a>. </li><li>This relies on equipollency considerations as in Olson s TE. </li><li>See <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_116.htm">Commissurotomy</a>. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3509_38"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3509_38"><B>Footnote 38</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>I agree  in this case. </li><li>However, we have to keep our TEs a little under control  as we re dealing with <u>our</u> identity  <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_734.htm">what we are</a>  not identity and persistence in general. </li><li>When tinkering with the case, we have to ensure that the individual(s) under consideration remains one of us. </li></ul> <a name="On-Page_Link_P3509_39"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3509_39"><B>Footnote 39</B></A></U>: Most likely, as he s referring to the first edition, Chapter 7 ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3969.htm">Noonan (Harold) - The Reduplication Problem</A>"). <a name="On-Page_Link_P3509_40"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3509_40"><B>Footnote 40</B></A></U>: This is based on the equipollency supposition. <a name="On-Page_Link_P3509_42"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3509_42"><B>Footnote 42</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>The truth-value of future contingents is moot in any case. </li><li>See <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1166.htm">Aristotle s Sea Battle</a>. </li></ul> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3510.htm">Olson (Eric) - Was I Ever a Fetus? (Human Animal)</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: The Human Animal, September 1999, Chapter 4, pp. 73-93<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Oxford Scholarship Online</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>The Psychological Approach implies that none of us was ever an early <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_71.htm">fetus</A><SUP>1</SUP>, for none of us is in any way psychologically continuous with an early <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_71.htm">fetus</A><SUP>2</SUP>. </li><li>This raises several problems. </li><li>There follows a discussion of when we do come into being. </li></ol></FONT><BR><U>Sections</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="I"><li>The <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_71.htm">Fetus</A><SUP>3</SUP> Problem</li><li>Playing the Problem Down</li><li>Future-Directed Identity and Disjunctive Criteria</li><li>Second-Order Capacities</li><li>When Did I Begin? </li></ol></FONT><BR><u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3510_4">Annotations</A></U><SUB>4</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3510_4"></A></u><ol type="I"><li>The <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_71.htm">Fetus</A><SUP>5</SUP> Problem<ul type="disc"><li></li><li></li><li> </li></ul></li><li>Playing the Problem Down<ul type="disc"><li></li><li></li><li> </li></ul></li><li>Future-Directed Identity and Disjunctive Criteria<ul type="disc"><li></li><li></li><li> </li></ul></li><li>Second-Order Capacities<ul type="disc"><li></li><li></li><li> </li></ul></li><li>When Did I Begin? <ul type="disc"><li></li><li></li><li> </li></ul> </li></ol></P><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U> ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3510.htm">Olson (Eric) - Was I Ever a Fetus? (Human Animal)</A>")</B><a name="On-Page_Link_P3510_4"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3510_4"><B>Footnote 4</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>In these Notes, I ve not been especially careful to distinguish Olson s points from my own, nor even Olson s points here from those he makes elsewhere. </li><li>See also the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_8/Notes_843.htm">general disclaimer</a>. </li><li>This write-up is logged as a Paper Abstract rather than a Write-up Note. This is contrary to my current standard, and I will make the appropriate adjustment when I ve completed annotating the whole book. </li></ul> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3511.htm">Olson (Eric) - Are People Animals?</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: The Human Animal, September 1999, Chapter 5, pp. 94-123<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Oxford Scholarship Online</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>This chapter argues that we are animals. </li><li>Otherwise numerous metaphysical and epistemological problems arise. </li><li>It is then argued that <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animals</A><SUP>1</SUP> do not have psychological identity conditions. </li><li>Thus, our being animals is incompatible with the Psychological Approach. </li></ol></FONT><BR><U>Sections</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="I"><li>Human People or <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">Human Animals</A><SUP>2</SUP>?</li><li>Appearances</li><li>Coincidence</li><li>Personhood</li><li>Why We Are Animals</li><li>Psychological Persistence Conditions for Animals?</li><li>Death and Ceasing to Be</li><li>A Counterattack </li></ol></FONT><BR><u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3511_3">Annotations</A></U><SUB>3</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3511_3"></A></u><ol type="I"><li>Human People or <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">Human Animals</A><SUP>4</SUP>? <ul type="disc"><li></li><li></li><li> </li></ul> </li><li>Appearances<ul type="disc"><li></li><li></li><li> </li></ul> </li><li>Coincidence<ul type="disc"><li></li><li></li><li> </li></ul> </li><li>Personhood<ul type="disc"><li></li><li></li><li> </li></ul> </li><li>Why We Are Animals<ul type="disc"><li></li><li></li><li> </li></ul> </li><li>Psychological Persistence Conditions for Animals? <ul type="disc"><li></li><li></li><li> </li></ul> </li><li>Death and Ceasing to Be<ul type="disc"><li></li><li></li><li> </li></ul> </li><li>A Counterattack <ul type="disc"><li></li><li></li><li> </li></ul> </li></ol></P><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U> ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3511.htm">Olson (Eric) - Are People Animals?</A>")</B><a name="On-Page_Link_P3511_3"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3511_3"><B>Footnote 3</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>In these Notes, I ve not been especially careful to distinguish Olson s points from my own, nor even Olson s points here from those he makes elsewhere. </li><li>See also the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_8/Notes_843.htm">general disclaimer</a>. </li><li>This write-up is logged as a Paper Abstract rather than a Write-up Note. This is contrary to my current standard, and I will make the appropriate adjustment when I ve completed annotating the whole book. </li></ul> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3512.htm">Olson (Eric) - The Biological Approach</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: The Human Animal, September 1999, Chapter 6, pp. 124-153<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Oxford Scholarship Online</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>This chapter discusses what an animal or an organism is and what it takes for one to persist. </li><li>Following Locke and van Inwagen, it is proposed that an animal persists as long as its biological life continues. </li><li>The Biological Approach is then distinguished from the bodily criterion of personal identity. </li></ol></FONT> <BR><U>Sections</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="I"><li>Further Questions</li><li>Organisms</li><li>The Identity of Organisms</li><li>Lives</li><li>Brainstem Replacement and Other Difficulties</li><li>The Bodily Criterion </li></ol></FONT><BR><u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3512_1">Annotations</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3512_1"></A></u><ol type="I"><li>Further Questions<ul type="disc"><li></li><li></li><li> </li></ul></li><li>Organisms<ul type="disc"><li></li><li></li><li> </li></ul></li><li>The Identity of Organisms<ul type="disc"><li></li><li></li><li> </li></ul></li><li>Lives<ul type="disc"><li></li><li></li><li> </li></ul></li><li>Brainstem Replacement and Other Difficulties<ul type="disc"><li></li><li></li><li> </li></ul></li><li>The Bodily Criterion<ul type="disc"><li></li><li></li><li> </li></ul> </li></ol></P><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U> ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3512.htm">Olson (Eric) - The Biological Approach</A>")</B><a name="On-Page_Link_P3512_1"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3512_1"><B>Footnote 1</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>In these Notes, I ve not been especially careful to distinguish Olson s points from my own, nor even Olson s points here from those he makes elsewhere. </li><li>See also the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_8/Notes_843.htm">general disclaimer</a>. </li><li>This write-up is logged as a Paper Abstract rather than a Write-up Note. This is contrary to my current standard, and I will make the appropriate adjustment when I ve completed annotating the whole book. </li></ul> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3513.htm">Olson (Eric) - The Human Animal: Alternatives</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: The Human Animal, September 1999, Chapter 7, pp. 154-169<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Oxford Scholarship Online</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Discusses three claims that have been assumed in previous chapters: <ol type="i"><li>That we exist; </li><li>That there is such a thing as absolute numerical identity; and </li><li>That we are not composed of temporal parts. </ol> </li><li>One could avoid many of the book's arguments by denying any one of these claims. </li></ol></FONT><BR><U>Sections</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="I"><li>Are There Any People</li><li>Relative Identity</li><li>Temporal Parts </li></ol></FONT><BR><u><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3513_1">Annotations</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3513_1"></A></u><ol type="I"><li>Are There Any People<ul type="disc"><li></li><li></li><li> </li></ul></li><li>Relative Identity<ul type="disc"><li></li><li></li><li> </li></ul></li><li>Temporal Parts <ul type="disc"><li></li><li></li><li> </li></ul> </li></ol></P><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U> ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3513.htm">Olson (Eric) - The Human Animal: Alternatives</A>")</B><a name="On-Page_Link_P3513_1"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3513_1"><B>Footnote 1</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>In these Notes, I ve not been especially careful to distinguish Olson s points from my own, nor even Olson s points here from those he makes elsewhere. </li><li>See also the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_8/Notes_843.htm">general disclaimer</a>. </li><li>This write-up is logged as a Paper Abstract rather than a Write-up Note. This is contrary to my current standard, and I will make the appropriate adjustment when I ve completed annotating the whole book. </li></ul> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_21/PaperSummary_21972.htm">Olson (Eric) - The Human Animal: References</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: The Human Animal, September 1999, References (pp. 179-185)<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><u>Notes</u><ol type="1"><li>To save having to look these up in my database each time they occur, they are listed below. </li><li>Where I don t have a copy, this is either because the work is peripheral, out of date or too expensive for what it has to offer. </li><li>Occasionally, the link is to a different edition to that cited by Olson. I ll note this if it matters.</li><li>Compare & contrast with "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12009.htm">Olson (Eric) - What Are We? Contents + References</A>". </li></ol><BR><u>Contents</u><ul type="disc"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21855.htm">Agich (George J.) & Jones (Royce P.) - Personal Identity and Brain Death: A Critical Response</A>", Agich, 1986, pp. 267-274</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_12/Abstract_12817.htm">Anscombe (G.E.M.) - Were You a Zygote?</A>", Anscombe, 1984</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6309.htm">Aune (Bruce) - Metaphysics: The Elements</A>", Aune, 1985</li><li>Austin, C.R. 1989. <em>Human <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1243.htm">Embryos</A><SUP>1</SUP>: The Debate on Assisted Reproduction</em>. OUP</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_29.htm">Ayers (Michael R.) - Locke (Vol 2 - Ontology)</A>", Ayers, 1990</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_474.htm">Bennett (Jonathan) - A Study of Spinoza's Ethics</A>", Bennett, 1984</li><li><A HREF = "../../../Authors/B/Author_Bennett (Jonathan).htm">Jonathan Bennett</A>. 1990. <em>Linguistic Behavior</em>, 2nd Edition, Indianapolis, Hackett. </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_568.htm">Brennan (Andrew) - Conditions of Identity</A>", Brennan, 1988</li><li><A HREF = "../../../Authors/B/Author_Brock (Dan W.).htm">Dan W. Brock</A>. 1993. <em>Life and Death: Philosophical Essays in Biomedical Ethics</em>, CUP</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_15/PaperSummary_15845.htm">Brody (Baruch) - Locke on the Identity of Persons</A>", Brody, 1972, pp. 327-334</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21854.htm">Brody (Baruch) - Ethical Questions Raised by the Persistent Vegetative Patient</A>", Brody, 1988, pp. 33-37, </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6393.htm">Burke (Michael) - Copper Statues and Pieces of Copper: A Challenge to the Standard Account</A>", Burke, 1992, pp. 12-17 </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1120.htm">Cairns-Smith (A.G.) - Seven Clues to the Origin of Life - A Scientific Detective Story</A>", Cairns-Smith, 1985</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_70.htm">Carruthers (Peter) - Introducing Persons: Theories and Arguments in the Philosophy of Mind</A>", Carruthers, 1986</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_75.htm">Chisholm (Roderick) - Person and Object</A>", Chisholm, 1976</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5884.htm">Chisholm (Roderick) - Coming Into Being and Passing Away: Can the Metaphysician Help?</A>", Chisholm, 1977</li><li>Corsini, Raymond, ed. 1994. <em>Encyclopedia of Psychology</em>. NY, Wiley. </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_585.htm">Descartes (Rene), Cottingham (John), Stoothoff (Robert), Murdoch (Dugald) - The Philosophical Writings of Descartes Vol I</A>", Cottingham, 1985</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_584.htm">Descartes (Rene), Cottingham (John), Stoothoff (Robert), Murdoch (Dugald) - The Philosophical Writings of Descartes Vol II</A>", Cottingham, 1985</li><li><A HREF = "../../../Authors/C/Author_Cranford (Ronald E.).htm">Ronald E. Cranford</A>, and Harman L. Smith, 1979,  Some Critical Distinctions Between <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1028.htm">Brain Death</A><SUP>2</SUP> and the Persistent Vegetative State . Ethics in Science and Medicine 6(4): 199-209</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21981.htm">Cranford (Ronald E.) - The Persistent Vegetative State: The Medical Reality (Getting the Facts Straight)</A>", Cranford, 1988</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6463.htm">Culver (Charles M.) & Gert (Bernard) - Philosophy in Medicine: Conceptual and Ethical Issues in Medicine and Psychiatry</A>", Culver+Gert, 1982 </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_04/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_4060.htm">Davies (Brian) - An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion</A>", Davies, 1982</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_852.htm">Dawkins (Richard) - The Blind Watchmaker</A>", Dawkins, 1986</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21986.htm">Diamond (James J.) - Abortion, Animation, and Biological Hominization</A>", Diamond, 1975</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2004.htm">Doepke (Frederick) - Spatially Coinciding Objects</A>", Doepke, 1982</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_21/PaperSummary_21973.htm">Donaldson (Margaret) - Reasoning: Development in Children</A>", Donaldson, 1987</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7320.htm">Engelhardt (H. Tristram) - The Ontology of Abortion</A>", Engelhardt, 1974</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6464.htm">Flanagan (Owen) - The Science of the Mind</A>", Flanagan, 1984</li><li><A HREF = "../../../Authors/F/Author_Flower (Michael J.).htm">Michael J. Flower</A>. <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P21972_3">1985</A></U><SUB>3</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P21972_3"></A>.  Neuromaturation of the Human <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_71.htm">Fetus </A><SUP>4</SUP>. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 10: 237-251.</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1365.htm">Ford (Norman) - When Did I Begin: Conception of the Human Individual in History, Philosophy and Science</A>", Ford, 1988</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_207.htm">Frankfurt (Harry) - Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person</A>", Frankfurt, 1971</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5191.htm">Geach (Peter) - Identity</A>", Geach, 1967</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5501.htm">Gert (Bernard) - Personal Identity and the Body</A>", Gert, 1971</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_919.htm">Glover (Jonathan) - Causing Death and Saving Lives</A>", Glover, 1977</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5249.htm">Green (Michael) & Wikler (Daniel) - Brain Death and Personal Identity</A>", Green & Wickler, 1980</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_228.htm">Grice (H. Paul) - Personal Identity</A>", Grice, 1941</li><li>Grisez, Germain, and Joseph M. Boyle Jnr. 1979 <em>Life and Death with Liberty and Justice: Contribution to the Euthanasia Debate</em>. Notre Dame. </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6465.htm">Grobstein (Clifford) - The Strategy of Life</A>", Grobstein, 1964</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6466.htm">Grobstein (Clifford) - Science and the Unborn: Choosing Human Futures</A>", Grobstein, 1988</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6310.htm">Hamlyn (D.W.) - Metaphysics</A>", Hamlyn, 1984</li><li>Hastings, James, ed. 1919. <em>Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics</em>. NY. Scribner s. </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_31.htm">Heller (Mark) - The Ontology of Physical Objects: Four-Dimensional Hunks of Matter</A>", Heller, 1990</li><li><A HREF = "../../../Authors/H/Author_Hick (John).htm">John Hick</A>, 1990. <em>Philosophy of Religion</em>, 4th Ed. Prentice-Hall. </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_32.htm">Hirsch (Eli) - The Concept of Identity</A>", Hirsch, 1982</li><li>Hoagland, Mahlon B. 1977. <em>The Roots of Life</em>. NY. Avon.</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_05/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_5719.htm">Hospers (John) - An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis - Second Edition</A>", Hospers, 1967</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_613.htm">Hume (David), Mossner (Ernest) - A Treatise of Human Nature</A>", Hume, 1978/1739</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_262.htm">Johnston (Mark) - Human Beings</A>", Johnston, 1987</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4320.htm">Johnston (Mark) - Fission and the Facts</A>", Johnston, 1989a</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5497.htm">Johnston (Mark) - Relativism and the Self</A>", Johnston, 1989b</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2006.htm">Johnston (Mark) - Constitution is Not Identity</A>", Johnston, 1992</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_554.htm">Korsgaard (Christine) - Personal Identity and the Unity of Agency; A Kantian Response to Parfit</A>", Korsgaard, 1989</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1989.htm">Kripke (Saul) - Identity and Necessity</A>", Kripke, 1971</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6460.htm">Kundera (Milan) - The Unbearable Lightness of Being</A>", Kundera, 1984</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_479.htm">Leibniz (Gottfried), Remnant (Peter), Bennett (Jonathan) - New Essays on Human Understanding</A>", Leibniz, 1982</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_111.htm">Lewis (David) - Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic</A>", Lewis, 1968</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_114.htm">Lewis (David) - How to Define Theoretical Terms</A>", Lewis, 1970</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_112.htm">Lewis (David) - Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies</A>", Lewis, 1971</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_113.htm">Lewis (David) - Survival and Identity</A>", Lewis, 1976a</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_58.htm">Lewis (David) - The Paradoxes of Time Travel</A>", Lewis, 1976b</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21857.htm">Lizza (John) - Persons And Death: What's Metaphysically Wrong With Our Current Statutory Definition Of Death?</A>", Lizza, 1993</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_620.htm">Locke (John), Nidditch (Peter) - An Essay Concerning Human Understanding</A>", Locke, 1975/1690</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5910.htm">Lockwood (Michael) - When Does a Life Begin?</A>", Lockwood, 1985</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2590.htm">Lowe (E.J.) - Substance and Selfhood</A>", Lowe, 1991a</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2636.htm">Lowe (E.J.) - Real Selves: Persons as a Substantial Kind</A>", Lowe, 1991b</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_05/PaperSummary_5976.htm">MacIntosh (J.J.) - A Problem About Identity</A>", MacIntosh, 1974</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_119.htm">Mackie (J.L.) - Problems from Locke</A>", Mackie, 1976</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6467.htm">Maynard Smith (John) - The Problems of Biology</A>", Maynard Smith, 1986</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_646.htm">Margolis (Joseph) - Persons and Minds: Prospects of Nonreductive Materialism</A>", Margolis, 1978</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3692.htm">Martin (Raymond) - Identity, Transformation, and What Matters in Survival</A>", Martin, 1991</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5987.htm">Matthews (Gareth B.) - Life and Death as the Arrival and Departure of the Psyche</A>", Matthews, 1979</li><li><A HREF = "../../../Authors/M/Author_Mayr (Ernst).htm">Ernst Mayr</A>. 1982. <em> The Growth of Biological Thought: Diversity, Evolution and Inheritance</em>. Cambridge MA, Harvard UP. </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_22/Abstract_22010.htm">McLaren (Ann) - Prelude to Embryogenesis</A>", McLaren, 1986 </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_02/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_2320.htm">Miller (Jonathan) - The Body in Question</A>", Miller, 1978</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_462.htm">Monod (Jacques) - Chance & Necessity</A>", Monod, 1971</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6468.htm">Morowitz (Harold J.) & Trefil (James) - The Facts of Life: Science and the Abortion Controversy</A>", Morowitz+Trefil, 1992</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_02/PaperSummary_2656.htm">Nagel (Ernest) - Teleology Revisited: A. Goal-Directed Processes in Biology</A>", Nagel, 1977</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_345.htm">Nagel (Thomas) - The View from Nowhere</A>", Nagel, 1986</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_40.htm">Noonan (Harold) - Personal Identity</A>", Noonan, 1989</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4423.htm">Noonan (Harold) - Constitution Is Identity</A>", Noonan, 1993</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_9.htm">Nozick (Robert) - Philosophical Explanations</A>", Nozick, 1981</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7348.htm">Olson (Eric) - Why I Have No Hands</A>", Olson, 1995</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5662.htm">Olson (Eric) - Composition and Coincidence</A>", Olson, 1996</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5211.htm">Olson (Eric) - Relativism and Persistence</A>", Olson, 1997</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_325.htm">Parfit (Derek) - Personal Identity</A>", Parfit, 1971</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_41.htm">Parfit (Derek) - Reasons and Persons</A>", Parfit, 1984</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1024.htm">Parfit (Derek) - Divided Minds and the Nature of Persons</A>", Parfit, 1987</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_328.htm">Perry (John) - Can the Self Divide?</A>", Perry, 1972</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5227.htm">Perry (John) - The Problem of Personal Identity</A>", Perry, 1975</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_541.htm">Perry (John) - The Importance of Being Identical</A>", Perry, 1976a</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5402.htm">Perry (John) - Review of Bernard Williams' 'Problems of the Self'</A>", Perry, 1976b</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1338.htm">Pollock (John L.) - How to Build a Person: A Prolegomenon</A>", Pollock, 1989</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6448.htm">Price (H.H.) - Essays in the Philosophy of Religion: Based on the Sarum Lectures 1971</A>", Price, 1972</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_12/PaperSummary_12609.htm">Price (H.H.) - Survival and the Idea of 'Another World'</A>", Price, 1973</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6028.htm">Puccetti (Roland) - Brain Transplants and Personal Identity</A>", Puccetti, 1969</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20197.htm">Puccetti (Roland) - The Conquest of Death</A>", Puccetti, 1976</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_42.htm">Quine (W.V.) - From a Logical Point of View</A>", Quine, 1953</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_534.htm">Quinton (Anthony) - The Soul</A>", Quinton, 1962</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3434.htm">Robinson (Denis) - Can Amoebae Divide Without Multiplying?</A>", Robinson, 1985</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_09/Abstract_9221.htm">Robinson (John) - Personal Identity and Survival</A>", Robinson, 1988</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1344.htm">Rosenberg (Jay) - Thinking Clearly About Death</A>", Rosenberg, 1983</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2800.htm">Russell (Bertrand) - Do We Survive Death?</A>", Russell, 1967</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6469.htm">Sacks (Oliver) - A Leg to Stand On</A>", Sacks, 1984</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_21/PaperSummary_21980.htm">Sacks (Oliver) - Nothingness</A>", Sacks, 1987a</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_253.htm">Sacks (Oliver) - The Man who Mistook his Wife for a Hat</A>", Sacks, 1987b</li><li><A HREF = "../../../Authors/S/Author_Sagan (Carl).htm">Carl Sagan</A>. 1990.  Life , Encyclopaedia Britannica. See <A HREF = "https://www.britannica.com/topic/life" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>. </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_15/Abstract_15846.htm">Schechtman (Marya) - The Same and the Same: Two Views of Psychological Continuity</A>", Schechtman, 1994</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_786.htm">Schrodinger (Erwin) - What is Life?</A>", Schrodinger, 1985</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21982.htm">Seifert (Josef) - Is 'Brain Death' Actually Death</A>", Seifert, 1993</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2409.htm">Shoemaker (Sydney) - Persons and Their Pasts</A>", Shoemaker, 1970a</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_378.htm">Shoemaker (Sydney) - Wiggins on Identity</A>", Shoemaker, 1970b</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_543.htm">Shoemaker (Sydney) - Embodiment and Behavior</A>", Shoemaker, 1976</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1791.htm">Shoemaker (Sydney) - Personal Identity: a Materialist Account</A>", Shoemaker, 1984</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_964.htm">Singer (Peter) - Rethinking Life & Death - The Collapse Our Traditional Ethics</A>", Singer, 1995</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_980.htm">Singer (Peter) & Khuse (Helga) - Should the Baby Live?</A>", Singer+Khuse, 1985</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3395.htm">Snowdon (Paul) - Persons, Animals, and Ourselves</A>", Snowdon, 1990</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2637.htm">Snowdon (Paul) - Personal Identity and Brain Transplants</A>", Snowdon, 1991</li><li>Stickel, Delford. 1979.  The <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1028.htm">Brain death</A><SUP>5</SUP> criterion of human death . Ethics in Science and Medicine. 6:177-197.</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21983.htm">Stone (Jim) - Why Potentiality Matters</A>", Stone, 1987</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5164.htm">Stone (Jim) - Parfit and the Buddha: Why There Are No People</A>", Stone, 1988</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_164.htm">Strawson (Peter) - Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics</A>", Strawson, 1959</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_11/Abstract_11985.htm">Strawson (Peter) - Comments on Some Aspects of Peter Unger's Identity, Consciousness and Value</A>", Strawson, 1992</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_03/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_3859.htm">Swinburne (Richard) - The Coherence of Theism</A>", Swinburne, 1977</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1792.htm">Swinburne (Richard) - Personal Identity: The Dualist Theory</A>", Swinburne, 1984</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6357.htm">Taylor (Richard) - Metaphysics</A>", Taylor, 1992</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2005.htm">Thomson (Judith Jarvis) - Parthood and Identity Across Time</A>", Thomson, 1983</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_06/PaperSummary_6042.htm">Thomson (Judith Jarvis) - Ruminations On an Account of Personal Identity</A>", Thomson, 1987</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_07/Abstract_7829.htm">Tye (Michael) - In Defense of the Words 'Human Body'</A>", Tye, 1980</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1375.htm">Unger (Peter) - I Do Not Exist</A>", Unger, 1979a</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1006.htm">Unger (Peter) - Why There Are No People</A>", Unger, 1979b</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_06/Abstract_6621.htm">Unger (Peter) - The Problem of the Many</A>", Unger, 1980</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_156.htm">Unger (Peter) - Identity, Consciousness and Value</A>", Unger, 1990</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4934.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - The Possibility of Resurrection</A>", van Inwagen, 1978</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_04/PaperSummary_4924.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - Philosophers and the Words 'Human Body'</A>", van Inwagen, 1980</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3662.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - Plantinga on Trans-world Identity</A>", van Inwagen, 1985</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_05/PaperSummary_5502.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - And Yet There Are Not Three Gods But One God</A>", van Inwagen, 1988</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3440.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - Four-Dimensional Objects</A>", van Inwagen, 1990a</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_49.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - Material Beings</A>", van Inwagen, 1990b</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21984.htm">Veatch (Robert M.) - The Impending Collapse of the Whole-Brain Definition of Death</A>", Veatch, 1993</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6470.htm">Walker (A. Earl) - Cerebral Death</A>", Walker, 1985</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21988.htm">Warren (Mary Anne) - Do Potential People Have Moral Rights?</A>", Warren, 1981</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_05/Abstract_5172.htm">Whiting (Jennifer E.) - Friends and Future Selves</A>", Whiting, 1986</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_53.htm">Wiggins (David) - Identity & Spatio-temporal Continuity</A>", Wiggins, 1967</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_422.htm">Wiggins (David) - On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time</A>", Wiggins, 1968</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_544.htm">Wiggins (David) - Locke, Butler and the Stream of Consciousness: And Men as Natural Kind</A>", Wiggins, 1976</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_54.htm">Wiggins (David) - Sameness and Substance</A>", Wiggins, 1980</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21858.htm">Wikler (Daniel) - Not Dead, Not Dying? Ethical Categories and Persistent Vegetative State</A>", Wikler, 1988</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_159.htm">Wilkes (Kathleen) - Real People: Personal Identity Without Thought Experiments</A>", Wilkes, 1988</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_02/Abstract_2438.htm">Williams (Bernard) - Are Persons Bodies?</A>", Williams, 1970</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6471.htm">Young (J.Z.) - An Introduction to the Study of Man</A>", Young, 1971 </li></ul></P><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U> ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21972.htm">Olson (Eric) - The Human Animal: References</A>")</B><a name="On-Page_Link_P21972_3"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P21972_3"><B>Footnote 3</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>I can t find this on-line. </li><li>However, see "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_21/Abstract_21987.htm">Flower (Michael J.) - Neuromaturation and the Moral Status of Human Fetal Life</A>". </li></ul> <a name="ColourConventions"></a><hr><br><B><U>Text Colour Conventions</U> (see <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</B><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL> </center> <BR><HR><BR><center> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-03T00:02" pubdate>03/08/2018 00:02:29</time> <br><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A> </TD></TR><TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>