Foreword by Martin Gardner (Full Text)
- Many great mathematicians and physicists find it difficult, if not impossible, to write a book that non-professionals can understand. Until this year one might have supposed that Roger Penrose, one of the world's most knowledgeable and creative mathematical physicists, belonged to such a class. Those of us who had read his non-technical articles and lectures knew better. Even so, it came as a delightful surprise to find that Penrose had taken time off from his labours to produce a marvellous book for informed laymen. It is a book that I believe will become a classic.
- Although Penrose's chapters range widely over relativity theory, quantum mechanics1, and cosmology, their central concern is what philosophers call the ‘mind—body problem'. For decades now the proponents of ‘strong Al' (Artificial Intelligence)2 have tried to persuade us that it is only a matter of a century or two (some have lowered the time to fifty years!) until electronic computers will be doing everything a human mind can do. Stimulated by science fiction read in their youth, and convinced that our minds are simply ‘computers made of meat' (as Marvin Minsky once put it), they take for granted that pleasure and pain, the appreciation of beauty and humour, consciousness, and free will are capacities that will emerge naturally when electronic robots become sufficiently complex in their algorithmic behaviour.
- Some philosophers of science (notably John Searle, whose notorious Chinese room thought experiment3 is discussed in depth by Penrose), strongly disagree. To them a computer is not essentially different from mechanical calculators that operate with wheels, levers, or anything that transmits signals. (One can base a computer on rolling marbles or water moving through pipes.) Because electricity travels through wires faster than other forms of energy (except light) it can twiddle symbols more rapidly than mechanical calculators, and therefore handle tasks of enormous complexity. But does an electrical computer ‘understand' what it is doing in a way that is superior to the ‘understanding' of an abacus? Computers now play grandmaster chess. Do they 'understand' the game any better than a tick-tack-toe machine that a group of computer hackers once constructed with tinker toys?
- Penrose's book is the most powerful attack yet written on strong Al. Objections have been raised in past centuries to the reductionist claim that a mind is a machine operated by known laws of physics, but Penrose's offensive is more persuasive because it draws on information not available to earlier writers. The book reveals Penrose to be more than a mathematical physicist. He is also a philosopher of first rank, unafraid to grapple with problems that contemporary philosophers tend to dismiss as meaningless.
- Penrose also has the courage to affirm, contrary to a growing denial by a small group of physicists, a robust realism. Not only is the universe ‘out there', but mathematical truth also has its own mysterious independence and timelessness. Like Newton and Einstein, Penrose has a profound sense of humility and awe toward both the physical world and the Platonic realm of pure mathematics. The distinguished number theorist Paul Erdos likes to speak of ‘God's book' in which all the best proofs are recorded. Mathematicians are occasionally allowed to glimpse part of a page. When a physicist or a mathematician experiences a sudden ‘aha' insight, Penrose believes, it is more than just something 'conjured up by complicated calculation'. It is mind making contact for a moment with objective truth. Could it be, he wonders, that Plato's world and the physical world (which physicists have now dissolved into mathematics) are really one and the same?
- Many pages in Penrose's book are devoted to a famous fractal-like structure called the Mandelbrot set after Benoit Mandelbrot who discovered it. Although self-similar in a statistical sense as portions of it are enlarged, its infinitely convoluted pattern keeps changing in unpredictable ways. Penrose finds it incomprehensible (as do I) that anyone could suppose that this exotic structure is not as much ‘out there' as Mount Everest is, subject to exploration in the way a jungle is explored.
- Penrose is one of an increasingly large band of physicists who think Einstein was not being stubborn or muddle-headed when he said his ‘little finger' told him that quantum mechanics4 is incomplete. To support this contention, Penrose takes you on a dazzling tour that covers such topics as complex numbers, Turing machines, complexity theory, the bewildering paradoxes of quantum mechanics5, formal systems, Godel undecidability, phase spaces, Hilbert spaces, black holes, white holes, Hawking radiation, entropy, the structure of the brain, and scores of other topics at the heart of current speculations. Are dogs and cats ‘conscious' of themselves? Is it possible in theory for a matter-transmission machine to translocate a person from here to there the way astronauts are beamed up and down in television's Star Trek series? What is the survival value that evolution found in producing consciousness? Is there a level beyond quantum mechanics6 in which the direction of time and the distinction between right and left are firmly embedded? Are the laws of quantum mechanics7, perhaps even deeper laws, essential for the operation of a mind?
- To the last two questions Penrose answers yes. His famous theory of ‘twistors' — abstract geometrical objects which operate in a higher-dimensional complex space that underlies space-time — is too technical for inclusion in this book. They are Penrose's efforts over two decades to probe a region deeper than the fields and particles of quantum mechanics8. In his fourfold classification of theories as superb, useful, tentative, and misguided, Penrose modestly puts twistor theory in the tentative class, along with superstrings and other grand unification schemes now hotly debated.
- Since 1973 Penrose has been the Rouse Ball Professor of Mathematics at Oxford University. The title is appropriate because W. W. Rouse Ball not only was a noted mathematician, he was also an amateur magician with such an ardent interest in recreational mathematics that he wrote the classic English work on this field, Mathematical Recreations and Essays. Penrose shares Ball's enthusiasm for play. In his youth he discovered an ‘impossible object' called a ‘tribar'. (An impossible object is a drawing of a solid figure that cannot exist because it embodies self-contradictory elements.) He and his father Lionel, a geneticist, turned the tribar into the Penrose Staircase, a structure that Maurits Escher used in two well-known lithographs: Ascending and Descending, and Waterfall. One day when Penrose was lying in bed, in what he called a ‘fit of madness', he visualized an impossible object in four-dimensional space. It is something, he said, that a four-space creature, if it came upon it, would exclaim ‘My God, what's that?'
- During the 1960s, when Penrose worked on cosmology with his friend Stephen Hawking, he made what is perhaps his best known discovery. If relativity theory holds ‘all the way down', there must be a singularity in every black hole where the laws of physics no longer apply. Even this achievement has been eclipsed in recent years by Penrose's construction of two shapes that tile the plane, in the manner of an Escher tessellation, but which can tile it only in a non-periodic way. (You can read about these amazing shapes in my book Penrose Tiles to Trapdoor Ciphers.) Penrose invented them, or rather discovered them, without any expectation they would be useful. To everybody's astonishment it turned out that three-dimensional forms of his tiles may underlie a strange new kind of matter. Studying these 'quasicrystals' is now one of the most active research areas in crystallography. It is also the most dramatic instance in modern times of how playful mathematics can have unanticipated applications.
- Penrose's achievements in mathematics and physics — and I have touched on only a small fraction — spring from a lifelong sense of wonder toward the mystery and beauty of being. His little finger tells him that the human mind is more than just a collection of tiny wires and switches. The Adam of his prologue and epilogue is partly a symbol of the dawn of consciousness in the slow evolution of sentient life. To me he is also Penrose — the child sitting in the third row, a distance back from the leaders of Al - who dares to suggest that the emperors of strong AI have no clothes. Many of Penrose's opinions are infused with humour, but this one is no laughing matter.
ContentsPrologue – 1
- Can A Computer Have A Mind? – 3
- Introduction – 3
- The Turing test – 6
- Artificial intelligence9 – 14
- An Al approach to ‘pleasure' and ‘pain' – 17
- Strong Al and Searle's Chinese room – 21
- Hardware and software – 30
- Algorithms And Turing Machines – 40
- Background to the algorithm concept – 40
- Turing's concept – 46
- Binary coding of numerical data – 56
- The Church-Turing Thesis – 61
- Numbers other than natural numbers – 65
- The universal Turing machine – 67
- The insolubility of Hilbert's problem – 75
- How to outdo an algorithm – 83
- Church's lambda calculus – 86
- Mathematics And Reality – 98
- The land of Tor'Bled-Nam – 98
- Real numbers – 105
- How many real numbers are there? – 108
- ‘Reality' of real numbers – 112
- Complex numbers – 114
- Construction of the Mandelbrot set – 120
- Platonic reality of mathematical concepts? – 123
- Truth, Proof, And Insight – 129
- Hilbert's programme for mathematics – 129
- Formal mathematical systems – 133
- Godel's theorem – 138
- Mathematical insight – 141
- Platonism or intuitionism? – 146
- Godel-type theorems from Turing's result – 151
- Recursively enumerable sets – 155
- Is the Mandelbrot set recursive? – 161
- Some examples of non-recursive mathematics – 168
- Is the Mandelbrot set like non-recursive mathematics? – 177
- Complexity theory – 181
- Complexity and computability in physical things – 188
- The Classical World – 193
- The status of physical theory – 193
- Euclidean geometry – 202
- The dynamics of Galileo and Newton – 209
- The mechanistic world of Newtonian dynamics – 217
- Is life in the billiard-ball world computable? – 220
- Hamiltonian mechanics – 225
- Phase space – 228
- Maxwell's electromagnetic theory – 238
- Computability and the wave equation – 243
- The Lorentz equation of motion; runaway particles – 244
- The special relativity of Einstein and Poincare – 248
- Einstein's general relativity – 261
- Relativistic causality10 and determinism – 273
- Computability in classical physics: where do we stand? – 278
- Mass, matter, and reality – 280
- Quantum Magic And Quantum Mystery – 291
- Do philosophers need quantum theory11? – 291
- Problems with classical theory – 295
- The beginnings of quantum theory12 – 297
- The two-slit experiment – 299
- Probability amplitudes – 306
- The quantum state of a particle – 314
- The uncertainty principle – 321
- The evolution procedures U and R – 323
- Particles in two places at once? – 325
- Hilbert space – 332
- Measurements – 336
- Spin and the Riemann sphere of states – 341
- Objectivity and measurability of quantum states – 346
- Copying a quantum state – 348
- Photon spin – 349
- Objects with large spin – 353
- Many-particle systems – 355
- The ‘paradox' of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen – 361
- Experiments with photons: a problem for relativity? – 369
- Schrodinger's equation; Dirac's equation – 372
- Quantum field theory – 374
- Schrodinger's cat – 375
- Various attitudes in existing quantum theory13 – 379
- Where does all this leave us? – 383
- Cosmology And The Arrow Of Time – 391
- The flow of time – 391
- The inexorable increase of entropy – 394
- What is entropy? – 400
- The second law in action – 407
- The origin of low entropy in the universe – 411
- Cosmology and the big bang – 417
- The primordial fireball – 423
- Does the big bang explain the second law? – 426
- Black holes – 427
- The structure of space-time singularities – 435
- How special was the big bang? – 440
- In Search Of Quantum Gravity – 450
- Why quantum gravity? – 450
- What lies behind the Weyl curvature hypothesis? – 453
- Time-asymmetry in state-vector reduction – 458
- Hawking's box: a link with the Weyl curvature hypothesis? – 465
- When does the state-vector reduce? – 475
- Real Brains And Model Brains – 483
- What are brains actually like? – 483
- Where is the seat of consciousness? – 492
- Split-brain experiments – 496
- Blindsight – 499
- Information processing in the visual cortex – 500
- How do nerve signals work? – 502
- Computer models – 507
- Brain plasticity – 512
- Parallel computers and the ‘oneness' of consciousness – 514
- Is there a role for quantum mechanics14 in brain activity? – 516
- Quantum computers – 518
- Beyond quantum theory15? – 520
- Where Lies The Physics Of Mind? – 523
- What are minds for? – 523
- What does consciousness actually do? – 529
- Natural selection of algorithms? – 534
- The non-algorithmic nature of mathematical insight – 538
- Inspiration, insight, and originality – 541
- Non-verbality of thought – 548
- Animal consciousness? – 550
- Contact with Plato's world – 552
- A view of physical reality – 555
- Determinism and strong determinism – 558
- The anthropic principle – 560
- Tilings and quasicrystals – 562
- Possible relevance to brain plasticity – 566
- The time-delays of consciousness – 568
- The strange role of time in conscious perception – 573
- Conclusion: a child's view – 578
- Epilogue – 583
Book Comment
Vintage Books, 1990, Paperback (OUP, 1989)
"Penrose (Roger) - The Emperor's New Mind: Teletransportation & Fission"
Source: Penrose - The Emperor's New Mind, pp. 34-37, 349, 498
Excerpts (pp. 34-37)
- To the supporters of strong Al, it is ‘clear’ that a person’s individuality can be treated in just the same way1. Like the sequences of letters on my display screen, so these people would claim, nothing is lost of a person’s individuality - indeed nothing would really have happened to it at all - if his physical form were to be translated into something quite different, say into fields of magnetization in a block of iron. They appear even to claim that the person’s conscious awareness would persist while the person’s ‘information’ is in this other form. On this view, a ‘person’s awareness’ is to be taken, in effect, as a piece of software, and his particular manifestation as a material human being is to be taken as the operation of this software by the hardware of his brain and body.
- It seems that the reason for these claims is that, whatever material form the hardware takes - for example some electronic device - one could always ‘ask’ the software questions (in the manner of a Turing test), and assuming that the hardware performs satisfactorily in computing the replies to these questions, these replies would be identical to those that the person would make whilst in his normal state. (‘How are you feeling this morning?’ ‘Oh, fairly well, thank you, though I have a slightly bothersome headache.’ ‘You don’t feel, then, that there’s ... er . . . anything odd about your personal identity... or something?’ ‘No; why do you say that? It seems rather a strange question to be asking.’ ‘Then you feel yourself to be the same person that you were yesterday?’ ‘Of course I do!’)
- An idea frequently discussed in this kind of context is the teleportation machine of science fiction2. It is intended as a means of ‘transportation’ from, say, one planet to another, but whether it actually would be such, is what the discussion is all about. Instead of being physically transported by a spaceship in the ‘normal’ way, the would-be traveller is scanned from head to toe, the accurate location and complete specification of every atom and every electron in his body being recorded in full detail. All this information is then beamed (at the speed of light), by an electromagnetic signal, to the distant planet of intended destination. There, the information is collected and used as the instructions to assemble a precise duplicate of the traveller, together with all his memories, his intentions, his hopes, and his deepest feelings. At least that is what is expected; for every detail of the state of his brain has been faithfully recorded, transmitted, and reconstructed. Assuming that the mechanism has worked, the original copy of the traveller can be ‘safely’ destroyed. Of course the question is: is this really a method of travelling from one place to another or is it merely the construction of a duplicate, together with the murder of the original? Would you be prepared to use this method of ‘travel’ - assuming that the method had been shown to be completely reliable, within its terms of reference? If teleportation is not travelling, then what is the difference in principle between it and just walking from one room into another? In the latter case, are not one’s atoms of one moment simply providing the information for the locations of the atoms of the next moment? We have seen, after all, that there is no significance in preserving the identity of any particular atom. The question of the identity of any particular atom is not even meaningful. Does not any moving pattern of atoms simply constitute a kind of wave of information propagating from one place to another? Where is the essential difference between the propagation of waves which describes our traveller ambling in a commonplace way from one room to the other and that which takes place in the teleportation device?
- Suppose it is true that teleportation does actually ‘work’, in the sense that the traveller’s own ‘awareness’ is actually reawakened in the copy of himself on the distant planet (assuming that this question has genuine meaning). What would happen if the original copy of the traveller were not destroyed, as the rules of this game demand? Would his ‘awareness’ be in two places at once? (Try to imagine your response to being told the following: ‘Oh dear, so the drug we gave you before placing you in the Teleporter has worn off prematurely has it? That is a little unfortunate, but no matter. Anyway, you will be pleased to hear that the other you - er, I mean the actual you, that is - has now arrived safely on Venus, so we can, er, dispose of you here - er, I mean of the redundant copy here. It will, of course, be quite painless.’) The situation has an air of paradox about it. Is there anything in the laws of physics which could render teleportation in principle impossible? Perhaps, on the other hand, there is nothing in principle against transmitting a person, and a person’s consciousness, by such means, but that the ‘copying’ process involved would inevitably destroy the original? Might it then be that the preserving of two viable copies is what is impossible in principle? I believe that despite the outlandish nature of these considerations, there is perhaps something of significance concerning the physical nature of consciousness and individuality to be gained from them. I believe that they provide one pointer, indicating a certain essential role for quantum mechanics in the understanding of mental phenomena. But I am leaping ahead. It will be necessary to return to these matters after we have examined the structure of quantum theory in Chapter 6 (cf. p. 348).
- Let us see how the point of view of strong Al relates to the teleportation question. We shall suppose that somewhere between the two planets is a relay station, where the information is temporarily stored before being re-transmitted to its final destination. For convenience, this information is not stored in human form, but in some magnetic or electronic device. Would the traveller’s ‘awareness’ be present in association with this device? The supporters of strong Al would have us believe that this must be so. After all, they say, any question that we might choose to put to the traveller could in principle be answered by the device, by ‘merely’ having a simulation set up for the appropriate activity of his brain. The device would contain all the necessary information; and the rest would just be a matter of computation. Since the device would reply to questions exactly as though it were the traveller, then (Turing test!) it would be the traveller. This all comes back to the strong-Al contention that the actual hardware is not important with regard to mental phenomena. This contention seems to me to be unjustified. It is based on the presumption that the brain (or the mind) is, indeed, a digital computer. It assumes that no specific physical phenomena are being called upon, when one thinks, that might demand the particular physical (biological, chemical) structure that brains actually have.
- No doubt it would be argued (from the strong-Al point of view) that the only assumption that is really being made is that the effects of any specific physical phenomena which need to be called upon can always be accurately modelled by digital calculations. I feel fairly sure that most physicists would argue that such an assumption is actually a very natural one to make on the basis of our present physical understandings. I shall be presenting the reasons for my own contrary view in later chapters (where I shall also need to lead up to why I believe that there is even any appreciable assumption being made). But, just for the moment, let us accept this (commonly held) view that all the relevant physics can always be modelled by digital calculations. Then the only real assumption (apart from questions of time and calculation space) is the ‘operational’ one that if something acts entirely like a consciously aware entity, then one must also maintain that it ‘feels’ itself to be that entity.
- The strong-AI view holds that, being ‘just’ a hardware question, any physics actually being called upon in the workings of the brain can necessarily be simulated by the introduction of appropriate converting software. If we accept the operational viewpoint, then the question rests on the equivalence of universal Turing machines, and on the fact that any algorithm can, indeed, be effected by such a machine - together with the presumption that the brain acts according to some kind of algorithmic action. It is time for me to be more explicit about these intriguing and important concepts.
Excerpts (p. 349)
- Recall the ‘teleportation machine’ discussed in Chapter 1 (p. 35). This depended upon it being possible, in principle, to assemble a complete copy of a person’s body and brain on a distant planet. It is intriguing to speculate that a person’s ‘awareness’ may depend upon some aspect of a quantum state. If so, quantum theory would forbid us making a copy of this ‘awareness’ without destroying the state of the original - and, in this way, the ‘paradox’ of teleportation might be resolved. The possible relevance of quantum effects to brain function will be considered in the final two chapters.
Excerpts (p. 498)
- In a more recent experiment of considerable interest, Donald Wilson and his coworkers (Wilson et al. 1977; Gazzaniga3, LeDoux, and Wilson 1977) examined a split-brain subject, referred to as ‘P. S.’ After the splitting operation, only the left hemisphere could speak, but both hemispheres could comprehend speech; later the right hemisphere learned to speak also! Evidently both hemispheres were conscious. Moreover, they appeared to be separately conscious, because they had different likes and desires. For example, the left hemisphere described that its wish was to be a draughtsman and the right, a racing driver!
- I, myself, simply cannot believe the common claim that ordinary human language is necessary for thought or for consciousness. (In the next chapter I shall give some of my reasons.) I therefore side with those who believe, generally, that the two halves of the split-brain subject can be independently conscious. The example of P. S. strongly suggests that, at least in this particular case, both halves indeed can be. In my own opinion the only real difference between P. S. and the others, in this respect, is that his right-brain consciousness could actually convince others of its existence!
- If we accept that P. S. indeed has two independent minds, then we are presented with a remarkable situation. Presumably, before the operation each split-brain subject possessed but a single consciousness; but afterwards there are two! In some way, the original single consciousness has bifurcated. We may recall the hypothetical traveller of Chapter 1 (p. 35), who subjected himself to the teleportation machine, and who (inadvertently) awoke to find that his allegedly ‘actual’ self had arrived on Venus. There, the bifurcation of his consciousness would seem to provide a paradox. For we may ask, ‘Which route did his stream of consciousness “actually” follow?’ If you were the traveller, then which one would end up as ‘you’? The teleportation machine could be dismissed as science fiction, but in the case of P. S we appear to have something seemingly analogous, but which has actually happened! Which of P. S.’s consciousnesses ‘is’ the P. S. of before the operation? No doubt many philosophers would dismiss the question as meaningless. For there seems to be no way of deciding the issue.
Paper Comment
A printout is held in "Various - Papers on Desktop".
In-Page Footnotes ("Penrose (Roger) - The Emperor's New Mind: Teletransportation & Fission")
Footnote 1: Footnote 2: Footnote 3:
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