Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem
Rosenthal (David), Ed.
This Page provides (where held) the Abstract of the above Book and those of all the Papers contained in it.
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BOOK ABSTRACT:



"Bernstein (Richard J.) - The Challenge of Scientific Materialism"

Source: Rosenthal - Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem



"Cornman (James) - The Identity of Mind and Body"

Source: Borst - The Mind-Brain Identity Theory


Philosophers Index Abstract
  1. The paper first argues that the problem expressed by the sentence, "could mental states be brain processes" is not simply an empirical matter but involves a central conceptual problem.
  2. It next argues for the conclusion that there is a conceptual problem for any version of the identity theory, namely that since brain processes and mental states each have properties not truly attributable to the other, then – by Leibniz's principle – they are not the same.
  3. Finally, the paper proposes a way to avoid this conclusion by arguing that application of Leibniz's principle is unwarranted whenever its application involves a category mistake.


COMMENT: Also in "Rosenthal (David), Ed. - Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem".



"Feyerabend (Paul) - Mental Events and the Brain"

Source: Rosenthal - The Nature of Mind

COMMENT: Also in "Rosenthal (David), Ed. - Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem" .



"Fodor (Jerry) - Materialism"

Source: Rosenthal - Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem



"Gunderson (Keith) - Asymmetries and Mind-Body Perplexities"

Source: Rosenthal - Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem



"Kim (Jaegwon) - On the Psycho-Physical Identity Theory"

Source: Rosenthal - Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem



"Lewis (David) - An Argument for the Identity Theory"

Source: Lewis - Philosophical Papers Volume I, Part 2: Philosophy of Mind, Chapter 7


  1. Lewis offers a functionalist argument for the type-type psychophysical identity theory, according to which, as a matter of fact, mental experiences are type-identical with certain neuro-chemical brain states.
  2. Lewis summarizes his argument as follows:
      "The definitive characteristic of any (sort of) experience as such is its causal role, its syndrome of most typical causes and effects. But we materialists believe causal roles which belong by analytic necessity to experiences belong in fact to certain physical states. Since those physical states possess the definitive characteristics of experience, they must be the experiences.


COMMENT:



"Nagel (Thomas) - Physicalism"

Source: Borst - The Mind-Brain Identity Theory (Philosophical Review, Vol. 74, No. 3, Jul., 1965, pp. 339-356)

COMMENT: Also in "Rosenthal (David), Ed. - Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem" (including a Postscript from November 1968)



"Putnam (Hilary) - The Nature of Mental States"

Source: Putnam - Philosophical Papers 2 - Mind, Language and Reality

COMMENT: Also in:-



"Rorty (Richard) - In Defense of Eliminative Materialism"

Source: Rosenthal - Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem



"Rorty (Richard) - Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories"

Source: Borst - The Mind-Brain Identity Theory

COMMENT: Also in:-



"Rosenthal (David) - Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem: Introduction"

Source: Rosenthal - Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem



"Shaffer (Jerome) - Mental Events and the Brain"

Source: Rosenthal - The Nature of Mind


Philosophers Index Abstract
  1. It is first shown that J J C Smart's account of the meaning of reports of sensations in terms of physical stimulus conditions is defective.
  2. It is then argued that no such materialistic manoeuvring can succeed, showing that we cannot avoid admitting the existence of nonphysical properties. However, it is added that these nonphysical properties need not be irreducibly different from physical properties.
  3. The remainder of the paper is concerned, first, to defend the proposition that a convention could be adopted for locating mental events in the brain and, then, to describe conditions under which the identity theory is empirically refuted.


COMMENT:



"Smart (J.C.C.) - Sensations and Brain Processes"

Source: Rosenthal - The Nature of Mind

COMMENT:



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  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2017
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