The Nature of Mind
Rosenthal (David), Ed.
This Page provides (where held) the Abstract of the above Book and those of all the Papers contained in it.
Colour-ConventionsDisclaimerBooks / Papers Citing this Book

BOOK ABSTRACT: None.


BOOK COMMENT:

Oxford University Press, 1991



"Anscombe (G.E.M.) - The First Person"

Source: Rosenthal - The Nature of Mind
COMMENT:



"Armstrong (David) - Is Introspective Knowledge Possible?"

Source: Rosenthal - The Nature of Mind



"Armstrong (David) - The Causal Theory of Mind"

Source: Rosenthal - The Nature of Mind
COMMENT: Also in "Lycan (William) - Mind and Cognition - An Anthology"



"Block (Ned) - Troubles with Functionalism"

Source: Block - Readings in Philosophy of Psychology - Vol 1
COMMENT:



"Burge (Tyler) - Individualism and the Mental"

Source: Rosenthal - The Nature of Mind


Abstract1
  • This paper is regularly cited as extending Putnam's twin earth critique of Fregean theories of reference to the social realm.
  • Just as Putnam argues that traditional meaning theory leaves out the contribution of the physical world, Burge has been taken as arguing that traditional meaning theories have left out the contribution of the social world; the linguistic community plays a role in determining the objective content of thoughts ascribed in the language of that community.
  • Burge's interpretation of his thought experiment2 is controversial, but the influence of this paper has been profound.


COMMENT:




In-Page Footnotes ("Burge (Tyler) - Individualism and the Mental")

Footnote 1: Taken from "Harnish (Robert M.) - Basic Topics in the Philosophy of Language: Introduction".



"Campbell (Keith) - Central State Materialism"

Source: Rosenthal - The Nature of Mind



"Chihara (Charles S.) & Fodor (Jerry) - Operationalism and Ordinary Language: A Critique of Wittgenstein"

Source: Fodor - Representations - Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science


Philosophers Index Abstract
  1. This paper explores some lines of argument in Wittgenstein1's post-Tractatus writings in order to indicate the relations between Wittgenstein2's philosophical psychology, on the one hand, and his philosophy of language, his epistemology, and his doctrines about the nature of philosophical analysis on the other.
  2. The authors maintain that the later writings of Wittgenstein3 express a coherent doctrine in which an operationalistic analysis of confirmation and language supports a philosophical psychology of a type the authors call "logical behaviorism."
  3. They also maintain that there are good grounds for rejecting the philosophical theory implicit in Wittgenstein4's later works. In particular,
    1. they first argue that Wittgenstein5's position leads to some implausible conclusions concerning the nature of language and psychology;
    2. second, they maintain that the arguments Wittgenstein6 provides are inconclusive; and
    3. third, they sketch an alternative position which they believe avoids many of the difficulties implicit in Wittgenstein7's philosophy.


COMMENT: Also in "Rosenthal (David), Ed. - The Nature of Mind"



"Chisholm (Roderick) - Intentional Inexistence"

Source: Rosenthal - The Nature of Mind



"Chisholm (Roderick) - The First Person"

Source: Rosenthal - The Nature of Mind


Contents
  1. Chapter 3: The Problem of First-Person Sentences
    • Belief De Re
    • A Difficulty with the Propositional Theory
    • The Problem with the ‘He, Himself’ Locution
    • Some Ways of Dealing with the Problem
    • An Approach to the Problem
    • Notes
  2. Chapter 4: Indirect Attribution
    • A Re-examination of Intentional Attitudes
    • Direct Attribution
    • Indirect Attribution
    • ’Under a Description’
    • Solution to the Problem of the ‘He, Himself’ Locution
    • Content and Object
    • Eternal Objects and Indirect Attribution
    • De Dicto Belief
    • Notes


COMMENT: Excerpts (Chapters 3 & 4) from the book of the same name.



"Chisholm (Roderick) - The Status of Appearances"

Source: Van Inwagen & Zimmerman - Metaphysics: The Big Questions

COMMENT: Part of Chap. 6 of "Theory of Knowledge (1st Edition)"; Also (excerpted) in "Rosenthal (David), Ed. - The Nature of Mind"



"Churchland (Paul) - Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes"

Source: Rosenthal - The Nature of Mind

COMMENT:



"Davidson (Donald) - Mental Events"

Source: Davidson - Essays on Actions and Events, Chapter 11

COMMENT:



"Davidson (Donald) - Thought and Talk"

Source: Davidson - Inquiries into Truth & Interpretation, Chapter 11

COMMENT: Also in "Rosenthal (David), Ed. - The Nature of Mind"



"Dennett (Daniel) - Brain Writing and Mind Reading"

Source: Dennett - Brainstorms - Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology, Chapter 3

COMMENT:



"Dennett (Daniel) - Reflections: Instrumentalism Reconsidered"

Source: Rosenthal - The Nature of Mind



"Dennett (Daniel) - Three Kinds of Intentional Psychology"

Source: Dennett - The Intentional Stance, Chapter 3

COMMENT: Also in "Rosenthal (David), Ed. - The Nature of Mind"



"Dennett (Daniel) - True Believers: The Intentional Strategy and Why it Works"

Source: Dennett - The Intentional Stance, Chapter 2
Write-up Note1

See the Note2.

COMMENT:



"Dretske (Fred) - The Intentionality of Cognitive States"

Source: Rosenthal - The Nature of Mind


Philosophers Index Abstract
    Our cognitive states exhibit intentional characteristics. It is argued that since statements of natural law also exhibit intentionality (if a is lawfully dependent on b, and "a" and "c" are co-extensional, c may not be lawfully dependent on b), information, understood as a measure of this lawful dependency, is a useful notion to explain the source of the mind's intentionality. Our cognitive states are information structures and, hence, exhibit the same (or a similar) kind of content as does the information on which they depend.



"Feyerabend (Paul) - Mental Events and the Brain"

Source: Rosenthal - The Nature of Mind

COMMENT: Also in "Rosenthal (David), Ed. - Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem" .



"Fodor (Jerry) - After-thoughts: Yin and Yang in the Chinese Room"

Source: Rosenthal - The Nature of Mind



"Fodor (Jerry) - Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Research Strategy in Cognitive Psychology"

Source: Fodor - Representations - Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science

COMMENT: Also in "Rosenthal (David), Ed. - The Nature of Mind"



"Fodor (Jerry) - Propositional Attitudes"

Source: Fodor - Representations - Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science

COMMENT:



"Fodor (Jerry) - Searle on What Only Brains Can Do"

Source: Rosenthal - The Nature of Mind

COMMENT: Photocopy in "Various - Papers on Philosophy of Psychology Boxes: Vol 2 (G-Z)", filed with "Searle (John) - Minds, Brains, and Programs: Author's Response to Peer Review".



"Frankfurt (Harry) - Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person"

Source: Rosenthal - The Nature of Mind
Write-up Note1

See the Note2.

COMMENT:



"Gordon (Robert M.) - Emotions and Knowledge"

Source: Rosenthal - The Nature of Mind



"Hampshire (Stuart) - The Analogy of Feeling"

Source: Rosenthal - The Nature of Mind


Philosophers Index Abstract
    In this article the author is concerned with the justification of the knowledge of other minds by virtue of statements of other people's feelings based upon inductive arguments of any ordinary pattern as being inferences from the observed to the unobserved of a familiar and accepted form. The author argues that they are not logically peculiar or invalid, when considered as inductive arguments. The author also proposes that solipsism is a linguistically absurd thesis, while at the same time stopping to explain why it is a thesis which tempts those who confuse epistemological distinctions with logical distinctions. (Staff)


COMMENT: Other Minds



"Jackson (Frank) - The Existence of Mental objects"

Source: Rosenthal - The Nature of Mind


Philosophers Index Abstract
    There is a very widespread view that, while there may be things like the "having" of bodily sensations and the "experiencing" of after images, there are, strictly speaking, no such things as bodily sensations and after-images. In this paper I challenge some of the more usual grounds for this view.


COMMENT: Chap. 3 of "Perceptions"; printout filed in "Various - Papers on Philosophy of Mind Boxes: Vol 2 (C-O)".



"Jackson (Frank) - What Mary Didn't Know"

Source: Block, Flanagan & Guzeldere - The Nature of Consciousness


Author’s Introduction
  1. Mary is confined to a black-and-white room, is educated through black-and-white books and through lectures relayed on black-and-white television. In this way she learns everything there is to know about the physical nature of the world. She knows all the physical facts about us and our environment, in a wide sense of 'physical' which includes everything in completed physics, chemistry, and neurophysiology, and all there is to know about the causal and relational facts consequent upon all this, including of course functional roles. If physicalism is true, she knows all there is to know. For to suppose otherwise is to suppose that there is more to know than every physical fact, and that is just what physicalism denies.
  2. Physicalism is not the noncontroversial thesis that the actual world is largely physical, but the challenging thesis that it is entirely physical. This is why physicalists must hold that complete physical knowledge is complete knowledge simpliciter. For suppose it is not complete: then our world must differ from a world, W(P), for which it is complete, and the difference must be in nonphysical facts; for our world and W(P) agree in all matters physical. Hence, physicalism would be false at our world {though contingently so1, for it would be true at W(P)}.
  3. It seems, however, that Mary does not know all there is to know. For when she is let out of the black-and-white room or given a color television, she will learn what it is like to see something red, say. This is rightly described as learning – she will not say "ho, hum." Hence, physicalism is false. This is the knowledge argument against physicalism in one of its manifestations2. This note is a reply to three objections to it mounted by Paul M. Churchland3.


COMMENT:




In-Page Footnotes ("Jackson (Frank) - What Mary Didn't Know")

Footnote 1:
  • The claim here is not that, if physicalism is true, only what is expressed in explicitly physical language is an item of knowledge. It is that, if physicalism is true, then if you know everything expressed or expressible in explicitly physical language, you know everything.
  • Pace "Horgan (Terence) - Jackson on Physical Information and Qualia" (April 1984).
Footnote 2: Footnote 3:



"Kim (Jaegwon) - Epiphenomenal and Supervenient Causation"

Source: Kim - Supervenience and Mind


Philosophers Index Abstract
    Causal relations involving macro-events and processes can be understood as cases of "supervenient causation1"--supervenient upon casual relations obtaining at the micro-level. It is argued that if the thesis of psychophysical supervenience2 is granted, casual relations involving mental events, too, can be understood on the model of supervenient causation3, and that this resolves many of the puzzles surrounding psychophysical casual relations.


COMMENT: Also in "Rosenthal (David), Ed. - The Nature of Mind"



"Lewis (David) - Mad Pain and Martian Pain"

Source: Lewis - Philosophical Papers Volume I, Part 2: Philosophy of Mind, Chapter 9


  1. Lewis invites us to consider two ostensible challenges to any materialist theory of the mind.
    • The madman feels pain just as we do, but his pain differs greatly from ours in its characteristic causes and effects;
    • the Martian also feels pain just as we do, but his pain differs greatly from ours in its physical realization.
  2. Lewis argues that his functionalist theory is adequate to meet the challenges presented by both cases.
  3. In the postscript, Lewis considers how advocates of phenomenal qualia respond to the functionalist account he defends; in particular, he responds to Frank Jackson's 'knowledge argument'.


COMMENT: Also in "Rosenthal (David), Ed. - The Nature of Mind".



"Lewis (David) - Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications"

Source: Lewis - Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology

COMMENT:



"Loar (Brian) - Social Content and Psychological Content"

Source: Rosenthal - The Nature of Mind



"Malcolm (Norman) - Knowledge of Other Minds"

Source: Rosenthal - The Nature of Mind

COMMENT: Also in "Chappell (Vere), Ed. - The Philosophy of Mind"



"Malcolm (Norman) - Thoughtless Brutes"

Source: Rosenthal - The Nature of Mind



"Matthews (Gareth B.) - Consciousness and Life"

Source: Rosenthal - The Nature of Mind


Philosophers Index Abstract
    Descartes rejected the traditional connection between thinking, or being conscious, and living. He also rejected the traditional separation between living things and mechanisms. In rejecting both the traditional connection and the traditional separation descartes rejected the traditional concept of soul and gave us the modern concept of mind. Suppose the problems of a cartesian philosophy of mind are as intractable as many people now suppose. We should then ask whether we, too, ought to reject the traditional concept of soul and accept descartes's concept of mind.



"Nagel (Thomas) - Brain Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness"

Source: Nagel (Thomas) - Mortal Questions


Introduction (Full Text)
  1. There has been considerable optimism recently, among philosophers and neuroscientists, concerning the prospect for major discoveries about the neurophysiological basis of mind. The support for this optimism has been extremely abstract and general. I wish to present some grounds for pessimism. That type of self-understanding may encounter limits which have not been generally foreseen: the personal, mentalist idea of human beings may resist the sort of coordination with an understanding of humans as physical systems, that would be necessary to yield anything describable as an understanding of the physical basis of mind. I shall not consider what alternatives will be open to us if we should encounter such limits. I shall try to present grounds for believing that the limits may exist - grounds derived from extensive data now available about the interaction between the two halves of the cerebral cortex, and about what happens when they are disconnected. The feature of the mentalist conception of persons which may be recalcitrant to integration with these data is not a trivial or peripheral one, that might easily be abandoned. It is the idea of a single person, a single subject of experience and action, that is in difficulties. The difficulties may be surmountable in ways I have not foreseen. On the other hand, this may be only the first of many dead ends that will emerge as we seek a physiological understanding of the mind.
  2. To seek the physical basis or realization of features of the phenomenal world is in many areas a profitable first line of inquiry, and it is the line encouraged, for the case of mental phenomena, by those who look forward to some variety of empirical reduction of mind to brain, through an identity theory, a functionalist theory, or some other device. When physical reductionism is attempted for a phenomenal feature of the external world, the results are sometimes very successful, and can be pushed to deeper and deeper levels. If, on the other hand, they are not entirely successful, and certain features of the phenomenal picture remain unexplained by a physical reduction, then we can set those features aside as purely phenomenal, and postpone our understanding of them to the time when our knowledge of the physical basis of mind and perception will have advanced sufficiently to supply it. (An example of this might be the moon illusion, or other sensory illusions which have no discoverable basis in the objects perceived.) However, if we encounter the same kind of difficulty in exploring the physical basis of the phenomena of the mind itself, we cannot adopt the same line of retreat. That is, if a phenomenal feature of mind is left unaccounted for by the physical theory, we cannot postpone the understanding of it to the time when we study the mind itself - for that is exactly what we are supposed to be doing. To defer to an understanding of the basis of mind which lies beyond the study of the physical realization of certain aspects of it is to admit the irreducibility of the mental to the physical. A clearcut version of this admission would be some kind of dualism. But if one is reluctant to take such a route, then it is not clear what one should do about central features of the mentalistic idea of persons which resist assimilation to an understanding of human beings as physical system. It may be true of some of these features that we can neither find an objective basis for them, nor give them up. It may be impossible for us to abandon certain ways of conceiving and representing ourselves, no matter how little support they get from scientific research. This, I suspect, is true of the idea of the unity of a person: an idea whose validity may be called into question with the help of recent discoveries about the functional duality of the cerebral cortex. It will be useful to present those results here in outline.


COMMENT:



"Nagel (Thomas) - What is it Like to Be a Bat?"

Source: Block, Flanagan & Guzeldere - The Nature of Consciousness


Author’s Introduction
  1. Consciousness is what makes the mind-body problem really intractable. Perhaps that is why current discussions of the problem give it little attention or get it obviously wrong. The recent wave of reductionist euphoria has produced several analyses of mental phenomena and mental concepts designed to explain the possibility of some variety of materialism, psychophysical identification, or reduction.
  2. But the problems dealt with are those common to this type of reduction and other types, and what makes the mind-body problem unique, and unlike the water-H20 problem or the Turing machine-IBM machine problem or the lightning-electrical discharge problem or the gene-DNA problem or the oak tree-hydrocarbon problem, is ignored.


COMMENT:



"Peacocke (Christopher) - Colour Concepts and Colour Experiences"

Source: Rosenthal - The Nature of Mind



"Putnam (Hilary) - Brains and Behaviour"

Source: Putnam - Philosophical Papers 2 - Mind, Language and Reality

COMMENT: Also in "Rosenthal (David), Ed. - The Nature of Mind"



"Putnam (Hilary) - Computational Psychology and Interpretive Theory"

Source: Putnam - Philosophical Papers 3 - Realism and Reason

COMMENT: Also in "Rosenthal (David), Ed. - The Nature of Mind"



"Putnam (Hilary) - The Nature of Mental States"

Source: Putnam - Philosophical Papers 2 - Mind, Language and Reality

COMMENT: Also in:-



"Quine (W.V.) - Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes"

Source: Quine - The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays

COMMENT:



"Quine (W.V.) - States of Mind"

Source: Rosenthal - The Nature of Mind



"Reid (Thomas) - Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man (I & II)"

Source: Rosenthal - The Nature of Mind



"Rorty (Richard) - Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories"

Source: Borst - The Mind-Brain Identity Theory

COMMENT: Also in:-



"Rosenthal (David) - Mind and Body: Introduction"

Source: Rosenthal - The Nature of Mind, 1991



"Rosenthal (David) - Problems About Mind: Introduction"

Source: Rosenthal - The Nature of Mind, 1991



"Rosenthal (David) - Psychological Explanation: Introduction"

Source: Rosenthal - The Nature of Mind, 1991



"Rosenthal (David) - Self and Other: Introduction"

Source: Rosenthal - The Nature of Mind, 1991



"Rosenthal (David) - The Nature of Mind: General Introduction"

Source: Rosenthal - The Nature of Mind, 1991



"Rosenthal (David) - The Nature of Mind: Introduction"

Source: Rosenthal - The Nature of Mind, 1991



"Rosenthal (David) - Two Concepts of Consciousness"

Source: Rosenthal - The Nature of Mind


Philosophers Index Abstract
    There are two conceptions of what it is for mental states to be conscious--i.E., To be in our stream of consciousness. On the cartesian conception, consciousness is essential to being mental. On the contrasting view I defend here mental states are not inherently conscious. We can then explain both introspective and so-called simple consciousness of mental state by appeal to suitable thoughts that one is in the states. I argue that consciousness is inexplicable except of this conception; that this conception saves the phenomenological appearances--including subjectivity and sensory quality--better than the cartesian conception; and that we can readily explain the apparent forcefulness of the cartesian view.



"Russell (Bertrand) - Analogy"

Source: Rosenthal - The Nature of Mind

COMMENT: Other Minds



"Ryle (Gilbert) - Descartes' Myth"

Source: Rosenthal - The Nature of Mind

COMMENT: From Chap. 1 of "Ryle (Gilbert) - The Concept of Mind"



"Ryle (Gilbert) - Self-Knowledge (excerpts)"

Source: Rosenthal - The Nature of Mind

COMMENT: From Chap. 6 of "Ryle (Gilbert) - The Concept of Mind"



"Searle (John) - Minds, Brains, and Programs"

Source: Rosenthal - The Nature of Mind
Write-up Note1

Philosophers Index Abstract
  1. I distinguish between strong and weak artificial intelligence (AI).
  2. According to strong AI, appropriately programmed computers literally have cognitive states, and therefore the problems are psychological theories.
  3. I argue that strong AI must be false, since a human agent could instantiate the program and still not have the appropriate mental states.
  4. I examine some arguments against this claim, and I explore some consequences of the fact that human and animal brains are the causal bases of existing phenomena.

BBS-Online
  • This article can be viewed as an attempt to explore the consequences of two propositions.
    1. Intentionality in human beings (and animals) is a product of causal features of the brain I assume this is an empirical fact about the actual causal relations between mental processes and brains. It says simply that certain brain processes are sufficient for intentionality.
    2. Instantiating a computer program is never by itself a sufficient condition of intentionality. The main argument of this paper is directed at establishing this claim
  • The form of the argument is to show how a human agent could instantiate the program and still not have the relevant intentionality.
  • These two propositions have the following consequences
    1. The explanation of how the brain produces intentionality cannot be that it does it by instantiating a computer program. This is a strict logical consequence of 1 and 2.
    2. Any mechanism capable of producing intentionality must have causal powers equal to those of the brain. This is meant to be a trivial consequence of 1.
    3. Any attempt literally to create intentionality artificially (strong AI) could not succeed just by designing programs but would have to duplicate the causal powers of the human brain. This follows from 2 and 4.

Another Abstract
  1. "Could a machine think?"
  2. On the argument advanced here only a machine could think, and only very special kinds of machines, namely brains and machines with internal causal powers equivalent to those of brains.
  3. And that is why strong AI has little to tell us about thinking, since it is not about machines but about programs, and no program by itself is sufficient for thinking.


COMMENT:



"Searle (John) - Yin and Yang Strike Out"

Source: Rosenthal - The Nature of Mind



"Sellars (Wilfrid) - Being and Being Known (excerpts)"

Source: Rosenthal - The Nature of Mind



"Sellars (Wilfrid) - Minds"

Source: Rosenthal - The Nature of Mind

COMMENT: Lecture II from "The Structure of Knowledge"



"Sellars (Wilfrid) - Phenomenalism (excerpts)"

Source: Rosenthal - The Nature of Mind



"Shaffer (Jerome) - Mental Events and the Brain"

Source: Rosenthal - The Nature of Mind


Philosophers Index Abstract
  1. It is first shown that J J C Smart's account of the meaning of reports of sensations in terms of physical stimulus conditions is defective.
  2. It is then argued that no such materialistic manoeuvring can succeed, showing that we cannot avoid admitting the existence of nonphysical properties. However, it is added that these nonphysical properties need not be irreducibly different from physical properties.
  3. The remainder of the paper is concerned, first, to defend the proposition that a convention could be adopted for locating mental events in the brain and, then, to describe conditions under which the identity theory is empirically refuted.


COMMENT:



"Shoemaker (Sydney) - Functionalism and Qualia"

Source: Shoemaker - Identity, Cause and Mind


Philosophers Index Abstract
    This paper replies to the claim of block and fodor, in "what psychological states are not" ("philosophical review", 1972), that functionalist accounts of mental states cannot accommodate their "qualitative character." It argues that cases of "absent qualia," in which a state lacking qualitative character is "functionally identical" to one having it, are not logically possible, and that the possibility of cases of "inverted qualia," in which functionally identical states are qualitatively different, is compatible with functionalism. Central to the paper is the claim that the relation of qualitative similarity between mental states is itself functionally definable.


COMMENT:



"Shoemaker (Sydney) - How is Self-Knowledge Possible?"

Source: Shoemaker - Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity, Chapter 6

COMMENT: Also (selections) in "Rosenthal (David), Ed. - The Nature of Mind"



"Smart (J.C.C.) - Sensations and Brain Processes"

Source: Rosenthal - The Nature of Mind

COMMENT:



"Stalnaker (Robert) - On What's in the Head"

Source: Rosenthal - The Nature of Mind



"Stich (Stephen) - Autonomous Psychology and the Belief-Desire Thesis"

Source: Rosenthal - The Nature of Mind


Philosophers Index Abstract
    The "belief-desire thesis" is the claim that states invoked in an explanatory psychological theory will include beliefs and desires. The "principle of autonomous psychology" is the claim that states invoked in an explanatory psychological theory must supervene1 upon current, internal physical states. A more informal way of stating the autonomy principle is this: organisms which are physical replicas of each other will be indistinguishable from the point of view of explanatory psychology. The paper argues that there is an incompatibility between the belief-desire thesis and the principle of autonomous psychology.


COMMENT:



"Stich (Stephen) - Paying the Price for Methodological Solipsism"

Source: Rosenthal - The Nature of Mind



"Strawson (Peter) - Persons"

Source: Rosenthal - The Nature of Mind

COMMENT:



"Strawson (Peter) - Self, Mind and Body"

Source: Rosenthal - The Nature of Mind



Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2019
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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