Mindwaves: Thoughts on Intelligence, Identity and Consciousness
Blakemore (Colin) & Greenfield (Susan), Eds.
This Page provides (where held) the Abstract of the above Book and those of all the Papers contained in it.
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BOOK ABSTRACT:

Amazon Product Description

  1. 'Nowadays the most fashionable view is that the brain is a digital computer, but in my childhood I was assured that it was a kind of telephone switchboard; Charles Sherrington compared the brain to a telegraph system and to a Jacquard loom; Sigmund Freud compared it to hydraulic pumps and electromagnetic systems; Leibniz compared it to a mill and I am told that certain Ancient Greeks thought the brain functioned like a catapult. The very latest view among neurophysiologists is that the brain functions like a Darwinian natural selection system.'
    → from Mindwaves
  2. One of the most important areas of modern enquiry is opened up in this book to reveal its cornerstones and controversies, and its future direction.
    • Is the mind an entity that exists apart from the brain? Or is it simply another way of talking about the brain itself?
    • What are the best models for understanding it?
    • Is the relationship of brain and mind like that of computer hardware and software?
    • Are computers a useful analogy for the workings of our own minds and if so how can a human mind have come to devise the analogy?
    These are some of the questions addressed in Mindwaves by specialists in brain research, philosophy, psychology, linguistics, psychiatry, physics and computer science.
  3. The contributors are1:
    Michael Argyle, Horace Barlow, Gordon Claridge, Stephen Clark, John Crook, Marian Dawkins, John Eccles, Hans Eysenck, Brian Farrell, Jeffrey Gray, Richard Gregory, Peter Hacker, Roy Harris, Ted Honderich, Jennifer Hornsby, Nicholas Humphrey, Ed Hundert, Philip Johnson-Laird, John Krebs, Rodolfo Llinas, Colin McGinn, Donald MacKay, Nicholas Mackintosh, Euan Macphail, Derek Parfit, Roger Penrose, Paul Seabright, John Searle, Anthony Storr, Janos Szentagothai, Herbert Terrace, Larry Weiskrantz.



In-Page Footnotes ("Blakemore (Colin) & Greenfield (Susan), Eds. - Mindwaves: Thoughts on Intelligence, Identity and Consciousness")

Footnote 1: There are some notables here!



"Blakemore (Colin) & Greenfield (Susan) - Mindwaves - Preface and Section Introductions"

Source: Blakemore & Greenfield - Mindwaves


Sections
  1. Preface
  2. Persons: What makes an Individual
  3. Animals: How do they Think, and Do they have Minds?
  4. Machines: Could they have Minds?
  5. Ideas: How Brains could have Minds, and Why
  6. Problems: What is Mind? .



"Argyle (Michael) - Innate and Cultural Aspects of Human Non-verbal Communication"

Source: Blakemore & Greenfield - Mindwaves



"Barlow (Horace) - The Biological Role of Consciousness"

Source: Blakemore & Greenfield - Mindwaves



"Claridge (Gordon) - Schizophrenia and the Human Individuality"

Source: Blakemore & Greenfield - Mindwaves



"Clark (Stephen) - The Description and Evaluation of Animal Emotion"

Source: Blakemore & Greenfield - Mindwaves



"Crook (John) - The Nature of Conscious Awareness"

Source: Blakemore & Greenfield - Mindwaves



"Dawkins (Marian Stamp) - Minding and Mattering"

Source: Blakemore & Greenfield - Mindwaves

COMMENT: Ethics of Animal usage



"Eccles (John) - Brain and Mind, Two or One?"

Source: Blakemore & Greenfield - Mindwaves



"Eysenck (Hans) - Individuality"

Source: Blakemore & Greenfield - Mindwaves



"Farrell (Brian) - Psychoanalytic Explanation, with Special Reference to Historical Material"

Source: Blakemore & Greenfield - Mindwaves



"Gray (Jeffrey) - The Mind-Brain Identity as a Scientific Hypothesis: A Second Look"

Source: Blakemore & Greenfield - Mindwaves



"Gregory (Richard) - In Defense of Artificial Intelligence - A Reply to John Searle"

Source: Blakemore & Greenfield - Mindwaves



"Hacker (P.M.S.) - Languages, Minds and Brain"

Source: Blakemore & Greenfield - Mindwaves



"Harris (Roy) - The Grammar in Your Head"

Source: Blakemore & Greenfield - Mindwaves



"Honderich (Ted) - Mind, Brain and Self-conscious Mind"

Source: Blakemore & Greenfield - Mindwaves



"Hornsby (Jennifer) - Intelligence - A Reply to Euan Macphail"

Source: Blakemore & Greenfield - Mindwaves



"Humphrey (Nicholas) - The Inner Eye of Consciousness"

Source: Blakemore & Greenfield - Mindwaves



"Hundert (Ed) - Can Neuroscience Contribute to Philosophy?"

Source: Blakemore & Greenfield - Mindwaves



"Johnson-Laird (Philip) - How Could Consciousness Arise from the Computations of the Brain?"

Source: Blakemore & Greenfield - Mindwaves



"Krebs (John) - The Evolution of Animal Signals"

Source: Blakemore & Greenfield - Mindwaves



"Llinas (Rudolfo) - 'Mindness' as a Functional State of the Brain"

Source: Blakemore & Greenfield - Mindwaves



"MacKay (Donald) - Divided Brains - Divided Minds"

Source: Blakemore & Greenfield - Mindwaves



"Mackintosh (Nicholas) - Animal Minds"

Source: Blakemore & Greenfield - Mindwaves



"Macphail (Euan) - Intelligence: A Comparitive Perspective"

Source: Blakemore & Greenfield - Mindwaves



"McGinn (Colin) - Could a Machine be Conscious?"

Source: McGinn - The Problem of Consciousness, Chapter 8

COMMENT: Also in "Blakemore (Colin) & Greenfield (Susan), Eds. - Mindwaves: Thoughts on Intelligence, Identity and Consciousness"



"Parfit (Derek) - Divided Minds and the Nature of Persons"

Source: Blakemore & Greenfield - Mindwaves


Author’s Introduction
  1. It was the split-brain cases which drew me into philosophy. Our knowledge of these cases depends on the results of various psychological tests, as described by1 Donald MacKay. These tests made use of two facts. We control each of our arms, and see what is in each half of our visual fields, with only one of our hemispheres. When someone's hemispheres have been disconnected, psychologists can thus present to this person two different written questions in the two halves of his visual field, and can receive two different answers written by this person's two hands.
  2. Here is a simplified imaginary version of the kind of evidence that such tests provide. One of these people looks fixedly at the centre of a wide screen, whose left half is red and right half is blue. On each half in a darker shade arc the words, 'How many colours can you see?' With both hands the person writes, 'Only one'. The words are now changed to read, 'Which is the only colour that you can see?' With one of his hands the person writes 'Red', with the other he writes 'Blue'.
  3. If this is how such a person responds, I would conclude that he is having two visual sensations - that he does, as he claims, see both red and blue. But in seeing each colour he is not aware of seeing the other. He has two streams of consciousness, in each of which he can see only one colour. In one stream he sees red, and at the same time, in his other stream, he sees blue. More generally, he could be having at the same time two series of thoughts and sensations, in having each of which he is unaware of having the other.
  4. This conclusion has been questioned. It has been claimed by some that there are not two streams of consciousness, on the ground that the subdominant hemisphere is a part of the brain whose functioning involves no consciousness. If this were true, these cases would lose most of their interest. I believe that it is not true, chiefly because, if a person's dominant hemisphere is destroyed, this person is able to react in the way in which, in the split-brain cases, the sub-dominant hemisphere reacts, and we do not believe that such a person is just an automaton, without consciousness. The sub-dominant hemisphere is, of course, much less developed in certain ways, typically having the linguistic abilities of a three-year-old. But three-year-olds are conscious. This supports the view that, in split-brain cases, there are two streams of consciousness.
  5. Another view is that, in these cases, there are two persons involved, sharing the same body. Like Professor MacKay, I believe that we should reject this view. My reason for believing this is, however, different. Professor MacKay denies that there are two persons involved because he believes that there is only one person involved. I believe that, in a sense, the number of persons involved is none.


COMMENT: Also in:-




In-Page Footnotes ("Parfit (Derek) - Divided Minds and the Nature of Persons")

Footnote 1: In "MacKay (Donald) - Divided Brains - Divided Minds".



"Penrose (Roger) - Minds, Machines and Mathematics"

Source: Blakemore & Greenfield - Mindwaves



"Seabright (Paul) - The Order of the Mind"

Source: Blakemore & Greenfield - Mindwaves



"Searle (John) - Minds and Brains Without Programs"

Source: Blakemore & Greenfield - Mindwaves



"Storr (Anthony) - Why Psychoanalysis is Not a Science"

Source: Blakemore & Greenfield - Mindwaves



"Szentagothai (Janos) - The Brain-Mind Relation: A Pseudoproblem?"

Source: Blakemore & Greenfield - Mindwaves



"Terrace (Herbert) - Thoughts Without Words"

Source: Blakemore & Greenfield - Mindwaves



"Weiskrantz (Larry) - Neuropsychology and the Nature of Consciousness"

Source: Blakemore & Greenfield - Mindwaves



Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2019
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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