Readings in the Philosophy of Language
Ludlow (Peter), Ed.
This Page provides (where held) the Abstract of the above Book and those of all the Papers contained in it.
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"Burge (Tyler) - Reference and Proper Names"

Source: Ludlow - Readings in the Philosophy of Language

Paper Comment

Printout filed in "Various - Papers on Logic & Metaphysics Boxes: Vol 1 (Coursework & A-E)".


"Carnap (Rudolf) - The Method of Intension"

Source: Ludlow - Readings in the Philosophy of Language


"Crimmins (Mark) & Perry (John) - The Prince and the Phone Booth: Reporting Puzzling Beliefs"

Source: Ludlow - Readings in the Philosophy of Language


Philosophers Index Abstract
    Beliefs are concrete particulars containing ideas of properties and notions of things, which also are concrete. The claim made in a belief report is that the agent has a belief (i) whose content is a specific singular proposition, and (ii) which involves certain of the agent's notions and ideas in a certain way. No words in the report stand for the notions and ideas, so they are unarticulated constituents of the report's content (like the relevant place in "it's raining"). The belief puzzles (Hesperus, Cicero, Pierre) involve reports about two different notions. So the analysis gets the puzzling truth values right.


"Davidson (Donald) - On Saying That"

Source: Davidson - Inquiries into Truth & Interpretation, Chapter 7


Philosophers Index Abstract
    An analysis of indirect discourse is offered according to which the "that" of (e.g.) "Galileo said that" is viewed as a demonstrative referring to an immediately subsequent utterance. It is argued that this analysis, unlike several discussed in Quine's Word and Object, does not prevent the recursive characterization of a Tarski-type truth predicate.

Paper Comment


"Davidson (Donald) - The Logical Form of Action Sentences"

Source: Davidson - Essays on Actions and Events, Chapter 6

Paper Comment


"Davidson (Donald) - Truth and Meaning"

Source: Davidson - Inquiries into Truth & Interpretation, Chapter 2


Abstract1
  • This paper, like "Grice (H. Paul) - Meaning" (1957) launched a whole program in the philosophy of language, the program alluded to above of giving a Tarski type truth definition for a natural language as a theory of meaning for that language.
  • Here Davidson argues for this approach over others, illustrates some of its virtues, and ends with a sketch of what needs to be done to bring this project to fruition.
  • For twenty years many philosophers of language have been attempting to complete this program.

Philosophers Index Abstract
  1. Apparently the speakers of a language can effectively determine the meaning or meanings of an indefinitely large number of expressions. A theory of meaning explains how this is possible if it gives a recursive account of the meaning of every sentence on the basis of its structure.
  2. The problem discussed in this paper is: how does a theory of meaning do this? It is argued that by characterizing a predicate satisfying (roughly) Tarski's convention t (which tests the adequacy of a formal semantical definition of truth), a theory of meaning describes the required kind of structure. A theory meeting this condition would provide a clear and testable semantics for a natural language.

Paper Comment



In-Page Footnotes ("Davidson (Donald) - Truth and Meaning")

Footnote 1: Taken from "Harnish (Robert M.) - Basic Topics in the Philosophy of Language: Introduction".


"Davies (Martin) - Individuation and the Semantics of Demonstratives"

Source: Ludlow - Readings in the Philosophy of Language


Philosophers Index Abstract
    The paper is concerned with a general and a more specific question about the semantic function of the matrix of a complex demonstrative, e.g., the expression 'admirer of Mary's' in 'that admirer of Mary's'. The greater part of the paper is taken up with a description of the function of the matrix, beginning from some ideas about perceptual demonstrative thoughts.


"den Dikken (Marcel), Larson (Richard K.) & Ludlow (Peter) - Intensional 'Transitive' Verbs and Concealed Complement Clauses"

Source: Ludlow - Readings in the Philosophy of Language


"Donnellan (Keith) - Reference and Definite Descriptions"

Source: Ludlow - Readings in the Philosophy of Language


Philosophers Index Abstract
  1. A distinction is developed between two uses of definite descriptions, the "attributive" and the "referential." The distinction exists even in the same sentence.
  2. Several criteria are given for making the distinction. It is suggested that both Russell's and Strawson's theories fail to deal with this distinction, although some of the things Russell says about genuine proper names can be said about the referential use of definite descriptions.
  3. It is argued that the presupposition or implication that something fits the description, present in both uses, has a different genesis depending upon whether the description is used referentially or attributively. This distinction in use seems not to depend upon any syntactic or semantic ambiguity.
  4. It is also suggested that there is a distinction between what is here called "referring" and what russell defines as denoting. Definite descriptions may denote something, according to his definition, whether used attributively or referentially.

Abstract1
  • In this paper Donnellan makes a distinction between referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions and goes on to argue that Russell's theory is adequate only for the second use.
  • What exactly is this distinction? Is it semantic? What does it show against Russell? Can it be extended to other referring devices such as proper names and indexicals?
  • These are all currently debated questions, but the fact that they are being debated is due primarily to this article.

Paper Comment



In-Page Footnotes ("Donnellan (Keith) - Reference and Definite Descriptions")

Footnote 1: Taken from "Harnish (Robert M.) - Basic Topics in the Philosophy of Language: Introduction".


"Dummett (Michael) - What is a Theory of Meaning?"

Source: Ludlow - Readings in the Philosophy of Language


"Evans (Gareth) - Semantic Structure and Logical Form"

Source: Ludlow - Readings in the Philosophy of Language


"Evans (Gareth) - The Causal Theory of Names"

Source: Ludlow - Readings in the Philosophy of Language

Paper Comment


"Evans (Gareth) - Understanding Demonstratives"

Source: Ludlow - Readings in the Philosophy of Language


"Fodor (Janet Dean) & Sag (Ivan A.) - Referential and Qualificational Indefinites"

Source: Ludlow - Readings in the Philosophy of Language


"Frege (Gottlob) - On Sense and Reference"

Source: Ludlow - Readings in the Philosophy of Language


Abstract1
  • This is not an easy piece. It is rarely voted the most popular essay in the course. The issues seem obscure, the style is pedantic, the humor heavy. But Frege is the single most important philosopher of language and this is perhaps his single most influential article dealing as it does with the general theory of sense and reference.
  • With guidance, the beginning student can. in my experience, be led through the article to an appreciation of (if not agreement with) the wonderful (and baroque) theory Frege constructed to deal with the many important philosophical phenomena he was the first (in our tradition at least) to uncover.
  • As becomes clear from subsequent readings in this anthology, Frege is almost always a point of departure. Theories in the philosophy of language are constantly being measured against the Fregean standard. One simply cannot consider oneself educated in the philosophy ot language without understanding Frege's views. (See also "Frege (Gottlob) - The Thought: A Logical Inquiry" (1918)).

Paper Comment



In-Page Footnotes ("Frege (Gottlob) - On Sense and Reference")

Footnote 1: Taken from "Harnish (Robert M.) - Basic Topics in the Philosophy of Language: Introduction".


"Frege (Gottlob) - The Thought: A Logical Inquiry"

Source: Blackburn & Simmons - Truth


Abstract1
  • Although this paper of Frege's is primarily on thoughts (the senses of complete indicative sentences) and is included here in the section on truth and meaning, it contains insightful and important discussions of many topics relevant to other areas of the philosophy of language, including indexicals, proper names, mood and speech acts, and an anticipation of some of Grice's observations on implicature.
  • There is even a fascinatingly contemporary discussion on solipsism, phenomenalism and the causal theory of perception.
  • This paper nicely complements "Frege (Gottlob) - On Sense and Reference" (1892).

Paper Comment



In-Page Footnotes ("Frege (Gottlob) - The Thought: A Logical Inquiry")

Footnote 1: Taken from "Harnish (Robert M.) - Basic Topics in the Philosophy of Language: Introduction".


"Grice (H. Paul) - Utterer's Meaning and Intentions"

Source: Ludlow - Readings in the Philosophy of Language

Paper Comment

Printout filed in "Various - Papers on Philosophy of Language Boxes: Vol 1 (Course Outline & A-M)".


"Harman (Gilbert) - Deep Structure as Logical Form"

Source: Ludlow - Readings in the Philosophy of Language


Philosophers Index Abstract
    Consequences of the identification of deep structure with logical form are discussed. Underlying subject predicate form becomes predicate plus arguments and transformations are simplified. Supposing that noun phrases come from quantifiers accounts for some aspects of pronominalization. The usual philosophical analyses of statements of belief must be rejected. And there is a conflict between current linguistic analyses of action statements and davidson's analysis.


"Higginbotham (James) - Elucidations of Meaning"

Source: Ludlow - Readings in the Philosophy of Language


"Kaplan (David) - Dthat"

Source: Ludlow - Readings in the Philosophy of Language

Paper Comment

Also in "Martinich (A.P.) - The Philosophy of Language"


"Kripke (Saul) - A Puzzle About Belief"

Source: Ludlow - Readings in the Philosophy of Language


Abstract1
  • Kripke's puzzle is still puzzling, despite numerous attempts to solve it. Although it focuses on attributions of attitude (here belief), it ranges over a wide range of issues in the philosophy of language. It may well be considered the fourth lecture for Naming and Necessity.
  • As Kripke notes, in that work he advocated a Millian position for modal2 contexts but appeared to advocate a non-Millian account for epistemic contexts. How to resolve this tension? Unlike Frege and Russell, Kripke generates his puzzle without appealing to principles of substitution.
  • Kripke's forceful, intuitive arguments makes it a regular favorite with students.

Paper Comment



In-Page Footnotes ("Kripke (Saul) - A Puzzle About Belief")

Footnote 1: Taken from "Harnish (Robert M.) - Basic Topics in the Philosophy of Language: Introduction".


"Kripke (Saul) - Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference"

Source: Ludlow - Readings in the Philosophy of Language


Philosophers Index Abstract
    Keith Donnellan has argued that certain "referential" uses of definite descriptions are counterexamples to a Russellian analysis of definite descriptions. The present paper argues that a distinction between 'speaker's reference' and 'semantic reference' shows that the existence of such phenomena is compatible with Russell's theory, or another unitary theory of descriptions. The problem is used to illustrate various methodological and other issues in the philosophy of language.

Paper Comment

Also in "Kripke (Saul) - Philosophical Troubles: Collected Papers, Volume 1".


"Larson (Richard K.) & Ludlow (Peter) - Interpreted Logical Form"

Source: Ludlow - Readings in the Philosophy of Language


"Larson (Richard K.) & Segal (Gabriel) - Knowledge of Meaning and Theories of Truth"

Source: Ludlow - Readings in the Philosophy of Language


"Lepore (Ernie) - What Model-Theoretic Semantics Cannot Do"

Source: Ludlow - Readings in the Philosophy of Language


"Ludlow (Peter) - Attitude Reports: Introduction"

Source: Ludlow - Readings in the Philosophy of Language, 1997


"Ludlow (Peter) - Definite and Indefinite Descriptions: Introduction"

Source: Ludlow - Readings in the Philosophy of Language, 1997


"Ludlow (Peter) - Demonstratives: Introduction"

Source: Ludlow - Readings in the Philosophy of Language, 1997


"Ludlow (Peter) - Language and Meaning: Introduction"

Source: Ludlow - Readings in the Philosophy of Language, 1997


"Ludlow (Peter) - Logical Form and Grammatical Form: Introduction"

Source: Ludlow - Readings in the Philosophy of Language, 1997


"Ludlow (Peter) - Names: Introduction"

Source: Ludlow - Readings in the Philosophy of Language, 1997


"Ludlow (Peter) - Readings in the Philosophy of Language: Preface"

Source: Ludlow - Readings in the Philosophy of Language, 1997


"Ludlow (Peter) & Neale (Stephen) - Indefinite Descriptions: In Defense of Russell"

Source: Ludlow - Readings in the Philosophy of Language


"May (Robert) - Logical Form as a Level of Linguistic Representation"

Source: Ludlow - Readings in the Philosophy of Language


"Neale (Stephen) - Context and Communication"

Source: Neale - Descriptions, Chapter 3


Sections
    3.1 Introductory Remarks
    3.2 The Referential Challenge
    3.3 Context and Propositions Expressed
    3.4 Propositions Expressed and Propositions Meant
    3.5 The Referential Challenge Revisited
    3.6 The Argument from Misdescription
    3.7 The Argument from Incompleteness
    3.8 Concluding Remarks

Paper Comment

Photocopy filed with "Neale (Stephen) - Descriptions".


"Partee (Barbara) - Opacity and Scope"

Source: Ludlow - Readings in the Philosophy of Language


"Perry (John) - Frege on Demonstratives"

Source: Ludlow - Readings in the Philosophy of Language

Paper Comment

Printout filed in "Various - Papers on Philosophy of Language Boxes: Vol 2 (N - Z)".


"Quine (W.V.) - Translation and Meaning"

Source: Quine - Word & Object, Chapter 2


Sections
    7. First steps of radical translation – 26
    8. Stimulation and stimulus meaning – 31
    9. Occasion sentences. Intrusive information – 35
    10. Observation sentences – 40
    11. Intrasubjective synonymy of occasion sentences – 46
    12. Synonymy of terms – 51
    13. Translating logical connectives – 57
    14. Synonymous and analytic sentences – 61
    15. Analytical hypotheses – 68
    16. On failure to perceive the indeterminacy – 73

Paper Comment

Also in "Ludlow (Peter), Ed. - Readings in the Philosophy of Language".


"Quine (W.V.) - Vagaries of Reference"

Source: Quine - Word & Object, Chapter 4


Sections
    26. Vagueness – 125
    27. Ambiguity of terms – 129
    28. Some ambiguities of syntax – 134
    29. Ambiguity of scope – 138
    30. Referential opacity – 141
    31. Opacity and indefinite terms – 146
    32. Opacity in certain verbs – 151

Paper Comment

Also in "Ludlow (Peter), Ed. - Readings in the Philosophy of Language".


"Russell (Bertrand) - Descriptions"

Source: Ludlow - Readings in the Philosophy of Language

Paper Comment


"Scheffler (Israel) - On Synonymy and Indirect Discourse"

Source: Ludlow - Readings in the Philosophy of Language


"Schiffer (Stephen) - Sententialist Theories of Belief"

Source: Ludlow - Readings in the Philosophy of Language

Paper Comment


"Searle (John) - Proper Names"

Source: Ludlow - Readings in the Philosophy of Language


Philosophers Index Abstract
    In this article the author is primarily concerned with the "sense" of proper names, i.e., do they refer, describe, or are they analytic? it is the author's contention that the looseness of criteria for utilizing proper names is a necessary condition for isolating the referring function from the descriptive function of language. The public use of proper names enables us to refer without raising issues and come to an agreement on what descriptive characteristics exactly constitute the identity of the object. (Staff)

Paper Comment


"Soames (Scott) - Direct Reference, Propositional Attitudes and Semantic Content"

Source: Ludlow - Readings in the Philosophy of Language

Paper Comment

Photocopy filed in "Various - Papers on Philosophy of Language Boxes: Vol 2 (N - Z)".


"Strawson (Peter) - On Referring"

Source: Ludlow - Readings in the Philosophy of Language


Philosophers Index Abstract
    In this article the author is concerned with the notion of referring in a "uniquely referring use." The author defines this as "we commonly use expressions of certain kinds to mention or refer to some individual person or single object or particular event or place or process, in the course of doing what we should normally describe as making a statement about that person, object, place, event, or process." (Staff)

Paper Comment


"Weinstein (Scott) - Truth and Demonstratives"

Source: Ludlow - Readings in the Philosophy of Language


Philosophers Index Abstract
    A theory of meaning for a natural language should at least give the conditions under which utterances of sentences of that language are true. Since natural languages contain indexical devices, such a theory must exhibit how the truth conditions of an utterance depend upon features of the context in which it occurs. A theory of truth for a simple language containing demonstrative pronouns is sketched. The theory requires the use of a primitive semantical relation which matches utterances of the demonstrative pronoun with their referents. No attempt is made to characterize this relation axiomatically.


"Wittgenstein (Ludwig) - Excerpt from The Blue and Brown Books"

Source: Ludlow - Readings in the Philosophy of Language, 1997


"Wittgenstein (Ludwig) - Some Remarks on Logical Form"

Source: Ludlow - Readings in the Philosophy of Language


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