Back Cover Blurb
- Presupposing no familiarity with the technical concepts of either philosophy or computing, this clear introduction reviews the progress made in Al since the inception of the field in 1956. Copeland goes on to analyse what those working in Al must achieve before they can claim to have built a thinking machine and appraises their prospects of succeeding.
- There are clear introductions to connectionism and to the language of thought hypothesis which weave together material from philosophy, artificial intelligence and neuroscience. John Searle's recent attacks on Al and cognitive science are countered and close attention is given to foundational issues, including the nature of computation, Turing machines, the Church-Turing thesis and the differences between classical symbol processing and parallel distributed processing. The book also explores the possibility of machines having freewill and consciousness and concludes with a discussion of in what sense the human brain may be a computer.
- 'An excellent job ... the most balanced treatment of the hopes and claims of Al I have yet seen.'
→ Hubert Dreyfus, University of California
- ‘The best philosophical introduction to artificial intelligence available.'
→ Justin Leiber, University of Houston
- Jack Copeland is Senior Lecturer in philosophy and logic at the University of Canterbury, New Zealand. He has published widely on logic, philosophy of mind and philosophy of language, and is editor of Logic and Reality (1993).
List of figures
Introduction - 1
In outline - 2
- The beginnings of Artificial Intelligence: a historical sketch - 4
- The arrival of the computer
- The Logic Theorist
- The Dartmouth Conference
- Alan Turing and the philosophy of Al
- Some dazzling exhibits - 11
- Inside the machine
- Parry the paranoid program
- Eliza the psychotherapist
- Shrdlu the robot
- Hacker the program-writing program
- Programs that play games
- The General Problem Solver
- Sam and the Frump
- Expert systems
- Can a machine think? - 33
- Is consciousness necessary for thought?
- The Turing Test
- Has the Test been passed already?
- Four objections to the Turing Test
- Assessing the Test
- Decision time
- The symbol system hypothesis - 58
- Symbol manipulation
- Binary symbols
- Programs as symbols
- A full-scale program
- The definition of a computer
- The hypothesis
- Multiple realizability
- A hard look at the facts - 83
- The evidence for the hypothesis
- Getting the evidence into perspective
- Programming common sense
- Data versus know-how
- The CYC project
- The complexity barrier
- The curious case of the Chinese room - 121
- The Chinese room argument
- What’s wrong with the argument?
- Deciding about understanding
- Turing machines and the biological objection to Al
- Freedom - 140
- Turbo Sam makes a choice
- Is freedom of the will an illusion?
- Two kinds of freedom
- Kleptomania and other compulsions
- Predictivism and chaos
- The inevitable
- Consciousness - 163
- Neglect and disarray
- The fuzzy baseline
- Consciousness as a type of internal monitoring
- The ineffable ‘feel’ of it all
- Into the heart of the mystery
- What is it like to be a bat?
- What Mary doesn’t know
- Drawing the threads together
- Are we computers? - 180
- The strong symbol system hypothesis
- Hardware versus wetware
- Goodbye, von Neumann
- Putting meaning into meat
- Believing what you don't believe
- Productivity and systematicity
- Evaluating the arguments
- The meaning of 'computer'
- Al’s fresh start: parallel distributed processing - 207
- The basic ideas
- English lessons
- Escape from a nightmare?
- The contrast with computers
- Comparisons with wetware
- Searle’s Chinese gym
- The Church-Turing thesis
- Are our cognitive processes algorithmically calculable?
- Simulating networks by computer
- The battle for the brain
- Concluding remarks
- Epilogue - 249
Notes - 250
Bibliography - 283
Blackwell, 1999 Reprint. Paperback.
Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
- Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2021
- Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)