Mental Simulation - Evaluations and Applications
Davies (Martin) & Stone (Tony), Eds.
This Page provides (where held) the Abstract of the above Book and those of all the Papers contained in it.
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Back Cover Blurb

  1. Many philosophers and psychologists argue that out everyday ability to predict and explain the actions and mental states of others is grounded in out possession of a primitive ′folk′ psychological theory. Recently however, this theory has come under challenge from the simulation alternative. This alternative view says that human beings are able to predict and explain each other′s actions by using the resources of their own minds to simulate the psychological aetiology of the actions of the others.
  2. This book and the companion volume "Davies (Martin) & Stone (Tony) - Folk Psychology: The Theory of Mind Debate" together offer a richly woven fabric of philosophical and psychological theory, which promises to yield real insights into the nature of our mental lives.
Book Comment

Blackwell, Oxford, 1995


"Stone (Tony) & Davies (Martin) - Mental Simulation: Introduction"

Source: Davies & Stone - Mental Simulation - Evaluations and Applications


Editors’ Introduction
  1. The essays collected in this volume are contributions to a complex inter-disciplinary debate about the nature of folk psychology.
  2. The debate is between those philosophers and psychologists who say that folk psychology is best thought of as a theory (the theory theory of folk psychology) and those who say that it is better thought of as an ability to simulate (the simulation theory).

Contents
  1. Overview of the Debate
    1. The Theory Theory
    2. The Simulation Alternative
  2. The Empirical Evidence
    1. The False Belief Task
    2. Focus on the First Person
  3. The Debate Continues: detailed reviews of the papers (q.v.)


"Fuller (Gary) - Simulation and Psychological Concepts"

Source: Davies & Stone - Mental Simulation - Evaluations and Applications, Chapter 1


Philosophers Index Abstract
    The paper explores the recent simulation theory of mind associated with such philosophers as Heal, Goldman, and especially Robert Gordon.
  1. After clarifying the notion of simulation, I argue that although simulation may be a useful and even indispensable epistemological tool, it fails to do what Gordon claims that it does, namely to play a fundamental role in explaining our possession of (or mastery of) folk-psychological concepts such as belief, desire and their contents.
  2. I argue further that Gordon is wrong in thinking that simulation as an account of possession of psychological concepts implies the falsity of functionalism or undermines eliminativism.

Editors’ Abstract1
  1. Gary Fuller's 'Simulation and Psychological Concepts' (chapter 1) is an investigation of Gordon's version of the simulation theory from a philosophical perspective. Fuller suggests that there are three ways of understanding simulation theory evident in Gordon's papers. First, it may be understood as an epistemological tool which is useful, and perhaps indispensable, for the prediction of others' actions. Second, it may be an attempt to provide a philosophically fundamental account of our mastery of the concept of belief. And third, it may be an alternative approach to the philosophical understanding of the ontology of mental states.
  2. Fuller argues that, in certain circumstances, simulation may be the best tool we have for making predictions about other people. He is not convinced, however, of the strength of simulation theory as understood in the second and third, philosophically more fundamental, ways.
  3. His objection to simulation theory as an account of the mastery of mental concepts is that it is circular. He says that 'ST is supposed to help explain psychological concepts, but any plausible account of the method of simulation will already make use of them' (p. 23). It is important, of course, that we keep in mind that an account of what it is to master a concept F is not shown to be circular just by the fact that we, as theorists, make use of the concept in the statement of our theory. The appropriate non-circularity requirement is that we should not use the concept within the scope of a thinker’s psychological attitudes (Christopher Peacocke, A Study of Concepts, 1992).
  4. A simulation must result in the attribution of a belief to another. But, Fuller argues, to attribute a belief to another, it is not enough just to make an assertion within the context of a simulation; the assertion also has to be linked in the right way to the person being simulated. The simulator must make the claim that his 'pretend' assertion is something that the other believes. Hence, in stating what it is that the thinker must be able to do in order to be credited with mastery of the concept of belief, we have to say that the thinker is not only able to simulate the other, but also that he is able to attribute the pretend utterance to the other as something that the other believes. It is with this latter claim that Fuller believes the simulation theorist is involved in circularity.
  5. As for the contribution of the simulation theory to ontological issues. Fuller claims that the simulation theory, taken as a theory of concept mastery, does not imply the falsity of functionalism or of eliminativism. For these latter are theories, not of the conditions for concept possession, but of the nature of mental states.
  6. We could, in principle, accept simulation theory as an account of psychological concepts, without drawing any immediate conclusions about the nature of mental states. Similarly, we could agree with Fuller about the unacceptability of simulation theory as a theory of concept possession, but still hold that mental simulation is an indispensable epistemological tool. For the simulation theory does not have to be construed as a philosophical theory about either concepts or ontology. Goldman, for example, has always been clear that his version of the simulation theory should not be construed in those ways.



In-Page Footnotes ("Fuller (Gary) - Simulation and Psychological Concepts")

Footnote 1: Taken from "Stone (Tony) & Davies (Martin) - Mental Simulation: Introduction".


"Heal (Jane) - How to Think About Thinking"

Source: Davies & Stone - Mental Simulation - Evaluations and Applications, Chapter 2


Editors’ Abstract1
  1. In her paper, 'How to Think About Thinking' (chapter 2), Jane Heal argues for a mixed position. We can distinguish three different prediction tasks in which mental simulation might figure. There is the prediction of a person's beliefs (and other mental states), given information about her situation. There is the prediction of a person's beliefs, given information about other beliefs that she holds. And there is the prediction of a person's behaviour, given information about her beliefs, and other mental states such as desires. Heal sees the case of prediction of beliefs from information about other beliefs, as the prime case for the simulation theory. For it is especially plausible, here, that the prediction can be based upon thinking through the other person's thoughts. For example, to predict what someone will beheve about a scientific or historical question requires one to think about the question directly, rather than to deploy a theory of scientific or historical thinking. In contrast, the theory theory says that 'first-level ability to think, to move through a reasoned sequence of thoughts, is one thing and a second-level theoretical representation enabling one to predict such a sequence is quite another' (p. 39). This, by Heal's lights, is a notable lack of economy in the theory theory, since the second-level ability can be no less complex than the first-level one; the theory theory posits a duplication2 of mental systems.
  2. In the case of predicting another person's beliefs from information about her situation. Heal argues that an intrusion of theory - and psychological theory, at that - is required. She does not directly discuss the prediction of behaviour from beliefs and desires, but argues that in the converse case - attributing beliefs on the basis of behaviour - simulation can play a role, but not a dominant one. This kind of hybrid position illustrates very well that the debate is far more complex than a simple theory theory versus simulation theory opposition.



In-Page Footnotes ("Heal (Jane) - How to Think About Thinking")

Footnote 1: Taken from "Stone (Tony) & Davies (Martin) - Mental Simulation: Introduction".


"Gordon (Robert M.) - Simulation Without Introspection or Inference from Me to You"

Source: Davies & Stone - Mental Simulation - Evaluations and Applications, Chapter 3


Philosophers Index Abstract
  1. Mental simulation of other minds is often assumed to be
    1. Founded on an implicit analogical inference
    2. Premised on introspectively based self-ascriptions and
    3. Requiring prior possession of the concepts of the mental states ascribed.
    But simulation, it is argued, is best understood as having none of these properties.
  2. Part of the argument employs the notion of an ascent routine, whereby, for example, one determines whether one believes that p, both by turning one's attention inward, but by querying whether p.
  3. Although this procedure is fairly reliable, it neither requires nor yields conceptual understanding. That comes only through simulation.

Editors’ Abstract1
  1. Robert Gordon's 'Simulation Without Introspection or Inference from Me to You' (chapter 3) takes up the issue of the relationship between simulation theory and introspective access to our our mental states - an issue that has been a major thread in the debate (cf. "Gopnik (Alison) - How We Know Our Own Minds: The Illusion of First-Person Knowledge of Intentionality", 1993; "Goldman (Alvin) - The Psychology of Folk Psychology", 1993). Gordon provides new arguments against the claim that a simulation theorist must be an introspectionist. He also argues against a related point: that simulation requires that I make an inference from what I would believe or do in some hypothetical situation to what you would believe or do in that situation (an inference from me to you). He is keen to show that the simulation theory does not require either introspection or an inference from me to you because he agrees that each of these commitments would face serious philosophical and empirical objections. He notes that introspection has been subjected to sustained philosophical attack throughout the twentieth century and that, if it is formulated in an introspectionist way, the simulation theory makes what may be a false prediction: that children will understand their own mental states before they understand others. In turn, an inferential version of simulation theory risks, he thinks, introducing a background psychological theory to give warrant to the inference from me to you. This, Gordon suggests, would be liable to lead to the collapse of the simulation theory into the theory theory.
  2. In opposition to the inferential view of simulation, Gordon argues that when I simulate I do not imagine what I would do in your situation. Rather, I directly imagine being you in your situation; and I ask myself (in imagination) what the right thing to do is. This means that no inferential step from me to you needs to take place. When Gordon identifies with someone else, the referent of ‘I’, in his mouth, ceases to be RMG and becomes, instead, the person that he is simulating (p. 55). Gordon's useful slogan here is that simulation requires 'not a transfer but a transformation'.
  3. Gordon goes on to suggest that the inferential view of simulation becomes attractive just when one takes an introspective approach to our access to our own mental states - first I introspect what I would do in your situation, then I infer that you would do what I would do in that situation.
  4. As an alternative to the introspective account of first-person access to mental states, Gordon proposes what he calls a 'non-recognitional' account of the self-ascription of mental states. This account is advertised as one that secures the reliability of self-ascription - which he considers as another key motivation of the introspectionist account - without having to postulate some special first-person mode of access to the state so ascribed.
  5. In the second part of his chapter, Gordon introduces the notion of an ascent routine. He claims that one would answer the question, 'Do you believe that Neptune has rings?' simply by answering the lower-order question, 'Does Neptune have rings?' This idea then plays a dual role in his thinking.
  6. First, it provides a further way of reinforcing the point that in a simulation I direct my gaze outwards upon the other's world. In simulation, I identify with the other and, facing his world, say what I (transformed in imagination) think about it; 'reporting what is there, I am reporting O's beliefs' (p. 60).
  7. Second, the ascent routine idea enables Gordon to say something to those, like Fuller, who see the simulation account as unable to offer any philosophical account of mastery of the concept of belief. Gordon proposes that prior to developing the concept of belief, a child can be trained to produce belief-talk simply by using the ascent routine: that is, the child can be trained to say, 'I believe that p', on those occasions when he is prepared to assert that p. Thus far, however, this is an uncomprehending use of the first-person attribution. But as the child develops the ability to simulate, so he may come to realize that assertions within the context of a simulation can contradict his own (unpretended) beliefs. This is a step in the direction of genuine understanding Of the notion of belief, and Gordon details further steps that would be required for 'a sophisticated understanding' (p. 61).



In-Page Footnotes ("Gordon (Robert M.) - Simulation Without Introspection or Inference from Me to You")

Footnote 1: Taken from "Stone (Tony) & Davies (Martin) - Mental Simulation: Introduction".


"Freeman (Norman H.) - Theories of the Mind in Collision: Plausibility and Authority"

Source: Davies & Stone - Mental Simulation - Evaluations and Applications, Chapter 4


Editors’ Abstract1
  1. In 'Theories of the Mind in Collision; Plausibility and Authority' (chapter 4), Norman Freeman argues that, so far as the psychological debate is concerned, the theory theory is the established theory and the simulation theory the challenger. Freeman claims that as a consequence of this the simulation theory has thus far concentrated on providing alternative explanations of results already discovered within the theory theory research programme. This inevitably tends to give the simulation theory an ad hoc feel. If it is to acquire research authority. Freeman argues, the advocates of the simulation theory must develop new experimental paradigms, about which the two opposing theories give clearly opposed predictions.
  2. As a starting point. Freeman argues that there are a number of 'windows of opportunity' for the simulation theory. He suggests, for example, that children's early folk-psychological abilities might best be understood in terms of practical intelligence which they are only later able to interpret and express in theoretical form. The simulation theory might then explore the child's 'primordial' practical intelligence (p. 82). Freeman reports some initial experimental investigations of this which provide some encouragement to the simulation theory. While Freeman concedes that it is possible for the results obtained so far to be explained in accordance with Perner's meta-representation theory, still, it seems clear that something like Freeman's suggestions do provide the simulation theorist with one way forward.



In-Page Footnotes ("Freeman (Norman H.) - Theories of the Mind in Collision: Plausibility and Authority")

Footnote 1: Taken from "Stone (Tony) & Davies (Martin) - Mental Simulation: Introduction".


"Stich (Stephen) & Nichols (Shaun) - Second Thoughts on Simulation"

Source: Davies & Stone - Mental Simulation - Evaluations and Applications, Chapter 5


Philosophers Index Abstract
  1. We suggest that much of the debate over simulation can be clarified by distinguishing various versions of the "theory theory" and simulation theory.
  2. We argue that merely showing that one of these versions of the theory theory is wrong wouldn't show that simulation theory is right. Further, we maintain that the different version of simulation theory must be assessed independently.
  3. We argue that it's still implausible to think that we predict behavior by means of "off-line" simulation. However, when we predict the grammaticality judgments or inferences that others would make, it's possible that we do use a type of simulation.

Editors’ Abstract1
  1. In their earlier paper, "Stich (Stephen) & Nichols (Shaun) - Folk Psychology: Simulation or Tacit Theory" (1992) Stephen Stich and Shaun Nichols take great care to set up the debate between the two theories so that the fundamental issues can be brought out in the clearest and most empirically tractable way. One of their key claims about the theory theory is that the body of knowledge that underpins our folk-psychological practice must be implemented separately from any theory that is part and parcel of our decision-making system; otherwise the simulation theory wins (1995, p. 154, n. 7). In their new paper, 'Second Thoughts on Simulation' (chapter 5), they take up an argument put forward by "Harris (Paul L.) - From Simulation to Folk Psychology: The Case for Development" (1992/1995) to the effect that this requirement of separate implementation has the implausible consequence that we must postulate duplicate2 first-person and third-person systems. Harris argues, for example, that the requirement would force us to posit two separate systems of linguistic knowledge - one used in making judgements about our native language, and a second used for the prediction of the grammaticality judgements that our fellow native speakers would make (see also "Heal (Jane) - How to Think About Thinking", chapter 2). Stich and Nichols concede Harris's point about this particular example. But, they point out that the example concerns predictions of judgement and belief, rather than predictions of behaviour. So far as the prediction of behaviour is concerned, they use examples of what they call cognitive penetrability to argue for the theory theory, and against the simulation theory (pp. 99-100):
      According to the theory theory, predictions about people's behaviour are guided by a rich body of mentally represented information (or misinformation) about the ways in which psychological states are related to environmental stimuli, other psychological states, and behavioural events. If that information is wrong or incomplete in various areas, then we should expect the accuracy of predictions in those areas to decline. According to the off-line simulation theory, we generate predictions of people's behaviour by running our own decision-making system off-line. If we are ignorant about how people's minds work, or if we have mistaken views, this should not affect the accuracy of our predictions about how people will behave, since our views about how the mind works are not involved in generating the predictions. So if the off-line simulation theory is right, what we don't know won't hurt us - predictions about people's behaviour are 'cognitively impenetrable'.
  2. The increasing complexity of the debate, and the departure from a simple theory theory versus simulation theory opposition, is illustrated once again here. Stich and Nichols, who would be labelled as theory theorists, are prepared to concede to the simulation theory the case of predicting a person's beliefs from information about her situation. Heal, who would be labelled as a simulation theorist, argues that this same case should be substantially conceded to the theory theory.



In-Page Footnotes ("Stich (Stephen) & Nichols (Shaun) - Second Thoughts on Simulation")

Footnote 1: Taken from "Stone (Tony) & Davies (Martin) - Mental Simulation: Introduction".


"Fodor (Jerry) - A Theory of the Child's Theory of Mind"

Source: Davies & Stone - Mental Simulation - Evaluations and Applications, Chapter 6


Editors’ Abstract1
  1. Alan Leslie has been one of the few contributors to the debate to discuss explicitly the nature and development of the information processing mechanisms that underpin folk-psychological practice. In Fodor’s, 'A Theory of the Child's Theory of Mind' (chapter 6), and in "Leslie (Alan M.) & German (Tim P.) - Knowledge and Ability in 'Theory of Mind': One-eyed Overview of a Debate" (chapter 7), we find articulations of the theory theory in full accord with the dominant paradigm in cognitive science that we mentioned above in section 1.12.
  2. Both Fodor, and Leslie and German, deploy the competence / performance distinction in their accounts. They argue that children's folk-psychological competence is a matter of their being innately endowed with folk-psychological knowledge. This knowledge only becomes available for use gradually, as other information processing mechanisms come on line. Thus, they argue that the correct inference to draw from the younger children's failure in the false belief task is that the child has a performance limitation rather than a competence deficit.



In-Page Footnotes ("Fodor (Jerry) - A Theory of the Child's Theory of Mind")

Footnote 1: Taken from "Stone (Tony) & Davies (Martin) - Mental Simulation: Introduction".

Footnote 2: Of the introduction, "Stone (Tony) & Davies (Martin) - Mental Simulation: Introduction".


"Leslie (Alan M.) & German (Tim P.) - Knowledge and Ability in 'Theory of Mind': One-eyed Overview of a Debate"

Source: Davies & Stone - Mental Simulation - Evaluations and Applications, Chapter 7


Editors’ Abstract1
  1. Alan Leslie has been one of the few contributors to the debate to discuss explicitly the nature and development of the information processing mechanisms that underpin folk-psychological practice. In his paper with Tim German, 'Knowledge and Ability in "Theory of Mind": One-eyed Overview of a Debate' (chapter 7), and in "Fodor (Jerry) - A Theory of the Child's Theory of Mind" (chapter 6), we find articulations of the theory theory in full accord with the dominant paradigm in cognitive science that we mentioned above in section 1.12.
  2. Both Fodor, and Leslie and German, deploy the competence / performance distinction in their accounts. They argue that children's folk-psychological competence is a matter of their being innately endowed with folk-psychological knowledge. This knowledge only becomes available for use gradually, as other information processing mechanisms come on line. Thus, they argue that the correct inference to draw from the younger children's failure in the false belief task is that the child has a performance limitation rather than a competence deficit.



In-Page Footnotes ("Leslie (Alan M.) & German (Tim P.) - Knowledge and Ability in 'Theory of Mind': One-eyed Overview of a Debate")

Footnote 1: Taken from "Stone (Tony) & Davies (Martin) - Mental Simulation: Introduction".

Footnote 2: Of the introduction, "Stone (Tony) & Davies (Martin) - Mental Simulation: Introduction".


"Currie (Gregory) - Imagination and Simulation: Aesthetics Meets Cognitive Science"

Source: Davies & Stone - Mental Simulation - Evaluations and Applications, Chapter 8


Philosophers Index Abstract
  1. Simulation theory argues that we understand other people by using our own minds as models of theirs, running our mental processes "off line."
  2. I argue that the idea of off-line simulation can help us understand how the imagination operates when we engage with fictional works. This leads to a questioning of some widespread assumptions about the nature of imagination.

Editors’ Abstract1
  1. The five chapters by Currie, Goldman, Bolton, Morton and Barnden2, whilst very different in content, share a common theme. They all set out to show how the simulation theory can be put to use, and can gamer support, by application to topics further afield than the explanation of our folk-psychological practice.
  2. Gregory Currie's 'Imagination and Simulation: Aesthetics Meets Cognitive Science' (chapter 8) contains, in its first half, a detailed examination and three criticisms of Leslie's (1987, 1988) claims about the isomorphism between pretend play and reports of mental states. Currie also includes some critical comments about a theory of pretense advanced by Harris and Kavanaugh (1993).
  3. In the second half of the chapter, Currie goes on to make the interesting suggestion that 'the imagination is the simulator' (p. 158), and adds the proposal that in autism this simulator is impaired.
  4. Currie stresses that he is not offering a conceptual analysis of imagination in terms of a simulation mechanism. Rather, on analogy with the claim that water is H2O, 'the cash value of the claim that imagining is simulation lies in its explanatory power: its power to explain how we come to have the capacity to imagine, to explain the surface features of imagining, and to correct some of our unreflective presuppositions about its nature - presuppositions that sometimes masquerade as a priori truths' (p. 160).



In-Page Footnotes ("Currie (Gregory) - Imagination and Simulation: Aesthetics Meets Cognitive Science")

Footnote 1: Taken from "Stone (Tony) & Davies (Martin) - Mental Simulation: Introduction".

Footnote 2: See


"Harris (Paul L.) - Imagining and Pretending"

Source: Davies & Stone - Mental Simulation - Evaluations and Applications, Chapter 9


Editors’ Abstract1
  1. The five chapters by Currie, Goldman, Bolton, Morton and Barnden2, whilst very different in content, share a common theme. They all set out to show how the simulation theory can be put to use, and can gamer support, by application to topics further afield than the explanation of our folk-psychological practice.
  2. Paul Harris takes up some of the issues in Currie's paper in 'Imagining and Pretending' (chapter 9), which he describes as 'a tidying-up operation'. In response to Currie's criticisms, Harris revises and clarifies the earlier Harris and Kavanaugh account of pretense in a way that more properly respects the difference between a type of propositional attitude state (say, believing or pretending) and the propositional content of the state (say, that the cup contains tea).
  3. Harris then goes on to present some surprising empirical results concerning autistic children (Scott, 1993). Children presented with a question about the conclusion of a syllogism:
    • All fishes live in trees.
    • Tot is a fish.
    • Does Tot live in the water?
    tend to answer in terms of the way things are in the real world (Tot, being a fish, lives in the water) unless they are encouraged to adopt a make-believe stance towards the syllogism. We might expect that autistic children, who seem to have a problem with imagining counterfactual situations, would continue to answer in terms of the real world, even when encouraged to use their imagination. But, the empirical finding is that, although autistic children have problems when they are encouraged to use their imagination, they tend to answer in line with the major premise of the syllogism when they are not told to adopt a make-believe stance.
  4. Harris suggests that these findings present a problem, not only for Currie, but for all theorists in this area, and goes on to suggest a link between the processing of pretend episodes and the processing of connected discourse.



In-Page Footnotes ("Harris (Paul L.) - Imagining and Pretending")

Footnote 1: Taken from "Stone (Tony) & Davies (Martin) - Mental Simulation: Introduction".

Footnote 2: See


"Goldman (Alvin) - Empathy, Mind, and Morals"

Source: Davies & Stone - Mental Simulation - Evaluations and Applications, Chapter 10


Philosophers Index Abstract
  1. This paper illustrates how empirical research in cognitive science can affect philosophical inquiry by concentrating on one phenomenon, empathy, which may have applications both to philosophy of mind and to moral theory.
  2. In philosophy of mind, an empathy or "simulation" theory might explain how people ascribe mental states to others, namely, by taking their perspective. In moral theory, empathy might help explain altruism, for example.
  3. The plausibility of these ideas can only be sustained through psychological research. The paper reviews some suggestive and encouraging work in this vein, especially in the area of developmental psychology.

Editors’ Abstract1
  1. The five chapters by Currie, Goldman, Bolton, Morton and Barnden2, whilst very different in content, share a common theme. They all set out to show how the simulation theory can be put to use, and can gamer support, by application to topics further afield than the explanation of our folk-psychological practice.
  2. In 'Empathy, Mind, and Morals' (chapter 10), Alvin Goldman strongly reasserts that the fundamental question to which both theory theory and simulation theory are candidate answers is 'an empirical question about the psychology of attributors: "What actually goes on in the heads of attributors that accounts for their attributions?"' (p. 186). This approach to the debate is one which Goldman has consistently adopted in his contributions:- , and arguably it distinguishes his version of the simulation theory from the versions expounded by Gordon and Heal.
  3. In this chapter, Goldman argues that the simulation theory enables us to resurrect the concept of 'empathy' as a useful one for moral theory, as well as for psychology. He suggests that simulation theory has consequences for both descriptive and prescriptive ethics.
  4. With regard to descriptive ethics, Goldman points to the simulation theory's potential for explaining phenomena such as the role of compassion in our moral thinking, and for explaining gender differences in ethical responses.
  5. With regard to prescriptive ethics, he suggests that the simulation theory may enable us to develop theories that make more realistic contact with human nature and, hence, which meet the constraint of realism or feasibility.
  6. Students of Goldman's work will recognize this idea from his ground-breaking work on epistemology (see many of the epistemological essays in Goldman, Liaisons: Philosophy meets the Cognitive and Social Sciences 1992).



In-Page Footnotes ("Goldman (Alvin) - Empathy, Mind, and Morals")

Footnote 1: Taken from "Stone (Tony) & Davies (Martin) - Mental Simulation: Introduction".

Footnote 2: See


"Bolton (Derek) - Self-knowledge, Error and Disorder"

Source: Davies & Stone - Mental Simulation - Evaluations and Applications, Chapter 11


Editors’ Abstract1
  1. The five chapters by Currie, Goldman, Bolton, Morton and Barnden2, whilst very different in content, share a common theme. They all set out to show how the simulation theory can be put to use, and can gamer support, by application to topics further afield than the explanation of our folk-psychological practice.
  2. Derek Bolton's 'Self-knowledge, Error and Disorder' (chapter 11) considers the potential of the theory theory and the simulation theory for understanding errors and disorders of self-knowledge.
  3. He argues that both the theory theory and the simulation theory have a contribution to make, and enters the suggestions that there is a role for thought experiments3 in understanding self-knowledge, and that simulation can be usefully seen as a form of thought experimentation4. But, he goes on to argue that there is also an essential role for theory in running thought experiments5.
  4. Bolton's position can be seen as further developing the prospects for the kind of mixed view advocated by Heal; it also has a kinship with Currie's claim for a link between imagination and simulation.



In-Page Footnotes ("Bolton (Derek) - Self-knowledge, Error and Disorder")

Footnote 1: Taken from "Stone (Tony) & Davies (Martin) - Mental Simulation: Introduction".

Footnote 2: See


"Morton (Adam) - Game Theory and Knowledge by Simulation"

Source: Davies & Stone - Mental Simulation - Evaluations and Applications, Chapter 12


Philosophers Index Abstract
    This paper makes a connection between some developments in game theory and issues about everyday psychological knowledge.
  1. I argue that there are two-person situations in which agents will do badly if they use a particular simple theory of rationality to predict one another's actions. If we assume that our everyday techniques for anticipating one another's actions will get better results than this, it follows that these techniques do not consist in applying a theory like this one.
  2. One alternative is that when we anticipate actions we supplement whatever theories we have with a capacity to imagine the other person's motivation. I sketch a way of modelling this capacity.

Editors’ Abstract1
  1. The five chapters by Currie, Goldman, Bolton, Morton and Barnden2, whilst very different in content, share a common theme. They all set out to show how the simulation theory can be put to use, and can gamer support, by application to topics further afield than the explanation of our folk-psychological practice.
  2. It is possible to see links between simulation theory, hypothetical reasoning and imagination. In 'Game Theory and Knowledge by Simulation' (chapter 12), Adam Morton gives a novel twist to this theme.
  3. He points out that game theory has provided a powerful way of understanding social interaction, especially in situations of competition or conflict. But, he suggests that we can go on to ask whether the observed behaviour in these situations is best accounted for by postulating that the actors simulate or by crediting them with use of a theory.
  4. Morton claims that the theory theory may well make implausible predictions of action in competitive game situations. In accord with a number of those who champion the simulation theory, Morton goes on to argue that any theory which could make better predictions would be 'inevitably more complex, in fact an unlikely candidate for a folk theory' (p. 240).



In-Page Footnotes ("Morton (Adam) - Game Theory and Knowledge by Simulation")

Footnote 1: Taken from "Stone (Tony) & Davies (Martin) - Mental Simulation: Introduction".

Footnote 2: See


"Barnden (John A.) - Simulation Reasoning, Common-sense Psychology, and Artificial Intelligence"

Source: Davies & Stone - Mental Simulation - Evaluations and Applications, Chapter 13


Editors’ Abstract1
  1. The five chapters by Currie, Goldman, Bolton, Morton and Barnden2, whilst very different in content, share a common theme. They all set out to show how the simulation theory can be put to use, and can gamer support, by application to topics further afield than the explanation of our folk-psychological practice.
  2. John Barnden's 'Simulative Reasoning, Common-sense Psychology and Artificial Intelligence3' (chapter 13) shows how work in artificial intelligence4, on simulative reasoning versus meta-reasoning, is closely related to the mental simulation debate, despite having a different initial motivation.
  3. He expounds a simulative reasoning system, and goes on to argue that the simulation approach is more efficient than the meta-reasoning (theory theory) approach.
  4. Furthermore, he explains how the simulative approach can deal with the control problem of when and why one should use a given rule of inference.
  5. It is also interesting to note that Barnden claims that his system can deal with nested simulations, whereas "Leslie (Alan M.) & German (Tim P.) - Knowledge and Ability in 'Theory of Mind': One-eyed Overview of a Debate" (p. 130) claims that these pose a major problem for the simulation theory.



In-Page Footnotes ("Barnden (John A.) - Simulation Reasoning, Common-sense Psychology, and Artificial Intelligence")

Footnote 1: Taken from "Stone (Tony) & Davies (Martin) - Mental Simulation: Introduction".

Footnote 2: See

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