Invitation to Cognitive Science (Vol. 3 - Thinking)
Osherson (Daniel) & Smith (Edward E.)
This Page provides (where held) the Abstract of the above Book and those of all the Papers contained in it.
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Bradford Books, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, second printing, Second Edition, 1998


"Atran (Scott) - Classifying Nature Across Cultures"

Source: Osherson - Invitation to Cognitive Science (Vol. 3 - Thinking)


"Block (Ned) - The Mind as the Software of the Brain"

Source: Osherson - Invitation to Cognitive Science (Vol. 3 - Thinking)


Author’s Abstract
  • Cognitive scientists often say that the mind is the software of the brain. This chapter is about what this claim means.

Section Introductions
  1. Machine Intelligence: In this section, we will start with an influential attempt to define 'intelligence', and then we will move to a consideration of how human intelligence is to be investigated on the machine model. The last part of the section will discuss the relation between the mental and the biological.
  2. Intelligence and Intentionality: Our discussion so far has centered on the computational approach to one aspect of the mind, intelligence. But there is a different aspect of the mind that we have not yet discussed, one that has a very different relation to computational ideas, namely intentionality.
  3. Functionalism and the Language of Thought: Thus far, we have
    1. Considered functional analysis, the computer model of the mind's approach to intelligence,
    2. Distinguished intelligence from intentionality, and
    3. Considered the idea of the brain as a syntactic engine.
    The idea of the brain as a syntactic engine explains how it is that symbol-crunching operations can result in a machine "making sense". But so far, we have encountered nothing that could be considered the computer model's account of intentionality. It is time to admit that although the computer model of the mind has a natural and straightforward account of intelligence, there is no account of intentionality that comes along for free.
  4. Searle's Chinese Room Argument: As we have seen, the idea that a certain type of symbol processing can be what makes something an intentional system is fundamental to the computer model of the mind. Let us now turn to a flamboyant frontal attack on this idea by John Searle
    → "Searle (John) - Minds, Brains, and Programs" (1980),
    → "Searle (John) - Is the Brain's Mind a Computer Program?" (1990),
    → "Churchland (Paul) & Churchland (Patricia) - Could a Machine Think?" (1990);
    the basic idea of this argument stems from
    → "Block (Ned) - Troubles with Functionalism", (1978).
    Searle's strategy is one of avoiding quibbles about specific programs by imagining that cognitive science of the distant future can come up with the program of an actual person who speaks and understands Chinese, and that this program can be implemented in a machine. Unlike many critics of the computer model, Searle is willing to grant that perhaps this can be done so as to focus on his claim that even if this can be done, the machine will not have intentional states.

Paper Comment

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"Carey (Susan) - Continuity and Discontinuity in Cognitive Development"

Source: Osherson - Invitation to Cognitive Science (Vol. 3 - Thinking)


"Harman (Gilbert) - Rationality"

Source: Osherson - Invitation to Cognitive Science (Vol. 3 - Thinking)


"Holyoak (Keith J.) - Problem Solving"

Source: Osherson - Invitation to Cognitive Science (Vol. 3 - Thinking)


"Jonides (John) - Working Memory and Thinking"

Source: Osherson - Invitation to Cognitive Science (Vol. 3 - Thinking)


"Osherson (Daniel) - Probability Judgment"

Source: Osherson - Invitation to Cognitive Science (Vol. 3 - Thinking)


"Rips (Lance J.) - Deduction and Cognition"

Source: Osherson - Invitation to Cognitive Science (Vol. 3 - Thinking)


"Schwarz (Norbert) - Social Cognition: Information Accessibility and Use in Social Judgment"

Source: Osherson - Invitation to Cognitive Science (Vol. 3 - Thinking)


"Shafir (Eldar) & Tversky (Amos) - Decision Making"

Source: Osherson - Invitation to Cognitive Science (Vol. 3 - Thinking)


"Smith (Edward E.) - Concepts and Categorization"

Source: Osherson - Invitation to Cognitive Science (Vol. 3 - Thinking)


"Smith (Edward E.) - Thinking: Introduction"

Source: Osherson - Invitation to Cognitive Science (Vol. 3 - Thinking)


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  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)


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