<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Locke (Vol 2 - Ontology) (Ayers (Michael R.)) - Theo Todman's Book Collection (Book-Paper Abstracts)</title> <link href="../../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../../TT_ICO.png" /> </head> <a name="Top"></a> <BODY> <div id="header"> <HR><H1>Theo Todman's Book Collection (Book-Paper Abstracts)</H1></div> <hr><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950><tr><td colspan =3><A HREF = "../BookSummary_29.htm">Locke (Vol 2 - Ontology)</A></td></tr><tr><td colspan =3><A HREF = "../../../Authors/A/Author_Ayers (Michael R.).htm">Ayers (Michael R.)</a></td></tr><tr><td colspan =3>This Page provides (where held) the <b>Abstract</b> of the above <b>Book</b> and those of all the <b>Papers</b> contained in it.</td></tr><tr><td><A HREF="#ColourConventions">Text Colour-Conventions</a></td><td><A HREF = "../BookCitings_29.htm">Books / Papers Citing this Book</A></td><td><A HREF = "../BooksToNotes_29.htm">Notes Citing this Book</A></td></tr></tr></TABLE></CENTER><hr> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>BOOK ABSTRACT: </B><BR><BR><U>Contents</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ul type="disc"><li>Introduction  1</li><li>Part I: Substance and Mode  15 </li><li>Part II: God, Nature and the Law of Nature  131 </li><li>Part III: Identity  205 </li><li>Conclusions of Volume II  293</li></ul></FONT><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><B>BOOK COMMENT: </B><BR><BR>Metaphysics; Printed with <a name="1"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_492.htm">Ayers (Michael R.) - Locke (Vol 1 - Epistemology)</A>" - see Vol. 1 for Epistemology</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_04/PaperSummary_4974.htm">Ayers (Michael R.) - Locke (Ontology) - Introduction & Conclusion</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Ayers - Locke (Vol. 2 - Ontology), 1991, Introduction (pp. 1-14) & Conclusion (pp. 293-295)<BR></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_15/PaperSummary_15428.htm">Ayers (Michael R.) - Part I: Substance and Mode</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Ayers - Locke (Vol. 2 - Ontology), 1991, Part I, pp. 14-130<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Contents</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Introduction to Part I  15</li><li>Substance, essence and accidents before Locke  18</li><li>Our complex ideas of substances and the idea of substance in general  31</li><li>Substance and real essence, matter and spirit, and the obscurity and confusion of the idea of substance  39</li><li>Substance, mode and the argument from language  51</li><li>Species and their names in the corpuscularian world  65</li><li>Are there real species?  78</li><li>Locke on the difference between substances and modes  91</li><li>Reflections on the notion of substance  110</li></ol></FONT></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_15/PaperSummary_15429.htm">Ayers (Michael R.) - Part II: God, Nature and the Law of Nature</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Ayers - Locke (Vol. 2 - Ontology), 1991, Part II, pp. 131-204<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Contents</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol start = "10" type="1"><li>Introduction to Part II  131</li><li>Forms of mechanism before Locke  135</li><li>The form of Locke's mechanism  142</li><li>Reflections on rationalism, empiricism and mechanism  154</li><li>The existence of God  169</li><li>The Law of Nature and human freedom  184</li><li>Reflections on Locke's ethics  196</li></ol></FONT></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3953.htm">Ayers (Michael R.) - Identity: Introduction</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Ayers - Locke (Vol. 2 - Ontology), 1991, Introduction to Part III, pp. 205-206<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Notes</U><ol type="1"><li>Possibility of immortality, but no need for immortality of the soul. </li><li>No immediate consciousness of Cartesian substance; unity of consciousness only a phenomenal unity. </li><li>First and Second editions of the <I>Essay</I> contradict. <ul type="disc"><li>In the first edition,  I can survive transmutation  can persist through change of colour, shape and loss of reason or even life. </li><li>In the second edition, life constitutes the animal and consciousness constitutes the self. Maybe at death the individual goes out of existence. </li></ul></li><li>Both editions resist Aristotelian forms. </li></ol><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>Part III: Identity</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3954.htm">Ayers (Michael R.) - Locke on 'Masses of Matter'</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Ayers - Locke (Vol. 2 - Ontology), 1991, Chapter 18, pp. 207-215<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Notes</U><ol type="1"><li>Aristotle s view of death as loss of substantial form</li><li>Boyle - Corpuscularian rejection of substantial form and claim that only God can create or destroy substances; appearances to the contrary are due to our semantics. Individuals survive death as long as there is a stable corporeal structure. </li><li>Locke (and hereafter & ) <BR>&rarr; rejected scattered objects; <BR>&rarr; allowed co-location of objects of different kinds (eg. the matter composing a horse); <BR>&rarr; rejected <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_78.htm">intermittent objects</A><SUP>1</SUP>;<BR>&rarr; rejected change of kind. </li><li>Kinds approximate to ideas. </li><li>Persistence through change is possible, but only within limits for each substance. Persistence conditions are kind-dependent</li><li>Spatiotemporal continuity is required for the persistence of finite intelligences as well as bodies</li><li>Existence itself is the <I>Principium <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_77.htm">Individuationis</A><SUP>2</SUP></I>. There is no need for <em>haecceitas</em> ("<A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_102.htm">thisness</A><SUP>3</SUP>").</li><li>The problem of persistence only arises with the change over time of compound substances. </li><li>Masses of matter can t survive change of constituent, but can survive change of shape. </li><li>The persistence condition for a biological entity is  one common life .</li><li>Mass and quantity are distinct, because for Locke a mass of matter is physically united, whereas a quantity is just a mereological sum that persists when scattered. </li></ol>& to be continued.<BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>Part III: Identity</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3955.htm">Ayers (Michael R.) - Locke on Living Things</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Ayers - Locke (Vol. 2 - Ontology), 1991, Chapter 19, pp. 216-228<BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>Part III: Identity</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3956.htm">Ayers (Michael R.) - Forms of Material Unity</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Ayers - Locke (Vol. 2 - Ontology), 1991, Chapter 20, pp. 229-238<BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>Part III: Identity</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3957.htm">Ayers (Michael R.) - Artificial and Other Problematical Objects</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Ayers - Locke (Vol. 2 - Ontology), 1991, Chapter 21, pp. 239-253<BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>Part III: Identity</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3958.htm">Ayers (Michael R.) - Personal Identity Before the Essay</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Ayers - Locke (Vol. 2 - Ontology), 1991, Chapter 22, pp. 254-259<BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>Part III: Identity</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3959.htm">Ayers (Michael R.) - Locke's Theory of Personal Identity</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Ayers - Locke (Vol. 2 - Ontology), 1991, Chapter 23, pp. 260-268<BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>Part III: Identity</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3960.htm">Ayers (Michael R.) - Contemporary Reactions to Locke's Theory</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Ayers - Locke (Vol. 2 - Ontology), 1991, Chapter 24, pp. 269-277<BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>Part III: Identity</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3961.htm">Ayers (Michael R.) - Neo-Lockean and Anti-Lockean Theories of Personal Identity in Analytic Philosophy</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Ayers - Locke (Vol. 2 - Ontology), 1991, Chapter 25, pp. 278-292<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Author s Introduction</U> (Full <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P3961_1">Text</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P3961_1"></A>)<FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Whether it is a measure of Locke's continuing influence or of what is perennial in philosophy, the main theories of personal identity currently adopted by analytic philosophers cover roughly the same range as those of the early eighteenth century. <ul type="disc"><li>Among them, the most important distinction by far holds between those who identify the person with the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animal</A><SUP>2</SUP> and those who see some sort of psychological unity and continuity as grounds for separating person and animal. </li><li>Of the latter, the few surviving dualists seem doomed to respond unsatisfactorily to the questions which must be answered if their theory is to have any precise content. </li><li>To place spirits outside space is unintelligible since without space individuality, or the distinction between numerical and qualitative identity, does not make sense. </li><li>To locate spirits in space on the other hand, raises insoluble questions as to how they fill it, what effects their filling a particular place has on surrounding, not to speak of coextensive, objects (i.e. what objective <em>difference</em> is made by a spirit's being <em>here</em> rather than <em>there</em>), and how such causal relations together with purely psychological mechanisms and processes; might be supposed to fit into a general physics or account of nature. </li><li>Such questions are <em>ex hypothesi</em> insoluble because even to hold that there are answers to them which make sense, but of which we are ignorant, is to imply that 'spirits' are in a broad sense material, material enough at any rate for the same distinction between the self and the body to arise all over again. </li><li>It is a fashionable deduction from ontological liberalism that dualism is to be rejected on merely empirical or pragmatic grounds i.e. just because there is now a potentially more explanatory and predictive theory in the field. It is overwhelmingly more attractive to suppose that dualism is to be rejected because it does not in the end make sense. </li></ul> </li><li>For whatever reason, present-day theories which distinguish between the person and the human being are not in general metaphysically dualist, but simply argue that the counting of persons proceeds on a different principle from the counting of human beings. <ul type="disc"><li>The argument employs two main kinds of example: <BR>& cases of multiple personality, in which people seem to outnumber biological individuals; and <BR>& cases of personal survival of biological death. </li><li>As an example of the first kind, we can imagine a race of two-headed giants: each head of each giant (like Locke's day-man and night-man) has its own discrete consciousness, referring to itself as  I and to its fellow in the second or third person. </li><li>A trite example of the second kind is the easily imagined brain-ransplant such that, of the two human beings involved, it is the brain-donor, rather than the brain-recipient, who will look forward to a successful operation as a kind of survival. </li><li>On the other hand, if the recipient has already suffered 'brain-death', then it may be said that that person has ceased to exist, although the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1265.htm">human animal</A><SUP>3</SUP> remains biologically alive. </li></ul></li><li>The neo-Lockean takes the view that such intuitions as these, concerned as they may seem to be with peripheral and unlikely examples, nevertheless reveal the core of 'our concept' of a person. They demonstrate (it is held) that personal identity is a matter of <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_16.htm">psychological continuity</A><SUP>4</SUP>', whether that is understood primarily in terms of subjective consciousness and memory (making the person what J. L. Mackie calls a 'system of co-conscious items') or in terms of more general causal and intentional links (involving character, desires, intentions, actions and so forth) such as constitute rational agency. On this basis a number of different accounts of the self have been constructed and, by some writers, conflated. </li><li></FONT> & [& snip & ] & </li></ol><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>Part III: Identity</P><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U> ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_03/Abstract_3961.htm">Ayers (Michael R.) - Neo-Lockean and Anti-Lockean Theories of Personal Identity in Analytic Philosophy</A>")</B><a name="On-Page_Link_P3961_1"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P3961_1"><B>Footnote 1</B></A></U>: Truncated towards the end of p. 279. <BR><BR> <a name="ColourConventions"></a><hr><br><B><U>Text Colour Conventions</U> (see <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</B><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL> </center> <BR><HR><BR><center> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-02T02:18" pubdate>02/08/2018 02:18:23</time> <br><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A> </TD></TR><TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>