Universals
Moreland (J.P.)
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BOOK ABSTRACT:

Cover Blurb

  1. Things are particulars and their qualities are universals1, but do universals2 have an existence distinct from the particular things describable by those terms? And what must be their nature if they do? This book provides a careful and assured survey of the central issues of debate surrounding universals3, in particular those issues that have been a crucial part of the emergence of contemporary analytic ontology.
  2. The book begins with a taxonomy of extreme nominalist, moderate nominalist, and realist positions on properties, and outlines the way each handles the phenomena of predication, resemblance, and abstract reference. The debate about properties and philosophical naturalism is also examined. Different forms of extreme nominalism, moderate nominalism, and minimalist realism are critiqued. Later chapters defend a traditional realist view of universals4 and examine the objections to realism from various infinite regresses, the difficulties in stating identity conditions for properties, and problems with realist accounts of knowledge of abstract objects. In addition, the debate between Platonists and Aristotelians is examined alongside a discussion of the relationship between properties and an adequate theory of existence. The book's final chapter explores the problem of individuating particulars.
  3. The book makes accessible a difficult topic without blunting the sophistication of argument required by a more advanced readership.

BOOK COMMENT:

Acumen Publishing Limited, Chesham, Bucks, 2001



"Moreland (J.P.) - The Problem(s) of Universals"

Source: Moreland - Universals, 2001, Chapter 1


Sections
  1. Introduction
  2. Issues and options regarding the ontological status of properties
  3. Three important phenomena relevant to the debate about properties
  4. Three important issues in the exemplification of properties
    • The Nature of the “Universal”
    • The relationship between redness and the quality-instance red1
    • An assay of the quality-instance red1
  5. Figures
    • 1.1: The nature of the universal
    • 1.2: Relationship of universal (redness) to quality-instance red1
    • 1.3: Assay of the quality-instance
  6. Universals1 and Philosophical Naturalism
  7. Key philosophical distinctions relevant to the problem of universals2
  8. Figure 1.4:-
    • Do properties exist?
    • Are properties abstract (outside of space and time)?
    • Acceptance of axiom of localisation?
    • Are properties universals3?
    • Are properties “in” concrete particulars?
  9. Two laws of identity
  10. Three important distinctions (due to Francis Suarez)




In-Page Footnotes ("Moreland (J.P.) - The Problem(s) of Universals")

Footnote 5: Controversial!



"Moreland (J.P.) - Extreme Nominalism and Properties"

Source: Moreland - Universals, 2001, Chapter 2



"Moreland (J.P.) - Moderate Nominalism and Properties"

Source: Moreland - Universals, 2001, Chapter 3



"Moreland (J.P.) - Minimalist Realism: Wolterstorff's Kinds and Armstrong's Properties"

Source: Moreland - Universals, 2001, Chapter 4



"Moreland (J.P.) - Traditional Realism: Properties are Abstract Objects"

Source: Moreland - Universals, 2001, Chapter 5



"Moreland (J.P.) - Traditional Realism: Issues and Objections"

Source: Moreland - Universals, 2001, Chapter 6



"Moreland (J.P.) - The Individuation of Particulars"

Source: Moreland - Universals, 2001, Chapter 7



Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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