<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Universals (Moreland (J.P.)) - Theo Todman's Book Collection (Book-Paper Abstracts)</title> <link href="../../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../../TT_ICO.png" /> </head> <a name="Top"></a> <BODY> <div id="header"> <HR><H1>Theo Todman's Book Collection (Book-Paper Abstracts)</H1></div> <hr><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950><tr><td colspan =3><A HREF = "../BookSummary_39.htm">Universals</A></td></tr><tr><td colspan =3><A HREF = "../../../Authors/M/Author_Moreland (J.P.).htm">Moreland (J.P.)</a></td></tr><tr><td colspan =3>This Page provides (where held) the <b>Abstract</b> of the above <b>Book</b> and those of all the <b>Papers</b> contained in it.</td></tr><tr><td><A HREF="#ColourConventions">Text Colour-Conventions</a></td><td><A HREF = "../BookCitings_39.htm">Books / Papers Citing this Book</A></td><td><A HREF = "../BooksToNotes_39.htm">Notes Citing this Book</A></td></tr></tr></TABLE></CENTER><hr> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>BOOK ABSTRACT: </B><BR><BR><u>Cover Blurb</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Things are particulars and their qualities are <a name="1"></a><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>1</SUP>, but do <a name="2"></a><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>2</SUP> have an existence distinct from the particular things describable by those terms? And what must be their nature if they do? This book provides a careful and assured survey of the central issues of debate surrounding <a name="3"></a><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>3</SUP>, in particular those issues that have been a crucial part of the emergence of contemporary analytic ontology. </li><li>The book begins with a taxonomy of extreme nominalist, moderate nominalist, and realist positions on properties, and outlines the way each handles the phenomena of predication, resemblance, and abstract reference. The debate about properties and philosophical naturalism is also examined. Different forms of extreme nominalism, moderate nominalism, and minimalist realism are critiqued. Later chapters defend a traditional realist view of <a name="4"></a><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>4</SUP> and examine the objections to realism from various infinite regresses, the difficulties in stating identity conditions for properties, and problems with realist accounts of knowledge of abstract objects. In addition, the debate between Platonists and Aristotelians is examined alongside a discussion of the relationship between properties and an adequate theory of existence. The book's final chapter explores the problem of individuating particulars. </li><li>The book makes accessible a difficult topic without blunting the sophistication of argument required by a more advanced readership. </li></ol><FONT COLOR = "800080"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><B>BOOK COMMENT: </B><BR><BR>Acumen Publishing Limited, Chesham, Bucks, 2001</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_08/PaperSummary_8029.htm">Moreland (J.P.) - The Problem(s) of Universals</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Moreland - Universals, 2001, Chapter 1<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Sections</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Introduction</li><li>Issues and options regarding the ontological status of properties <ul type="disc"><li>Attribute-agreement and extreme nominalism, moderate nominalism and realism</li><li>Extreme nominalists:-<BR>& <A HREF = "../../../Authors/C/Author_Carnap (Rudolf).htm">Rudolf Carnap</A> , <BR>& <A HREF = "../../../Authors/G/Author_Goodman (Nelson).htm">Nelson Goodman</A>,<BR>& <A HREF = "../../../Authors/Q/Author_Quine (W.V.).htm">W.V. Quine</A>,<BR>& <A HREF = "../../../Authors/S/Author_Sellars (Wilfrid).htm">Wilfrid Sellars</A>, and<BR>& <A HREF = "../../../Authors/Q/Author_Quinton (Anthony).htm">Anthony Quinton</A>.</li><li>Moderate nominalists:- <BR>& <A HREF = "../../../Authors/S/Author_Stout (G.F.).htm">G.F. Stout</A>,<BR>& <A HREF = "../../../Authors/W/Author_Williams (Donald C.).htm">Donald C. Williams</A>,<BR>& <A HREF = "../../../Authors/M/Author_Martin (C.B.).htm">C.B. Martin</A>, and<BR>& <A HREF = "../../../Authors/C/Author_Campbell (Keith).htm">Keith Campbell</A>.</li><li>Realists:-<BR>& <A HREF = "../../../Authors/H/Author_Husserl (Edmund).htm">Edmund Husserl</A>,<BR>& <A HREF = "../../../Authors/B/Author_Bergmann (Gustav).htm">Gustav Bergmann</A>,<BR>& <A HREF = "../../../Authors/G/Author_Grossmann (Reinhardt).htm">Reinhardt Grossmann</A>,<BR>& <A HREF = "../../../Authors/W/Author_Wolterstorff (Nicholas P.).htm">Nicholas P. Wolterstorff</A>,<BR>& <A HREF = "../../../Authors/L/Author_Loux (Michael).htm">Michael Loux</A>, and<BR>& <A HREF = "../../../Authors/A/Author_Armstrong (David).htm">David Armstrong</A>. </li></ul></li><li>Three important phenomena relevant to the debate about properties</li><li>Three important issues in the exemplification of properties <ul type="disc"><li>The Nature of the  Universal </li><li>The relationship between redness and the quality-instance red<sub>1</sub></li><li>An assay of the quality-instance red<sub>1</sub> </li></ul> </li><li>Figures <ul type="disc"><li>1.1: The nature of the universal</li><li>1.2: Relationship of universal (redness) to quality-instance red<sub>1</sub></li><li>1.3: Assay of the quality-instance </li></ul></li><li><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">Universals</A><SUP>1</SUP> and Philosophical Naturalism</li><li>Key philosophical distinctions relevant to the problem of <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>2</SUP></li><li>Figure 1.4:- <ul type="disc"><li>Do properties exist?</li><li>Are properties abstract (outside of space and time)?</li><li>Acceptance of axiom of localisation? </li><li>Are properties <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>3</SUP>? </li><li>Are properties  in concrete particulars? </li></ul></li><li>Two laws of identity <ul type="disc"><li>Leibniz s Law of the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_81.htm">indiscernibility of identicals</A><SUP>4</SUP></li><li> Leibniz s Law of the identity of <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P8029_5">indiscernibles</A></U><SUB>5</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P8029_5"></A> </li></ul></li><li>Three important distinctions (due to Francis Suarez)</li></ol></FONT></P><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U> ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_08/Abstract_8029.htm">Moreland (J.P.) - The Problem(s) of Universals</A>")</B><a name="On-Page_Link_P8029_5"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P8029_5"><B>Footnote 5</B></A></U>: Controversial!<BR><BR> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_08/PaperSummary_8030.htm">Moreland (J.P.) - Extreme Nominalism and Properties</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Moreland - Universals, 2001, Chapter 2<BR></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_08/PaperSummary_8031.htm">Moreland (J.P.) - Moderate Nominalism and Properties</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Moreland - Universals, 2001, Chapter 3<BR></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_08/PaperSummary_8032.htm">Moreland (J.P.) - Minimalist Realism: Wolterstorff's Kinds and Armstrong's Properties</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Moreland - Universals, 2001, Chapter 4<BR></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_08/PaperSummary_8033.htm">Moreland (J.P.) - Traditional Realism: Properties are Abstract Objects</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Moreland - Universals, 2001, Chapter 5<BR></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_08/PaperSummary_8034.htm">Moreland (J.P.) - Traditional Realism: Issues and Objections</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Moreland - Universals, 2001, Chapter 6<BR></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_08/PaperSummary_8035.htm">Moreland (J.P.) - The Individuation of Particulars</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Moreland - Universals, 2001, Chapter 7<BR></P> <a name="ColourConventions"></a><hr><br><B><U>Text Colour Conventions</U> (see <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</B><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL> </center> <BR><HR><BR><center> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-02T02:18" pubdate>02/08/2018 02:18:44</time> <br><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A> </TD></TR><TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>