Personal Identity
Noonan (Harold)
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BOOK ABSTRACT:

Amazon Product Description

  1. Personal Identity is a comprehensive introduction to the nature of the self and its relation to the body. Harold Noonan places the problem of personal identity in the context of more general puzzles about identity, discussing the major historical theories and more recent debates.
  2. The second edition of Personal Identity contains a new chapter on 'animalism1' and a new section on vagueness.

BOOK COMMENT:
  • Routledge; 2 edition (30 Oct 2003),
  • My copy badly adulterated by my own marginal annotations.



"Noonan (Harold) - An Initial Survey"

Source: Noonan - Personal Identity, 2003, Chapter 1


Contents
  1. Introduction – 1
  2. Constitutive and evidential criteria – 2
  3. The bodily criterion – 2
  4. The brain criterion1 – 3
  5. The physical criterion – 4
  6. Objections to the physical criterion – 6
  7. The memory criterion – 9
  8. The psychological continuity2 criterion – 10
  9. The circularity objection – 11
  10. The reduplication3 argument – 12
  11. The revised psychological continuity4 criterion – 13
  12. The multiple occupancy thesis – 14
  13. The simple view5 – 15
  14. The determinacy thesis – 17
  15. What matters6 in survival – 19
  16. Parfit7's argument – 21



"Noonan (Harold) - Locke"

Source: Noonan - Personal Identity, 2003, Chapter 2


Contents
  1. Introduction – 24
  2. The principium individuationis1 – 27
  3. Substantial identity – 28
  4. Plants, animals and men – 31
  5. Personal identity and consciousness – 33
  6. 'Person': a forensic term – 39
  7. Consciousness – 43
  8. A much debated passage – 44


COMMENT: Photocopy filed in "Various - Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 12 (N-O)".



"Noonan (Harold) - Leibniz, Butler and Reid"

Source: Noonan - Personal Identity, 2003, Chapter 3


Contents
  1. Introduction – 47
  2. Discourse on metaphysics – 47
  3. The New Essays – 49
  4. Butler and Reid – 53
  5. The circularity objection – 56
  6. The Butler-Reid-Shoemaker objection – 58
  7. Conclusion – 63



"Noonan (Harold) - Hume"

Source: Noonan - Personal Identity, 2003, Chapter 4


Contents
  1. Introduction – 64
  2. Our idea of identity – 67
  3. The reification of perceptions – 68
  4. Of soul and self – 73
  5. The source of the mistake – 76
  6. Objections to Hume – 80
  7. Conclusion – 85



"Noonan (Harold) - Identity and Personal Identity"

Source: Noonan - Personal Identity, 2003, Chapter 5


Contents
  1. Introduction – 86
  2. A puzzle – 87
  3. A solution – 88
  4. An alternative solution – 93
  5. The simple and complex views – 95
  6. Reductionism and non-reductionism– 97
  7. Persons as endurers or persons as perdurers? – 100
  8. Conclusion – 104



"Noonan (Harold) - Identity and Determinacy"

Source: Noonan - Personal Identity, 2003, Chapter 6


Contents
  1. Introduction – 105
  2. The Determinacy Thesis – 105
  3. Types of indeterminacy – 107
  4. Indeterminacy as semantic indecision – 108
  5. The Epistemic View – 109
  6. Indeterminacy and identity over time – 110
  7. Fuzzy objects – 112
  8. Indeterminacy and brain transplants1 – 118
  9. Indeterminacy and Methuselah2 – 119
  10. The determinacy thesis and personal perdurance – 120
  11. Objections to personal perdurance – 121
  12. Inconstancy in modal3 predication – 124
  13. Conclusion – 126



"Noonan (Harold) - The Reduplication Problem"

Source: Noonan - Personal Identity, 2003, Chapter 7


Contents
  1. Introduction: The generality of the argument – 127
  2. The Only x and y1 principle – 129
  3. The ship of Theseus2 – 131
  4. Wiggins's argument – 133
  5. An alternative argument – 135
  6. Further objections – 136
  7. A counter-argument countered – 137
  8. Cambridge change – 138
  9. The Only x and y3 principle reformulated – 139
  10. The multiple occupancy thesis – 139
  11. Conclusion – 142



"Noonan (Harold) - Quasi-Memory"

Source: Noonan - Personal Identity, 2003, Chapter 8


Contents
  1. Introduction – 144
  2. The circularity objection – 145
  3. Quasi-memory1 – 147
  4. Quasi-memory2 and privileged access – 150
  5. The content of quasi-memory3 – 153
  6. M-connectedness and personal identity – 157



"Noonan (Harold) - Parfit and What Matters in Survival"

Source: Noonan - Personal Identity, 2003, Chapter 9


Contents
  1. Introduction – 163
  2. Identity and survival – 163
  3. What does matter – 164
  4. Fission and survival – 165
  5. Assessment of the argument – 166
  6. Anti-Parfit1 – 168
  7. The Only x and y2 principle revisited – 171
  8. Parfitian3 survival and trivial facts – 172



"Noonan (Harold) - The Self and the Future"

Source: Noonan - Personal Identity, 2003, Chapter 10


Contents
  1. Introduction – 178
  2. Two puzzle cases – 179
  3. Body-switching? – 181
  4. Mind-swapping? – 185
  5. Identity and determinacy – 190
  6. Conclusion – 195



"Noonan (Harold) - Persons, Animals and Human Beings"

Source: Noonan - Personal Identity, 2003, Chapter 11


Contents
  1. Introduction – 196
  2. The Transplant1 Intuition – 199
  3. Rejection of the Transplant2 Intuition – 201
  4. The Hybrid Approach – 205
  5. The Too Many Minds3 Objection – 209
  6. Conclusion – 213


COMMENT: See "Noonan (Harold) - Persons, Animals and Human Beings (2010)" for an updated account.



"Noonan (Harold) - Persons, Animals and Human Beings (2010)"

Source: Campbell, O'Rourke & Silverstein - Time and Identity, III - The Self, Chapter 9


Abstract1
  1. Harold Noonan leans on an intriguing view of first-person reference to further articulate his approach to personal identity and personhood.
  2. We might ask very generally, "What changes can a person survive? What changes will terminate a person's existence?" Noonan argues that the indexical formulation of the problem is more basic: "Our interest in personal identity is fundamentally an interest in our own identity." On this view, persons are just the objects of first-person reference.
  3. Armed with this simple conception of persons, Noonan suggests that defenders of the psychological approach to personal identity can rebut Olson's "too many minds2 objection," also known as the "thinking animal3" problem.
  4. Perhaps we should admit that each of us "is" an animal "in the sense of coinciding with one and being constituted of the same matter as one — but this 'is' is the 'is' of constitution, not identity" (195).
  5. But even if persons and human animals4 coincide in this manner and both think "'I'-thoughts," it does not follow that their thoughts are about different thinkers.
  6. Noonan thus dissolves the skeptical difficulties associated with the too many minds5 objection — "Both the person and the animal can know that their utterance of 'I am a person' is true" (198) — for 'I'-thoughts always refer to the person thinking them. His essay concludes with an extended defense of this approach from "Olson (Eric) - Thinking Animals and the Reference of 'I'" (2002) objections.


COMMENT: This is an update of "Noonan (Harold) - Persons, Animals and Human Beings", Chapter 11 of "Noonan (Harold) - Personal Identity".




In-Page Footnotes ("Noonan (Harold) - Persons, Animals and Human Beings (2010)")

Footnote 1: Taken from p. 16 of "Slater (Matthew H.) - Framing the Problems of Time and Identity", footnotes removed (for now).



"Noonan (Harold) - Against the Closest Continuer Theory"

Source: Noonan - Personal Identity, 2003, Chapter 12


Contents
  1. Introduction – 214
  2. The Only x and y1 principle revisited – 215
  3. The Vienna Circle – 220
  4. The self and the future – 221
  5. Fission – 225



Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2019
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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