<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Essays in Quasi-Realism (Blackburn (Simon)) - Theo Todman's Book Collection (Book-Paper Abstracts)</title> <link href="../../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../../TT_ICO.png" /> </head> <a name="Top"></a> <BODY> <div id="header"> <HR><H1>Theo Todman's Book Collection (Book-Paper Abstracts)</H1></div> <hr><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950><tr><td colspan =2><A HREF = "../BookSummary_403.htm">Essays in Quasi-Realism</A></td></tr><tr><td colspan =2><A HREF = "../../../Authors/B/Author_Blackburn (Simon).htm">Blackburn (Simon)</a></td></tr><tr><td colspan =2>This Page provides (where held) the <b>Abstract</b> of the above <b>Book</b> and those of all the <b>Papers</b> contained in it.</td></tr><tr><td><A HREF="#ColourConventions">Text Colour-Conventions</a></td><td><A HREF = "../BookCitings_403.htm">Books / Papers Citing this Book</A></td></tr></tr></TABLE></CENTER><hr> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>BOOK ABSTRACT: </B><BR><BR><U>Amazon Book Description</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>This volume collects together some influential essays in which Simon Blackburn explores one of the most profound and fertile of philosophical problems: the way in which our judgements relate to the world. </li><li>This debate has centered on realism, or the view that what we say is validated by the way things stand in the world, and a variety of oppositions to it. Prominent among the latter are expressive and projective theories, but also a relaxed pluralism that discourages the view that there are substantial issues at stake. </li><li>The figure of the  quasi-realist dramatizes the difficulty of conducting these debates. Typically philosophers thinking of themselves as realists will believe that they alone can give a proper or literal account of some of our attachments - to truth, to facts, to the independent world, to knowledge, and to certainty. The quasi-realist challenge, developed by Blackburn in this volume, is that we can have those attachments without any metaphysic that deserves calling realism, so that the metaphysical picture that goes with our practices is quite idle. </li><li>The cases treated here include the theory of value, of knowledge, <a name="1"></a><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_121.htm">modality</A><SUP>1</SUP>, probability, <a name="2"></a><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_39.htm">causation</A><SUP>2</SUP>, intentionality and rule-following, and explanation.</li><li>A substantial new introduction has been added, drawing together some of the central themes. The essays articulate a fresh alternative to a primitive realist/anti-realist opposition, and their cumulative effect is to yield a new appreciation of the delicacy of the debate in these central areas. </li></ol></FONT></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_02/PaperSummary_2378.htm">Blackburn (Simon) - Attitudes and Contents</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Blackburn - Essays in Quasi-Realism<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Philosophers Index Abstract</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">This paper rebuts a doubt about quasi realism voiced in "ethics" by Professor Schueler. I develop a logic for mixed sets of attitude and belief and suggest a semantical treatment similar to that of Hintikka.</ol></FONT></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_02/PaperSummary_2376.htm">Blackburn (Simon) - Errors and the Phenomenology of Value</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Blackburn - Essays in Quasi-Realism<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Write-up <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1009.htm">Note</A><SUP>1</SUP><BR><BR><U>Philosophers Index Abstract</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">In this paper I argue that a Humean or projective account of morality is superior to any that takes comfort from the comparison with secondary qualities. <li>I particularly try to show that the 'phenomenology' of moral judgement, including its absolutist feel, provides no difficulty for such a theory when it is properly developed.</li></ol></FONT><BR>For a prcis, follow this <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1009.htm">Note</A><SUP>2</SUP>.<BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>Annotated photocopy filed in "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1288.htm">Various - Papers on Ethics Boxes Vol 1 (Coursework & A-F)</A>".</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_04/PaperSummary_4144.htm">Blackburn (Simon) - Essays in Quasi-Realism: Introduction</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Blackburn - Essays in Quasi-Realism<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Philosophers Index Abstract</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">This book collects together the main papers I have written on the theme of realism and its competitors. It includes addenda discussing reactions and exploring further avenues, and a scene-setting introduction.</ol></FONT></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_02/PaperSummary_2382.htm">Blackburn (Simon) - Filling in Space</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Blackburn - Essays in Quasi-Realism<BR></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_02/PaperSummary_2377.htm">Blackburn (Simon) - How to Be an Ethical Anti-Realist</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Blackburn - Essays in Quasi-Realism<BR></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_02/PaperSummary_2373.htm">Blackburn (Simon) - Hume and Thick Connexions</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Blackburn - Essays in Quasi-Realism<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Philosophers Index Abstract</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">In this paper I dispute the view, propounded by John Wright, Galen Strawson and others, that Hume is a "causal realist". I argue that the realist interpretation depends upon offering Hume an impoverished menu of options. When we take into account Hume's method, and the avowed influence of Hutcheson not only on the later parts but upon the metaphysical foundations of the Treatise, Hume comes into view as a sophisticated projectivist or quasi-realist about <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_39.htm">causation</A><SUP>1</SUP>, as he was about morals. This alone reconciles the realist sounding passages of the Treatise with Hume's principles of meaning and understanding.</ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>See <A HREF = "http://www2.phil.cam.ac.uk/~swb24/PAPERS/Humecause.htm" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>.</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_02/PaperSummary_2379.htm">Blackburn (Simon) - Just Causes</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Blackburn - Essays in Quasi-Realism<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Philosophers Index Abstract</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">This paper considers the realist contention in ethics, that contrary to claims by some anti-realists, ethical properties are genuinely explanatory. From a 'projectivist' perspective I seek to explain why this is so, concluding that no argument against that point of view can derive from its phenomenon.</ol></FONT></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_02/PaperSummary_2370.htm">Blackburn (Simon) - Knowledge, Truth, and Reliability</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Blackburn - Essays in Quasi-Realism<BR></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_02/PaperSummary_2381.htm">Blackburn (Simon) - Losing Your Mind: Physics, Identity, and the Folk Burglar Prevention</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Blackburn - Essays in Quasi-Realism<BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>Eliminitivism</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_02/PaperSummary_2374.htm">Blackburn (Simon) - Moral Realism</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Blackburn - Essays in Quasi-Realism<BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>Photocopy filed in "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1288.htm">Various - Papers on Ethics Boxes Vol 1 (Coursework & A-F)</A>".</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_02/PaperSummary_2371.htm">Blackburn (Simon) - Morals and Modals</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Blackburn - Essays in Quasi-Realism<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Philosophers Index Abstract</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">This paper displays a "quasi-realist" theory of necessary truths, in which our propensity to attach <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_121.htm">modal</A><SUP>1</SUP> values to propositions is compared with our propensity to moral attitudes. The theory offers an alternative to quinean scepticism to 'as if' theories, and to <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_121.htm">modal</A><SUP>2</SUP> realism.</ol></FONT></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_02/PaperSummary_2372.htm">Blackburn (Simon) - Opinions and Chances</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Blackburn - Essays in Quasi-Realism<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Philosophers Index Abstract</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">In this paper I try to suggest a position on probability which could be called 'responsible subjectivism': probability judgments are to be seen as projections of degrees of confidence but subject to more constraints than the usual coherence and dynamic coherence constraints. I argue that this enables us to account for the apparently realistic nature of chances as theoretical entities, without departing from a subjective metaphysic, and I draw affinities with Ramsey's views. </ol></FONT></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_02/PaperSummary_2375.htm">Blackburn (Simon) - Supervenience Revisited</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Blackburn - Essays in Quasi-Realism<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Philosophers Index Abstract</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">In this paper I return to the problem of relating the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1263.htm">supervenience</A><SUP>1</SUP> of the ethical on the natural, to the lack of logical relations between the two realms. I compare other cases, and discuss whether different strengths of <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_121.htm">modality</A><SUP>2</SUP> render the ethical case unproblematic, so that the combination is no special difficulty for moral realism. I conclude that they do not, and that antirealism gives a superior explanation of the phenomena.</ol></FONT></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_02/PaperSummary_2380.htm">Blackburn (Simon) - The Individual Strikes Back</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Blackburn - Essays in Quasi-Realism<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Philosophers Index Abstract</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">In this paper I discuss the virtues and possible limitations of Saul Kripke's exegesis of the rule-following considerations. I express reservations about the way the public-private dichotomy fits with this argument, and the way in which it relates to the notion of truth in the later Wittgenstein. </ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>Kripke, Wittgenstein & "Following a Rule"</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_02/PaperSummary_2369.htm">Blackburn (Simon) - Truth, Realism, and the Regulation Theory</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Blackburn - Essays in Quasi-Realism<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Philosophers Index Abstract</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">In this paper I address the question of how to distinguish whether the use of a kind of assertion is best thought of in 'realist' or 'anti-realist' terms. I reject various proposals--putnam's 'naturalistic fallacy' argument, dummett's use of bivalence as a litmus test, certain attitudes to indeterminacy and the existence of other theories of the same area. The only surviving proposal is that we look to our own explanations of the truths to which we are responding when we make assertions. This gives us a debate in, say, mathematics or ethics, but fails to distinguish anti-realism about common-sense.</ol></FONT></P> <a name="ColourConventions"></a><hr><br><B><U>Text Colour Conventions</U> (see <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</B><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL> </center> <BR><HR><BR><center> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-02T23:57" pubdate>02/08/2018 23:57:28</time> <br><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A> </TD></TR><TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>