<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology (Dancy (Jonathan)) - Theo Todman's Book Collection (Book-Paper Abstracts)</title> <link href="../../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../../TT_ICO.png" /> </head> <a name="Top"></a> <BODY> <div id="header"> <HR><H1>Theo Todman's Book Collection (Book-Paper Abstracts)</H1></div> <hr><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950><tr><td colspan =3><A HREF = "../BookSummary_419.htm">An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology</A></td></tr><tr><td colspan =3><A HREF = "../../../Authors/D/Author_Dancy (Jonathan).htm">Dancy (Jonathan)</a></td></tr><tr><td colspan =3>This Page provides (where held) the <b>Abstract</b> of the above <b>Book</b> and those of all the <b>Papers</b> contained in it.</td></tr><tr><td><A HREF="#ColourConventions">Text Colour-Conventions</a></td><td><A HREF = "../BookCitings_419.htm">Books / Papers Citing this Book</A></td><td><A HREF = "../BooksToNotes_419.htm">Notes Citing this Book</A></td></tr></tr></TABLE></CENTER><hr> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>BOOK ABSTRACT: </B><BR><BR><u>Amazon Customer Review</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>This book introduces and defends the coherence theory of truth and justification as an approach to the epistemological enterprise. <ul type="disc"><li>The book starts out with a clear classification of central sceptical problems and the author s convictions that they should be taken seriously.</li><li>It then introduces the definition of knowledge and the associated Gettier problems as well as providing a critique of the conditional theory, causal theory and defeasibility condition theory.</li><li>Thirdly the book provides a critique of foundationalism as a theory of justification and instead defends the coherence theory against some of its traditional criticisms and makes an interesting case for the coherence theory justifying inductive reasoning. </li></ul></li><li>I found this book quite enjoyable, the arguments are passionately given but are at the same time clear and make much reference to other philosophers, especially Quine (it's not just the author s own views and theories being run off).</li><li>Readers are unlikely to buy some of the author's defensive arguments for the coherence theory  he seems to try and sidestep the plurality objection rather than create a strong argument against it  but the book is worth reading for its scope of inquiry alone: perception, memory, induction, holism versus atomism, indeterminacy etc. All are examined with reference to the coherence theory's application to their central poblems.</li></ol></FONT><BR>For a detailed analysis of the whole book, <a name="1"></a><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1198.htm">follow this link</A><SUP>1</SUP>.</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_07/PaperSummary_7180.htm">Dancy (Jonathan) - An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology: Introduction</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Dancy - An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology, 1985, Introduction<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Write-up <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1091.htm">Note</A><SUP>1</SUP><BR><BR><U>Philosophers Index Abstract</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">An introductory textbook covering the main areas of contemporary debate, with sections on knowledge, justification, perception, etc. Direct realism is preferred to other theories of perception. In general, a coherentist perspective is preferred even to weak forms of foundationalism. Various answers to the probings of the sceptic are suggested, and the relevance of the internalism/externalism distinction made clear. The book ends with chapters on memory, induction, a priori knowledge and the possibility of epistemology.</ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>For a prcis, see this <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1091.htm">Note</A><SUP>2</SUP>.</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_07/PaperSummary_7181.htm">Dancy (Jonathan) - Scepticism</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Dancy - An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology, 1985, Chapter 1<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Write-up <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1103.htm">Note</A><SUP>1</SUP><BR><BR><u>Sections</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Some Distinctions</li><li>Three Sceptical Arguments<BR>& 2.1 <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_56.htm">Brains in Vats</A><SUP>2</SUP><BR>& 2.2 The Argument from Error<BR>& 1.2.3 The Justification of Arguments from Experience</li><li>A Short Way with the Sceptic</li><li>Another Reply</li><li>A Better Response</li></ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>For a prcis, see this <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1103.htm">Note</A><SUP>3</SUP>.</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_07/PaperSummary_7182.htm">Dancy (Jonathan) - Knowledge</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Dancy - An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology, 1985, Chapter 2<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Write-up <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1100.htm">Note</A><SUP>1</SUP><BR><BR><u>Sections</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>The Traditional Account</li><li>Gettier Counter-examples</li><li>Responses to Gettier<BR>& 3.1 The Presence of Relevant Falsehood<BR>& 3.2 Defeasibility<BR>& 3.3 Reliability<BR>& 3.4 Conclusive Reasons<BR>& 3.5 The Causal Theory</li><li>Concluding Remarks</li></ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>For a prcis, see this <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1100.htm">Note</A><SUP>2</SUP>.</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_07/PaperSummary_7183.htm">Dancy (Jonathan) - The Conditional Theory of Knowledge</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Dancy - An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology, 1985, Chapter 3<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Write-up <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1104.htm">Note</A><SUP>1</SUP><BR><BR><u>Sections</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>The Theory</li><li>Some Comments<BR>& 2.1 Relation to the Other Theories<BR>& 2.2 Relation to Justified Belief<BR>& 2.3 Luck<BR>& 2.4 Certainty</li><li>The Principle of Closure & the First Sceptical Argument<BR>& 3.1 Disproof of the Principle of Closure (PCk)</li><li>Has Nozick Refuted the Sceptic?</li><li>Internalism and Externalism</li></ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>For a prcis, see this <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1104.htm">Note</A><SUP>2</SUP>.</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_07/PaperSummary_7184.htm">Dancy (Jonathan) - Foundationalism</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Dancy - An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology, 1985, Chapter 4<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Write-up <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1095.htm">Note</A><SUP>1</SUP><BR><BR><u>Sections</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Classical Foundationalism<BR>& 1.1 Probability and Certainty<BR>& 1.2 The Regress Argument<BR>& 1.3 Infallibility and Justification</li><li>Problems for Classical Foundationalism</li><li>Foundationalism Without Infallibility</li></ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>For a prcis, see this <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1095.htm">Note</A><SUP>2</SUP>.</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_07/PaperSummary_7185.htm">Dancy (Jonathan) - Foundationalism and Other Minds</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Dancy - An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology, 1985, Chapter 5<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Write-up <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1096.htm">Note</A><SUP>1</SUP><BR><BR><u>Sections</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Basic Beliefs and One s Own Sensory States</li><li>The Problem of Other Minds</li><li>The Argument from Analogy</li><li>Can you Understand Propositions about Minds other than Your Own?</li><li>The Private Language Argument: Rule Following</li><li>Another Interpretation<BR>& 6.1 Objection 1 (Solo-operation?)<BR>& 6.2 Objection 2 (Objectivity?)</li><li>Common Conclusions</li><li>Prospects for Foundationalism</li></ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>For a prcis, see this <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1096.htm">Note</A><SUP>2</SUP>.</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_07/PaperSummary_7186.htm">Dancy (Jonathan) - Empiricist Theories of Meaning</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Dancy - An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology, 1985, Chapter 6<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Write-up <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1094.htm">Note</A><SUP>1</SUP><BR><BR><u>Sections</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>The Relevance of Theories of Meaning to Epistemology</li><li>Logical Empiricism and the Evidence of One s Senses</li><li>Three Verificationist Theories<BR>& 3.1 Phenomenalism<BR>& 3.2 Carnap s Relaxation<BR>& 3.3 Quine</li></ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>For a prcis, see this <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1094.htm">Note</A><SUP>2</SUP>.</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_07/PaperSummary_7187.htm">Dancy (Jonathan) - Holism and Indeterminacy</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Dancy - An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology, 1985, Chapter 7<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Write-up <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1097.htm">Note</A><SUP>1</SUP><BR><BR><u>Sections</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>The Indeterminacy of Translation</li><li>Quine as a Foundationalist</li><li>Atomism and Holism</li><li>The Merits of a More Complete Holism<BR>& 4.1 Argument 1: the  argument from above <BR>& 4.2 Argument 2: the criteria used in translations<BR>& 4.3 Argument 3: the relation between belief and meaning<BR>& 4.4 Conclusion</li><li>Verificationism, Anti-Realism and Foundationalism</li></ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>For a prcis, see this <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1097.htm">Note</A><SUP>2</SUP>.</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_07/PaperSummary_7188.htm">Dancy (Jonathan) - Coherence Theories</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Dancy - An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology, 1985, Chapter 8<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Write-up <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1092.htm">Note</A><SUP>1</SUP><BR><BR><u>Sections</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>What is Coherence?</li><li>The Coherence Theory of Truth</li><li>The Coherence Theory of Justification</li><li>The Role of Empirical Data</li><li>Coherentism and Empiricism</li></ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>For a prcis, see this <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1092.htm">Note</A><SUP>2</SUP>.</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_07/PaperSummary_7189.htm">Dancy (Jonathan) - Coherence, Justification and Knowledge</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Dancy - An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology, 1985, Chapter 9<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Write-up <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1093.htm">Note</A><SUP>1</SUP><BR><BR><u>Sections</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>The Regress Argument<BR>& 1.1 A First Regress Argument<BR>& 1.2 Another Regress Argument</li><li>Internalism and Externalism</li><li>Degrees of Internalism<BR>& 3.1 No clause c<BR>& 3.2 Accompany c with Kac<BR>& 3.3 Accompany c with Bac<BR>& 3.4 Accompany c with JBac</li><li>Internalism and Coherentism</li><li>Coherentism, Realism and Scepticism</li></ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>For a prcis, see this <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1093.htm">Note</A><SUP>2</SUP>.</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_07/PaperSummary_7190.htm">Dancy (Jonathan) - Theories of Perception</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Dancy - An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology, 1985, Chapter 10<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Write-up <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1105.htm">Note</A><SUP>1</SUP><BR><BR><u>Sections</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Is There Room for a Philosophy of Perception?</li><li>Theories of Perception</li><li>Direct Realism</li><li>Indirect Realism</li><li>Nave and Scientific Forms of Indirect Realism</li><li>Phenomenalism and Idealism</li></ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>For a prcis, see this <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1105.htm">Note</A><SUP>2</SUP>.</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_07/PaperSummary_7191.htm">Dancy (Jonathan) - Perception: the Choice of a Theory</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Dancy - An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology, 1985, Chapter 11<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Write-up <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1102.htm">Note</A><SUP>1</SUP><BR><BR><u>Sections</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Phenomenalism and the Explanation of Experience</li><li>Indirect Realism: Double Awareness and a Double Object<BR>& 2.1 The Sceptical Objection<BR>& 2.2 The Direct and the Indirect<BR>& 2.3 Inferential Realism<BR>& 2.4 Conclusion</li><li>Direct Realism and the Explanation of Perceptual Error</li><li>A Causal Element<BR>& 4.1 Comment 1: Reliability Requirements<BR>& 4.2 Comment 2: Externalism</li><li>Perception, <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_39.htm">Causation</A><SUP>2</SUP> and Justification<BR>& 5.1 Justification 1: Truth Tracking<BR>& 5.2 Justification 2: Conceptual Necessity<BR>& 5.3 Justification 3: Coherentism<BR>& 5.4 Justification 4: Causal</li><li>Direct Realism and Coherentism<BR>& 6.1 Pure anti-realists should be phenomenalists<BR>& 6.2 A coherentist should be a direct rather than indirect realist<BR>& 6.3 Scientific direct realism is better than the nave form</li></ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>For a prcis, see this <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1102.htm">Note</A><SUP>3</SUP>.</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_07/PaperSummary_7192.htm">Dancy (Jonathan) - Memory</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Dancy - An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology, 1985, Chapter 12<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Write-up <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1101.htm">Note</A><SUP>1</SUP><BR><BR><u>Sections</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Theories of Memory</li><li>Indirect Realism<BR>& 2.1 Objection 1: double awareness<BR>& 2.2 Objection 2: double intermediacy<BR>& 2.3 Objection 3: memory and imagination</li><li>Direct Realism<BR>& 3.1 Factual memory<BR>& 3.2 Perceptual memory<BR>& 3.3 Definitions, distinctions and contrasts<BR>& 3.4 Problems for direct realism</li><li>Phenomenalism</li><li>Russell s Hypothesis<BR>& 5.1 Nozick s response<BR>& 5.2 The phenomenalist response<BR>& 5.3 The transcendental argument<BR>& 5.4 Conclusion</li><li>Perceptual Memory and Justification</li></ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>For a prcis, see this <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1101.htm">Note</A><SUP>2</SUP>.</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_07/PaperSummary_7193.htm">Dancy (Jonathan) - Induction</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Dancy - An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology, 1985, Chapter 13<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Write-up <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1098.htm">Note</A><SUP>1</SUP><BR><BR><u>Sections</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Induction, Perception and Memory</li><li>Two Conceptions of the Future</li><li>Hume and his Critics<BR>& 3.1 Is the Circularity Vicious?<BR>& 3.2 Appeals to Analyticity</li><li>Goodman s New Riddle of Induction</li><li>Coherentism and Induction</li></ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>For a prcis, see this <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1098.htm">Note</A><SUP>2</SUP>.</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_07/PaperSummary_7194.htm">Dancy (Jonathan) - A Priori Knowledge</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Dancy - An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology, 1985, Chapter 14<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Write-up <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1090.htm">Note</A><SUP>1</SUP><BR><BR><u>Sections</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Foundationalism and A Priori Knowledge</li><li>Empiricism. The A Priori and the Analytic</li><li>Can Synthetic Truths be Known A Priori?</li><li>A Priori Knowledge and Universal Truth</li><li>A Priori Knowledge and Necessary Truth</li><li>Quine and the Distinction between A Priori and Empirical</li><li>A Coherentist Approach<BR>& 7.1 Hume s view<BR>& 7.2 Quine s view<BR>& 7.3 Blanchard s view </li></ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>For a prcis, see this <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1090.htm">Note</A><SUP>2</SUP>.</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_07/PaperSummary_7195.htm">Dancy (Jonathan) - Is Epistemology Possible?</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Dancy - An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology, 1985, Chapter 15<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Write-up <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1099.htm">Note</A><SUP>1</SUP><BR><BR><u>Sections</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Hegel</li><li>Chisholm and the Problem of the Criterion</li><li>Quine and the Non-Existence of First Philosophy</li><li>Epistemology Naturalised</li><li>Conclusion</li></ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>For a prcis, see this <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1099.htm">Note</A><SUP>2</SUP>.</P> <a name="ColourConventions"></a><hr><br><B><U>Text Colour Conventions</U> (see <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</B><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL> </center> <BR><HR><BR><center> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-02T02:29" pubdate>02/08/2018 02:29:58</time> <br><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A> </TD></TR><TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>