From a Logical Point of View
Quine (W.V.)
This Page provides (where held) the Abstract of the above Book and those of all the Papers contained in it.
Text Colour-ConventionsBooks / Papers Citing this BookNotes Citing this Book

BOOK ABSTRACT:

Amazon Customer Review


BOOK COMMENT:

Harvard University Press; New edition edition (1 July 1980)



"Quine (W.V.) - From a Logical Point of View: Foreword, 1980"

Source: Quine - From a Logical Point of View


Full Text (some footnotes omitted)
  1. In 1950, having Methods of Logic and a revision of Mathematical Logic in hand, I set my sights on a book of more broadly philosophical character. It proved in the fullness of time to be Word and Object1, and the fullness of time was nine years. I foresaw by 1952 that it would be a long pull and became impatient to make some of my philosophical views conveniently accessible meanwhile. Henry Aiken and I were with our wives in a Greenwich Village nightspot when I told him of the plan, and Harry Belafonte had just sung the calypso "From a logical point of view." Henry noted that this would do nicely as a title for the volume, and so it did.
  2. The book did nicely as well. In the course of its two editions and its many printings it sold nearly forty thousand copies in English and I have no notion how many in Spanish, Italian, Polish, German, and Japanese. Eight of the nine essays have reappeared also independently in one or more anthologies, and each in one or more translations. The first two, indeed, have been anthologized to extinction: twenty-four and twenty-five times respectively and in seven and six languages. I am much gratified and flattered by all this, and likewise by the readiness of my friends at Harvard University Press to take over the paperback rights and keep up the output.
  3. The time for revision is past. The book is dated, and its dates are 1953 and 1961. On the present occasion I have revised just a single page, one that contained mistaken criticism of Church and Smullyan. It is page 154, amid the tumultuous pages where most of the 1961 revision took place.
  4. But I shall improve the opportunity in this preface for a few caveats. One is that "On what there is" is nominalistic neither in doctrine nor in motivation. I was concerned rather with ascribing ontologies than with evaluating them. Moreover, in likening the physicists' posits to the gods of Homer, in that essay and in "Two dogmas," I was talking epistemology and not metaphysics. Posited objects can be real. As I wrote elsewhere, to call a posit a posit is not to patronize it.
  5. The holism in "Two dogmas" has put many readers off, but I think its fault is one of emphasis. All we really need in the way of holism, for the purposes to which it is put in that essay, is to appreciate that empirical content is shared by the statements of science in clusters and cannot for the most part be sorted out among them. Practically the relevant cluster is indeed never the whole of science; there is a grading off, and I recognized it, citing the example of the brick houses on Elm Street.
  6. Both that essay and the next, "The problem of meaning in linguistics," reflected a dim view of the notion of meaning. A discouraging response from somewhat the fringes of philosophy has been that my problem comes of taking words as bare strings of phonemes rather than seeing that they are strings with meaning. Naturally, they say, if I insist on meaningless strings I shall be at a loss for meanings. They fail to see that a bare and identical string of phonemes can have a meaning, or several, in one or several languages, through its use by sundry people or peoples, much as I can have accounts in several banks and relatives in several countries without somehow containing them or being several persons. It is usually convenient elsewhere in linguistics to distinguish homomorphs by meanings or history — sound (sonus) and sound (sanus), for example — but when we are philosophically concerned about meaning we had best not bury it. I hope this paragraph has been superfluous for most readers.
  7. Finally, some technical remarks about "New foundations." We see in pages 98-99 the superiority of ML over NF in respect of mathematical induction and the existence of the class of natural numbers. There remains, however, this related infirmity in ML: Rosser has shown that the class of natural numbers cannot be proved in ML to be a set, or element, if ML is consistent. We can still add an axiom to that effect, and indeed we need it for the theory of real numbers. But it is inelegant to have to add it.
  8. NF and ML can be further criticized for allowing self-membership, which beclouds individuation. The glory of classes, over against properties, is their clear individuation: they are identical if and only if they have the same members. This, however, is relative individuation; classes are individuated only as clearly as their members. Under self-membership the individuation ceases to wind down.
  9. Russell's theory of types has an epistemological advantage over NF and ML: it lends itself to a more plausible reconstruction of the genesis of high-level class concepts2. From the theory of types to the set theories of Zermelo and von Neumann, in turn, a natural transition can be made3. NF is to be reckoned as an artificial alternative devised afterward for its convenience and elegance; and ML is another. The advantages are real, despite the above reservations.
  10. During the forty-odd years since NF was first published, much ingenious work has been done by Rosser, Benes, Specker, Orey, Henson, Jensen, Boffa, Grishin, and others in hopes of either deriving a contradiction or proving that the system is consistent if a more classical set theory is consistent. The problem is still open, but a number of curious and surprising relationships have been uncovered in the course of the search.
    … Cambridge, Massachusetts




In-Page Footnotes ("Quine (W.V.) - From a Logical Point of View: Foreword, 1980")

Footnote 1: See "Quine (W.V.) - Word & Object".

Footnote 2: See The Roots of Reference (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1973), pp. 120ff ("Quine (W.V.) - The Roots of Reference").

Footnote 3: See Set Theory and Its Logic (Cambridge: Harvard, 1963, 1969), §§ 38, 43 ("Quine (W.V.) - Set Theory and its Logic").



"Quine (W.V.) - Identity, Ostension, and Hypostasis"

Source: Quine - From a Logical Point of View


Author’s Introduction
  1. Identity is a popular source of philosophical perplexity. Undergoing change as I do, how can I be said to continue to be myself? Considering that a complete replacement of my material substance takes place every few years, how can I be said to continue to be I for more than such a period at best?
  2. It would be agreeable to be driven, by these or other considerations, to belief in a changeless and therefore immortal soul as the vehicle of my persisting self-identity. But we should be less eager to embrace a parallel solution of Heracleitus's parallel problem regarding a river: "You cannot bathe in the same river twice, for new waters are ever flowing in upon you."
  3. The solution of Heracleitus's problem, though familiar, will afford a convenient approach to some less familiar matters. The truth is that you can bathe in the same river twice, but not in the same river-stages. You can bathe in two river-stages which are stages of the same river, and this is what constitutes bathing in the same river twice. A river is a process through time, and the river-stages are its momentary parts. Identification of the river bathed in once with the river bathed in again is just what determines our subject-matter to be a river process as opposed to a river stage.
  4. Let me speak of any multiplicity of water molecules as a water. Now a river-stage is at the same time a water-stage, but two stages of the same river are not in general stages of the same water. River stages are water stages, but rivers are not waters. You may bathe in the same river twice without bathing in the same water twice, and you may, in these days of fast transportation, bathe in the same water twice while bathing in two different rivers.


COMMENT:



"Quine (W.V.) - Logic and the Reification of Universals"

Source: Quine - From a Logical Point of View



"Quine (W.V.) - Meaning and Existential Inference"

Source: Quine - From a Logical Point of View



"Quine (W.V.) - New Foundations for Mathematical Logic"

Source: Quine - From a Logical Point of View



"Quine (W.V.) - Notes on the Theory of Reference"

Source: Quine - From a Logical Point of View



"Quine (W.V.) - On What There Is"

Source: Quine - From a Logical Point of View


Frazer MacBride’s Notes on W.V.O. Quine "On What There Is" (MPhil Stud Seminar, Birkbeck, 3rd October 2005)

Fundamental Point: "To be assumed as an entity is, purely and simply, to be reckoned as the value of a variable.... We are convicted of a particular ontological presupposition if, and only if, the alleged presuppositum has to be reckoned among the entities over which our variables range in order to render one of our affirmations true" (OWI: 13).

Structure of paper
  1. Plato's Beard—unsatisfactory responses to the Puzzle of Non-Being (OWI: 1-5)
  2. Untangling the Beard using Russell's Theory of Descriptions (OWI: 5-9)
  3. The Problem of Universals1—there are no universals2 (OWI: 9-15)
  4. Ontological Methodology—how to adjudicate between rival ontologies (OWI: 15-19)
Analysis
  1. Plato's Beard: Does Pegasus exist? If he doesn't then what am I+XX+ denying the existence of?
    • a) McX3 identifies Pegasus with a mental idea but Pegasus no more an idea than the Parthenon.
    • b) Wyman4 identifies Pegasus with an un-actualised possibility but such entities are unduly mysterious and there also non-existent things which could not exist (e.g. the round square cupola).
  2. Untangling the Beard
    There's no necessity to admit non-existent objects because
    • (c) Russell's theory of descriptions and
    • (d) Frege's distinction between sense and reference
    show that being meaningful and naming are different things.
      (TD5): The F Gs ↔ (∃xFx & (∀yFy → x=y)) & Gx
  3. The Problem of Universals6
    There is no need to admit mysterious entities like being red any more than non-existent things like Pegasus because
    • (e) the semantic role of a predicate is simply to be true or false of an entity picked out by a name,
    • (f) expressions can be meaningful without there being meanings and
    • (g) we do not quantify over predicate expressions.
    Clarifying ontological commitment by comparison with philosophy of mathematics:
      realism—logicism, conceptualism—intuitionism, nominalism—formalism.
  4. Ontological Methodology
    A criterion of ontological commitment does not tell us what there is, but what someone says there is; whether we accept what someone says is guided by the general ideals of theory construction; a choice of ontology is determined by the over-all conceptual scheme that accommodates science in the broadest sense.


COMMENT: Required reading for Birkbeck MPhil Stud Seminar 03/10/2005; Also in:- Photocopy filed in "Various - Heythrop Essays & Supporting Material (Boxes)". Note - see "Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Quine, “On What There Is”".




In-Page Footnotes ("Quine (W.V.) - On What There Is")

Footnote 3: TT: Presumably McTaggart.

Footnote 4: TT: Presumably Meinong.

Footnote 5: TD = “(Russell’s) Theory of Descriptions.” For helpful HTML tags for logical connectives, see Link.



"Quine (W.V.) - Reference and Modality"

Source: Quine - From a Logical Point of View



"Quine (W.V.) - The Problem of Meaning in Linguistics"

Source: Quine - From a Logical Point of View



"Quine (W.V.) - Two Dogmas of Empiricism"

Source: Quine - From a Logical Point of View

COMMENT:



Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



© Theo Todman, June 2007 - June 2018. Please address any comments on this page to theo@theotodman.com. File output:
Website Maintenance Dashboard
Return to Top of this Page Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page Return to Theo Todman's Home Page