<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics (Laurence (Stephen) & Macdonald (Cynthia), Eds.) - Theo Todman's Book Collection (Book-Paper Abstracts)</title> <link href="../../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../../TT_ICO.png" /> </head> <a name="Top"></a> <BODY> <div id="header"> <HR><H1>Theo Todman's Book Collection (Book-Paper Abstracts)</H1></div> <hr><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950><tr><td colspan =2><A HREF = "../BookSummary_423.htm">Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics</A></td></tr><tr><td colspan =2><A HREF = "../../../Authors/L/Author_Laurence (Stephen).htm">Laurence (Stephen)</a> & <A HREF = "../../../Authors/M/Author_Macdonald (Cynthia).htm">Macdonald (Cynthia)</a>, Eds.</td></tr><tr><td colspan =2>This Page provides (where held) the <b>Abstract</b> of the above <b>Book</b> and those of all the <b>Papers</b> contained in it.</td></tr><tr><td><A HREF="#ColourConventions">Text Colour-Conventions</a></td><td><A HREF = "../BookCitings_423.htm">Books / Papers Citing this Book</A></td></tr></tr></TABLE></CENTER><hr> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>BOOK ABSTRACT: </B><BR><BR><U>Back Cover Blurb</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>The basic tools and concepts of metaphysics are employed in virtually every branch of philosophy, necessitating a basic understanding of metaphysics to completely understand any philosophical work. </li><li>This volume is a comprehensive survey of contemporary thought on a wide range of issues and provides students with the basic background to current debates in metaphysics and ontology. </li><li>An introductory essay by the editors offers an overview of the volume and introduces students to the major debates that are contained within the main body of the text. </li><li>The collection contains classic contemporary papers on topics such as <ul type="disc"><li>Ontological Commitment and Methodology, </li><li>Possible Worlds and Possibilia, </li><li>Properties and <a name="1"></a><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">Universals</A><SUP>1</SUP>, </li><li>Substances, </li><li>Events, </li><li>Tropes and </li><li>Mathematical Objects. </li></ul></li><li>It also includes seven newly commissioned state of the art articles by Van Inwagen, Lycan, Bealer, Loux, Lombard, Macdonald and Field. </li><li>The volume is ideal for undergraduate and graduate courses in metaphysics and contemporary philosophy.</li><li><b>Stephen Laurence</b> is a Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Sheffield, England and is co editor of <a name="2"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_227.htm">Margolis (Eric) & Laurence (Stephen), Eds. - Concepts - Core Readings</A>" (1998). </li><li><b>Cynthia Macdonald</b> is Professor at the University of Canterbury at Christchurch, New Zealand. She is co author of <ul type="disc"><li><a name="3"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_226.htm">MacDonald (Cynthia) & MacDonald (Graham), Eds. - The Philosophy of Psychology: Debates in Psychological Explanation - Vol. 1</A>" (1995) and </li><li><a name="4"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_05/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_5740.htm">MacDonald (Cynthia) & MacDonald (Graham), Eds. - Connectionism: Debates in Psychological Explanation - Vol. 2</A>"(1995).</li></ul> </li></ol> </FONT><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><B>BOOK COMMENT: </B><BR><BR>Blackwell Publishers, 1999 reprint</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_01/PaperSummary_1978.htm">Allaire (Edwin B.) - Another Look at Bare Particulars</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Laurence & Macdonald - Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Philosophers Index Abstract</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>The article goes into <A HREF = "../../../Authors/C/Author_Chappell (Vere).htm">Vere Chappell</A>'s position that the "correct" solution to the "spurious" <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_77.htm">individuation</A><SUP>1</SUP> problem does not require <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_102.htm">bare particulars</A><SUP>2</SUP>. </li><li>The author notes that Chappell tries to solve the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_77.htm">individuation</A><SUP>3</SUP> problem by making relations individuate. </li><li>In objecting to this view he calls on an argument of <A HREF = "../../../Authors/R/Author_Russell (Bertrand).htm">Bertrand Russell</A> for support which holds that relation "presuppose" numerical difference, not account for it. </li><li>He further argues that the belief that relations individuate derives from confusing numerical difference with qualitative difference. <BR>&rarr; (Staff)</li></ol> </FONT></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_01/PaperSummary_1976.htm">Allaire (Edwin B.) - Bare Particulars</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Laurence & Macdonald - Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Philosophers Index Abstract</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">The article goes into the problem of reconciling the principle of acquaintance with a theory of "bare particulars." The author goes into an analysis of what sort of entities individuals are, arguing that they are not rudimentary aristotelian substances, but are the carriers of numerical difference. He holds that this view of individuals allows the singling out of bare particulars without using 'exist' philosophically, and thus avoids the dialectics of the nominalism-realism issue. He concludes that with this view one need not abandon the principle of acquaintance in order to maintain that we are presented with bare particulars. (Staff)</ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>Also in "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_424.htm">Loux (Michael), Ed. - Metaphysics - Contemporary Readings</A>".</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_01/PaperSummary_1969.htm">Alston (William) - Ontological Commitments</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Laurence & Macdonald - Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Philosophers Index Abstract</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">This article considers the task of translating linguistic expressions, such as sentences of the form 'there are p's', to sentences of some other form. The author is especially concerned with the view that such translations enable us to avoid "ontological commitments." He takes an example from morton white which allegedly provides a case of a translation which avoids ontological commitments and argues that if the translation is adequate then it is used to make the same assertion as the original and so makes the same commitments. He concludes that those who take avoidance of ontological commitment as the point of linguistic translations are obstructing our view of the real point of such translations. (Staff)</ol></FONT></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_01/PaperSummary_1973.htm">Bealer (George) - Universals and Properties</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Laurence & Macdonald - Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Philosophers Index Abstract</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">This paper summarizes and extends the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_121.htm">transmodal</A><SUP>1</SUP> argument for the existence of <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>2</SUP> (developed in full detail in "<A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">Universals</A><SUP>3</SUP>"). This argument establishes not only the existence of <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>4</SUP>, but also that they exist necessarily, thereby confirming the ante rem view against the post rem and in re views (and also anti-existentialism against existentialism). Once summarized, the argument is extended to refute the trope theory of properties and is also shown to succeed even if possibilism is assumed. A nonreductionist theory of <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>5</SUP> and properties is then outlined, and it is sketched how to reap the benefits of possibilism and Meinongianism in an actualist setting.</ol></FONT></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_01/PaperSummary_1984.htm">Benacerraf (Paul) - What Numbers Could Not Be</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Laurence & Macdonald - Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Philosophers Index Abstract</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>In reviewing the essentials of a logicist analysis of number it is noted that no analysis identifying numbers with particular sets is "correct" to the exclusion of other analyses, which identify the numbers with different sets. But if the sense of, e.g., "Three" determines its reference, and at least two analyses of "three" are equally "correct" but assign it two different sets as its referent, then the condition in the analyses that states that three is a set is a superfluous one, and numbers couldn't be sets at all. </li><li>In a final section it is suggested that by substituting the word "object" for the word "set" a similar argument arises which can then be used to refute the identification of numbers with any given system of objects: to characterize the numbers is to characterize not a system of objects but an abstract structure which many systems of objects might exhibit.</li></ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>Also in:- <ul type="disc"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_61.htm">Benacerraf (Paul) & Putnam (Hilary) - Philosophy of Mathematics - Selected Readings</A>", and </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6307.htm">Hales (Steven D.), Ed. - Metaphysics: Contemporary Readings</A>". </li></ul></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_01/PaperSummary_1975.htm">Bigelow (John) & Pargetter (Robert) - A Theory of Structural Universals</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Laurence & Macdonald - Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics<BR></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_01/PaperSummary_1096.htm">Campbell (Keith) - The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Mellor & Oliver - Properties - Oxford Readings<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Philosophers Index Abstract</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>This paper argues that instances or cases of properties (abstract particulars) can be individuals in their own right, and that to take them as the basic category of entities leads to attractive analyses of <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_39.htm">causation</A><SUP>1</SUP>, perception, and evaluation. </li><li>A first philosophy based on abstract particulars can give an elegant account of concrete individuals, and can make some progress with the classic problem of <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>2</SUP>. </li><li>The role of space in this metaphysic is discussed, a philosophy of change sketched out, and the system recommended on the ground of its affinity with contemporary cosmology.</li></ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B><ul type="disc"><li>Also in "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_423.htm">Laurence (Stephen) & Macdonald (Cynthia), Eds. - Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics</A>". </li><li>For Notes, see "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20406.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Campbell,  The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars </A>". </li></ul></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_01/PaperSummary_1971.htm">Cartwright (Richard) - Identity and Substitutivity</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Laurence & Macdonald - Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics<BR></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_01/PaperSummary_1977.htm">Chappell (Vere) - Particulars Re-clothed</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Laurence & Macdonald - Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Philosophers Index Abstract</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">The article goes into Allaire's paper "bare particulars" in which Allaire seeks to reconcile what he calls the "individual-character analysis" of things like colored discs with the Russellian "principle of acquaintance." The author argues that the individual-character analysis is founded on certain views about reference that are either wrong or merely true by definition. Concerning the principle of acquaintance he charges that Allaire makes the false assertion that there is a sense of "know" in which "to know" means "to be acquainted with." He concludes, among other things, that since both views are incorrect the task of reconciling them is no real problem. (Staff)</ol></FONT></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_01/PaperSummary_1139.htm">Davidson (Donald) - The Individuation of Events</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Davidson - Essays on Actions and Events, Chapter 8<BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B><ul type="disc"><li>Part II: Event and Cause; Also in:- </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6307.htm">Hales (Steven D.), Ed. - Metaphysics: Contemporary Readings</A>", and </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_423.htm">Laurence (Stephen) & Macdonald (Cynthia), Eds. - Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics</A>".</li></ul></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_01/PaperSummary_1983.htm">Field (Hartry) - Mathematical Objectivity and Mathematical Objects</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Laurence & Macdonald - Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Philosophers Index Abstract</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">The most objectionable feature of traditional Platonism isn't its assumption of mathematical objects but its assumption that mathematics has a certain kind of objectivity. The objectionable kind of objectivity is the view that any sentence of mathematics has a determinate truth value even if it is undecidable by axioms we accept or are disposed to accept. "Nominalism" or "fictionalism" is simply one form that a properly antiobjectivist philosophy of mathematics can take. The paper also argues that while structuralism contains important insights, the version due to Resnik and Shapiro faces a serious problem in dealing with structures that have symmetries.</ol></FONT></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_01/PaperSummary_1972.htm">Forrest (Peter) - Ways Worlds Could Be</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Laurence & Macdonald - Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Philosophers Index Abstract</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">This paper proposes that suitable uninstantiated properties can be used as replacement for merely possible worlds, in a theory of <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_121.htm">modality</A><SUP>1</SUP>. It discusses the operations on properties required if we are to have enough structural properties to provide a satisfactory theory. And it argues that the theory so obtained conserves more of our <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_121.htm">modal</A><SUP>2</SUP> intuitions than its rivals, in particular than david lewis's realism about possible worlds.</ol></FONT></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_01/PaperSummary_1968.htm">Haack (Susan) - Descriptive and Revisionary Metaphysics</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Laurence & Macdonald - Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics<BR></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_01/PaperSummary_1970.htm">Haack (Susan) - Quantifiers</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Laurence & Macdonald - Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics<BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>From "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_712.htm">Haack (Susan) - Philosophy of Logics</A>"</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_01/PaperSummary_1680.htm">Kim (Jaegwon) - Events as Property Exemplifications</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Kim - Supervenience and Mind<BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>Also in <ul type="disc"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6307.htm">Hales (Steven D.), Ed. - Metaphysics: Contemporary Readings</A>", and </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_423.htm">Laurence (Stephen) & Macdonald (Cynthia), Eds. - Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics</A>". </li></ul></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_04/PaperSummary_4167.htm">Laurence (Stephen) & Macdonald (Cynthia) - Metaphysics and Ontology</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Laurence & Macdonald - Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics<BR></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_01/PaperSummary_1233.htm">Lewis (David) - Against Structural Universals</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Lewis - Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology<BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>Also in "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_423.htm">Laurence (Stephen) & Macdonald (Cynthia), Eds. - Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics</A>"</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_01/PaperSummary_1100.htm">Lewis (David) - New Work for a Theory of Universals</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Lewis - Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Author s Introduction</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>D. M. Armstrong offers a theory of <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>1</SUP> as the only adequate answer to a 'compulsory question' for systematic philosophy: the problem of One over <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P1100_2">Many</A></U><SUB>2</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P1100_2"></A>. I find this line of argument unpersuasive. But I think there is more to be said for Armstrong's theory than he himself has said. For as I bear it in mind considering various topics in philosophy, I notice time and again that it offers solutions to my problems. Whatever we may think of the problem of One over Many, <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>3</SUP> can earn their living doing other much-needed work. </li><li>I do not say that they are indispensable. The services they render could be matched using resources that are Nominalistic in letter, if perhaps not in <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P1100_4">spirit</A></U><SUB>4</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P1100_4"></A>. But neither do I hold any presumption against <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>5</SUP>, to the effect that they are to be accepted only if we have no alternative. I therefore suspend judgement about <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>6</SUP> themselves. I only insist that, one way or another, their work must be done. </li><li>I shall investigate the benefits of adding <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>7</SUP> to my own usual ontology. That ontology, though Nominalistic, is in other respects generous. It consists of possibilia  particular, individual things, some of which comprise our actual world and others of which are <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P1100_8">unactualised</A></U><SUB>8</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P1100_8"></A>  together with the iterative hierarchy of classes built up from them. Thus I already have at my disposal a theory of properties as classes of possibilia. Properties, so understood, are not much like <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>9</SUP>. Nor can they, unaided, take over the work of <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>10</SUP>. Nevertheless they will figure importantly in what follows, since for me they are part of the environment in which <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>11</SUP> might operate. </li><li>The friend of <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>12</SUP> may wonder whether they would be better employed not as an addition to my ontology of possibilia and classes, but rather as a replacement for parts of it. A fair question, and an urgent one; nevertheless, not a question considered in this paper. </li><li>In the next section, I shall sketch Armstrong's theory of <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>13</SUP>, contrasting <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>14</SUP> with properties understood as classes of possibilia. </li><li>Then I shall say why I am unconvinced by the One over Many argument. </li><li>Then I shall turn to my principal topic: how <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>15</SUP> could help me in connection with such topics as <ul type="disc"><li>duplication, <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1263.htm">supervenience</A><SUP>16</SUP>, and divergent worlds; </li><li>a minimal form of materialism; </li><li>laws and <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_39.htm">causation</A><SUP>17</SUP>; and </li><li>the content of language and thought. </li></ul>Perhaps the list could be extended. </li></ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B><ul type="disc"><li>First published in The Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (1983), pp. 343 377. </li><li>Also in "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_533.htm">Mellor (D.H.) & Oliver (Alex), Eds. - Properties: Oxford Readings in Philosophy</A>" </li><li>And in "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_423.htm">Laurence (Stephen) & Macdonald (Cynthia), Eds. - Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics</A>". </li><li>Photocopy filed in "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_05/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_5969.htm">Various - Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 09 (L)</A>". </li><li>For Notes, see "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20407.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Lewis,  New Work for a Theory of Universals </A>". </li></ul></P><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U> ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1100.htm">Lewis (David) - New Work for a Theory of Universals</A>")</B><a name="On-Page_Link_P1100_2"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P1100_2"><B>Footnote 2</B></A></U>: <ul type="disc"><li>See "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_275.htm">Armstrong (David) - Universals and Scientific Realism (Vol. 1: Nominalism and Realism)</A>" </li><li>& "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_276.htm">Armstrong (David) - Universals and Scientific Realism (Vol. 2: A Theory of Universals)</A>" (1978); </li><li>See also "<A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_01/PaperSummary_1094.htm">Armstrong (David) - Against 'Ostrich Nominalism': A Reply to Michael Devitt</A>" (1980) pp. 440-449. </li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P1100_4"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P1100_4"><B>Footnote 4</B></A></U>: <FONT COLOR = "800080">In this paper, I follow Armstrong's traditional terminology: <ul type="disc"><li>'<A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">Universals</a>' are repeatable entities, wholly present wherever a particular instantiates them; </li><li>'Nominalism' is the rejection of such entities. </li><li>In the conflicting modem terminology of Harvard, classes count as '<A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</a>' and 'Nominalism' is predominantly the rejection of classes. </li><li>Confusion of the terminologies can result in grave misunderstanding; see "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20428.htm">Quine (W.V.) - Soft Impeachment Disowned</A>" (1980). </li></ul> </FONT><a name="On-Page_Link_P1100_8"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P1100_8"><B>Footnote 8</B></A></U>: <FONT COLOR = "800080"><ul type="disc"><li>Among 'things' I mean to include all the gerrymandered wholes and undemarcated parts admitted by the most permissive sort of mereology. </li><li>Further, I include such physical objects as spatiotemporal regions and force fields, unless an eliminative reduction of them should prove desirable. </li><li>Further, I include such nonphysical objects as gods and spooks, though not - I hope - as parts of the same world as us. </li><li>Worlds themselves need no special treatment. They are things  big ones, for the most part. </li></ul> </FONT> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_00/PaperSummary_507.htm">Lewis (David) - Possible Worlds</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Laurence & Macdonald - Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics<BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B><ul type="disc"><li>Also in "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_424.htm">Loux (Michael), Ed. - Metaphysics - Contemporary Readings</A>" </li><li>and in "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1190.htm">Various - Papers on Logic & Metaphysics Boxes: Vol 1 (Coursework & A-E)</A>" </li><li>and in "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6554.htm">Loux (Michael), Ed. - The Possible and the Actual: Readings in the Metaphysics of Modality</A>"</li></ul></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_01/PaperSummary_1980.htm">Lombard (Lawrence B.) - Ontologies of Events</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Laurence & Macdonald - Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics<BR></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_01/PaperSummary_1974.htm">Loux (Michael) - Beyond Substrata and Bundles: A Prolegomenon to a Substance Ontology</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Laurence & Macdonald - Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics<BR></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_00/PaperSummary_506.htm">Lycan (William) - Possible Worlds and Possibilia</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Laurence & Macdonald - Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Philosophers Index Abstract</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">This is a survey of metaphysical theories of nonactual entities: Meinongianism, David Lewis' concretism, ersatsism of several kinds, etc.</ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>Photocopy filed in "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_05/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_5985.htm">Various - Papers on Logic & Metaphysics Boxes: Vol 2 (F-N)</A>".</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_01/PaperSummary_1981.htm">MacDonald (Cynthia) - Tropes and Other Things</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Laurence & Macdonald - Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Philosophers Index Abstract</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">What is it for an object to have a property? And what is the relation between an object and its properties? This article briefly outlines some classic answers to these questions and the difficulties associated with them, in order to provide a basis on which to discuss the view that, at root, reality consists of individual, particularized qualities known as tropes. This view has been thought by many to offer an important and ultimately more satisfactory answer to the two questions just posed than the other classic positions described. The article explores the prospects for trope theory.</ol></FONT></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_01/PaperSummary_1471.htm">Putnam (Hilary) - On Properties</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Putnam - Philosophical Papers 1 - Mathematics, Matter and Method<BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>Also in "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_423.htm">Laurence (Stephen) & Macdonald (Cynthia), Eds. - Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics</A>"</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_01/PaperSummary_1472.htm">Putnam (Hilary) - Philosophy of Logic</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Putnam - Philosophical Papers 1 - Mathematics, Matter and Method<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Philosophers Index Abstract</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">This monograph raises the nominalist-realist issue in connection with the question of the indispensability of quantification over abstract entities such as sets. It is argued that quantification is necessary for science and that acceptance of quantification commits us to acceptance of the existence of the mathematical entities involved. Nominalism is rejected as in principle inadequate to the language of physics; and other objections to the indispensability argument, such as linguistic purism, conventionalism, and fictionalism, are disposed of in turn. (Bp)</ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>Also in "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_423.htm">Laurence (Stephen) & Macdonald (Cynthia), Eds. - Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics</A>"</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_01/PaperSummary_1091.htm">Quine (W.V.) - On What There Is</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Quine - From a Logical Point of View<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Frazer MacBride s Notes on W.V.O. Quine "On What There Is"</U> (MPhil Stud Seminar, Birkbeck, 3rd October 2005) <FONT COLOR = "800080"><BR><BR><B>Fundamental Point</B>: "To be assumed as an entity is, purely and simply, to be reckoned as the value of a variable.... We are convicted of a particular ontological presupposition if, and only if, the alleged presuppositum has to be reckoned among the entities over which our variables range in order to render one of our affirmations true" (OWI: 13).<BR><BR><B>Structure of paper</B> <ol type="1"><li><B>Plato's Beard</B> unsatisfactory responses to the Puzzle of Non-Being (OWI: 1-5)</li><li><B>Untangling the Beard</B> using Russell's Theory of Descriptions (OWI: 5-9)</li><li><B>The Problem of <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">Universals</A><SUP>1</SUP></B> there are no <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>2</SUP> (OWI: 9-15)</li><li><B>Ontological Methodology</B> how to adjudicate between rival ontologies (OWI: 15-19) </li></ol><B>Analysis</B> <ol type="1"><li><B>Plato's Beard</B>: Does Pegasus exist? If he doesn't then what am I+XX+ denying the existence of? <ul type="disc"><li>a) <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P1091_3">McX</A></U><SUB>3</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P1091_3"></A> identifies Pegasus with a mental idea but Pegasus no more an idea than the Parthenon.</li><li>b) <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P1091_4">Wyman</A></U><SUB>4</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P1091_4"></A> identifies Pegasus with an un-actualised possibility but such entities are unduly mysterious and there also non-existent things which could not exist (e.g. the round square cupola). </li></ul></li><li><B>Untangling the Beard</B><BR>There's no necessity to admit non-existent objects because <ul type="disc"><li>(c) Russell's theory of descriptions and </li><li>(d) Frege's distinction between sense and reference </li></ul>show that <I>being meaningful</I> and <I>naming</I> are different things.<ul type="disc">(<U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P1091_5">TD</A></U><SUB>5</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P1091_5"></A>): The F Gs &harr; (&exist;xFx & (&forall;yFy &rarr; x=y)) & Gx </ul></li><li><B>The Problem of <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">Universals</A><SUP>6</SUP></B><BR>There is no need to admit mysterious entities like <I>being red</I> any more than non-existent things like Pegasus because <ul type="disc"><li>(e) the semantic role of a predicate is simply to be true or false of an entity picked out by a name, </li><li>(f) expressions can be meaningful without there being meanings and </li><li>(g) we do not quantify over predicate expressions.</li></ul>Clarifying ontological commitment by comparison with philosophy of mathematics: <ul type="disc"><I>realism logicism, conceptualism intuitionism, nominalism formalism</I>.</ul></li><li> <B>Ontological Methodology</B><BR>A criterion of ontological commitment does not tell us what there is, but what someone says there is; whether we accept what someone says is guided by the general ideals of theory construction; a choice of ontology is determined by the over-all conceptual scheme that accommodates science in the broadest sense.</li></ol> </FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>Required reading for Birkbeck MPhil Stud Seminar 03/10/2005; Also in:- <ul type="disc"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6307.htm">Hales (Steven D.), Ed. - Metaphysics: Contemporary Readings</A>",</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_423.htm">Laurence (Stephen) & Macdonald (Cynthia), Eds. - Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics</A>", </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_424.htm">Loux (Michael), Ed. - Metaphysics - Contemporary Readings</A>", </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_533.htm">Mellor (D.H.) & Oliver (Alex), Eds. - Properties: Oxford Readings in Philosophy</A>", and </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_17.htm">Linsky (Leonard), Ed. - Semantics and the Philosophy of Language - A Collection of Readings</A>"</li></ul>Photocopy filed in "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_04/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_4082.htm">Various - Heythrop Essays & Supporting Material (Boxes)</A>". Note - see "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20391.htm">Funkhouser (Eric) - Notes on Quine,  On What There Is </A>".</P><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U> ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1091.htm">Quine (W.V.) - On What There Is</A>")</B><a name="On-Page_Link_P1091_3"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P1091_3"><B>Footnote 3</B></A></U>: TT: Presumably McTaggart. <a name="On-Page_Link_P1091_4"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P1091_4"><B>Footnote 4</B></A></U>: TT: Presumably Meinong.<a name="On-Page_Link_P1091_5"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P1091_5"><B>Footnote 5</B></A></U>: <B>TD</B> =  (Russell s) <B>T</B>heory of <B>D</B>escriptions. For helpful HTML tags for logical connectives, see <A HREF = "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_logic_symbols" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>. <BR><BR> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_01/PaperSummary_1982.htm">Simons (Peter) - Particulars in Particular Clothing: Three Trope Theories of Substance</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 54, No. 3 (Sep., 1994), pp. 553-575<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Philosophers Index Abstract</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">If the attributes of concrete individuals (substances) are tropes, particular instances, what are the substances? Are they bundles of tropes related by compresence, or is there a non- trope bearer or substratum? Both theories have their drawbacks. This paper proposes a third, "nuclear" theory, according to which substances have an inner bundle or nucleus of essential tropes tied by strong ontological dependence, and an outer swarm of generically necessary and optional tropes. The theory's flexibility is tested by examining the differences between fermions and bosons considered as trope bundles.</ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>Also in "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6307.htm">Hales (Steven D.), Ed. - Metaphysics: Contemporary Readings</A>".</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_00/PaperSummary_508.htm">Stalnaker (Robert) - Possible Worlds</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Stalnaker - Ways a World Might Be, Chapter 1<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Philosophers Index Abstract</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>This paper explores David Lewis's four <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P508_1">theses</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P508_1"></A> on possible worlds. </li><li>It is argued that these constitute a doctrine called extreme realism about possible worlds, which is deemed false. </li><li>However, these theses need not be accepted or rejected as a package. </li><li>The independence of the more plausible parts of the package is shown to defend the coherence of a more moderate form of realism about possible worlds, one that may be justified by common <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_121.htm">modal</A><SUP>2</SUP> opinions and defended as a foundation for a theory about the activities of rational agents. </li></ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B><ul type="disc"><li>Part I - Ways and Worlds. </li><li>Also in "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_423.htm">Laurence (Stephen) & Macdonald (Cynthia), Eds. - Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics</A>"; </li><li>and in "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_806.htm">Honderich (Ted) & Burnyeat (Myles) - Philosophy as it Is</A>" and "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6554.htm">Loux (Michael), Ed. - The Possible and the Actual: Readings in the Metaphysics of Modality</A>"; </li><li>Photocopy filed in "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_05/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_5986.htm">Various - Papers on Logic & Metaphysics Boxes: Vol 3 (O-Z)</A>".</li></ul></P><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U> ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_00/Abstract_508.htm">Stalnaker (Robert) - Possible Worlds</A>")</B><a name="On-Page_Link_P508_1"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P508_1"><B>Footnote 1</B></A></U>: Stalnaker gives these as:- <FONT COLOR = "800080"><ul type="disc"><li>1. Possible worlds exist.</li><li>2. Other possible worlds are things of the same sort as the actual world.</li><li>3. The indexical analysis of the adjective  actual is the correct analysis.</li><li>4. Possible worlds cannot be reduced to something more basic. </FONT> </li></ul> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_01/PaperSummary_1979.htm">Van Cleve (James) - Three Versions of the Bundle Theory</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Philosophical Studies, Vol. 47, No. 1 (Jan., 1985), pp. 95-107<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Author s Abstract</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>'A thing (individual, concrete particular) is nothing but a bundle of properties'. If we take it as it stands, this traditional metaphysical view is open to several familiar and, to my mind, decisive objections. </li><li>Sophisticated upholders of the tradition, such as Russell and Castaneda, do not take it as it stands, but I shall argue that even their version of it remains open to some of the same objections. </li><li>Then I shall suggest a third version of the view that avoids all the standard objections, but only at a price I think most people would be unwilling to pay. </li></ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>Also in <ul type="disc"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6307.htm">Hales (Steven D.), Ed. - Metaphysics: Contemporary Readings</A>", and </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_424.htm">Loux (Michael), Ed. - Metaphysics - Contemporary Readings</A>".</li></ul></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_01/PaperSummary_1967.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - The Nature of Metaphysics</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Laurence & Macdonald - Contemporary Readings in the Foundations of Metaphysics<BR></P> <a name="ColourConventions"></a><hr><br><B><U>Text Colour Conventions</U> (see <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</B><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL> </center> <BR><HR><BR><center> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-03T00:00" pubdate>03/08/2018 00:00:40</time> <br><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A> </TD></TR><TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>