Naming and Necessity
Kripke (Saul)
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BOOK ABSTRACT:


BOOK COMMENT:

For an electronic copy, see Web Link.



"Kripke (Saul) - Naming and Necessity"

Source: Kripke - Naming and Necessity


Abstract1
  • Ever since these lectures were first given at Princeton in 1970, they have constituted one of the main challenges to the 'Fregean' doctrine that the sense of a proper name is a cluster of descriptive information an object must fit to be the referent.
  • Kripke argues that proper names are rigid designators and among the consequences of these investigations is the contention that there are a posteriori necessary statements as well as a priori contingent statements.
  • The philosophical significance of Kripke's work, combined with its intuitive, informal lecture style makes it a regular favorite with students.


COMMENT: This is the text of "Kripke (Saul) - Naming and Necessity", excerpted in "Harnish (Robert M.) - Basic Topics in the Philosophy of Language". See Web Link.




In-Page Footnotes ("Kripke (Saul) - Naming and Necessity")

Footnote 1: Taken from "Harnish (Robert M.) - Basic Topics in the Philosophy of Language: Introduction".



"Kripke (Saul) - Naming and Necessity: Preface"

Source: Kripke - Naming and Necessity, 1980, Preface, pp. 1-7
Write-up Note1

Sections2
  1. Introduction
  2. Historical Background
  3. Names & Rigid Designation




In-Page Footnotes ("Kripke (Saul) - Naming and Necessity: Preface")

Footnote 2:



"Kripke (Saul) - Naming and Necessity: Lecture I"

Source: Kripke - Naming and Necessity, 1980, Chapter 1
Write-up Note1

Sections2
  1. Introduction
  2. Naming
  3. Mill
  4. Frege & Russell
  5. Arguments Against Mill
  6. Quine
  7. Cluster Concept
  8. Reference Or Meaning?
  9. Five Distinctions
    • 9.1 Distinction 1 : “A Priori” Versus “A Posteriori”
    • 9.2 Distinction 2 – “Necessary” Versus “Sufficient”
    • 9.3 Distinction 3 – “Analytic” Versus “Synthetic”
    • 9.4 Distinction 4 – “Certainty”
    • 9.5 Distinction 5 – Modality “De Re” And “De Dicto”
  10. Identity Across Possible Worlds
  11. Counterpart Theory
  12. Necessary & Sufficient Conditions For Being A Particular Sortal
  13. Rigid Designators
  14. Names As Rigid Designators
  15. Trans-World Identification
  16. Frege, Russell & Wittgenstein – Meaning Or Reference?
  17. Contingent A Priori Truths
  18. Using Actual-World Descriptions To Fix The Referent
  19. Frege & Russell On Names
  20. Frege On “Sense”
  21. The Special Case Of
  22. Searle’s Cluster Theory
  23. Cluster Theory – Formal Definition
  24. Cluster Theory - Critique
  25. Non-Circularity Condition




In-Page Footnotes ("Kripke (Saul) - Naming and Necessity: Lecture I")

Footnote 2:
  • For a précis and analysis of the whole book, click File Note (PDF)
  • The “sectioning” is not Kripke’s, but relates to my analysis in the above document.



"Kripke (Saul) - Naming and Necessity: Lecture II"

Source: Kripke - Naming and Necessity, 1980, Chapter 2
Write-up Note1

Sections2
  1. The Cluster Theory Reviewed
  2. Examples of Problems with the Cluster Theory
  3. Lewis
  4. Languages
  5. Another Look at the 6 Theses of Cluster Theory
  6. Theses 1 - 5
  7. Can the Cluster Theory be Rescued?
  8. More on the Non-Circularity Condition
  9. Kripke’s Transmission Theory of Reference
  10. Does Kripke have a Theory?
  11. Necessary & Sufficient Conditions for Reference
  12. Are Identity Statements Necessary?
  13. Identities Between Proper Names




In-Page Footnotes ("Kripke (Saul) - Naming and Necessity: Lecture II")

Footnote 2:
  • For a précis and analysis of the whole book, click File Note (PDF)
  • The “sectioning” is not Kripke’s, but relates to my analysis in the above document.



"Kripke (Saul) - Naming and Necessity: Lecture III"

Source: Kripke - Naming and Necessity, 1980, Chapter 3
Write-up Note1

Sections2
  1. Summary So Far
  2. Essences and “de re” Modality
  3. The Essentiality of Origins
  4. Nominal Essences
  5. Natural Kinds3
  6. Species
  7. Are there Degrees of Necessity?
  8. Non-epistemological Necessity
  9. Essence Again
  10. Examples
    • 10.1 Water as H2O
    • 10.2 Light
    • 10.3 Heat
    • 10.4 Lightening
    • 10.5 Summary
  11. Recapitulation
    • 11.1 Singular and General Terms (Mill)
    • 11.2 Species Terms and Proper Names
    • 11.3 Properties and Natural Kinds
    • 11.4 Science & Natural Kinds
    • 11.5 Transmission of the Name of a Natural Kind
    • 11.6 Primary & Secondary Qualities
    • 11.7 Objections to the Necessary a Posteriori
    • 11.8 Kripke’s Response to the Above Objections
    • 11.9 Qualitative Contingent Statements
  12. The Mind-Brain Identity Theory
  13. Token-Token Identity Theories
  14. Type-Type Identity Theories
  15. Analogies: C-fibres / Molecular Motion versus Pain / Heat
  16. Another Analogy – “What God had to Do”
  17. Identity Between Brain and Mind can’t be Contingent




In-Page Footnotes ("Kripke (Saul) - Naming and Necessity: Lecture III")

Footnote 2:
  • For a précis and analysis of the whole book, click File Note (PDF)
  • The “sectioning” is not Kripke’s, but relates to my analysis in the above document.
Footnote 3:



"Kripke (Saul) - Naming and Necessity: Addenda"

Source: Kripke - Naming and Necessity, 1980, Addenda
Write-up Note1

Sections2
  1. Unicorns
  2. “Can” To “Must”
  3. Non-circularity Condition
  4. Initial “Baptism”
  5. Santa Claus
  6. Acknowledgements
  7. Necessity




In-Page Footnotes ("Kripke (Saul) - Naming and Necessity: Addenda")

Footnote 2:
  • For a précis and analysis of the whole book, click File Note (PDF)
  • The “sectioning” is not Kripke’s, but relates to my analysis in the above document.



"Kripke (Saul) - Naming and Necessity: Appendix - Kripke’s Response To His Critics"

Source: Kripke - Naming and Necessity, 1980, Preface, pp. 7-21
Write-up Note1

Sections2
  1. Non-Unique Names
  2. The Relation of Rigidity to Scope
  3. Why did Russell et al Oppose the Rigidity of Names?
  4. Possible Worlds
  5. Substitutability of Proper Names?
  6. Rigidity and Non-Existence




In-Page Footnotes ("Kripke (Saul) - Naming and Necessity: Appendix - Kripke’s Response To His Critics")

Footnote 2:

Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2017
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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