Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz - The Concept of Substance in Seventeenth Century Metaphysics
Woolhouse (Roger)
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BOOK ABSTRACT:

Back Cover Blurb

  1. ‘This book is both a fine introduction to the metaphysics of Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz, and a rich and wide-ranging study of the interaction between natural sciences and metaphysics in the seventeenth century’
    Kenneth Winkler, Wellesley College
  2. Rene Descartes (1596-1650), 'the father of modern philosophy’, set the scene for much philosophy from the seventeenth century to the present day. In particular, his metaphysical scheme with its distinction between extended substance and thinking substance, and his mechanical conception of the physical world greatly influenced the work of the two great mainland European philosophers who followed him: Benedict Spinoza (1632-1677) and Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716). This book introduces and explains the metaphysics of these three thinkers on the assumption that they are best under-stood via the concept of substance.
  3. Roger Woolhouse provides a systematic treatment of the central metaphysical views of these important and interrelated philosophers, considering their areas of agreement and dis-agreement. Going beyond the conventional classification of the three as 'The Rationalists’, he explores their accounts of what is real and how these lie at the heart of their philosophies. In particular, he shows how they provided conceptual foundations for the seventeenth-century science of mechanics.
  4. Roger Woolhouse is Reader in Philosophy at the University of York. He has taught previously at the Universities of California, Pennsylvania, Princeton and Wales. His earlier books include Locke (1983) and "Woolhouse (Roger) - The Empiricists" (1988).

BOOK COMMENT:

Routledge, London, 1993. Paperback.



"Woolhouse (Roger) - Causation, Occasionalism and Force"

Source: Woolhouse - Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz - The Concept of Substance in Seventeenth Century Metaphysics
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"Woolhouse (Roger) - Descartes and Substance"

Source: Woolhouse - Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz - The Concept of Substance in Seventeenth Century Metaphysics



"Woolhouse (Roger) - Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, and Extended Substance"

Source: Woolhouse - Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz - The Concept of Substance in Seventeenth Century Metaphysics



"Woolhouse (Roger) - Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, and the Mechanics of Extended Substance"

Source: Woolhouse - Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz - The Concept of Substance in Seventeenth Century Metaphysics



"Woolhouse (Roger) - Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, and Thinking Substance"

Source: Woolhouse - Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz - The Concept of Substance in Seventeenth Century Metaphysics



"Woolhouse (Roger) - Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz - The Concept of Substance in Seventeenth Century Metaphysics: Introduction"

Source: Woolhouse - Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz - The Concept of Substance in Seventeenth Century Metaphysics



"Woolhouse (Roger) - Extended Substance and Thinking Substance Related: 'The Nature of the Union Between Body and Mind'"

Source: Woolhouse - Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz - The Concept of Substance in Seventeenth Century Metaphysics
COMMENT: Photocopy filed in "Various - Papers on Modern Philosophy Boxes: Vol 2 (G-Z)".



"Woolhouse (Roger) - Leibniz and Substance"

Source: Woolhouse - Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz - The Concept of Substance in Seventeenth Century Metaphysics
Write-up Note1 (Full Text reproduced below).

COMMENT:

Write-up3 (as at 08/06/2020 21:40:19): Woolhouse - Leibniz and Substance

Introduction
  • This note provides my analysis of "Woolhouse (Roger) - Leibniz and Substance". I must have written it as an undergraduate at Birkbeck, probably around 2002.
  • It starts off with the text I originally wrote – which is a very detailed analysis. I wrote these analyses in that way to force myself to focus on the detail of the argument. Sometimes they are longer than the original paper. I doubt they are of any value to anyone other than me, but may provide a different “take” on the paper or chapter under review and may help someone to understand what’s going on.
  • I’ve left this text substantially as it was, but have (started to) add further notes below to discuss some of the issues raised insofar as they impact on my research into Personal Identity.

Detailed Analysis
  • Leibniz remarked towards the end of his life that considerations of the concept of substance are of the greatest importance and fruitfulness for philosophy. He thought these fruits included truths, hitherto only partly known and barely demonstrated, about God, minds, and the nature of bodies which are of the greatest use for the future of other sciences. An exposition of his ideas is difficult, because
    1. he left no master-work and
    2. his ideas changed considerably over time.
  • Woolhouse focuses on Leibniz’s ‘middle’ period between 1680 and 1700, to which belongs the Discourse on Metaphysics and the Correspondence with Arnauld. During this period, Leibniz’s ideas came to some kind of resolution and their first public expression in the controversial New System of the Nature of Substances (1695). By the end of his life, Leibniz’s account of substance, as given in the Monadology (1714), had undergone some radical changes from that explained to Arnauld. However, Woolhouse thinks that, as far as Leibniz’s agreements and disagreements with Descartes are concerned, Leibniz’s later thought presents no really new considerations.
  • Central to Leibniz’s account is the concept of an individual created substance. Aristotle had distinguished between second and first substances, ie. between kinds and the individuals that belong to them4. Aristotle is thinking of individual things when he says that a substance has properties and is not itself the property of anything else. This is Leibniz’s starting point in the Discourse.
  • For Descartes, God created two kinds of substance – corporeal and incorporeal, but there are individual created substances only of the incorporeal kind. There are individual substantial minds but not bodies, which are just pieces of created extended substance, not individual substances themselves.
  • Leibniz is dissatisfied with this aspect of Descartes’ metaphysics and thinks that Descartes’ extended substance is not part of substantial reality. Leibniz does believe in individual corporeal substances, but thinks that their substantiality and individuality do not derive from their being corporeal or extended, but from their union with something like an individual substantial mind. Individual mental substances are paradigmatic for Leibniz, because reflection enables us to find the idea of substance within ourselves, since we are substances. Minds make corporeal substances possible because the substance of body is union with a sustaining mind. However, in the Monadology, matter is merely “well-founded phenomenon” and mind-like monads are the only reality of any kind.
  • Spinoza allows substantial reality of (at least) two kinds, but not individual substances of either kind, agreeing with Descartes that material bodies are not substances (they are finite modes) but going beyond Descartes in thinking something similar of minds. Leibniz thinks this is a step in entirely the wrong direction. When annotating the Ethics he remarked on P14 (“no substance but God”) that, while he, himself, was unsure whether bodies are substances, he was sure that minds were. In a passage similar to Descartes’s Principles 1.16, Leibniz claims that experience shows us that we are particular thinking things, distinct from others of the same kind; otherwise we would fall into Spinozism, that there is only one substance, namely God.
  • One question that concerned Leibniz was the co-operation of God with created things; so, in Discourse §8, he attempts to distinguish the actions of God from those of creatures. To do this, and understand the nature of created things, we need to explain what an individual substance is.
  • He begins by saying that it is true that if a number of predicates are attributed to a subject, but that subject is not attributed to anything else, then it is a substance. However, this is only a nominal and superficial explanation of substance and doesn’t tell us what it is for a substance to have an attribute.
  • Leibniz’s suggestion for what it is to be truly attributed to a subject is as follows:
    1. Every true predicate has some basis in the nature of things.
    2. There are identities, in which the predicate is expressly contained in the subject.
    3. Otherwise, the predicate must be included in the subject virtually, what the philosophers call in-esse, saying that the predicate is in the subject.
    4. Either way, the subject term must include the predicate in such a way that anyone perfectly understanding the concept of the subject will also know that the predicate pertains to it.
    5. Given this, we define an individual substance or complete being as having a concept so complete as to be sufficient to make us understand and deduce from it all the predicates of the subject to which the concept is attributed.
  • Leibniz set off from the traditional Aristotelian definition of substance, but his deeper explanation is non-traditional, though he implies that it is. Woolhouse thinks it’s unclear what Leibniz’s explanation amounts to, what it’s meant to explain and what Leibniz intends by his question about true attribution.
  • Reconstructing the question from the answer, and also taking into account Leibniz’s interest in the relative activity of created substances and God, Woolhouse thinks that Leibniz wanted to explain why created substances have the properties they do – whether through God’s or their own activity. Leibniz eventually concludes it’s through their own activity, though it’s not immediately obvious that this is the direction in which he’s heading, so Woolhouse follows him step by step.
  • For Leibniz, a substance is not simply the possessor of properties or predicates, but the possessor of a concept so complete as to allow these to be deduced from it. He continues to say that a consequence is that a body’s entire nature cannot just be extension (size, shape, motion) but must include something soul-like, a substantial form.
  • Woolhouse points out that some predicates of an individual substance, say a person, are permanent but others transient or intermittent – blue eyes as against a temporary limp or occasionally sitting down. So, what sort of complete concept or nature contains all these, why can’t the nature of body consist solely in extension and what is the relation between a complete concept and a substantial form?
  • Substantial forms belong to the Aristotelian metaphysics of substance which Huygens considered part of the irrelevant paraphernalia that Descartes swept away. The development of the mechanical philosophy in which Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz were involved rejected any ideas of hylomorphism in physical explanation in favour of the corpuscularian theory. Why, therefore, Leibniz’s appeal to substantial forms?
  • Leibniz denies that he’s reintroducing substantial forms into natural philosophy, where he is as corpuscularian as one can be, insisting that one must explain nature along mathematical and mechanical lines; substantial forms serve no purpose in the details of physics and should not be used to explain particular phenomena.
  • Substantial forms are, Leibniz thinks, required for any metaphysical account of the world. Without an adequate metaphysics, physics is unsatisfactory because without foundations. The metaphysical principles of detailed physical enquiries require substantial forms. Leibniz thinks that in the final analysis of the principles of physics and mechanics, the mechanical principles are not explicable purely by the modifications of extension, and the nature of force requires something else.
  • Woolhouse leaves Leibniz’s account of the use of substantial forms in the metaphysical foundations of physics until the next couple of chapters, here concentrating on their place in the account of substance. There are two aspects of substantial forms
    1. their traditional function as the organising active natures of substances as they develop and change and
    2. they produce the unity and individuality of individual corporeal substances, making them entia per se.
  • Leibniz’s worry about Cartesian extension is that, on its own, it can’t provide for individual extended substances because extended substances, and therefore extended things qua extended, are essentially composite and divisible. Arnauld noted that it is the infinite divisibility of extension that makes it difficult to conceive of its unity and that this was the reason Leibniz had for reinstating substantial forms. However, Arnauld did not share Leibniz’s concerns for, like Descartes, he considers the parts of a marble block to be substantial, even though not individual substances, because they are not modes or states of some other substance. Arnauld accuses Leibniz of setting up a special definition of substance as that which has a true unity, to which Leibniz correctly responds that the Scholastics saw things this way too.
  • Arnauld and Leibniz debate the ability of substantial forms to produce unified material substances or entia per se. Leibniz admits the inadequacy of some of his answers, but says that there is a genuine problem that extension hasn’t solved.
  • Arnauld asks what happens to a tile’s substantial form if it is broken in two, to which Leibniz’s response is that a tile doesn’t have the kind of unity to which a substantial form applies. It is like a heap of stones, with an accidental unity, united by accident or aggregation and not united per se or in itself. Clearly, the tile has more cohesion than the heap of stones, but mere physical connection, no matter how close or tight, cannot produce more than accidental unity. Leibniz’s examples of such aggregates include diamonds in a ring, fish in a frozen pond, a flock of bound sheep and a chain of links. Even ordered societies and machines with parts connected in other than straightforward physical ways and conspiring to the same end are not substantial unities because their unity is fabricated in our minds and exists by convention. A more than mechanical unity is required for the attribution of substantial form.
  • Entia per se are animate machines whose soul or substantial form creates substantial unity independent of the external union of contiguity. Leibniz is sure that human beings are genuine substantial unities, but not so sure about other promising cases such as animals or trees.
  • Leibniz takes up the hylomorphic analysis of individual substances into matter and form, according to which a living person is a composite of substantial form (the rational soul) and the bodily material of flesh and blood. The human body is a body because its material is ensouled or animated, organised by an entelechy or form. On death, the body ceases, strictly speaking, to be a body at all and is just a mass of material; death happens to the composite human being as a whole as a disorganisation of the previously organised whole. Descartes understands a living human being quite differently as the union of two substances, mind and body, rather than as one substantial composite of form and matter; a dead body, like a broken clock, is as much a body as a living one and death happens to the body, not to the mind-body unity; the mind leaves the body because the body is broken or run down rather than the body dying because the mind ceases its union with it.
  • So, Leibniz revives the pre-Cartesian perspective in which the living human being is a composite of a soul, or substantial form, animating and organising an amount of material. While the human body is an extended material substance, it does not derive its substantiality from its being material and extended but from the form that organises it; absent the soul, the corpse cannot correctly be called a substance.
  • Leibniz tends to think that other animals are also individual substances, having souls but lacking consciousness, the alternative being to treat animals as did Descartes as inanimate mechanisms.
  • Leibniz, while denying substantiality to the body without the soul, does allow that the disembodied soul is a substance. This is a departure from an awkwardness (for Aquinas) in traditional hylomorphism in which only the composite of matter and form is a substance, though immortality demanded that the specifically rational part of the human soul could exist apart from matter. However, while allowing the theoretical possibility of disembodied forms, he denies that this is ever the case in practise.
  • For Leibniz, substances are indivisible, since it was the divisibility of extension that made it unsuitable as a substantial attribute and led him to reintroduce substantial forms. As applied to immaterial substances, Leibniz shares this view with Descartes. Leibniz also thinks substances immortal and indestructible, and, though Arnauld shares this view with respect to human souls, he’s less happy about applying the same principle to animals (almost on the grounds of overcrowding, given his example of 100,000 silkworms perishing in a fire yet their souls being supposed to continue in existence).
  • Arnauld accepts indivisibility on the part of man – since one cannot conceive of half a man – but is troubled by worms where we end up with two for one. Leibniz’s response is that, though both halves of the worm continue to move, only one is really ensouled, the other being simply matter, a bit like an amputated limb (though Leibniz doesn’t put the point like this).
  • While Arnauld accepts the one case of indivisibility – man – he won’t accept any cases of indestructibility, saying that the corporeal whole human being does perish when the soul is separated from the body, after which the human body is no longer indivisible. Leibniz, however, doesn’t consider that souls become detached from bodies at death, but considers the death of an animated corporeal substance to be but a transformation of the corporeal substance, and not a separation between soul and body at all. When a living insect is torn up and destroyed, its souls remains in a certain part that is both alive and sufficiently small to avoid further attack. Even burning, though it reduces the body in size, doesn’t separate soul from body, leaving something animate even in ashes. Animal death is a transformation into organic little bodies which have contracted from a larger body that has undergone corruption.
  • Leibniz takes the orthodox Thomist view that a dead human body isn’t a substance when considered in abstraction from a substantial form as a purely material thing. But given that it’s not a material substance, nor, as for Descartes an arrangement of material substance, what is it? It’s an aggregate, an ens per accidens, but what is it an aggregate of? Leibniz stated to Arnauld that it was an aggregate of substances, but what substances, since they cannot either be the corporeal substances of which human bodies were elements or the immaterial substances which formed the other element of corporeal bodies?
  • The natural presumption would be that the parts of an extended body (whether human, animal, watch or tile) to which they aggregate are themselves portions of extended body, and hence aggregates themselves. Leibniz thinks that aggregates have only so much reality as exists in their constituent parts and, consequently, that extended body considered apart from any form will not even be a real entity. Aggregated extended matter, such as soulless corpses and marble tiles, has no independent reality as substance in its own right; so, unless there are material substances for it to be aggregated from, it will have no reality at all, but just be like the rainbow – a true phenomenon. Since matter can be infinitely divided, we will never get to something on which we can say that it is really an entity.
  • Arnauld suggests, as some Cartesians such as Gerauld de Cordemoy have held, that the division, instead of continuing for ever, terminates in perfectly hard and indivisible, if minutely extended, atoms, whose indivisibility would give them a substantial unity and reality on which the larger aggregated bodies would depend for their own reality. Leibniz, however, while applauding the recognition that unity is an important feature of substances, doesn’t share this view.
  • Leibniz’s solution for the substantial unities out of which marble tiles can be aggregated is a combination of Cordemoy’s purely material atoms and his own hylomorphic account of living corporeal substances. Matter is divided into unitary but not ultimate parts, but these parts are substantial, being small, animated living material substances. The body of any living being can be further divided into more substances. The substantial forms of these parts of bodily aggregate are not minds in the human sense, but only analogous to minds. Even their matter would be mere phenomenon were it not an aggregate of further individual material substances – it is a matter for empirical investigation just where a chunk of non-substantial matter needs further subdivision to reveal the smaller corporeal substances of which it is aggregated, and not something Leibniz’s theory need decide. He doesn’t know how far we need divide a piece of flint in order to arrive at organic bodies, but doesn’t take this ignorance as prejudicial to his theory.
  • In later years, Leibniz believed that there are no corporeal substances, and that since a bodily mass has no substantial parts from which it can derive its reality, it is, like the rainbow, no more than true phenomena. His view then was that the whole of substantial reality consists of mind, but in the period under consideration here, his view is that just as a living human being is a composite of form and matter, so its matter – the body taken by itself – is an aggregate of parts which are themselves substantial composites of form and matter. The body, apart from the soul, has only the unity of aggregation, but retains reality because its constituent parts have substantial unity because of the numberless living bodies that are included in them5. Every part of non-substantial extended matter is divided into corporeal substances, so that there is an almost infinite number of little animals in a drop of water.
  • Woolhouse recaps: for Leibniz, individual substances have complete concepts, consequently, the body cannot consist merely in extension and substantial forms must be reintroduced to provide for true unities or entia per se. However, we have yet to see the connection between complete concepts and substantial forms.
  • This doctrine that an individual substance is something with a complete concept from which all its predicates can be deduced echoes Leibniz’s theory of truth. For Leibniz, in any true proposition the concept of the predicate is somehow involved in the concept of the subject. Woolhouse doesn’t discuss here how these metaphysical and logical doctrines of Leibniz relate, either philosophically or temporally; however, he notes that some people have seen the connection and consequently interpreted Leibniz’s metaphysical view in a quasi-logical, atemporal way. Russell’s view was that Leibniz’s doctrine that all the states of a substance are contained in its notion as amounting to no more than the “obvious fact” that every proposition about the future is already determined as either true or false, even though we may be unable to decide which.
  • Russell’s “obvious fact” is the idea that truth is timeless, so that if something is true at a certain time, then not only will it always be true thereafter that it was true at that time, but it was always true beforehand that it would be true at that time. It is not that the later truth depends on the earlier obvious fact that it would be true, but the reverse, that the fact that something will be true in the future is dependent on the relevant fact being true at that time in the future when it happens.
  • Not everyone finds it as obvious as Russell that there are determinate truths about the future and that truth is timeless in this way, but did Leibniz and does it explain about substances having complete concepts? It does in one respect, for Leibniz supports his claim that the concept of a substance involves all its predicates, past, present and future by saying that it is already true now that a future predicate will be a predicate in the future, and so is contained in the concept.
  • However, this quasi-logical, atemporal account doesn’t connect Leibniz’s complete concepts of substances with the metaphysical idea of substantial forms. We must recognise that
    1. individual substances, unlike atemporal geometrical figures about which there really are unchanging truths, exist in time and change their properties through it and
    2. substantial forms are active, organising natures of substances as they develop and change through time.
    Leibniz means by the complete concept that the predicates that become true of a substance do so by virtue of its substantial form. Its future is written into it just as the future of the oak is in the acorn – there are at all times in the soul of Alexander traces of all that has, and marks of all that will, happen to him. All that happens to a substance comes from its own depths, so the present is big with the future.
  • This further explains why Leibniz rejects as substances Descartes’ extension and even Cordemoy’s atoms – they can have nothing to do with the temporal development and change typical of an individual substance. Extension expresses only the present state, and no action or change can be deduced from it and a man consisting only of atoms cannot contain within him all past and future states.
  • The reason Leibniz had to give an account of individual substances in the Discourse was because of his aim to distinguish the actions of God from those of creatures. We can now understand his rejection of the idea that God does everything, for individual substances have a self-sufficiency that makes them the source of their actions, so that all that happens or will happen to a substance comes from its own depths (though God is still involved as it is dependent on God). This independence is partly a matter of initial creation, though Leibniz thinks that God preserves created substances and even produces them continually by a kind of emanation.
  • While the changes that happen to created substances and the predicates that become true of them are the development of their own natures, God is still responsible for creating and sustaining them with those natures. Leibniz thinks that God’s ordinary concourse is preservative – maintaining each substance on course and subject to the laws established for it – and thinks that those who believe God does everything have lost the distinction between this and God’s extraordinary concourse, which would apply to everything.
  • Leibniz has a detailed answer to why God created substances with the particular natures they have, rather than others. This world is one of an infinite number of possible worlds that might have been created, but the only one that can, in fact, exist – because it is the best of these possible worlds and consequently God’s wisdom causes him to know it, his goodness causes him to choose it and his power causes him to create it6.
  • What it means, according to Leibniz, for God to choose to create a particular world can be filled out by the following example. Imagine, for the sake of argument, that Adam (in our world) sinned on the 10th day. What was it about the world on the 8th day that made it such a world for Adam to sin on the 10th day rather than one in which he never sinned? An answer would be to say that from the start God’s intention had been, by extraordinary concourse, to bring it about that Adam sinned on the 10th day.
  • This “God does everything” view is that of Malebranche and other contemporaries of Leibniz who adopted occasionalism. Malebranche distinguishes between two forms of causation:
    1. real, active or primary and
    2. occasional or secondary.
    God is the only type (1) cause and in the created world there are only type (2) causes, all change coming about from God’s direct activity.
  • This occasionalist account is not Leibniz’s, because it conflicts with his view that individual created substances are themselves active as governed by their own natures. What explains Adam’s sin was that he embodied a form whose development over time would bring it about. Apart from God’s sustaining them in their courses, individual created substances are themselves responsible for the predicates that become true of them. The occasionalists effectively deny them substantiality by denying them activity and leaving it to God to do everything – which is more or less Spinoza’s position, which Leibniz recognised as being due to pushing too far the denial of force and action to creatures and making them mere modifications of the one divine substance.
  • Leibniz adds to the original doctrine of hylomorphism in two ways. While traditional hylomorphism allowed that many of the features of an individual substance relate to the form it embodies, it didn’t think all of them did. An oak’s vegetative soul wasn’t supposed to guide the whole of it’s destiny, for many things, such as the exact number of acorns it produced, were deemed accidental, and it was also supposed that things on occasion came to be true of it as a passive recipient of an outside cause, for instance the number of leaves lost in a storm. While its form governed the utilisation of water and other nutrients, these still needed to be supplied from outside.
  • In Leibniz’s view, God left nothing to chance in choosing what substances were best to create but has examined every aspect of the world in every manner. Everything is numbered, even the hairs of our head. A substance’s concept is so complete that we can deduce from it all its predicates. However, might not something become true of a substance as the result of another substance’s activities, rather than its own?
  • Leibniz rejects inter-substantial causation, because all the actions and passions of a substance come from its own depths. Changes to substances come from an internal principle and an external cause cannot influence their interior.
  • This view has been recently challenged, says Woolhouse. It has been argued that, though nothing that becomes true of a Leibnizian substance does so because of God’s extraordinary concourse, it doesn’t all become true solely on account of its own activity and nature but because of interaction between itself and other substances.
  • To clarify matters, we need to impose a distinction on Leibniz’s terminology. Leibniz speaks indifferently of concept on the one hand and form, nature or soul on the other. We can think of the concepts of individual substances as the detailed ideas God had in mind of possible substances prior to creation, but their natures or souls as the embodiments of those concepts as actually created.
  • The traditional view has it that there is a complete overlap between a substance’s concept and nature, with the latter being the embodiment of the whole of the former. Recent interpretation suggests this overlap is only partial; while all that what God wants to come true actually does, only part comes true because of that substance’s nature corresponding to its concept, the rest coming true because of mutual interaction between substances whose natures relate to only part of their concepts.
  • Woolhouse points out7 how the centrality of activity in Leibniz’s concept of substance can hardly be over-stressed, quoting from passages from his earliest to latest years:-
    1. Being which subsists in itself is that which has a principle of action within itself.
    2. The essence of substance consists in the primitive force of action.
    3. Actions belong to substances; everything that acts is an individual substance and every individual substance acts continually.
  • During the period Woolhouse is considering, Leibniz increasingly came to think of the active principle in substances – their form or soul – as a primitive, active force or power. Active force is so basic, that rather than Leibniz seeing it as a feature of substantial form, he explains substantial form in terms of it. In all corporeal substance is an active, primitive force corresponding to the soul or substantial form; and so on.
  • This primitive active force within corporeal substances primarily relates to their form rather than matter of their bodies. They also possess a passive force which does relate to their matter, though things are not as simple as “active to passive as form to matter”. Leibniz distinguishes between primary and secondary matter. The matter constituting the bodies of animated corporeal substances or non-substantial marble tiles is secondary matter. Both primary and secondary matter have passive force, but secondary matter has active force derived from the primitive active force of the corporeal substances from which it is aggregated. Woolhouse expounds the meaning of all this in the next chapter.

Further Notes & Animadversions
  • I could have applied this Notes as Footnotes to the above text, but have decided to give myself more “room” to discuss the matters raised.




In-Page Footnotes ("Woolhouse (Roger) - Leibniz and Substance")

Footnote 3:
  • This is the write-up as it was when this Abstract was last output, with text as at the timestamp indicated (08/06/2020 21:40:19).
  • Link to Latest Write-Up Note.
Footnote 4:
  • This is the correct order – individuals are first substances, kinds are second substances.
Footnote 5:
  • This seems to be an accurate paraphrase of a comment made by Leibniz to Arnauld, but seems wrongly to grant substantial unity to aggregates (the constituent parts of the human body).
Footnote 6:
  • So, according to Leibniz, God is bound by his own nature to create the universe he did create.
Footnote 7:
  • Has Woolhouse cleared up the controversy or left it hanging?



"Woolhouse (Roger) - Spinoza and Substance"

Source: Woolhouse - Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz - The Concept of Substance in Seventeenth Century Metaphysics
Write-up Note1 (Full Text reproduced below).

See the Note2.

COMMENT:

Write-up4 (as at 05/06/2020 23:05:17): Woolhouse - Spinoza and Substance

This note provides my detailed analysis of "Woolhouse (Roger) - Spinoza and Substance". I must have written it as an undergraduate at Birkbeck, probably around 2002.

Detailed Notes
  • Spinoza’s Ethics is a systematic treatment of the substantial nature of God, and of the relationship to this of the human mind, emotions and freedom.
  • The literary structure of the Ethics is atypical of philosophical works. It opens formally with definitions and axioms, from which propositions are deduced via demonstrations. Leibniz considered this geometrical approach an “empty pretentious device”. Others, such as Bergson, have been more impressed, and beginners are struck with admiration and terror! Understanding the style helps to understand the content.
  • Mersenne had suggested it would have been a good idea had Descartes’ Meditations been set out in the manner of Euclid’s Elements5.
  • Woolhouse suggests there must be more to the geometrical method than simply surface form, because, as Descartes pointed out, even geometry doesn’t need to be set out in this way. Descartes’ reply to Mersenne gives a clue in distinguishing two forms of demonstration, distinguishing the analytic and synthetic6, and identifying the approach of the Elements as synthetic.
  • The view goes back to Aristotle that true knowledge or science7 is knowledge of causes and that firmly established is of why something must be so. We can know that the internal angles of a plane triangle add up to two right angles, but to know why is to have moved analytically from effect to cause. Some things are known before others – in this case properties of triangles are known before their causes – but this order of knowledge is the reverse of the order of things, where the cause precedes its effect, which it explains.
  • This reversal is ubiquitous, as in my knowing the postman has called from the evidence of letters on the mat, but this evidence isn’t what caused him to come, rather his arrival caused the evidence.
  • Synthesis is the opposite of analysis and follows the order of things, from cause to effect. From causes, whether geometrical axioms or the postman’s arrival, I can deduce effects, properties of triangles or letters on the doormat.
  • Analysis, starting from what is first in the order of knowledge, is the method of discovery, whereas synthesis, starting from what is first in the order of things, is the method of proof, and which was the better method for presenting one’s ideas was debatable, but the 17th century had a taste for synthesis (witness Aubrey’s account of Hobbes falling in love with geometry on encountering the proof of Pythagoras’ theorem in Euclid). Meyer favoured the method as providing sure foundations for certain knowledge. Descartes admits that anyone who doubts the results of synthesis can be shown how it arose in the demonstration, and compelled to assent, however stubborn; yet Descartes prefers analysis as more instructive and satisfying than synthesis as it shows how things were discovered.
  • Spinoza’s Ethics is not like Descartes’ Meditations, which is a paradigm case of analytic discovery – it doesn’t show the how Spinoza came to believe what he did. Spinoza must have gone through the process of discovery at one stage, starting from what he knew and worked backwards to explain them; but, in the Ethics, he works forward from the things that explain to the things he is making sense of.
  • Spinoza admits that the synthetic method is cumbersome. However it is appropriate to his subject matter since it follows the order of things and our mind, in Spinoza’s view, reproduces completely the order of nature. The order of nature is reproduced in the Ethics, an aim of which is to “give an account of the human mind and its highest blessedness”. To do this, Spinoza thinks we must account for God, the world and the relations between them, with God having priority in the order of things. Our mind, in order to reproduce the likeness of Nature, must take as the source of all ideas that idea which represents the source of Nature. Everything depends on God, so in the Ethics, everything follows from what is said about God, with this reflected in the demonstrative order. Since in reality everything stems from God, so, in the philosophical account of reality, proofs start from God.
  • On God, the first part of the Ethics, starts with definitions; 1Def3 is of Substance, which Spinoza defines as
    1. what is in itself and is conceived through itself; or equivalently
    2. that whose concept does not require the concept of another thing from which it must be formed.
    Leibniz accused Spinoza of obscurity for it’s unclear whether have one or both of the properties
    1. of being “in itself” and
    2. of being “conceived through itself”.
    While Spinoza almost certainly meant both, he needs to prove it as some have thought only (a) necessary for substantiality.
  • Descartes believed (a) because substances depend for their existence on nothing other than God. However, he didn’t believe (b) because he substances are known by their attributes. This interpretation connects Spinoza’s “what is in itself” with Descartes’ “depends on no other thing”. Woolhouse, however, thinks that Spinoza’s definition of substance aligns rather than contrasts with Descartes’, for Spinoza’s 1Def4 has it that an attribute is what the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of a substance, which Woolhouse takes as the counterpart of a Cartesian principal attribute, which constitutes a substance’s nature and essence.
  • Without 1Def4, 1Def3 is empty, because it is only by virtue of having attributes that a substance – of a particular kind – can be conceived through itself. Part 1 assumes and Part 2 proves that thought and extension are attributes that constitute a substance’s essence. Therefore, it is only extended substance or thinking substance that is conceived through itself. Similarly, Descartes said that we can hardly understand substance on its own, ignoring the fact whether it thinks or is extended.
  • For Descartes, what qualifies an attribute as something that constitutes a substance’s essence – ie. as a principal property marking out a kind of substance – is our ability to clearly and distinctly conceive of that property without reference to any other. Similarly for Spinoza, for whom an attribute is conceived in and through itself and whose concept requires no others; extension is conceived in and through itself, but motion isn’t, as its concept involves extension. Something with a certain property is a substance if that property can be conceived by the intellect as constituting a substantial essence, conceivable through itself. This reverses the apparent order of 1P10, where the self-conceivability of substances is taken as a premise for the conclusion of the self-conceivability of attributes.
  • A substance’s being conceived through itself is the test that it can exist in itself. Descartes illustrates this well in the Replies, where he says that the (alleged) fact that we can conceive of thought and extension apart is the clearest sign that they are two different principal properties and so constitute two kinds of substance.
  • For Descartes, attributes are not substances, nor substances attributes. Curley said, based on a couple of pre- and post-Ethics letters, where the definitions of substance and attribute are either parallel or identical – that Spinoza doesn’t recognise this conceptual distinction. Woolhouse doesn’t find the blurring surprising since it is with this or that attribute that a substance is conceived through itself.
  • Woolhouse says that Spinoza “need not be taken” to obliterate the Cartesian conceptual distinction between substance and attribute. Descartes, in any case, agreed that there’s not much difference between the substance and the principal property that constitutes its essence, and equated thought with thinking substance and extension with extended substance8.
  • Descartes had two principal attributes – thought and extension. Spinoza allows God an infinity of attributes, which may simply mean all possible attributes, but he does say explicitly in the Short Treatise that there are more than two, and when asked why we can’t know more of God’s attributes than thought and extension, he didn’t say there were no more to be known. Even so, there’s nothing in his metaphysics that reflects more than two.
  • Woolhouse now turns to which substances exist for Spinoza, who demonstrates in 1P11 the necessary existence of a substance with an infinity of attributes. Since 1Def6 defines God as a substance with an infinity of attributes, this amounts to saying that God necessarily exists. 1P14 demonstrates that no substance other than God can exist or be conceived of. This is so because, given the necessary existence of God, a substance with an infinity of attributes, and 1P5, which states that no two substances can have an attribute in common, there are no attributes left for another substance to have. This conclusion explains the common characterisation of Spinoza as a substance monist.
  • It is an important, but not straightforward, question whether there’s a contrast between Spinoza’s monism and Descartes’ dualism.
  • Broad characterised Descartes as a “differentiating attribute dualist”, where a differentiating attribute is something that makes for a kind of substance; immaterial and corporeal substances being respectively differentiated by the attributes of thought and extension. However, Woolhouse thinks “instantiated- attribute dualist” a more accurate description, since Descartes thinks that the two attributes are actually instantiated. Had he thought that God could have created a dualism, but had in fact created an immaterialist universe, he would have been an attribute dualist but not an instantiated-attribute dualist.
  • Broad points out that Descartes is also an instantiation-pluralist, holding that there are a plurality of instantiations of the two attributes. Extension is instantiated only by the created material world, but thought is instantiated both by the uncreated infinite mind which is God, but also by a plurality of created minds.
  • We now ask whether Spinoza’s monism is contrasted with Descartes attribute dualism, instantiated-attribute dualism or instantiation pluralism. The short answer is that there is a contrast for immaterial substance between Spinoza and Descartes’ instantiation pluralism, since
    1. Descartes thought that the pieces of material substance are not numerically different individual substances, and Spinoza agreed, calling them finite modes of extended substance; however,
    2. there are many individual thinking substances – individual substantial minds – for Descartes, but Spinoza these are only finite modes, rather finite thinking substances.
  • Spinoza’s rejection of instantiation pluralism comes from 1P5, that attributes cannot be shared between substances, the foundation for the monism of 1P14. This has been taken to mean that there can be no two substances of the same secondary kind, in the Aristotelian sense, to which Oldenburg countered by saying that two men are two substances with the same attribute, reason. While, like Descartes, Spinoza denies substantiality to their bodies, being simply rearrangements of extended matter, this agreement doesn’t help reject a number of different thinking substances.
  • 1P5 assumes that the difference between two substances cannot be merely numerical9, but must be accounted for either by a difference of attributes or of affections, ie. states. Difference in the affections already presupposes that there are two substances, so we are left with differences in attributes. Woolhouse suggests (in agreement with Leibniz) that for the argument to work, Spinoza has to assume what he later denies, that substances have only one attribute, otherwise they could be similar in one respect and different in another.
  • 1P8S2 also argues for 1P5; it is not part of a thing’s definition that it should be instantiated any determinate number of times, so an external explanation is required of why each instantiation exists. As Spinoza says in 1P8S2, 20 isn’t part of the definition of man, so if 20 men exist, the cause for each of the 20 must lie outside each of them. This denies their substantiality, for a there can be no explanation outside a substance, which cannot be produced by anything else. Hence, men cannot be individual substances, but only modes, and there cannot be a number of instances of the (potentially) two kinds of substances – extended and thinking.
  • Woolhouse doesn’t think that that Spinoza’s rejection of instantiation pluralism with respect to mind and body (the latter shared with Descartes) does not amount to the monism of 1P14, which depends on 1P11 as well as 1P5. Woolhouse draws up the following list of possible dualisms and trialisms, left after Spinoza’s departure from Cartesianism with respect to mind, and asks which is eliminated by 1P14:
    1. Attribute dualism
    2. Instantiated-attribute dualism
    3. Instantiation dualism with respect to created substance
    4. Instantiation trialism with respect to created or uncreated substance indifferently.
  • Option (3) cannot be an instantiation-attribute dualism with respect to created substance because ‘being created’ is not a principal property or substantial attribute; the listed option is possible because 1P5 leaves created corporeal and immaterial substances. Option (4) is explained by the fact that besides created corporeal and immaterial substances, there is the individual uncreated immaterial substance, namely God.
  • Woolhouse notes that 1P14 eliminates (4) and hence has possible consequences for (3). The reason is that 1P14 does away with the Cartesian contrast between created and uncreated substance, because for Spinoza nothing created is a substance. Either “uncreated substances” are not substances or they are not created. The latter, and favoured, alternative would mean that God and the material & mental worlds are identical, and when combined with the assumption that Spinoza’s God is instantiated, either alternative results in the usual view of Spinoza’s monism as an instantiation monism.
  • The other main premise of 1P14, 1P11, has it that that there is a substance with an infinite number of attributes, but can a substance really have more than one attribute, as Spinoza explicitly says in 1P10S? This is Spinoza’s greatest departure from Cartesian metaphysics.
  • For Descartes, the reason we might have two distinct substances is that we can clearly and distinctly understand one without the other, which comes down to seeing their respective attributes as principal attributes. So, for Descartes, where we have two principal attributes, we have two substances, and no existent substance can instantiate more than one attribute, or be a substance of more than one kind.
  • Woolhouse says that 1P10S can easily be read10 as explicitly denying this Cartesian claim. Even given Spinoza’s attribute pluralism, it looks as though it supports instantiation monism. Spinoza accepts that each attribute is conceived through itself, but then, contra Descartes, explicitly denies that this implies that if follows that the two attributes belong to two substances, claiming that it is far from absurd to ascribe two attributes to one substance.
  • How can some existent be really of this kind, say extended, and yet really of that kind, say thinking, as well? If this seemed to be the case, couldn’t we, along with Leibniz, suggest that the two attributes expressed the same things in different ways and that at least one of them might be further analysable?
  • One approach to justifying Spinoza’s approach is to pick up on Descartes point that attributing two principal properties to the same subject is to say what Descartes thinks is a contradiction – that the same subject has two different natures. Of course, Descartes allows the human being to have both thought and extension, but the human being is not a simple substance but a composite entity of two – mind and body.
  • So, one understanding (due to Gueroult, not favoured by Woolhouse) is to understand Spinoza’s multi-attribute substance as analogous to man multiplied to infinity. Gueroult admits that the union in the two cases is different, because in the case of Descartes’ man, the union is only a contingent composition or juxtaposition which dissolves at death, whereas for Spinoza’s God, the union is absolutely necessary, is in one substance, and is of the nature of God.
  • Another attempt is Wolfson’s ‘subjective interpretation of attributes’ which exploits a different interpretation of attributes which, for Descartes constitute the nature and essence of substance, while for Spinoza they are what the intellect perceives of a substance, as constituting its essence (1D4). So, Spinoza’s view is said to be that thought the mind perceives the attributes as distinct, in fact they are one – different words expressing the same reality – and the problem of a single substance being characterised by two attributes disappears.
  • Woolhouse rejects this view as well, because Spinoza seems expressly to suppose that there are objectively many attributes, and not just subjectively so. Spinoza says that the more attributes a substance has, the more reality it has, that its attributes have always been in it together, and that an absolutely infinite being consists of infinite attributes.
  • Woolhouse diagnoses both Gueroult’s and Wolfson’s explanations as explaining how a substance could have more than one attribute while simultaneously denying that it could, which Woolhouse suggests is just what Spinoza rejects. Spinoza’s radical difference from Descartes is that a substance must have all the attributes there are, not simply that it could.
  • Descartes thinks that – in the case of thought and extension – these two attributes are directly incompatible and contradictory, because body is infinitely divisible whereas mind is not divisible at all; so – as in the case of any pair of contradictory properties – cannot be possessed by the same substance. Consequently, Cottingham imagines the difference to arise because Spinoza rejects Descartes’ thesis that thought and extension are incompatible notions. While Woolhouse agrees that Spinoza does deny the divisibility of extended substance, he denies there is any evidence that this is what led him to conclude that thought and extension are compatible and so can be attributed to the same substance.
  • Descartes also maintains that the reason that the same substance cannot have these two attributes is that they are differentiating attributes that enable us to tell the substances apart. He says that, not only is it not the case that mind and body are merely different rather than opposite, and so capable of co-existing in the same subject, but that when attributes constitute the essence of a substance, there is no greater opposition between them than when they are different. To say that the same substance has two different natures – as would be the case if it had both the attributes of thought and extension – implies a contradiction.
  • This is where Spinoza parts company from Descartes, for it is this differentiating property that for Descartes prevents the two attributes from belonging to the same subject that for Spinoza allows them to do so. Since an attribute is perceived through itself, it must be independent of any other and cannot rule out the substance’s possession of other attributes – indeed he thinks that it necessitates this possession, for he thinks that a substance must have all attributes.
  • In response to de Vries’s criticism that he hadn’t demonstrated (in an early draft of the Ethics) that he hadn’t proved that two attributes necessitates two substances, Spinoza provided two arguments. (1) We conceive each being under some attribute, and the more reality or being a being has, the more attributes must be attributed to it (hence leading to an absolutely infinite being having infinite attributes). This is because substantial attributes designate ways of being or kinds of reality, so the reality of a substance is proportional to the number of its attributes. Hence God, who is the most11 real being, must have all the attributes there are and be real in all the ways possible to be real. God’s reality consists in absolutely unlimited being, not being of a certain type.
  • Spinoza disagrees with Descartes about what constitutes reality. For Descartes, the amount of reality something possesses is related to its degree of dependence. For Spinoza, it relates to the number of ways in which a substance is real. Even though this seems to have some plausibility, says Woolhouse, it also seems to beg the question since it means that for a substance to have twice the reality it would need to have two different natures, which is the point at issue.
  • (2) Spinoza’s second argument is that the more attributes attributed to some being, the more I’m compelled to attribute existence to it and conceive it true. The more attributes we conceive of something having, the more we conceive it as having to exist.
  • Woolhouse doesn’t think this will do either, because we may still feel, with de Vries, that thinking of something with more than one attribute and nature is to think of something impossible or chimerical. We need to be able to understand what it is for something to be in more than one of the ways in which it is possible to be.
  • Woolhouse suggests that Spinoza’s position is that any substance must have all the attributes, in which case he holds to compatibilism rather than to Descartes’ incompatibilism. Woolhouse lists attempted proofs by Delahunty and Curley12.
  • Delahunty has it that Spinoza argues that
    1. a substance possessing an infinite and eternal attribute must be an absolutely infinite and eternal substance and that
    2. an absolutely infinite substance must possess every infinite and eternal attribute.
    So, since any attribute is infinite and eternal for Spinoza, this implies that a substance with any attribute has them all. However, Woolhouse argues that, though we know from 1Def6 that Spinoza would accept (2), he wouldn’t accept (1) because having an infinite attribute only involves being infinite relative to that attribute – infinite in its own kind (1D6E) – and not necessarily absolutely infinite with respect to all attribute.
  • Curley’s explanation is that for Spinoza, each of the attributes is necessary and it is impossible for one of them to exist without the others. If we grant the premise that every attribute must be instantiated in a substance, then it does follow, says Woolhouse13, that there will not be a substance with a given attribute without there being a substance with any other. Given this step, there is a sense in which no attribute can exist without the others, but this is a much weaker claim than Spinoza’s, which is that “all the attributes substance has have always been in it together” (1P10S), since there might be as many substances as attributes for all the argument tells us.
  • Donagan asks the question how a world constituted of one substance with really distinct attributes would differ from one constituted of several substances each having one attribute.
  • Collingwood thought that Spinoza gave no reason why the two attributes of thought and extension have always been together in the one substance, but just posited it as a brute fact. However, in the Short Treatise, Spinoza gives the reason that it is the unity of nature that demands this; different substances have nothing in common with one another. So the reason to prefer one substance with many attributes over many substances each with one attribute is that the latter lacks the unity of the former, for the only way for their to be union between attributes – as in the unity between mind and body in human beings – is for them to belong to the same substance.
  • Woolhouse now reviews where we’ve got to in the argument. We started discussing Spinoza’s doctrine of the multi-attributed substance to see how to construe the monism of 1P14. The answer previously given was that if Spinoza’s God is the instantiation of various attributes, then we have at least an instantiation monism in 1P14, as is usually understood. From then on, we looked at how a substance could have more than one attribute, and Woolhouse’s proposal is that substances cannot have less than all the attributes there are and that the nature of differentiating attributes as differentiating kinds of substance is such that they must go together. If this is correct, then, despite Spinoza positing more than one differentiating attribute, the monism of 1P14 must deny attribute dualism as normally understood, leaving us with a kind of attribute monism.
  • Woolhouse contends that understanding 1P14 as amounting to instantiation monism is a mistake. The idea that Spinoza’s God is an instantiation comes from assuming that his single substance is to be identified with the extended corporeal world, which is a serious mistake. For Spinoza “there is existent14 substance” means that extension is a substantial attribute, something that can be conceived through itself, quite apart from there actually being extended things. If we imagine Spinoza, in talking about extended substance, as talking about possibility, the actuality which contrasts with this possibility is not that of actual extended substance. This is because, for Spinoza, anything instantiating the substantial attribute of extension would not be extended substance, but a mode of extended substance. So, the reality of Spinoza’s single substance isn’t existent instantiation, but one that makes it possible for there actual extended modes of extension.
  • Leaving human thinking things aside for the time being, Woolhouse contrasts Descartes’ and Spinoza’s metaphysical systems. For Descartes, we have an uncreated thinking substance (God) and the created extended substance of corporeal world. For Spinoza, we have an uncreated extended substance, which is also thinking and which Spinoza identifies with God. Many have identified Spinoza’s and Descartes’ extended substances, thereby equating the former with the corporeal world and making out that for Spinoza the corporeal world is God.
  • Woolhouse quotes from John Harris (1698) and Samuel Clarke (1704) and the more recent Joachim (1964) as supporting this (erroneous) view that res extensa is no creation of God, but is God.
  • Spinoza rejected Descartes’ view that God is the transitive cause of corporeal world as a substantially different entity. For Descartes, God is clearly differentiated from the corporeal world because God is not corporeal. For Spinoza a dual fogginess arises because (i) God is seen as the immanent cause, hence making it difficult to differentiate cause and effect and (ii) God is seen as itself an extended corporeal substance, not as a purely thinking substance. Thus, it is the obscurity of the causal link between Spinoza’s God and the corporeal world that led Malebranche to complain that Spinoza had taken the universe as his God because he couldn’t see how by his power and will alone God could create the universe.
  • This misidentification of Descartes’ and Spinoza’s extended substances arises from a failure to see that they are realities of radically different sorts. Woolhouse believes that what Spinoza and Descartes mean when they say that God or extended substance exist are rather different things. For Spinoza, the reality of extended substance is not an existent instantiation of extension, but of a kind of reality that underwrites the possibility of actual extended things as initiations of extension.
  • It was common in the 17th century to believe in two kinds of reality or existence – of immutable, eternal natures, essences or forms and of corporeal things in the extended material world. An example is Descartes’ idea of a triangle having a determinate, immutable and eternal nature, form or essence independent both of Descartes’ mind and of whether there had been or would ever be any triangular figures existing outside his thought.
  • Spinoza makes the same distinction between the kind of reality enjoyed by eternal and immutable attributes and their instantiations in the physical world. In his Metaphysical Thoughts, Spinoza distinguishes between
    1. the being of essence,
    2. the being of existence and
    3. the being of idea.
    Existence is the being of the instantiation of an essence, attributed to something after it has been created by God. Essence can be conceived apart from existence other than in the case of God. Spinoza claims that an essence differs from an idea because something that is conceived clearly and distinctly is something different from an idea.
  • Given that an essence isn’t an idea, what is it? In what way has it being outside the intellect? Spinoza thinks that it is its dependence on the divine essence alone, in which all things are contained, that allows us to say that the essences of things are eternal.
  • For Spinoza, things can be actual in two ways –
    1. in relation to a particular time and place and
    2. insofar as we conceive them to be contained in God, where they involve the eternal and infinite essence of God, the formal essences of modes which exist insofar as they are comprehended in God’s attributes.
  • A similar distinction is made by Leibniz, for whom propositions about the existence of things should not all be understood in the same way, some, such as a man, being existential and others, such as a circle, being essential. For the existence of a man, there needs to be a corporeal world containing a man, but for a circle to exist, there need not be corporeal world with circular things in it – all that is required is geometrical possibility.
  • For Descartes and Leibniz, essences, natures and forms are not ideas, but things of which we can have ideas. Leibniz points out that we can have ideas which we mistakenly think correspond to essences, as when under the delusion that two parabolas can be found that are parallel to one another in the way that two straight lines or circles can be. On the other hand, we can have ideas of already existing essences – the inventor’s idea having as its archetype a divine idea.
  • In the case of both God and extended substance, Descartes understands existential rather than essential existence. His ontological proof of the existence of God draws a parallel between the immutable essences of God and a triangle, and aims to show that the divine nature is instantiated at least once, differing from all others in being necessarily instantiated. Even though God’s existence is necessary, God is, for Descartes, like a corporeal triangle in being the instantiation of an immutable essence or nature. Likewise, the mode of existence of Cartesian extended substance is like that of an instantiation of an immutable essence or nature. Descartes sharply distinguishes between our having a clear and distinct idea of extended matter and there actually existing something extended that we call matter.
  • However, things are different for Spinoza, for when he says that God or extended substance exist, he means essentially rather than existentially. However, it isn’t quite correct to say that Spinoza’s extended substance or God but rather that it is what supports essences or natures, or is where they are located.
  • The corporeal extended world doesn’t feature in Spinoza’s system as in Descartes’ as extended substance but as a mode, the so-called infinite mediate mode of the attribute of extension.
  • Spinoza’s identification of God and nature (Deus sive natura) doesn’t mean that extended substance is after all the corporeal extended world, because it needs to be seen against the background of his distinction between natura naturans and natura naturata. The former is nature seen as active and creative the latter as passive and created. The former is God as a free cause, the latter is whatever follows from God’s nature or attributes. The former is what is in itself and conceived through itself, the latter as things which are in God and can neither be not be conceived without God. The corporeal world is part of natura naturata , a mode of the attribute of extension that can neither be nor be conceived without God as extended substance.
  • Modes are the affections of a substance, or that which is in another through which it is also conceived (1Def5). This would be simple enough for Descartes, for whom the square shape of a piece of extended substance is one of its modes, an affection or property of the thing, inconceivable without that thing both because it can only be the shape of an extended thing, but also because it can only be the shape of that extended thing. Things are more complex in Spinoza’s three-tiered modal structure.
  • Modes of the topmost level are immediate, infinite modes; eternal and infinite and directly following from the absolute nature of any of God’s attributes. Those of the second level are mediate, infinite modes; also eternal and infinite, but following indirectly from God’s attributes, mediated by one of the topmost modes. There is one of each kind of mode for each attribute. At the bottom of the structure are those finite modes that have determinate existence. These follow, not from one of the levels above, but from modes of their own sort; they are called by Spinoza singular things and there are many of them for each attribute.
  • This 3-fold structure in Ethics 1P21-3 & 1P28 is a development of an earlier 2- fold structure in the Short Treatise, which divides natura naturata into a universal and a particular aspect. The first aspect consists of eternal modes, immediately dependent on or created by God. The second aspect consists of singular things which are produced by the eternal modes.
  • Neither the finished nor draft versions of the Ethics gave concrete examples of the infinite modes, though when asked Spinoza gave “absolute infinite understanding” and “motion and rest” as, respectively, the immediate modes of the attributes of thought and extension. It’s unclear what is the infinite mediate mode of thought, but that of extension is “the body of the whole universe”. We can conceive of the whole of nature as one individual, Spinoza says in 1P13L7S, whose parts vary in infinite ways without any change in the whole individual. Our minds are finite modes of thought, while our bodies and other material things are finite modes of extension.
  • Woolhouse concludes by noting that Spinoza’s finite modes seem to be of the wrong logical types to be compared with Cartesian modes, which are properties.




In-Page Footnotes ("Woolhouse (Roger) - Spinoza and Substance")

Footnote 4:
  • This is the write-up as it was when this Abstract was last output, with text as at the timestamp indicated (05/06/2020 23:05:17).
  • Link to Latest Write-Up Note.
Footnote 5:
  • Spinoza wrote an exposition of Descartes’ Principles (not the Meditations), but I’m not clear whether this was in the geometrical manner – check up!
Footnote 6:
  • This is a different distinction than between analytic and synthetic truths. This distinction envisaged here is between whether knowledge is gained by synthesising from first principles, as in Euclid’s demonstrations, or by breaking down complex things into simples (analysis). Really, analysis has to take place before synthesis so we can know what to synthesise. This has more to do with demonstrative proof and the display of knowledge than its acquisition. Maybe Woolhouse will expatiate on these topics later.
Footnote 7:
  • In the 17th century sense, as distinct from natural philosophy.
Footnote 8:
  • While this may be OK for Descartes, one would have thought that Spinoza, with only one substance but many attributes, can hardly equate the two.
Footnote 9:
  • Ie. Spinoza wouldn’t allow two peas in the pod both to be substances if they were exactly alike, simply on account of their alikeness.
Footnote 10:
  • Is Woolhouse suggesting that this reading is incorrect?
Footnote 11:
  • This doesn’t seem to follow – if there were two beings, one of whom had two attributes and the other one, the one with two attributes would still be most real. An infinitely real being would need all the attributes.
Footnote 12:
  • Check there aren’t more authors in the list!
Footnote 13:
  • I don’t see why, nor even what this is supposed to mean! Curley’s “premise” was the necessity of the attributes, so, for each of them, some substance or other must possess them – but I still don’t understand the logic of what’s being claimed – why, given the premise, should the intantiation of one attribute make the instantiation of the others any more certain, when this was already certain, given the premise?
Footnote 14:
  • This is as Woolhouse writes it – but I’d have expected to see “extended” rather than “existent” here.



"Woolhouse (Roger) - Uncreated and Created Substance: God and the World"

Source: Woolhouse - Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz - The Concept of Substance in Seventeenth Century Metaphysics



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