<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Problems in Personal Identity (Baillie (James)) - Theo Todman's Book Collection (Book-Paper Abstracts)</title> <link href="../../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../../TT_ICO.png" /> </head> <a name="Top"></a> <BODY> <div id="header"> <HR><H1>Theo Todman's Book Collection (Book-Paper Abstracts)</H1></div> <hr><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950><tr><td colspan =3><A HREF = "../BookSummary_564.htm">Problems in Personal Identity</A></td></tr><tr><td colspan =3><A HREF = "../../../Authors/B/Author_Baillie (James).htm">Baillie (James)</a></td></tr><tr><td colspan =3>This Page provides (where held) the <b>Abstract</b> of the above <b>Book</b> and those of all the <b>Papers</b> contained in it.</td></tr><tr><td><A HREF="#ColourConventions">Text Colour-Conventions</a></td><td><A HREF = "../BookCitings_564.htm">Books / Papers Citing this Book</A></td><td><A HREF = "../BooksToNotes_564.htm">Notes Citing this Book</A></td></tr></tr></TABLE></CENTER><hr> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>BOOK ABSTRACT: </B><BR><BR><U>Cover Blurb</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>This concise introduction to the topic of personal identity is concerned with what it is to be a person, and with what is involved in being the same person over time.</li><li>The first few chapters are devoted to placing these questions in historical context, presenting the ideas of Descartes, Locke, Butler, Hume, and Reid, followed by a summary of recent debates between reductionism and non-reductionism, identity and survival, featuring Parfit, Williams, Nozick, Lewis, Brennan, and Unger.</li><li>Baillie then scrutinizes the methodological assumptions that have guided these debates. He casts a critical eye over the use of <a name="1"></a><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_32.htm">thought experiments</A><SUP>1</SUP>, wherein conclusions regarding identity are derived from our responses to various bizarre situations, and argues that many influential arguments are flawed due to a misuse of this methodology.</li><li>The remainder of the book discusses issues that remain, once a more modest methodological framework is imposed. The author focuses on real-life conditions, both typical and pathological, and, in individual chapters on amnesia, split-brains, and Multiple Personality Disorder, he shows that the real issues of personal identity are rooted within scientific research rather than imaginative speculation.</li><li>Special Features:<BR>& Provides a comprehensive overview of historical and contemporary debates<BR>& Provides an accessible discussion of important but difficult recent work<BR>& Concerns issues in philosophy that are central and fundamental, with implications for a vast number of contemporary issues<BR>& Organization of the subject matter stresses both the history of the subject and its connections with other disciplines</li><li>James Baillie is assistant professor of philosophy at the. University of Portland and the author of numerous papers and articles on personal identity, philosophy of science, and philosophy of psychology. </li></ol> </FONT> <U>Philosophers Index Abstract</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">This book discusses the nature of personhood, and proposed criteria of personal identity. After surveying historical material by Locke, Butler, Reid, and Hume, I assess contemporary work by Parfit, Williams, Nozick, Lewis, Shoemaker, Swinburne, and Unger. Following Wilkes, I then criticise the unrestricted use of <a name="2"></a><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_32.htm">thought-experiments</A><SUP>2</SUP>, arguing that this methodology has produced a distorted view of the issues, and that questions regarding personal identity are more profitably studied by focussing on actual cases. Thus, I examine problems arising from amnesia, <a name="3"></a><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_116.htm">commissurotomy</A><SUP>3</SUP>, and Multiple Personality Disorder.</ol></FONT><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><B>BOOK COMMENT: </B><BR><BR>Paragon Issues in Philosophy, Paragon House, New York, 1993</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3799.htm">Baillie (James) - Problems in Personal Identity: Preface</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Baillie (James) - Problems in Personal Identity, 1993, Preface<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Preface</U> (Full Text)<FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>This book is concerned with what it is to be a person, and with what is involved in being the same person over time. I begin by making a survey of the major theories of personal identity. I mark some important divisions and distinctions between them. Primarily, I distinguish Reductionism and Non-Reductionism and, within the former, between the Physical and the Psychological Criterion, and argue that none of these has proved to be satisfactory. I stress the importance of the work of Derek Parfit, and in particular his shifting of the agenda away from the relation of identity to that of  Relation R,' and his claim that it is the holding of this latter relation namely <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_16.htm">psychological continuity</A><SUP>1</SUP> by any means that contains  all that matters' to us regarding the future, and not necessarily whether I survive. I show how this theory avoids the pitfalls that defeated the other theories, and propose various developments of it.</li><li>A critical eye is then cast over the methodology of <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_32.htm">thought-experimentation</A><SUP>2</SUP>, so long the cornerstone of philosophical studies into personal identity, whereby conclusions are derived from considerations regarding what we would say if certain hypothetical states of affairs were to occur. The concept of  theoretical possibility' is employed in order to determine the limits of applicability of such <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_32.htm">thought-experiments</A><SUP>3</SUP>. Many influential arguments are found to be flawed due to misuse of this methodology.</li><li>The remainder of the book is concerned with identifying and discussing issues that remain once a more modest methodological framework is imposed. These concern the nature and the limits of psychological unity and continuity. They focus on real-life conditions, both typical and pathological, and are rooted within scientific research rather than in imaginative speculation.</li><li>My conclusions are for the most part negative, arguing that not only the answers but also the questions that have traditionally been posed regarding personal identity cease to be relevant, once the flaws in the framework that supported them have been exposed.</li></ol></FONT></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3800.htm">Baillie (James) - Problems in Personal Identity: Introduction</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Baillie (James) - Problems in Personal Identity, 1993, Chapter 1<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Sections</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Prelude</li><li>Varieties of Identity</li><li>Reductionism and Non-Reductionism</li><li>Reductionist Criteria of Identity</li><li>The Menu </li></ol></FONT></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3801.htm">Baillie (James) - Identity and Survival</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Baillie (James) - Problems in Personal Identity, 1993, Chapter 2<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Sections</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Williams Dilemma</li><li>The Closest Continuer Theory</li><li>The Psychological Spectrum</li><li>The Physical Spectrum</li><li>My Division</li><li>The  Only X and Y Rule<BR>Appendix: Lewis  The Indeterminacy of Population </li></ol></FONT></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3802.htm">Baillie (James) - Aspects of Non-Reductionism</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Baillie (James) - Problems in Personal Identity, 1993, Chapter 3<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Sections</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Butler s Charge of Circularity</li><li>Quasi-Memory</li><li>Swinburne s Simple View</li><li>Non-Reductionism and Dualism</li><li>The Subjective View</li><li>Empirical Grounds for Non-Reductionism?</li></ol></FONT></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3803.htm">Baillie (James) - What Am I?</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Baillie (James) - Problems in Personal Identity, 1993, Chapter 4<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Write-up <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_773.htm">Note</A><SUP>1</SUP><BR><BR>I ve written a paper on this work  follow the link above  which was in part reviewed at a couple of supervisions (write-ups accessible from the file-note). <BR><BR><U>Sections</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Introduction</li><li>Locke s Man/Person Distinction</li><li><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">Natural Kinds</A><SUP>2</SUP> and Natural Laws</li><li>Once an  f </li><li>Conditions of Survival</li><li>Teletransportation Revisited</li><li>Is Identity <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_10.htm">Sortal-Relative</A><SUP>3</SUP>?<BR>Appendix: Discontinuous Persons? </li></ol></FONT></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3804.htm">Baillie (James) - Methodology Matters</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Baillie (James) - Problems in Personal Identity, 1993, Chapter 5<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Sections</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Uses of <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_32.htm">Thought Experiment</A><SUP>1</SUP></li><li>Abuses of <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_32.htm">Thought Experiment</A><SUP>2</SUP></li><li>Human Freedom and Natural Laws</li><li><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_32.htm">Thought Experiments</A><SUP>3</SUP> Reassessed</li><li><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_108.htm">What Matters</A><SUP>4</SUP> in Survival? </li></ol></FONT></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3805.htm">Baillie (James) - Memory</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Baillie (James) - Problems in Personal Identity, 1993, Chapter 6<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Sections</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Locke s Criterion</li><li>  Memory Dismantled</li><li>Memory Storage</li><li>Parfit s Psychological Criterion Tested</li><li>The Sleeping Pill</li><li>Varieties of Memory</li><li>Two Case Histories<BR>Appendix: Psychogenic Fugue </li></ol></FONT></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3806.htm">Baillie (James) - Commissurotomy and the Unity of Mind</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Baillie (James) - Problems in Personal Identity, 1993, Chapter 7<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Sections</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Introduction</li><li><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_116.htm">Commissurotomy</A><SUP>1</SUP> Described</li><li>The Experimental Background</li><li>Minds, Brains, and Persons</li><li>Puccetti s  Two Person Theory</li><li>Cognition in the Right Hemisphere</li><li>Sperry s  Two Mind Theory</li><li>The Subjective View</li><li>Sperry Challenged</li><li>Split Brains and Single Minds<BR>Appendix: My Physics Exam </li></ol></FONT></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3807.htm">Baillie (James) - Degrees of Psychological Integrity</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Baillie (James) - Problems in Personal Identity, 1993, Chapter 8<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Sections</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>MPD (Multiple Personality Disorder): Historical Background</li><li>Minds, Persons, and Personalities</li><li>Mary and Mary</li><li>All about Eve</li><li>Dissociation and Hypnosis</li><li>The Self</li><li>A Matter of Degree </li></ol></FONT></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3808.htm">Baillie (James) - Problems in Personal Identity: In Conclusion</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Baillie (James) - Problems in Personal Identity, 1993, Conclusion<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Notes</U><ol type="1"><li>Baillie rejects the traditional  <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_32.htm">thought experiment </A><SUP>1</SUP> approach; our intuitions are unreliable, the conclusions are inconclusive and any benefits of this approach have already been assimilated. The problem cases are often impossible, and a false dichotomy is often set up between conflicting intuitions. </li><li>Abandoning this methodology, the Physical Criterion wins out. We are material beings whose persistence is Bodily. However, if forced to accept the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_32.htm">thought experiments</A><SUP>2</SUP>, Baillie thinks he goes where his brain goes (should <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">brain transplants</A><SUP>3</SUP> be possible). He largely accepts Parfit s analysis should double <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">half-brain transplants</A><SUP>4</SUP> be possible: presumably he accepts that while I don t survive (or am not identical to either of the survivors), I have <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_108.htm">what matters</A><SUP>5</SUP> in survival. </li><li>Any contribution made by philosophers with respect to the Psychological Criterion must be in the light of the sciences of Neuroscience and Psychology. The philosopher is very much the handmaiden of the sciences in the respect. </li></ol></P> <a name="ColourConventions"></a><hr><br><B><U>Text Colour Conventions</U> (see <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</B><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL> </center> <BR><HR><BR><center> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-02T02:33" pubdate>02/08/2018 02:33:55</time> <br><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A> </TD></TR><TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>