<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Identity - Essays Based on Herbert Spencer Lectures Given in the University of Oxford (Harris (Henry)) - Theo Todman's Book Collection (Book-Paper Abstracts)</title> <link href="../../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../../TT_ICO.png" /> </head> <a name="Top"></a> <BODY> <div id="header"> <HR><H1>Theo Todman's Book Collection (Book-Paper Abstracts)</H1></div> <hr><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950><tr><td colspan =3><A HREF = "../BookSummary_576.htm">Identity - Essays Based on Herbert Spencer Lectures Given in the University of Oxford</A></td></tr><tr><td colspan =3><A HREF = "../../../Authors/H/Author_Harris (Henry).htm">Harris (Henry)</a></td></tr><tr><td colspan =3>This Page provides (where held) the <b>Abstract</b> of the above <b>Book</b> and those of all the <b>Papers</b> contained in it.</td></tr><tr><td><A HREF="#ColourConventions">Text Colour-Conventions</a></td><td><A HREF = "../BookCitings_576.htm">Books / Papers Citing this Book</A></td><td><A HREF = "../BooksToNotes_576.htm">Notes Citing this Book</A></td></tr></tr></TABLE></CENTER><hr> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>BOOK ABSTRACT: </B><BR><BR><u>Amazon Book Description</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Who am I, and <a name="1"></a><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_734.htm">what am I</A><SUP>1</SUP>? The question is one asked through the ages, answered in various ways in different disciplines. Identity is a matter of intellectual interest but also of personal and practical interest, attracting attention and stimulating controversy outside the ranks of the specialists. This volume offers a comparison and cross-fertilization of insights and theories from various disciplines in which identity is a key concept.</li><li><em>Identity</em>contains essays by six internationally famous contributors, focusing on different facets of identity from the viewpoint of their various disciplines. <ul type="disc"><li>Two philosophers, Bernard Williams and Derek Parfit, discuss, respectively, numerical identity (when can we say that two phenomena observed at different times are one and the same thing?) and personal identity (how far can the concept of  I be stretched, and does it always matter whether we can say if that would still be me?). </li><li>Henry Harris looks at philosophical discussions of identity from the perspective of an experimentalist, and discusses whether philosophical <a name="2"></a><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_32.htm">thought-experiments</A><SUP>2</SUP> have any basis in scientific reality.<BR>The essays that follow offer perspectives from outside philosophy: </li><li>Michael Ruse considers homosexual identity and to what extent it is reasonable to claim that homosexuality is a social construct. </li><li>Terence Cave looks at personal identity through the eye of literature and fiction, and portrays identity as generated through the narratives that one weaves about oneself or about other people. </li><li>Finally, Anthony D Smith looks at national identities and how they are formed, analysing how this process is shaped by the interplay of cultural inheritance, political expediency, and myth.</li></ul> </li></ol></FONT><BR><u>Comment</u><ol type="1"><li>The above collection of essays demonstrate that the term  Identity is not univocal.</li><li>The term is already used in philosophical circles in  The Loose and Popular and the Strict and Philosophical Senses , see<ul type="disc"><li><a name="3"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_04/Abstract_4420.htm">Baxter (Donald L.M.) - Identity in the Loose and Popular Sense</A>", and </li><li><a name="4"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1319.htm">Chisholm (Roderick) & Shoemaker (Sydney) - Symposium: The Loose and Popular and the Strict and Philosophical Senses of Identity</A>". </li></ul>Here, numerical identity and exact (or even inexact) similarity may be confused. </li><li>But it seems that the use outside philosophy  when, for instance, talking of someone s  sexual identity , we re talking of something entirely different  namely aspects of their personality, or  maybe better  what social grouping they choose to align themselves with. . </li></ol><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><B>BOOK COMMENT: </B><BR><BR>Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_01/PaperSummary_1395.htm">Cave (Terence) - Fictional Identities</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Harris - Identity - Essays Based on Herbert Spencer Lectures Given in the University of Oxford<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">Terence Cave looks at personal identity through the eye of literature and fiction, and portrays identity as generated through the narratives that one weaves about oneself or about other people. </ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>Probably irrelevant to my Thesis</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_01/PaperSummary_1393.htm">Harris (Henry) - An Experimentalist Looks at Identity</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Harris - Identity - Essays Based on Herbert Spencer Lectures Given in the University of Oxford<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Philosophers Index Abstract</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ul type="disc"><li>An Experimentalist looks at Identity' examines two questions: <ol type="1"><li>Whether the philosophical notion of 'necessary' identity has any purchase in the material world; and </li><li>Whether the concept of 'personal identity' can be sustained by <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_32.htm">thought experiments</A><SUP>1</SUP> involving the bi-section, replication and <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">transplantation of brains</A><SUP>2</SUP>. </li></ol></li><li>With respect to 1), the conclusion is reached that 'necessary' identity is a logical construct limited to formal systems with no application in the real world. </li><li>With respect to 2), the conclusion is reached that <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_32.htm">thought experiments</A><SUP>3</SUP> involving manipulation of the brain are based on misapprehension of clinical reality and cannot provide a workable definition of personal identity.</li></ul></FONT></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_00/PaperSummary_559.htm">Parfit (Derek) - The Unimportance of Identity</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Martin & Barresi - Personal Identity, Chapter 11<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>First Two Pages</U> (Full Text)<FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>We can start with some science fiction. Here on Earth, I enter the Teletransporter. When I press some button, a machine destroys my body, while recording the exact states of all my cells. The information is sent by radio to Mars, where another machine makes, out of organic materials, a perfect copy of my body. The person who wakes up on Mars seems to remember living my life up to the moment when I pressed the button, and he is in every other way just like me.</li><li>Of those who have thought about such cases, some believe that it would be I who would wake up on Mars. They regard Teletransportation as merely the fastest way of travelling. Others believe that, if I chose to be Teletransported, I would be making a terrible mistake. On their view, the person who wakes up would be a mere Replica of me.</li><li>That is a disagreement about personal identity. To understand such disagreements, we must distinguish two kinds of sameness. Two white billiard balls may be qualitatively identical, or exactly similar. But they are not numerically identical, or one and the same ball. If I paint one of these balls red, it will cease to be qualitatively identical with itself as it was; but it will still be one and the same ball. Consider next a claim like, 'Since her accident, she is no longer the same person'. That involves both senses of identity. It means that she, one and the same person, is <em>not</em> now the same person. That is not a contradiction. The claim is only that this person's character has changed. This numerically identical person is now qualitatively different. </li><li>When psychologists discuss identity, they are typically concerned with the kind of person someone is, or wants to be. That is the question involved, for example, in an identity crisis. But, when philosophers discuss identity, it is numerical identity they mean. And, in our concern about our own futures, that is what we have in mind. I may believe that, after my marriage, I shall be a different person. But that does not make marriage death. However much I change, I shall still be alive if there will be someone living who will be me. Similarly, if I was Teletransported, my Replica on Mars would be qualitatively identical to me; but, on the sceptic's view, he wouldn't be me. I shall have ceased to exist. And that, we naturally assume, is <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_108.htm">what matters</A><SUP>1</SUP>.</li><li>Questions about our numerical identity all take the following form. We have two ways of referring to a person, and we ask whether these are ways of referring to the same person. Thus we might ask whether Boris Nikolayevich is Yeltsin. In the most important questions of this kind, our two ways of referring to a person pick out a person at different times. Thus we might ask whether the person to whom we are speaking now is the same as the person to whom we spoke on the telephone yesterday. These are questions about identity over time.</li><li>To answer such questions, we must know the <em>criterion</em> of personal identity: the relation between a person at one time, and a person at another time, which makes these one and the same person.</li><li>Different criteria have been advanced. On one view, what makes me the same, throughout my life, is my having the same body. This criterion requires uninterrupted bodily continuity. There is no such continuity between my body on Earth and the body of my Replica on Mars; so, on this view, my Replica would not be me. Other writers appeal to <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_16.htm">psychological continuity</A><SUP>2</SUP>. Thus Locke claimed that, if I was conscious of a past life in some other body, I would be the person who lived that life. On some versions of this view, my Replica would be me.</li><li>Supporters of these different views often appeal to cases where they conflict. Most of these cases are, like Teletransportation, purely imaginary. Some philosophers object that, since our concept of a person rests on a scaffolding of facts, we should not expect this concept to apply in imagined cases where we think those facts away. I agree. But I believe that, for a different reason, it is worth considering such cases. We can use them to discover, not what the truth is, but what we believe. We might have found that, when we consider science fiction cases, we simply shrug our shoulders. But that is not so. Many of us find that we have certain beliefs about what kind of fact personal identity is. </li></ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>Also in "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_121.htm">Martin (Raymond) & Barresi (John), Eds. - Personal Identity</A>"</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_01/PaperSummary_1394.htm">Ruse (Michael) - Sexual Identity: Reality or Construction?</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Harris - Identity - Essays Based on Herbert Spencer Lectures Given in the University of Oxford<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">Michael Ruse considers homosexual identity and to what extent it is reasonable to claim that homosexuality is a social construct. </ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>Probably irrelevant to my Thesis</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_01/PaperSummary_1396.htm">Smith (Anthony D.) - The Formation of National Identity</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Harris - Identity - Essays Based on Herbert Spencer Lectures Given in the University of Oxford<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">Anthony D Smith looks at national identities and how they are formed, analysing how this process is shaped by the interplay of cultural inheritance, political expediency, and myth. </ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>Probably irrelevant to my Thesis</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_01/PaperSummary_1392.htm">Williams (Bernard) - Identity and Identities</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Harris - Identity - Essays Based on Herbert Spencer Lectures Given in the University of Oxford<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Extract</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Many philosophical problems about identity concern the criteria for the identity of particular things. In the first part of this essay I shall consider a number of different philosophical problems that are associated with the concept of the identity of a particular thing. This leads to a particularly important case of the relation of particulars to types, which I shall take up in the later part of the essay: this is the notion of a person's social identity. </li><li>I start with more strictly metaphysical questions. Identity intimately involves counting, either synchronic or over time, and problems of identity are connected with what, in ancient terms, may be called questions of the One and the Many, of how many things of a certain sort there are at a certain place or over a certain period. As Frege helpfully insisted, the question 'how many?' always demands an answer to 'how many what?'</li></ol></FONT></P> <a name="ColourConventions"></a><hr><br><B><U>Text Colour Conventions</U> (see <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</B><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL> </center> <BR><HR><BR><center> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-02T02:34" pubdate>02/08/2018 02:34:18</time> <br><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A> </TD></TR><TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>