The Diachronic Mind: An Essay on Personal Identity, Psychological Continuity and the Mind-Body Problem
Slors (Marc)
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BOOK ABSTRACT:

Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, The Netherlands, 2001. Very similar to "Slors (Marc) - Personal Identity and the Metaphysics of Mind".

Back Cover Blurb
  1. The Diachronic Mind makes an original contribution to current philosophical debates on the nature of personal identity and the reducibility of the mind.
  2. It traces traditional problems facing psychological continuity1 theories of personal identity to the ease with which theorists of personal identity adopt and apply a sometimes naïve physicalism about the mind.
  3. This novel diagnosis opens that way to new solutions to traditional problems in the debate on the psychological criterion2 of personal identity. Through these solutions, an unorthodox version of nonreductive physicalism about the mind-brain relation is developed that avoids the recurrent epiphenomenalism objection to such positions.
  4. The book is written in a crisp style that presupposes no more than an elementary knowledge of philosophy. It is intended for students and professional philosophers alike.

Preface
  1. The ideas expressed in this book began to evolve from 1995 onwards, while I was writing my PhD dissertation. Chapters 1-5 still follow the basic structure of my thesis.
  2. After 1997 I published a number of articles on ideas developed during the writing of my thesis. The comments of colleagues and friend, of the various anonymous referees of the respective journals and the comments and criticism I received after the articles were published and/or when they were presented at conferences have helped me tremendously to modify and sharpen my view on the issues discussed.
  3. From 1998 onwards, a grant of the Dutch Organisation for Scientific Research (NOW) allowed me to rewrite — at the University of Nijmegen — what are now Chapters 1-5 and to widen the ideas expressed therein through the addition of two further chapters, Chapters 6 and 7, and an appendix. I am grateful to NOW, the University of Nijmegen and Utrecht University for the opportunities they gave me to develop my ideas.
  4. This book would not have existed in its present form without the help, comments, and criticism from a large number of people. I'd very much like to thank … Lynne Rudder Baker, … , Cynthia Macdonald, Graham MacDonald… , Marya Schechtman, …
    … Abcoude, December 2000



"Slors (Marc) - The Diachronic Mind: Introduction and Overview"

Source: Slors - The Diachronic Mind, Chapter 1



"Slors (Marc) - Setting the Stage: Personal Identity and the Metaphysics of Mind"

Source: Slors - The Diachronic Mind, Chapter 2


Sections
  1. Introduction – 6
  2. The Problem of Personal Identity over Time – 7
  3. The Psychological Criterion1 of Personal Identity over Time – 12
  4. The Neo-Lockean Psychological Criterion2 of Personal Identity – 16
  5. The Circularity Objection – 19
  6. Problems of Logical Form – 21
  7. The Lack of a Third-Person Criterion for Reidentification – 23
  8. The Unity of the Mental Bundle – 25
  9. The Individuation3 of Persons – 26
  10. The Neo-Lockean Criterion and Physicalism: a 'Natural' Alliance – 28
  11. One 'Solution' to Five Problems – 35


COMMENT: See "Slors (Marc) - Personal Identity and the Metaphysics of Mind: Setting the Stage" for an earlier version of this Chapter.



"Slors (Marc) - Parfit's Reductio of a Substratum-Oriented Conception of Psychological Continuity"

Source: Slors - The Diachronic Mind, Chapter 3


Sections
  1. Introduction – 43
  2. Relation R – 45
  3. Relation R and the Neo-Lockian Paradigm – 51
  4. Psychological Atomism – 56
  5. The Central Place of Q-Memory1 in the Neo-Lockean Paradigm – 61
  6. The Trouble with Q-memory2 – 64
  7. Contents and Contexts. The Other Four Problems – 74
  8. Conclusions – 79


COMMENT: See "Slors (Marc) - Parfit's Reductio of a Substratum-Oriented Conception of Psychological Continuity" for an earlier version of this Chapter.



"Slors (Marc) - A Content-Oriented Conception of Psychological Continuity"

Source: Slors - The Diachronic Mind, Chapter 4


Sections
  1. Introduction – 82
  2. Two Kinds of Psychological Continuity1 – 83
  3. Levels of N-Continuity – 91
  4. The Unity of N-Continuous Sequences. The Role of the Body – 93
  5. N-Continuity and Psychological Connectedness – 105
  6. Summary – 109


COMMENT: See "Slors (Marc) - A Content-Oriented Conception of Psychological Continuity" for an earlier version of this Chapter.



"Slors (Marc) - A Psychological Criterion of Personal Identity: The Five Problems Revisited (The Diachronic Mind, Chapter 5)"

Source: Slors - The Diachronic Mind, Chapter 5


Sections
  1. Introduction – 111
  2. Circularity, Q-Memory1, and N-Continuity – 112
  3. Narrativity and Logical Form – 119
  4. Third-Person Criteria of Reidentification: The Role of the Body – 127
  5. In Between the Ego- and the Bundle Theory – 131
  6. Contents, Substrata and the Individuation2 of Persons – 134
  7. Summary – 138


COMMENT: See "Slors (Marc) - A Psychological Criterion of Personal Identity: The Five Problems Revisited (Personal Identity and the Metaphysics of Mind, Chapter 4)" for an earlier version of this Chapter.



"Slors (Marc) - N-Continuity as a Part of Folk-Psychology: The Link Between Personal Identity and the Identities of Persons"

Source: Slors - The Diachronic Mind, Chapter 6


Sections
  1. Introduction – 140
  2. Lower-Level N-Continuity as a Trivial Part of Folk-Psychology – 142
  3. The Problem of Idiosyncratic Practical Reasoning – 146
  4. A Bipartite Solution. Induction and Higher-Level N-Continuity – 153
  5. N-Continuity and the Identities of Persons – 160
  6. Conclusion – 164



"Slors (Marc) - Nonreductivism: The Relevance of N-Continuity"

Source: Slors - The Diachronic Mind, Chapter 7


Sections
  1. Introduction – 166
  2. Nonreductive Physicalism as Epiphenomenalism – 169
  3. Three Interpretations of the Above Argument – 173
  4. Anomalous Monism and the Nonreductivist's Dilemma – 178
  5. Strategic Intermezzo. Presuppositions Behind the Dilemma – 185
  6. Diachronic Holism and Irreducibility – 189
  7. The Resulting Picture – 198
  8. The Mental and Its Explananda – 200
  9. Summary – 207



"Slors (Marc) - Interpretationism and Mental Realism"

Source: Slors - The Diachronic Mind, Chapter 8 (Appendix)



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  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2019
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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