Personal Identity: A Philosophical Analysis
Vesey (Godfrey N.A.)
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BOOK ABSTRACT:

Cover Blurb

  1. Professor Vesey here examines, in the light of recent philosophical work on personal identity, the problem as it presented itself to David Hume.
  2. Hume rejected an account of personal identity according to which we are 'conscious of what we call our SELF' in favour of an account in terms of a bond we feel among the ideas we form of our perceptions. But he was far from satisfied with his treatment of the problem, and described himself as being involved in such a labyrinth that he neither knew how to correct his opinions on the matter nor how to render them consistent.
  3. This book is a sustained attempt to do for Hume what he found he could not do for himself. Recent versions of the accounts rejected by Hume are critically examined; and an 'obvious answer' to Hume's problem is expounded. This answer is then defended against arguments based on considerations of what we should say about personal identity in the event of a bisected brain transplant.
  4. Professor Vesey writes lucidly on this central problem in modern philosophy. His study will be valued, not only for the clarity with which he presents Hume's opinions and modern theories, but also for his original contribution to debate, notably the extended critique in Chapter 2 of the argument for the self being conscious of itself.

BOOK COMMENT:

Problems of Philosophy Series. Macmillan & Co., London, 1974



"Vesey (Godfrey N.A.) - In Which a Labyrinth is Explored and Landmarks Established"

Source: Vesey - Personal Identity: A Philosophical Analysis, Chapter 1



"Vesey (Godfrey N.A.) - Are We Intimately Conscious of What We Call Our Self"

Source: Vesey - Personal Identity: A Philosophical Analysis, Chapter 2



"Vesey (Godfrey N.A.) - The Self Is a Relatively Constant Mass of Bodily Feeling"

Source: Vesey - Personal Identity: A Philosophical Analysis, Chapter 3



"Vesey (Godfrey N.A.) - Unity Constituted By Relations Among Experiences"

Source: Vesey - Personal Identity: A Philosophical Analysis, Chapter 4



"Vesey (Godfrey N.A.) - Why Not the Obvious Answer to the Unity Question?"

Source: Vesey - Personal Identity: A Philosophical Analysis, Chapter 5



"Vesey (Godfrey N.A.) - Are Persons Identified Only By Reference to Their Bodies"

Source: Vesey - Personal Identity: A Philosophical Analysis, Chapter 6



"Vesey (Godfrey N.A.) - Is Belief In the Special Nature of Personal Identity False"

Source: Vesey - Personal Identity: A Philosophical Analysis, Chapter 7



"Vesey (Godfrey N.A.) - Out Of the Labyrinth?"

Source: Vesey - Personal Identity: A Philosophical Analysis, Chapter 8



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