The Mind-Brain Identity Theory
Borst (C.V.)
This Page provides (where held) the Abstract of the above Book and those of all the Papers contained in it.
Text Colour-ConventionsBooks / Papers Citing this Book

BOOK ABSTRACT: None.



"Armstrong (David) - The Nature of Mind"

Source: Block - Readings in Philosophy of Psychology - Vol 1


Author’s Introduction
    It is suggested that it is possible to give an analysis of the mental concepts as states of the person apt for producing certain ranges of behaviour. This analysis leaves it open what the concrete nature of the states is. But scientific considerations made it plausible that these states are purely physical states of the central nervous system. Special attention is given to the concept of consciousness, which is argued to be perception of our own mental state.


COMMENT: Also in "Borst (C.V.) - The Mind-Brain Identity Theory"



"Baier (Kurt) - Smart on Sensations"

Source: Borst - The Mind-Brain Identity Theory



"Borst (C.V.) - The Mind-Brain Identity Theory: Editor's Introduction"

Source: Borst - The Mind-Brain Identity Theory



"Coburn (Robert) - Shaffer on the Identity of Mental States and Brain Processes"

Source: Borst - The Mind-Brain Identity Theory



"Cornman (James) - The Identity of Mind and Body"

Source: Borst - The Mind-Brain Identity Theory


Philosophers Index Abstract
  1. The paper first argues that the problem expressed by the sentence, "could mental states be brain processes" is not simply an empirical matter but involves a central conceptual problem.
  2. It next argues for the conclusion that there is a conceptual problem for any version of the identity theory, namely that since brain processes and mental states each have properties not truly attributable to the other, then – by Leibniz's principle – they are not the same.
  3. Finally, the paper proposes a way to avoid this conclusion by arguing that application of Leibniz's principle is unwarranted whenever its application involves a category mistake.


COMMENT: Also in "Rosenthal (David), Ed. - Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem".



"Feigl (Herbert) - Mind-body, not a Pseudo-problem"

Source: Borst - The Mind-Brain Identity Theory



"Feyerabend (Paul) - Comment: 'Mental Events and the Brain'"

Source: Borst - The Mind-Brain Identity Theory



"Feyerabend (Paul) - Materialism and the Mind-body Problem"

Source: Feyerabend - Philosophical Papers Vol 1: Realism, Rationalism and Scientific Method


Philosophers Index Abstract
    Maintaining that the proper task of philosophy is to encourage the invention and refinement of new theories, the author defends materialism against three popular arguments. The first holds that materialism is inconsistent with ordinary usage and so cannot meaningfully be applied to human beings; the second argues from observation that thoughts are not material processes; the third asserts that people are directly acquainted with their own mental experiences. The author examines the logic and motivation of these arguments and concludes there is no reason to abandon the attempt to give a purely physiological account of human beings. (Staff)


COMMENT: Also in "Borst (C.V.) - The Mind-Brain Identity Theory"



"Hinton (J.M.) - Illusions and Identity"

Source: Borst - The Mind-Brain Identity Theory



"Malcolm (Norman) - Rejoinder to Mr. Sosa"

Source: Borst - The Mind-Brain Identity Theory



"Malcolm (Norman) - Scientific Materialism and the Identity Theory"

Source: Borst - The Mind-Brain Identity Theory



"Nagel (Thomas) - Physicalism"

Source: Borst - The Mind-Brain Identity Theory (Philosophical Review, Vol. 74, No. 3, Jul., 1965, pp. 339-356)

COMMENT: Also in "Rosenthal (David), Ed. - Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem" (including a Postscript from November 1968)



"Place (U.T.) - Is Consciousness a Brain Process?"

Source: Lycan - Mind and Cognition - An Anthology

COMMENT: Also in



"Place (U.T.) - Materialism as a Scientific Hypothesis"

Source: Borst - The Mind-Brain Identity Theory



"Rorty (Richard) - Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories"

Source: Borst - The Mind-Brain Identity Theory

COMMENT: Also in:-



"Shaffer (Jerome) - Could Mental States be Brain Processes?"

Source: Borst - The Mind-Brain Identity Theory



"Shaffer (Jerome) - Mental Events and the Brain"

Source: Rosenthal - The Nature of Mind


Philosophers Index Abstract
  1. It is first shown that J J C Smart's account of the meaning of reports of sensations in terms of physical stimulus conditions is defective.
  2. It is then argued that no such materialistic manoeuvring can succeed, showing that we cannot avoid admitting the existence of nonphysical properties. However, it is added that these nonphysical properties need not be irreducibly different from physical properties.
  3. The remainder of the paper is concerned, first, to defend the proposition that a convention could be adopted for locating mental events in the brain and, then, to describe conditions under which the identity theory is empirically refuted.


COMMENT:



"Smart (J.C.C.) - Brain Processes and Incorrigibility"

Source: Borst - The Mind-Brain Identity Theory



"Smart (J.C.C.) - Further Remarks on Sensations and Brain Processes"

Source: Borst - The Mind-Brain Identity Theory

COMMENT: A follow-up to "Smart (J.C.C.) - Sensations and Brain Processes".



"Smart (J.C.C.) - Materialism"

Source: Borst - The Mind-Brain Identity Theory



"Smart (J.C.C.) - Sensations and Brain Processes"

Source: Rosenthal - The Nature of Mind

COMMENT:



"Sosa (Ernest) - Professor Malcolm on 'Scientific Materialism and the Identity Theory'"

Source: Borst - The Mind-Brain Identity Theory



"Stevenson (J.T.) - 'Sensations and Brain Processes': A Reply to J.J.C. Smart"

Source: Borst - The Mind-Brain Identity Theory

COMMENT: A reply to "Smart (J.C.C.) - Sensations and Brain Processes".



"Taylor (Charles) - Mind-Body Identity, a Side Issue?"

Source: Borst - The Mind-Brain Identity Theory



Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2017
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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