Phenomenal Consciousness
Carruthers (Peter)
This Page provides (where held) the Abstract of the above Book and those of all the Papers contained in it.
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CUP Abstract

How can phenomenal consciousness exist as an integral part of a physical universe? How can the technicolour phenomenology of our inner lives be created out of the complex neural activities of our brains? Many have despaired of finding answers to these questions; and many have claimed that human consciousness is inherently mysterious. Peter Carruthers argues, on the contrary, that the subjective feel of our experience is fully explicable in naturalistic (scientifically acceptable) terms. Drawing on a variety of interdisciplinary resources, he develops and defends a novel account in terms of higher-order thought. He shows that this can explain away some of the more extravagant claims made about phenomenal consciousness, while substantively explaining the key subjectivity of our experience. Written with characteristic clarity and directness, and surveying a wide range of extant theories, this book is essential reading for all those within philosophy and psychology interested in the problem of consciousness.

  1. Develops a novel solution to a problem that is now of central concern to many in the cognitive sciences
  2. Surveys all the main arguments and theories in the area
  3. Clearly and accessibly written

Book Comment
  • CUP, Cambridge, first paperback edition, 2003. See Link (Defunct) for a symposium on this book.
  • See Link



"Byrne (Alex) - Review of 'Phenomenal Consciousness', by Peter Carruthers"

Source: Mind, Vol. 110, No. 440 (Oct., 2001), pp. 1057-1062

Paper Comment

For the full text, follow this link (Local website only): PDF File1.



"Carruthers (Peter) - Phenomenal Consciousness: Preface"

Source: Carruthers - Phenomenal Consciousness



"Carruthers (Peter) - Precis of 'Phenomenal Consciousness', by Peter Carruthers"

Source: Website

Paper Comment



"Carruthers (Peter) - Assumptions, distinctions, and a map"

Source: Carruthers - Phenomenal Consciousness


Sections
  1. Physicalism and naturalism
  2. Functionalism and theory-theory
  3. Some distinctions: kinds of consciousness
  4. A route map: the tree of consciousness



"Carruthers (Peter) - Perspectival, subjective, and worldly facts"

Source: Carruthers - Phenomenal Consciousness


Sections
  1. Perspectival and ‘myness’ facts
  2. On facts and properties
  3. Necessary identities
  4. Logical supervenience1



"Carruthers (Peter) - Explanatory gaps and qualia"

Source: Carruthers - Phenomenal Consciousness


Sections
  1. Cognitive closure
  2. The explanatory gap
  3. The knowledge argument
  4. Inverted and absent qualia arguments



"Carruthers (Peter) - First-order representationalism"

Source: Carruthers - Phenomenal Consciousness


Sections
  1. FOR theory: elucidation
  2. FOR theory: defence
  3. Non-conceptual content versus analog content
  4. More varieties of FOR theory



"Carruthers (Peter) - Naturalisation and narrow content"

Source: Carruthers - Phenomenal Consciousness


Sections
  1. Neural identities and consciousness boxes
  2. Naturalisation by content
  3. Wide versus narrow content
  4. Phenomenal consciousness and narrow content



"Carruthers (Peter) - Against first-order representationalism"

Source: Carruthers - Phenomenal Consciousness


Sections
  1. Non-conscious experience: the case from common sense
  2. Non-conscious experience: the scientific case
  3. A trilemma for FOR theory
  4. Non-conscious phenomenality?



"Carruthers (Peter) - Higher-order representationalism: a first defence"

Source: Carruthers - Phenomenal Consciousness


Sections
  1. Overview and preliminaries
  2. HOR theory and qualia irrealism
  3. Of animals, infants, and the autistic
  4. Moral consequences?



"Carruthers (Peter) - Dispositionalist higher-order thought theory (1): function"

Source: Carruthers - Phenomenal Consciousness


Sections
  1. Higher-order experience (HOE) theory
  2. Actualist HOT theory
  3. Dispositionalist HOT theory
  4. Dispositional theory and categorical experience



"Carruthers (Peter) - Dispositionalist higher-order thought theory (2): feel"

Source: Carruthers - Phenomenal Consciousness


Sections
  1. HOE theory and feel
  2. Actualist HOT theory and feel
  3. Consumer semantics and feel
  4. Elucidations and replies

Paper Comment

See Link.



"Carruthers (Peter) - Phenomenal consciousness and language"

Source: Carruthers - Phenomenal Consciousness


Sections
  1. Reflexive thinking theory and language
  2. Higher-order description (HOD) theory
  3. The Joycean machine
  4. The independence of structured HOTs from language



"Carruthers (Peter) - Fragmentary consciousness and the Cartesian theatre"

Source: Carruthers - Phenomenal Consciousness


Sections
  1. Multiple drafts versus integrated contents
  2. Fragmenting the Cartesian theatre
  3. Time as represented versus time of representing
  4. Objective versus subjective time



"Carruthers (Peter) - Phenomenal Consciousness: Conclusion"

Source: Carruthers - Phenomenal Consciousness



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  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2025
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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