The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory
Chalmers (David)
This Page provides (where held) the Abstract of the above Book and those of all the Papers contained in it.
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BOOK ABSTRACT:

Contents

    Introduction: Taking Consciousness Seriously
  1. FOUNDATIONS
    1. Two Concepts of Mind
      → What is consciousness?
      → The phenomenal and the psychological concepts of mind
      → The double life of mental terms
      → The two mind-body problems
      → Two concepts of consciousness
    2. Supervenience1 and Explanation
      → Supervenience2
      → Reductive explanation
      → Logical supervenience3 and reductive explanation
      → Conceptual truth and necessary truth
      → Almost everything is logically supervenient on the physical
  2. THE IRREDUCIBILITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS
    1. Can Consciousness be Reductively Explained?
      → Is consciousness logically supervenient on the physical?
      → The failure of reductive explanation
      → Cognitive modeling
      → Neurophysiological explanation
      → The appeal to new physics
      → Evolutionary explanations
      → Whither reductive explanation?
    2. Naturalistic Dualism
      → An argument against materialism
      → Objection from a posteriori necessity
      → Other arguments for dualism
      → Is this epiphenomenalism?
      → The logical geography of the issues
      → Reflections on naturalistic dualism
    3. The Paradox of Phenomenal Judgment
      → Consciousness and cognition
      → The paradox of phenomenal judgment
      → On explaining phenomenal judgments
      → Arguments against explanatory irrelevance
      → The argument from self-knowledge
      → The argument from memory
      → The argument from reference
  3. TOWARD A THEORY OF CONSCIOUSNESS
    1. On the Coherence between Consciousness and Cognition
      → Toward a nonreductive theory
      → Principles of coherence
      → More on the notion of awareness
      → The explanatory role of coherence principles
      → Coherence as a psychophysical law
    2. Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia
      → The principle of organizational invariance
      → Absent qualia
      → Fading qualia
      → Inverted qualia
      → Dancing qualia
      → Nonreductive functionalism
    3. Consciousness and Information: Some Speculation
      → Toward a fundamental theory
      → Aspects of information
      → Some supporting arguments
      → Is experience ubiquitous?
      → The metaphysics of information
      → Open question
  4. APPLICATIONS
    1. Strong Artificial Intelligence4
      → Machine consciousness
      → On implementing a computation
      → In defense of strong AI
      → The Chinese room and other objections
      → External objections
      → Conclusion
    2. The Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics5
      → Two mysteries
      → The framework of quantum mechanics6
      → Interpreting quantum mechanics7
      → The Everett interpretation
      → Objections to the Everett interpretation
    3. Conclusion
BOOK COMMENT:

Oxford University Press, 1996. See Chalmers - The Conscious Mind: In search of a fundamental theory for Chalmers' page on the book.


"Alward (Peter) - Is Phenomenal Pain the Primary Intension of 'Pain'?"

Source: Metaphysica 5.1 (2004), pp. 15-28


Author’s Abstract
    David Chalmers, in his recent book The Conscious Mind1, defends a conceivability argument for property dualism. In order to avoid the difficulties for such arguments posed by a posteriori necessities, he invokes a two-dimensional modal2 framework. But in order to do this, he needs to make substantial assumptions linking thought and talk with elements of the framework. In particular, he needs to assume that phenomenal qualities serve as the primary intensions of our sensation terms. In this paper, I argue that this assumption cannot be sustained.


COMMENT: Review of "Chalmers (David) - The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory".



In-Page Footnotes ("Alward (Peter) - Is Phenomenal Pain the Primary Intension of 'Pain'?")

Footnote 1: "Chalmers (David) - The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory".


"Chalmers (David) - The Conscious Mind Reviews"

Source: Website


Author’s Abstract
    I get to choose the excerpts, so take all this with a grain of salt (though I've tried to be reasonably balanced). Reviews are arranged chronologically (until I stopped updating this page, in 1998). I've also included a few non-review articles focusing on the book. I give some very brief replies here; I have a separate page for more detailed responses to some articles on my work.


COMMENT: Reviews of "Chalmers (David) - The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory". Link.


"Levine (Joseph) - Review of David Chalmers's 'The Conscious Mind'"

Source: Mind - 107/428 (October 1998)
COMMENT: Review of "Chalmers (David) - The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory".


"Chalmers (David) - Taking Consciousness Seriously"

Source: Chalmers - The Conscious Mind, 1996, Introduction


Author’s Abstract
  1. This book was published with Oxford University Press in April 1996. It started life as my Ph. D. dissertation at Indiana University (1993), and was revised into a book by adding some new chapters, tightening up the arguments, and making it more accessible. A paperback edition has just been published.
  2. The book is an extended study of the problem of consciousness. After setting up the problem, I argue that reductive explanation of consciousness is impossible (alas!), and that if one takes consciousness seriously, one has to go beyond a strict materialist framework. In the second half of the book, I move toward a positive theory of consciousness with fundamental laws linking the physical and the experiential in a systematic way. Finally, I use the ideas and arguments developed earlier to defend a form of strong artificial intelligence1 and to analyze some problems in the foundations of quantum mechanics2.


"Chalmers (David) - Two Concepts of Mind"

Source: Chalmers - The Conscious Mind, 1996, Chapter 1


Sections
  1. What is consciousness?
  2. The phenomenal and the psychological concepts of mind
  3. The double life of mental terms
  4. The two mind-body problems
  5. Two concepts of consciousness


"Chalmers (David) - Supervenience and Explanation"

Source: Chalmers - The Conscious Mind, 1996, Chapter 2


Sections
  1. Supervenience1
  2. Reductive explanation
  3. Logical supervenience2 and reductive explanation
  4. Conceptual truth and necessary truth
  5. Almost everything is logically supervenient on the physical


"Chalmers (David) - Can Consciousness be Reductively Explained?"

Source: Chalmers - The Conscious Mind, 1996, Chapter 3


Sections
  1. Is consciousness logically supervenient on the physical?
  2. The failure of reductive explanation
  3. Cognitive modeling
  4. Neurophysiological explanation
  5. The appeal to new physics
  6. Evolutionary explanations
  7. Whither reductive explanation?


"Chalmers (David) - Naturalistic Dualism"

Source: Chalmers - The Conscious Mind, 1996, Chapter 4


Sections
  1. An argument against materialism
  2. Objection from a posteriori necessity
  3. Other arguments for dualism
  4. Is this epiphenomenalism?
  5. The logical geography of the issues
  6. Reflections on naturalistic dualism


"Chalmers (David) - The Paradox of Phenomenal Judgment"

Source: Chalmers - The Conscious Mind, 1996, Chapter 5


Sections
  1. Consciousness and cognition
  2. The paradox of phenomenal judgment
  3. On explaining phenomenal judgments
  4. Arguments against explanatory irrelevance
  5. The argument from self-knowledge
  6. The argument from memory
  7. The argument from reference


"Chalmers (David) - The Coherence between Consciousness and Cognition"

Source: Chalmers - The Conscious Mind, 1996, Chapter 6


Sections
  1. Toward a nonreductive theory
  2. Principles of coherence
  3. More on the notion of awareness
  4. The explanatory role of coherence principles
  5. Coherence as a psychophysical law


"Chalmers (David) - Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia"

Source: Chalmers - The Conscious Mind, 1996, Chapter 7


Philosophers Index Abstract
    I argue for a principle of organizational invariance: systems with the same fine-grained functional organization have the same sort of conscious experience. I argue that absent qualia and inverted qualia are (naturally or nomologically) impossible, using thought-experiments1 involving replacement of neurons by silicon2 chips. If absent qualia are possible, a phenomenon I call "fading qualia" is possible; if inverted qualia are possible, a phenomenon I call "dancing qualia" is possible; but it is very implausible that fading qualia or dancing qualia are possible. So it is very implausible that absent or inverted qualia possible. This leads to a nonreductive functionalism, according to which experience is determined by (but not necessarily constituted by) functional organization.
Sections
  1. The principle of organizational invariance
  2. Absent qualia
  3. Fading qualia
  4. Inverted qualia
  5. Dancing qualia
  6. Nonreductive functionalism


"Chalmers (David) - Consciousness and Information: Some Speculation"

Source: Chalmers - The Conscious Mind, 1996, Chapter 8


Sections
  1. Toward a fundamental theory
  2. Aspects of information
  3. Some supporting arguments
  4. Is experience ubiquitous?
  5. The metaphysics of information
  6. Open question


"Chalmers (David) - Strong Artificial Intelligence"

Source: Chalmers - The Conscious Mind, 1996, Chapter 9


Sections
  1. Machine consciousness
  2. On implementing a computation
  3. In defense of strong AI
  4. The Chinese room and other objections
  5. External objections
  6. Conclusion


"Chalmers (David) - The Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics"

Source: Chalmers - The Conscious Mind, 1996, Chapter 10


Sections
  1. Two mysteries
  2. The framework of quantum mechanics1
  3. Interpreting quantum mechanics2
  4. The Everett interpretation
  5. Objections to the Everett interpretation
  6. Conclusion


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