Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective
Davidson (Donald)
This Page provides (where held) the Abstract of the above Book and those of all the Papers contained in it.
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Back Cover Blurb

  1. Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective is the long-awaited third volume of philosophical writings by Donald Davidson, whose influence on philosophy since the 1960s has been deep and broad. His first two collections, published by OUP in the early 1980s, are recognized as contemporary classics.
  2. Now Davidson presents a selection of his work on knowledge, mind, and language from the 1980s and the 1990s. We all have knowledge of our own minds, knowledge of the contents of other minds, and knowledge of the shared environment. Davidson examines the nature and status of each of these three sorts of knowledge, and the connections and differences among them. Along the way he has illuminating things to say about truth, human rationality, and the relations among language, thought, and the world.
  3. This new volume offers a rich and rewarding feast for anyone interested in philosophy today, and is essential reading for anyone working on its central topics.
Book Comment
  • Clarendon Press; New Edition (27 Sept. 2001)
  • Volume III of Davidson's Collected Works


"Davidson (Donald) - Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective: Introduction"

Source: Davidson - Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective


Philosopher’s Index Abstract
  1. This is the third volume of Donald Davidson's philosophical writings.
  2. In this selection of his work from the 1980s and the 90s, Davidson critically examines three types of propositional knowledge:-
    • knowledge of one's own mind,
    • knowledge of other people's minds, and
    • knowledge of the external world
    by working out the nature and status of each type, and the connections and differences among them.
  3. While his main concern remains the relation between language, thought, and reality, Davidson's discussions touch a vast variety of issues in analytic metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophy of mind, including those of truth, human rationality, and facets of the realism-antirealism debate.

Paper Comment

Contains abstracts of the chapters.


"Davidson (Donald) - First Person Authority"

Source: Davidson - Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Chapter 1


Philosophers Index Abstract
    What explains the presumption that a speaker is right when he sincerely attributes a belief, desire, or intention to his present self, while there is no such presumption when others make similar attributions to him? it is argued that 'solutions' to the problem of knowledge of other minds which merely restate the asymmetry leave the open field to the skeptic. A new explanation of first person authority is offered which traces the source of the authority to a necessary feature of the interpretation of speech. Attempts to explain the assumption that a speaker's sincere self-attribution of propositional attitudes is justified, while such justification is lacking if the attribution is done by somebody else. By tracing the source of first-person authority, the justification of such self-attribution, to a necessary feature of language, Davidson offers both an original solution to the authority-problem and an escape from sceptical solutions to the problem of other minds.

Paper Comment

Part I: Subjective


"Davidson (Donald) - Knowing One's Own Mind"

Source: Davidson - Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Chapter 2


Philosophers Index Abstract
    A number of philosophers have argued that if the contents of thoughts are in part determined by social or other factors external, and perhaps unknown, to the thinker, then the intuition that we know what we think, special cases aside, must be false. This is a mistake; externalism neither shows that meanings ain't in the head' nor that we do not know what we think. The argument to this conclusion depends on the view that thinking does not require inner objects before the mind. Is an attempt to resolve the following apparent difficulty: given that the contents of our minds are in part determined by external factors of which we are ignorant, how is it possible for us to know these contents without the need to appeal to evidence? Davidson resolves this difficulty by, among other things, giving up the idea of 'objects before the mind', for the attributes of such objects cannot be hidden from the agent.

Paper Comment


"Davidson (Donald) - The Myth of the Subjective"

Source: Davidson - Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Chapter 3


Philosopher’s Index Abstract
  1. This chapter is a direct attack on the idea of a subjective-objective dichotomy resulting in a fundamental distinction between uninterpreted experience and an organizing structure of concepts.
  2. Consequently, Davidson attacks the foundation of all metaphysical and epistemological dualisms and the philosophical stances based upon them.
  3. He attempts to make a case for their replacement by a view that combines the denial of objects before the mind with the claim that empirical knowledge does not and need not have an epistemological foundation.

Paper Comment

Part I: Subjective


"Davidson (Donald) - What Is Present to the Mind?"

Source: Davidson - Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Chapter 4


Philosopher’s Index Abstract
  1. This chapter is a further attempt to exorcise the traditional belief that in experiencing objects, there must be objects present to the mind.
  2. Davidson further illuminates and restates the arguments in the two preceding1 papers and offers more illuminating examples to make his case.
  3. He concludes that in experiencing objects, there are no objects before the experiencer's mind, for the attributes of such objects could not be hidden from the agent.

Paper Comment



In-Page Footnotes ("Davidson (Donald) - What Is Present to the Mind?")

Footnote 1: Ie. In


"Davidson (Donald) - Indeterminism and Antirealism"

Source: Davidson - Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Chapter 5


Philosopher’s Index Abstract
  1. Gives an insight into the richness of Davidson's contributions to the realism-anti-realism debate, here with regards to the factuality of propositional-attitude talk.
  2. Davidson argues that anti-realism is best understood in epistemological terms, as a stance that commits ontologically in the light of what can be known.
  3. He concludes that, generally, one should not have anti-realist attitudes as understood here towards propositional attitudes and, in particular, argues that one does not have to give up belief in first-person authority, even if one accepts Quine's indeterminacy thesis.

Paper Comment

Part I: Subjective


"Davidson (Donald) - The Irreducibility of the Concept of the Self"

Source: Davidson - Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Chapter 6


Philosopher’s Index Abstract
  1. Having attacked a number of features that some views have regarded as constitutive of the concept of 'the self', Davidson now discusses those features that he thinks should replace the traditional ones.
  2. He especially emphasizes the special authority that our propositional attitudes are equipped with and the irreducible role of indexical sentences.
  3. In Davidson's opinion, the thoughts expressed by indexical sentences relate us to the world around us and thereby form a constitutive component of our concept of the self.

Paper Comment

Part I: Subjective


"Davidson (Donald) - Rational Animals"

Source: Davidson - Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Chapter 7


Philosophers Index Abstract
    There remains the difference, with respect to rationality, between the infant and the snail on one hand, and the normal adult person on the other; this difference is discussed here. The difference consists, it is argued, in the having of propositional attitudes such as belief, desire, intention and shame. This raises the question how to tell when a creature has propositional attitudes; snails, we may agree, do not, but how about dogs or chimpanzees? the question is not empirical; the question is what sort of empirical evidence is relevant to deciding when a creature has propositional attitudes. It is next contended that language is a necessary concomitant of any of the propositional attitudes. This idea is not new but there seem to be few arguments in its favor in the literature; one is attempted here. (Edited)
Second Abstract
    This chapter is an attempt to specify some of the constitutive components of human rationality. Drawing on conclusions previously defended (mainly in his essay 'Thought and Talk'), Davidson argues for the mutual dependence of thought and language. Given the characteristically holistic framework of the discussion, Davidson regards this conclusion as being established by antecedent empirical knowledge rather than by considerations that secure a necessary footing.

Paper Comment

Part II: Intersubjective


"Davidson (Donald) - The Second Person"

Source: Davidson - Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Chapter 8


Philosophers Index Abstract
    It is argued that to have thoughts, and so to mean anything in speaking, it is necessary to understand, and be understood by, a second person. If Wittgenstein held that language is necessarily social, then the central thesis of this paper is Wittgensteinian. But it is denied that communication requires that one person speak as others do. Rather, the objectivity which thought and language demand depends on the mutual and simultaneous responses of two or more creatures to common distal stimuli and to one another's responses. The author argues that language is necessarily a social phenomenon. The argument draws heavily on considerations advanced in favour of the thesis that meaning something requires understanding, and being understood by, a second person. Davidson denies that it is necessary for successful communication between X and Y that X speaks as Y; in substitution of this requirement, Davidson proposes a three-way speaker-speaker-world relation he labels 'triangulation', which is not constituted by syntax but by common stimuli and responses.

Paper Comment

Part II: Intersubjective


"Davidson (Donald) - The Emergence of Thought"

Source: Davidson - Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Chapter 9


Author’s Abstract
  1. A phenomenon "emerges" when a concept is instantiated for the first time: hence, emergence is relative to a set of concepts. Propositional thought and language emerge together. It is proposed that the degree of complexity of an object language relative to a given metalanguage can be gauged by the number of ways it can be translated into that metalanguage: in analogy with other forms of measurement, the more ways the object language can be translated into the metalanguage, the less powerful the conceptual resources of the object language.
  2. This chapter1 is concerned with the cognitive development of the pre-conceptual mental life of an infant through to the psychologically fully equipped mind of a child or adult. Davidson argues that known natural languages do not possess the linguistic potential to describe this development, mainly because our current vocabularies are impotent for the task at hand. Furthermore, Davidson argues, it is not clear what would satisfy the felt need for such a vocabulary.

Paper Comment

For the full text, follow this link (Local website only): PDF File2.



In-Page Footnotes ("Davidson (Donald) - The Emergence of Thought")

Footnote 1: This Abstract is taken from "Davidson (Donald) - Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective: Introduction".


"Davidson (Donald) - A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge"

Source: Davidson - Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Chapter 10


Philosophers Index Abstract
  1. It is argued that all that counts as evidence or justification for a belief must come from the same totality of belief from which the belief comes.
  2. Therefore we must reject the idea that our knowledge of the world requires epistemic intermediaries like sense data, sensations, or sensory stimulations.
  3. A correct account of what gives our simplest empirical beliefs their content also shows why there is a presumption that such beliefs are true.


Abstract1
  1. In this chapter, a set of replies to Richard Rorty's then-pragmatist criticisms, Davidson defends a coherence theory of truth that is not incompatible but in fact yields a correspondence theory.
  2. He argues that the common ground for the theories are considerations of meaning and the objective truth-conditions that state when meanings are given.
  3. Coherence, then, is supposed to be a test for both truth and the judgement that objective truth-conditions are justified, yielding what Davidson calls a 'non-confrontational' correspondence and a realist stance in all departments involved.

Paper Comment



In-Page Footnotes ("Davidson (Donald) - A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge")

Footnote 1: I don’t know where this came from.


"Davidson (Donald) - A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge: Afterthoughts"

Source: Davidson - Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Chapter 10 (Appendix)

Paper Comment

Part III: Objective


"Davidson (Donald) - Empirical Content"

Source: Davidson - Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Chapter 11


Philosophers Index Abstract
    The dispute between Schlick and Neurath over the foundations of empirical knowledge illustrates the difficulties in trying to draw epistemological conclusions from a verificationist theory of meaning. It also shows how assuming the general correctness of science does not automatically avoid, or provide an easy answer to, skepticism. But while neither Schlick nor Neurath arrived at a satisfactory account of empirical knowledge, there are promising hints of a better theory in their writings. These hints, augmented by further ideas in Hempel, Carnap and particularly Quine, suggest the direction a naturalistic epistemology should take. Explores Schlick's and Neurath's dispute over the foundations of empirical knowledge, and thereby equips 'A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge' with commentary and historical background. Davidson works out the difficulties involved in drawing epistemological conclusions from a verificationist theory of meaning and argues that there are promising hints of a better theory, akin to Davidson's coherence theory of truth and knowledge, in the logical positivists' writings.

Paper Comment

Part III: Objective


"Davidson (Donald) - Epistemology and Truth"

Source: Davidson - Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Chapter 12


Author’s Abstract
  1. (This chapter) discusses the relation of epistemology to truth.
  2. Two positions are often seen as opposed:
    • that truth is “radically non-epistemic” (in Putnam’s words) or that
    • truth is to be understood in terms of what it is possible (in practice, in theory, or ideally) for us to know.
  3. Neither of these alternatives, it is argued, is acceptable. Truth cannot be limited to what we can or could determine to be true; nevertheless, there are firm reasons to connect truth with true belief in one way or another.
  4. A way of partially reconciling the two positions, based on the ideas explored in Essay 101, is outlined.

Paper Comment

Part III: Objective



In-Page Footnotes ("Davidson (Donald) - Epistemology and Truth")

Footnote 1: Ie. "Davidson (Donald) - A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge".


"Davidson (Donald) - Epistemology Externalized"

Source: Davidson - Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Chapter 13


Philosophers Index Abstract
    Starting with Descartes, epistemology has been almost entirely based on first person knowledge. We must begin, according to the usual story, with what is most certain: knowledge of our own sensations and thoughts. In one way or another we then progress, if we can, to knowledge of an objective external world. There is then the final, tenuous, step to knowledge of other minds. In this paper I argue for a total revision of this picture. All propositional thought, whether positive or skeptical, whether of the inner or of the outer, requires possession of the concept of objective truth, and this concept is accessible only to those creatures in communication with others. Third person knowledge--knowledge of other minds--is thus conceptually basic. But such knowledge is impossible without knowledge of a shared world or object in a shared time and space. Thus the acquisition of knowledge is not based on a progression from the subjective to the objective; it emerges holistically, and is interpersonal from the start. As the title of the paper suggests, chapter 12 discusses the relation between epistemology and truth. Davidson criticizes two main (and apparently opposing) positions according to which truth is, respectively, radically non-epistemic or to be spelled out in modal1 epistemological terms. Instead, Davidson suggests a partial reconciliation of the two positions by arguing that truth has to be in one way or other connected to true belief.

Paper Comment

Part III: Objective


"Davidson (Donald) - Three Varieties of Knowledge"

Source: Davidson - Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Chapter 14


Philosophers Index Abstract
    This paper explores the relations among three kinds of empirical knowledge: knowledge of our own minds, knowledge of other minds, and knowledge of the world. It is argued that these three varieties of knowledge are interdependent; none would be possible without the other two. It follows that there can be no question of epistemic priority and no possibility of reducing one sort of knowledge to one or more of the others. It also follows that we are never in a position to question the existence of other minds or an external world. This chapter could function as an introduction to the current collection of Davidson's papers, in that it deals with the three types of knowledge the book is concerned with, namely knowledge of our own minds, knowledge of other minds, and knowledge of an external reality. Davidson's main aim is to sketch the project of examining the nature and status of each type of knowledge and the connections between them, and he hints at the answers he is about to give.

Paper Comment

Part III: Objective


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