<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Personal Identity and Self-consciousness (Garrett (Brian)) - Theo Todman's Book Collection (Book-Paper Abstracts)</title> <link href="../../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../../TT_ICO.png" /> </head> <a name="Top"></a> <BODY> <div id="header"> <HR><H1>Theo Todman's Book Collection (Book-Paper Abstracts)</H1></div> <hr><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950><tr><td colspan =3><A HREF = "../BookSummary_97.htm">Personal Identity and Self-consciousness</A></td></tr><tr><td colspan =3><A HREF = "../../../Authors/G/Author_Garrett (Brian).htm">Garrett (Brian)</a></td></tr><tr><td colspan =3>This Page provides (where held) the <b>Abstract</b> of the above <b>Book</b> and those of all the <b>Papers</b> contained in it.</td></tr><tr><td><A HREF="#ColourConventions">Text Colour-Conventions</a></td><td><A HREF = "../BookCitings_97.htm">Books / Papers Citing this Book</A></td><td><A HREF = "../BooksToNotes_97.htm">Notes Citing this Book</A></td></tr></tr></TABLE></CENTER><hr> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>BOOK ABSTRACT: </B><ul type="disc"><li>Routledge, London, 1998</li><li>The Preface caims that the book is intended to feed the Personal Identity mill of professional philosophers, but that it is also accessible to graduate students. </li><li>This is probably why I spent 60 on it.</li></ul><U>Publisher s Blurb</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>In Personal Identity and Self-Consciousness, Brian Garrett presents an original and comprehensive theory of persons: their nature, their values, and their self-consciousness. He begins by proposing a new theory of personal identity over time. Next, he defends the importance of personal identity against recent sceptical attack. Finally, Garrett explores the nature of self-consciousness by examining the elusive pronoun  I and the various grounds of our  I judgements.</li><li>Brian Garrett places recent discussions of personal identity in a broader context, and links issues in personal identity with other central issues in philosophy, notably the problem of self-consciousness and questions in ethics. Garrett manages to tackle a technical and complex discussion with jargon-free and elegant language.</li><li>This is the first book of its kind to bring together the many different issues that surround the discussion of personal identity. Brian Garrett makes an important and original contribution to the study of the philosophy of personal identity, the philosophy of mind, and to epistemology.</li><li>Brian Garrett is Lecturer in Philosophy at the Australian National University.</li><li><B>Paul F. Snowdon</B>: In eight, clear, careful and well-designed chapters Brian Garrett analyses the central issues involved in the problem of personal identity. I found the central chapters, in which Garrett brings & his clarity of thought and a mastery of general logic, particularly penetrating and helpful. Garrett has written an intelligent, thoughtful and thought-provoking book & which significantly moves the debate along, and which should be read by students and by all philosophers interested in personal identity. </li></ol> </FONT><U>Chapters</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">Preface<li>The problem and its place in philosophy <ul type="disc"><li>The problem of personal identity</li><li>What is a person?</li><li>What is it for the same person to persist through time? </li><li>The methodology of <a name="1"></a><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_32.htm">thought-experiments</A><SUP>1</SUP></li><li>Why is personal identity important? </li></ul></li><li><a name="2"></a><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm">Animalism</A><SUP>2</SUP> and reductionism<ul type="disc"><li><a name="3"></a><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm">Animalism</A><SUP>3</SUP></li><li>An argument for <a name="4"></a><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm">animalism</A><SUP>4</SUP></li><li>The <a name="5"></a><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm">animalist</A><SUP>5</SUP>'s argument rebuffed</li><li>Models of reductionism</li><li>Conclusion</li></ul></li><li>Criteria of personal identity <ul type="disc"><li>The range of criteria</li><li>The physical criterion</li><li>The psychological criterion </li><li>Conclusion</li></ul></li><li>Fission<ul type="disc"><li>The importance of Fission</li><li>Six responses to Fission</li><li>The best candidate theory of personal identity </li><li>Some comments on the best candidate theory </li><li>The lesson of Fission</li></ul></li><li>Identity and vagueness<ul type="disc"><li>The commitment to vagueness</li><li>Evans' proof</li><li>Evans' proof examined</li><li>Evans' proof and Kripke's proof</li><li>Conclusion</li></ul></li><li>Parfit and '<a name="6"></a><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_108.htm">what matters</A><SUP>6</SUP>'<ul type="disc"><li>Persons and value theory</li><li>A new value theory?</li><li>Self-concern and special concern</li><li>Four arguments for the new value theory</li><li>Conclusion</li></ul></li><li>Anscombe on  I <ul type="disc"><li>Introduction</li><li>The common-sense view of  I </li><li>Two arguments against the common-sense view</li><li>Anscombe's positive view</li><li>Supporting the referential view</li><li>Conclusion</li></ul></li><li>Wittgenstein on  I <ul type="disc"><li>Introduction</li><li>Wittgenstein and the  as subject use of  I </li><li>Running repairs to the  as subject /  as object distinction</li><li>The status of the  as subject use</li><li>Interpreting Wittgenstein on avowals: reference, knowledge and authority</li></ul>Conclusion</li></ol></FONT></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3740.htm">Garrett (Brian) - The Problem (of Personal Identity) and Its Place in Philosophy</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Garrett - Personal Identity and Self-consciousness, 1998, Chapter 1<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Sections</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"> <ol type="1"><li>The problem of personal identity</li><li>What is a person? <ul type="disc"><li>The Satisfaction Question</li><li>The Nature Question<BR>& The Immaterialist Answer<BR>& The Materialist Answer</li></ul></li><li>What is it for the same person to persist through time?</li><li>The methodology of <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_32.htm">thought-experiments</A><SUP>1</SUP><ul type="disc"><li><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_7/Notes_763.htm">Brain Transplant</A><SUP>2</SUP></li><li>Scattered Existence</li><li>Bionic Replacement</li><li>Teletransportation</li><li>Branch-line</li><li>Accident</li><li>Indeterminacy</li><li>Fission</li></ul></li><li>Why is personal identity important? </li></ol> </FONT></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3741.htm">Garrett (Brian) - Animalism and Reductionism</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Garrett - Personal Identity and Self-consciousness, 1998, Chapter 2<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Sections</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"> <ol type="1"><li><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm">Animalism</A><SUP>1</SUP></li><li>An argument for <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_24.htm">animalism</A><SUP>2</SUP></li><li>The <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_112.htm">animalist's argument rebuffed</A><SUP>3</SUP> <ul type="disc"><li>Wiggins Charge of <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_96.htm">Relative Identity</A><SUP>4</SUP></li></ul></li><li>Models of reductionism <ul type="disc"><li>The Eliminativist Model</li><li>The Scientific Identification Model</li><li>The Entailment Model<BR>&rarr; The Central Motivation<BR>&rarr; Two Questions</li><li>The Epistemic Model</li><li>The No-substance Model</li><li> Person is a <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_29.htm">Phased Sortal</A><SUP>5</SUP></li><li>Parfit s Reductionism</li></ul></li><li>Conclusion </li></ol> </FONT></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3742.htm">Garrett (Brian) - Criteria of Personal Identity</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Garrett - Personal Identity and Self-consciousness, 1998, Chapter 3<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Sections</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"> <ol type="1"><li> The Range of Criteria</li><li>The Physical Criterion <ul type="disc"><li>The Bodily Criterion</li><li>The <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_909.htm">Brain Criterion</A><SUP>1</SUP><BR>& One Motivation<BR>& The Implausibility of the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_909.htm">Brain Criterion</A><SUP>2</SUP><BR>& A Deeper Worry about the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_909.htm">Brain Criterion</A><SUP>3</SUP></li></ul></li><li>The Psychological Criterion<ul type="disc"><li>Two Objections to the Weak Version of the Psychological Criterion<BR>& Williams Objection<BR>& The Duplication Objection</li></ul></li><li>Conclusion<ul type="disc"><li>A Complication</li></ul> </li></ol> </FONT></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3743.htm">Garrett (Brian) - Fission</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Garrett - Personal Identity and Self-consciousness, 1998, Chapter 4<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Sections</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"> <ol type="1"><li>The Importance of Fission</li><li>Six Responses to Fission <ol type="i"><li>The case is not really possible, so we can say nothing about it and learn nothing from it.</li><li>I survive the operation, and am one or other of Lefty or Righty.</li><li>I survive fission as both Lefty and Righty.</li><li>The case of fission has been misdescribed. Lefty and Righty exist prior to fission, but only become spatially separated at fission. </li><li>When I divide into Lefty and Righty, I cease to exist. Lefty and Righty then come into existence, and are numerically distinct, though initially very similar persons.</li><li>It is vague or indeterminate whether I am Lefty and vague or indeterminate whether I am Righty. There is simply no fact of the matter as to who I am after fission. </ol></li><li>The Best Candidate Theory of Personal Identity </li><li>Some Comments on the Best Candidate Theory </li><li>The Lesson of Fission </li></ol> </FONT></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3744.htm">Garrett (Brian) - Identity and Vagueness</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Garrett - Personal Identity and Self-consciousness, 1998, Chapter 5<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Sections</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"> <ol type="1"><li>The Commitment to Vagueness<ul type="disc"><li>What Is Vagueness? </li></ul></li><li>Evans' Proof</li><li> Evans' Proof Examined <ul type="disc"><li> Evans' Proof<BR>& 3 Questions</li><li>Premise (2) and Vague Objects</li><li>Vague Identity and Vague Objects</li></ul></li><li>Evans' Proof and Kripke's Proof</li><li>Conclusion </li></ol> </FONT></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3745.htm">Garrett (Brian) - Parfit and 'What Matters'</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Garrett - Personal Identity and Self-consciousness, 1998, Chapter 6<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Sections</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"> <ol type="1"><li>Persons and Value Theory </li><li>A New Value Theory? <ul type="disc"><li>The Unimportance of Personal Identity over Time<BR>& Other Implications </li><li>The Unimportance of Personal Identity at a Time </li></ul></li><li>Self-concern and Special Concern </li><li>Four Arguments for the New Value Theory <ul type="disc"><li>The Argument from Analysis</li><li>The Radical Argument from Analysis</li><li>The Argument from Fission</li><li>The Argument from Reductionism </li></ul></li><li>Conclusion </li></ol> </FONT></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3746.htm">Garrett (Brian) - Anscombe on 'I'</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Garrett - Personal Identity and Self-consciousness, 1998, Chapter 7<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Sections</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"> <ol type="1"><li>Introduction</li><li>The Common-sense View of  I </li><li>Two arguments against the common-sense view <ul type="disc"><li>Anscombe s Challenge<BR>& Some Contrasts between  I and  A <BR>& Some Residual Worries</li><li>The Tank Argument </li></ul></li><li>Anscombe's positive view </li><li>The Common-sense View of  I </li><li>Supporting the Referential View </li><li>Conclusion </li></ol> </FONT></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3747.htm">Garrett (Brian) - Wittgenstein on 'I'</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Garrett - Personal Identity and Self-consciousness, 1998, Chapter 8<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Sections</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Introduction<ul type="disc"><li>Self-consciousness: Five claims <ol type="i"><li>There are two different uses of the pronoun  I .  The use as object and  the use as subject .</li><li>Given <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_110.htm">Wittgenstein</A><SUP>1</SUP> s examples, we are evidently meant to infer that  as subject uses feature only in mental self-ascriptions.</li><li>All and only  as object uses  involve the recognition of a particular person .</li><li>Only in such cases has  the possibility of an error been provided for , viz. the error of mistaking another person for myself. </li><li>It is a misreading of the  grammar of  as subject uses of  I which fuels the illusion of a Cartesian subject. <BR></ol></li><li>The tension between (ii) and (iii)</li><li>The tension between (ii) and (iv)</li></ul></li><li><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_110.htm">Wittgenstein</A><SUP>2</SUP> and the  as Subject use of  I </li><li> Running Repairs to the  as Subject /  as Object Distinction <ul type="disc"><li>A New Definition<BR>&rarr; A Possible Tension?</li></ul></li><li>The Status of the  as Subject Use<ul type="disc"><li>The  as Subject Use is more Basic than the  as Object Use</li><li>Self-consciousness and the  as Subject Use of  I </li></ul></li><li>Interpreting <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_110.htm">Wittgenstein</A><SUP>3</SUP> on Avowals<ul type="disc"><li>Reference</li><li>Knowledge </li><li>Authority</li></ul></li><li>Conclusion </li></ol> </FONT></P> <a name="ColourConventions"></a><hr><br><B><U>Text Colour Conventions</U> (see <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</B><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL> </center> <BR><HR><BR><center> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-02T02:20" pubdate>02/08/2018 02:20:37</time> <br><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A> </TD></TR><TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>