<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>The Roots of Reference (Quine (W.V.)) - Theo Todman's Book Collection (Book-Paper Abstracts)</title> <link href="../../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../../TT_ICO.png" /> </head> <a name="Top"></a> <BODY> <div id="header"> <HR><H1>Theo Todman's Book Collection (Book-Paper Abstracts)</H1></div> <hr><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950><tr><td colspan =2><A HREF = "../BookSummary_1023.htm">The Roots of Reference</A></td></tr><tr><td colspan =2><A HREF = "../../../Authors/Q/Author_Quine (W.V.).htm">Quine (W.V.)</a></td></tr><tr><td colspan =2>This Page provides (where held) the <b>Abstract</b> of the above <b>Book</b> and those of all the <b>Papers</b> contained in it.</td></tr><tr><td><A HREF="#ColourConventions">Text Colour-Conventions</a></td><td><A HREF = "../BookCitings_1023.htm">Books / Papers Citing this Book</A></td></tr></tr></TABLE></CENTER><hr> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>BOOK ABSTRACT: </B><BR><BR><u>Back Cover <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_B1023_1">Blurb</A></U><SUB>1</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_B1023_1"></A></u> <FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Our only channel of information about the world is the impact of external forces on our sensory surfaces. So says science itself. There is no clairvoyance. How, then, can we have parlayed this meagre sensory input into a full-blown scientific theory of the world? This is itself a scientific question. The pursuit of it, with free use of scientific theory, is what I call naturalized epistemology. <em>The Roots of Reference</em> falls within that domain. Its more specific concern, within that domain, is reference to concrete and abstract objects: what such reference consists in, and how we achieve it. </li><li>Part I is a statement of general psychological presumptions regarding perception and learning. The underlying notions of cause and disposition are examined in a philosophical spirit. In Part II those considerations are brought to bear more particularly on the learning of language. </li><li>Part II comes firmly to grips with the nature of reification and reference. The process is inseparable from language, and unequivocally identifiable only to the degree that the language resembles ours in certain structural respects. Stages of reification are sorted out, rudimentary to full-fledged. The full phase is heralded by the use of the relative clause with its relative pronoun and subsidiary pronouns. It is these pronouns that recur in logical notation as the bound variables of quantification. </li><li>Part III concludes with a conjectural sketch of the development of reification in the race and the individual. Especial attention is directed to the positing of abstract objects: properties, classes, numbers. It is traced in large part to the serendipity of fruitful confusions. Truth, after all, can issue from fallacious proofs; to condemn the outcome for its fallacious origin is simply to add the genetic fallacy to what had gone before. Let us count our blessings. </li></ol> </FONT> <BR><u>Contents</u> <FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">Preface  ix <BR>Introduction  xi <BR><b>I. PERCEIVING AND LEARNING</b>  1<li>Reception and perception  1</li><li>Cause  4</li><li>Disposition  8</li><li>Some questions and answers on dispositions  12</li><li>Similarity  16</li><li>Interference from within  20</li><li>Traces and salience  24</li><li>Pleasure  27<BR><b>II. BREAKING INTO LANGUAGE</b>  33</li><li>Mentalism and language  33</li><li>Observation sentences  37</li><li>Ostensive learning  41</li><li>Assent  45</li><li>Values  49</li><li>Masses and bodies  52</li><li><a name="1"></a><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_77.htm">Individuation</A><SUP>2</SUP> of bodies  55</li><li>Observational compounds  59</li><li>Predication and the categorical  63</li><li>Serendipity  67</li><li>Color and shape  70</li><li>Truth functions  75</li><li>Analyticity  78<BR><b>III. REFERRING TO OBJECTS</b>  81</li><li>Narrowing the subject  81</li><li>General and singular  84</li><li>Relative clauses  89</li><li>Substitution and 'such that'  92</li><li>Quantifiers and variables  97</li><li>Quantifying over abstract objects  101</li><li>Set theory  105</li><li>Sour grapes  111</li><li>Identity and number  115</li><li>Higher types  120</li><li>Psychogenesis summed up  123</li><li>Past and future  127</li><li>Ontological sophistication  131</li><li>Ontological economy  134</li><li>Relative empiricism  137<BR>REFERENCES  143<BR>INDEX  147 </li></ol> </FONT><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U> (<a name="2"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1023.htm">Quine (W.V.) - The Roots of Reference</A>")</B><a name="On-Page_Link_B1023_1"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_B1023_1"><B>Footnote 1</B></A></U>: Quotation from Quine.<BR><BR></P> <a name="ColourConventions"></a><hr><br><B><U>Text Colour Conventions</U> (see <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</B><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL> </center> <BR><HR><BR><center> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-02T02:46" pubdate>02/08/2018 02:46:38</time> <br><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A> </TD></TR><TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>