Mind - 107/425 (January 1998)
Sainsbury (Mark), Ed.
This Page provides (where held) the Abstract of the above Book and those of all the Papers contained in it.
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BOOK ABSTRACT: None.



"Bealer (George) - Propositions"

Source: Mind - 107/425 (January 1998)


Philosophers Index Abstract
    Recent work in philosophy of language has raised significant problems for the traditional theory of propositions, engendering serious skepticism about its general workability. The problems fall into two groups. The first has to do with reductionism, specifically, attempts to reduce propositions to extensional entities--ordered sets, sequences, extensional functions, etc. The second group concerns problems of fine-grained content--both traditional puzzles (e.g., 'Cicero'/'Tully' puzzles) and a cluster of new puzzles associated with scientific essentialism. After characterizing the problems, a nonreductionist approach--the algebraic approach--which avoids the problems associated with reductionism is outlined. The paper then describes how, by incorporating a distinction between descriptive and singular predication, the theory may use non-Platonic modes of presentation (e.g., socially constructed modes) to yield the sort of fine-grained distinctions needed to solve the puzzles of fine-grained content.



"Blackburn (Simon) - Realism and Truth: Wittgenstein, Wright, Rorty and Minimalism"

Source: Mind - 107/425 (January 1998)


Philosophers Index Abstract
    In this paper I consider Crispin Wright's 'Truth and Objectivity' and the response to it made by Richard Rorty. While I generally sympathize with Wright, I also argue that expressivist options, which he dismisses in favor of a sorted truth-predicate, are not so easily sidelined. The paper also suggests that Wright finds it incredible that Wittgenstein should have been an expressivist in the light of his minimalist attitude to truth. I argue that Wright is here overinfluenced by Paul Boghossian's treatment of the issue of nonfactualism.



"Donaho (Stephen) - Are Declarative Sentences Representational"

Source: Mind - 107/425 (January 1998)



"Goetz (Stewart) - Reasons for Forming an Intention: A Reply to Pink"

Source: Mind - 107/425 (January 1998)



"Ludwig (Kirk) - Review of George Rey's 'Contemporary Philosophy of Mind'"

Source: Mind - 107/425 (January 1998)



"Makin (Stephen) - Review of Graham Oppy's 'Ontological Arguments and Belief in God'"

Source: Mind - 107/425 (January 1998)



"McCullogh (Gregory) - Review of Galen Strawson's 'Mental Reality'"

Source: Mind - 107/425 (January 1998)



"Mele (Alfred) - Review of Thomas Pink's 'The Psychology of Freedom'"

Source: Mind - 107/425 (January 1998)



"Merricks (Trenton) - Against the Doctrine of Microphysical Supervenience"

Source: Mind - 107/425 (January 1998)


Philosophers Index Abstract
  1. The doctrine of Microphysical Supervenience1 (MS) states that: Necessarily, if atoms A1 through An compose an object that exemplifies intrinsic qualitative properties Q1, through Qn, then atoms like A1 through An (in all their respective intrinsic qualitative properties), related to one another by all the same restricted atom-to-atom relations as A1 through An, compose an object that exemplifies Q1 through Qn.
  2. I show that MS entails a contradiction and so must be rejected. And my argument against MS provides the resources to show that Global Microphysical Supervenience2 (GMS) is false. GMS states that possible worlds qualitatively exactly alike at the microphysical level are qualitatively exactly alike at the macrophysical level.


COMMENT:



"Pietroski (Paul) - Actions, Adjuncts, and Agency"

Source: Mind - 107/425 (January 1998)


Philosophers Index Abstract
    The event analysis of action sentences seems to be at odds with plausible (Davidsonian) views about how to count actions. If Booth pulled a certain trigger, and thereby shot Lincoln, there is good reason for identifying Booth's action of pulling the trigger with his action of shooting Lincoln; but given truth conditions of certain sentences involving adjuncts, the event analysis requires that the pulling and the shooting be distinct events. So I propose that event sortals1 like "shooting" and "pulling" are true of complex events that have actions (and various effects of actions) as parts. Combining this view with some facts about so-called causative verbs, I then argue that paradigmatic actions are best viewed as tryings, where tryings are taken to be intentionally characterized events that typically cause peripheral bodily motions. The proposal turns on a certain conception of what it is to be the Agent of an event; and I conclude by elaborating this conception in the context of some recent discussions about the relation of thematic roles to grammatical categories.



"Pink (Thomas) - Reply to Goetz (on Reasons for Forming an Intention)"

Source: Mind - 107/425 (January 1998)



"Retallick (Gary) - Review of Smith & Oaklander's 'Change and Freedom: Introduction to Metaphysics'"

Source: Mind - 107/425 (January 1998)



"Ripley (Mat) - Review of Steven Savitt's 'Time's Arrow Today'"

Source: Mind - 107/425 (January 1998)



"Saka (Paul) - Quotation and the Use-Mention Distinction"

Source: Mind - 107/425 (January 1998)



"Sorensen (Roy) - Yablo's Paradox and Kindred Infinite Liars"

Source: Mind - 107/425 (January 1998)


Philosophers Index Abstract
    This is a defense and extension of Stephen Yablo's claim that self-reference is completely inessential to the liar paradox. An infinite sequence of sentences of the form "None of these subsequent sentences are true" generates the same instability in assigning truth values. I argue Yablo's technique of substituting infinity for self-reference applies to all so-called "self-referential" paradoxes. A representative sample is provided which includes counterparts of the preface paradox, pseudo-Scotus's validity paradox, the Knower, and other enigmas of the genre. I rebut objections that Yablo's paradox is not a genuine liar by constructing a sequence of liars that blend into Yablo's paradox. I rebut objections that Yablo's liar has hidden self-reference with a distinction between attributive and referential self-reference and appeals to Gregory Chaitin's algorithmic information theory. The paper concludes with comments on the mystique of self-reference.



"Tieszen (Richard) - Godel's Philosophical Remarks on Logic and Mathematics (Review of Kurt Godel's 'Collected Works')"

Source: Mind - 107/425 (January 1998)


Philosophers Index Abstract
    In this critical notice of Volumes I, II and III of Kurt Godel: Collected Works I describe and discuss the development of Godel's philosophical views on logic and mathematics. Special attention is paid to the previously unpublished philosophical papers in Volume III and to the question of whether there are systematic relationships between the views expressed in different papers.



"Wright (Crispin) - Comrades Against Quietism: Reply to Simon Blackburn on Truth and Objectivity"

Source: Mind - 107/425 (January 1998)



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