Mind - 107/428 (October 1998)
Sainsbury (Mark), Ed.
This Page provides (where held) the Abstract of the above Book and those of all the Papers contained in it.
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BOOK ABSTRACT: None.



"Frances (Bryan) - Defending Millian Theories"

Source: Mind - 107/428 (October 1998)


Philosophers Index Abstract
    In this article I offer a three-pronged defense of Millian theories, all of which share the rough idea that all there is to a proper name is its referent. I first give what I believe to be the first correct analysis of Kripke's puzzle and its anti-Fregean lessons. The main lesson is that the Fregean's arguments against Millianism and for the existence of semantically relevant senses are viciously circular. Second, I offer original, positive arguments for the Millian idea that the thoughts that Cicero was bald and that Tully was bald are identical. Third, I examine one of the most important recent papers on Kripke's puzzle, that by David Sosa (1996). (edited)



"Gendler (Tamar Szabo) - Continence on the Cheap"

Source: Mind - 107/428 (October 1998)


Philosophers Index Abstract
    A tongue-in-cheek response to a tongue-in-cheek "advertisement" of Roy Sorensen's which purports to show that incontinence can be "cured" by the placing of side-bets.



"Gratton-Guiness (I.) - Structural Similarity or Structuralism? Comments on Priest's Analysis of the Paradoxes of Self-Reference"

Source: Mind - 107/428 (October 1998)


Philosophers Index Abstract
    Graham Priest (1994) argued (1) that all the paradoxes of set theory and logic fall under one schema; and (2) hence, they should be solved by one kind of solution. This reply addresses both claims, and counters that (1) in fact at least one paradox escapes the schema, and also some apparently "safe" theorems fall within it; and (2) even for the (considerable) range of paradoxes so captured by the schema, the assumption of a common solution is not obvious; each paradox surely depends upon the theory and context in which it arises. Details of Priest's proposed solution are also sought.



"Hawley (Katherine) - Merricks on Whether Being Conscious is Intrinsic"

Source: Mind, 107, Number 428, October 1998, pp. 841-843


Philosophers Index Abstract
  1. The paper is a response to "Merricks (Trenton) - Against the Doctrine of Microphysical Supervenience", Mind, 107, 1998, pp. 59-71.
  2. Merricks denies that the existence and intrinsic properties of things supervene1 upon the intrinsic properties of their microphysical parts and relations between those parts. He claims that the property being conscious is an intrinsic property of people although it does not supervene2 upon the microphysical basis.
  3. I argue, in response, that being conscious is not an intrinsic property of people. Something intrinsically exactly like me as I am now, but attached to an extra toe, would not3 be conscious.
  4. So Merricks has not discovered a counterexample to the doctrine of Microphysical Supervenience4.


COMMENT:




In-Page Footnotes ("Hawley (Katherine) - Merricks on Whether Being Conscious is Intrinsic")

Footnote 3:



"Levine (Joseph) - Review of David Chalmers's 'The Conscious Mind'"

Source: Mind - 107/428 (October 1998)

COMMENT: Review of "Chalmers (David) - The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory".



"Matthews (Robert) - Review of Jenifer Hornsby's 'Simple Mindedness'"

Source: Mind - 107/428 (October 1998)



"Merricks (Trenton) - On Whether Being Conscious is Intrinsic"

Source: Mind, 107, Number 428, October 1998, pp. 845-846


Philosophers Index Abstract
  1. This short paper is a response to "Hawley (Katherine) - Merricks on Whether Being Conscious is Intrinsic", Mind 107 (1998: 841-843).
  2. Hawley's paper is itself a response to my "Merricks (Trenton) - Against the Doctrine of Microphysical Supervenience" Mind 107 (1998): 59-71.


COMMENT: Annotated printout in "Various - Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 11 (M2: Me+)".



"Noordhof (Paul) - Review of D.H. Mellor's 'The Facts of Causation'"

Source: Mind - 107/428 (October 1998)



"Oppy (Graham) - Review of Dale Jacquette's 'Meinongian Logic: The Semantics of Existence and Nonexistence'"

Source: Mind - 107/428 (October 1998)



"Peacocke (Christopher) - The Principle-Based Conception of Modality: Sullivan's Question Addressed"

Source: Mind - 107/428 (October 1998)



"Priest (Graham) - The Import of Inclosure: Some Comments on Gratton-Guiness"

Source: Mind - 107/428 (October 1998)



"Robertson (Teresa) - Possibilities and the Arguments for Origin Essentialism"

Source: Mind - 107/428 (October 1998)


Philosophers Index Abstract
    In this paper, I examine the case that has been made for origin essentialism and find it wanting. I focus on the arguments of Nathan Salmon and Graeme Forbes. Like most origin essentialists, Salmon and Forbes have been concerned to respect the intuition that slight variation in the origin of an artifact or organism is possible. But, I argue, both of their arguments fail to respect this intuition. Salmon's argument depends on a sufficiency principle for cross-world identity, which should be rejected, if--as Salmon concedes--a given artifact might have been originally made from slightly different material. Similarly, Forbes's argument succeeds only if essentially the same argument can be used to establish a claim that--by his own admission--is too strong, namely that no variation, however slight, in an organism's origin is possible.


COMMENT: Kripke



"Shalkowski (Scott A.) - Review of Joshua Hoffman and Gary S. Rosenkrantz 'Substance: Its Nature and Existence'"

Source: Mind - 107/428 (October 1998)

COMMENT: Review of "Hoffman (Joshua) & Rosenkrantz (Gary) - Substance: Its Nature and Existence".



"Shapiro (Stewart) - A Procedural Solution to the Unexpected Hanging and the Sorites Paradoxes"

Source: Mind - 107/428 (October 1998)


Philosophers Index Abstract
  1. The paradox of the Unexpected Hanging, related prediction paradoxes, and the sorites1 paradoxes involve reasoning about ordered collections of entities. Each entity is assigned a value that depends on the previously assigned value of one of the neighboring entities.
  2. The final result is paradoxical because it conflicts with the obviously correct, commonsensical value. The paradox is due to the serial procedure of assigning a value based on the newly assigned value of the neighbor.
  3. An alternative procedure is to assign each value based only on the original values of neighbors - a parallel procedure. That procedure does not give paradoxical answers.



"Waller (David) - The Chicken and Her Egg"

Source: Mind - 107/428 (October 1998)


Philosophers Index Abstract
    Previous attempts to solve the chicken-egg riddle have approached it from the point of view of evolutionary taxonomy, neglecting the question of how an egg is produced in the first place. An egg is the product of the reproductive system of the female and an expression of her genes alone; only a chicken can lay a chicken egg. Thus, the chicken came first.



"Weir (Alan) - Naïve Set Theory is Innocent!"

Source: Mind - 107/428 (October 1998)



"Wenar (Leif) - Original Acquistition of Private Property"

Source: Mind - 107/428 (October 1998)



"Wheeler (Michael) - Review of Donald Gillies's 'Artificial Intelligence and Scientific Method'"

Source: Mind - 107/428 (October 1998)



Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2019
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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