Mind - 114/455 (July 2005)
Martin (Michael G.F.), Ed.
This Page provides (where held) the Abstract of the above Book and those of all the Papers contained in it.
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"Caplan (Ben) - Why So Tense About the Copula?"

Source: Mind, 114, Number 455, July 2005, pp. 703-708(6)


Philosophers Index Abstract
    Propositionalists attempt to solve the problem of temporary intrinsics1 by saying that what it is for a persisting object to have an intrinsic property at a time is for a certain proposition to be true at that time. In "Tensing the Copula," David Lewis argues that this view fails. I argue that Lewis's argument fails.


"Clark (Andy) - Review of Kim Sterelny's 'Thought in a Hostile World: The Evolution of Human Cognition'"

Source: Mind, 114, Number 455, July 2005, pp. 718-722(5)


"Clark (Stephen) - Review of Michael Ruse's 'Can a Darwinian Be a Christian? The Relationship Between Science and Religion'"

Source: Mind - 114/455 (July 2005)


"Dummett (Michael) - The Justificationist's Response to a Realist"

Source: Mind, 114, Number 455, July 2005, pp. 671-688(18)


Philosophers Index Abstract
    Justificationism differs from realism about how linguistic meaning is given, and hence in its associated conception of truth, and in particular in rejecting bivalence. Empirical discourse differs from mathematical primarily in that an effective decision-procedure for an empirical statement may cease to be available at a later time. The contrast is not that empirical knowledge is derived from what is mind-dependent, namely perception, whereas mathematical knowledge is not so derived. Mathematical knowledge does not accrue simply because a proof exists: the proof has to be understood and recognized to be valid. Most ordinary mathematical proofs are indirect: they supply an effective means, in principle, to construct a direct or canonical proof. An indirect justification for asserting an empirical statement does not, in general, supply a means for bringing into existence a direct justification; it merely provides a ground for supposing that a direct justification would be or have been available for someone suitably placed to make the necessary observations. But it is by what constitutes direct evidence for a statement that its meaning is given; a grasp of its meaning does not rest on an ability to survey all conceivable indirect evidence. A direct justification of an empirical statement of the kind capable of being used as a report of observation must be an actual or possible observation by a suitably placed observer. A possible observation need not be explained by means of a counterfactual: it may be taken as consisting of the appropriate physical stimuli. This way of understanding it evades all three of the untenable choices Peacocke offers the justificationist. Unlike mathematical ones, empirical statements are often justifiably asserted on probabilistic grounds. When the statement admits of a conclusive justification, probabilistic evidence will not figure as a direct justification for asserting it, and hence as determining its meaning, so no circularity is involved, as Peacocke charges. There may, however, be empirical statements that can neither be reports of observation nor admit of a conclusive justification. Such statements can be asserted only on inductive or abductive grounds; this goes to characterize their meanings. Their meanings must therefore be explained by specifying such grounds as the most direct justifications of them that can be given, although they are difeasible rather than conclusive. Peacocke appears to deny that there can be statements that transcend all possible verification. To vindicate such a view from a realist standpoint is surely very difficult: it requires a demonstration that we could not grasp what it would be for such a statement to be true. It is very obscure what a realist's conception of truth is. The principle of bivalence remains a strong mark of differentiation between a justificationist and a realist conception of truth; a clear argument why the principle should be accepted would greatly help to clarify how the realist conceives of truth. I enjoyed reading Peacocke's article, but remain as perplexed as I was before just how he does conceive of truth.


"Hannan (Barbara) - Review of Ted Honderich's 'On Consciousness'"

Source: Mind - 114/455 (July 2005)


"Hausman (Daniel M.) - Review of John Broome's 'Weighing Lives'"

Source: Mind - 114/455 (July 2005)

Paper Comment

See John Broome.


"Hellie (Benj) - Noise and Perceptual Indiscriminability"

Source: Mind, 114, Number 455, July 2005, pp. 481-508(28)


Philosophers Index Abstract
    Perception represents colours inexactly. This inexactness results from phenomenally manifest noise, and results in apparent violations of the transitivity of perceptual indiscriminability. Whether these violations are genuine depends on what is meant by 'transitivity of perceptual indiscriminability'.


"Hull (Gerald) - Vagueness and 'Vague': A Reply to Varzi"

Source: Mind, 114, Number 455, July 2005, pp. 689-693(5)


Author’s Abstract
  1. Varzi (2003) has recently joined a thread of arguments originating in an attempt by Sorensen (1985) to demonstrate that the predicate ‘vague’ is itself vague.
  2. Sorensen's conclusion is significant in that it has provided the basis for a subsequent effort by Hyde (1994) to defend the legitimacy of supposing higher-order vagueness.
  3. Varzi's contribution to this debate is twofold.
    1. First, contra earlier criticism by Deas (1989), he claims that Sorensen's result is sound so far as it goes.
    2. Second, he argues that despite this it cannot be used as Hyde wishes on pain of circularity.
  4. I am not interested in the latter argument — it is examined in Hyde (2003) — but rather wish to defend and elaborate Deas's criticism of Sorensen against Varzi's repudiation.

Paper Comment

For the full text, follow this link (Local website only): PDF File1.


"Kolodny (Niko) - Why Be Rational?"

Source: Mind, 114, Number 455, July 2005, pp. 509-563(55)


Philosophers Index Abstract
  1. I argue; there are no reasons to comply with rational requirements in general.
    1. First, this would lead to 'bootstrapping', because, contrary to the claims of ABroome (John)A+, not all rational requirements have 'wide scope'.
    2. Second, it is unclear what such reasons to be rational might be.
    3. Finally, we typically do not, and in many cases could not, treat rational requirements as reasons.
  2. Instead, I suggest, rationality is only apparently normative, and the normativity that it appears to have is that of reasons. According to this 'transparency account', rational requirements govern our responses to our beliefs about reasons. The normative 'pressure' that we feel, when rational requirements apply to us, derives from these beliefs; from the reasons that, as it seems to us, we have.

Author’s Abstract
  1. Normativity involves two kinds of relation.
    • On the one hand, there is the relation of being a reason for. This is a relation between a fact and an attitude.
    • On the other hand, there are relations specified by requirements of rationality. These are relations among a person's attitudes, viewed in abstraction from the reasons for them.
  2. I ask how the normativity of rationality — the sense in which we ‘ought’ to comply with requirements of rationality — is related to the normativity of reasons — the sense in which we ‘ought’ to have the attitudes what we have conclusive reason to have.
  3. The normativity of rationality is not straightforwardly that of reasons, I argue; there are no reasons to comply with rational requirements in general.
    1. First, this would lead to ‘bootstrapping’, because, contrary to the claims of John Broome, not all rational requirements have ‘wide scope’.
    2. Second, it is unclear what such reasons to be rational might be.
    3. Finally, we typically do not, and in many cases could not, treat rational requirements as reasons.
  4. Instead, I suggest, rationality is only apparently normative, and the normativity that it appears to have is that of reasons. According to this ‘Transparency Account’, rational requirements govern our responses to our beliefs about reasons. The normative ‘pressure’ that we feel, when rational requirements apply to us, derives from these beliefs: from the reasons that, as it seems to us, we have.


"MacBride (Fraser) - The Particular-Universal Distinction: A Dogma of Metaphysics?"

Source: Mind, 114, Number 455, July 2005, pp. 565-614(50)


Philosophers Index Abstract
    Is the assumption of a fundamental distinction between particulars and universals1 another unsupported dogma of metaphysics? F. P. Ramsey famously rejected the particular–universal distinction but neglected to consider the many different conceptions of the distinction that have been advanced. As a contribution to the (inevitably) piecemeal investigation of this issue three interrelated conceptions of the particular–universal distinction are examined: (i) universals2, by contrast to particulars, are unigrade; (ii) particulars are related to universals3 by an asymmetric tie of exemplification; (iii) universals4 are incomplete whereas particulars are complete. It is argued that these conceptions are wanting in several respects. Sometimes they fail to mark a significant division amongst entities. Sometimes they make substantial demands upon the shape of reality; once these demands are understood aright it is no longer obvious that the distinction merits our acceptance. The case is made via a discussion of the possibility of multigrade universals5.

Paper Comment

For the full text, follow this link (Local website only): PDF File6.


"Merricks (Trenton) - Composition and Vagueness"

Source: Mind, 114, Number 455, July 2005, pp. 615-637(23)


Philosophers Index Abstract
    ‘Restricted composition’ says that there are some composite objects. And it says that some objects jointly compose nothing at all. The main threat to restricted composition is the in.uential and widely defended Vagueness Argument. We shall see that the Vagueness Argument fails. In seeing how this argument fails, we shall discover a new focus for the debate over composition's extent.

Paper Comment

For the full text, follow this link (Local website only): PDF File1.


"Peacocke (Christopher) - Justification, Realism and the Past"

Source: Mind, 114, Number 455, July 2005, pp. 639-670(32)


Philosophers Index Abstract
    This paper begins by considering Dummett's justificationist treatment of statements about the past in his book Truth and the Past (2004). Contrary to Dummett's position, there is no way of applying the intuitionistic distinction in the arithmetical case between direct and indirect methods of establishing a content to the case of past-tense statements. Attempts to do so either give the wrong truth conditions, or rely on notions not available to a justificationist position. A better, realistic treatment makes ineliminable use of identity of state in its positive account of understanding of the past tense; this account can also be applied to other subject matters besides the past. A theory is developed of how realists should conceive of the relation between meaning and evidence. Points from this discussion are used in criticism of Wright's minimalist conception of truth. Three grades of possible involvement of truth and reference in a substantive theory of intentional content are distinguished, and reasons are given for thinking that a range of contents involve the highest degree of involvement of reference and truth in their substantive individuation1.


"Varzi (Achille) - Vagueness and 'Vague': Rejoinder to Hull"

Source: Mind, 114, Number 455, July 2005, pp. 695-702(8)


Author’s Abstract
  1. A rejoinder to G. Hull’s reply1 to my Mind 20032.
  2. Hull argues that Sorensen’s purported proof that ‘vague’ is vague – which I defended against certain familiar objections – fails. He offers three reasons:
    1. the vagueness exhibited by Sorensen’s sorites3 is just the vagueness of ‘small’;
    2. the general assumption underlying the proof, to the effect that predicates which possess borderline cases are vague, is mistaken;
    3. the conclusion of the proof is unacceptable, for it is possible to create Sorensen-type sorites4 even for predicates that are paradigmatically precise.
  3. I argue that each of these points involves fallacious reasoning.

Paper Comment

For the full text, follow this link (Local website only): PDF File5.



In-Page Footnotes ("Varzi (Achille) - Vagueness and 'Vague': Rejoinder to Hull")

Footnote 1: See "Hull (Gerald) - Vagueness and 'Vague': A Reply to Varzi".

Footnote 2: See "Varzi (Achille) - Higher-Order Vagueness and the Vagueness of 'Vague'".


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