Cassam (Quassim), Ed.
This Page provides (where held) the Abstract of the above Book and those of all the Papers contained in it.
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Amazon Book Description

  1. This volume brings together some of the most important and influential recent writings on knowledge of oneself and of one's own thoughts, sensations, and experiences.
  2. The essays give valuable insights into such fundamental philosophical issues as personal identity, the nature of consciousness, the relation between mind and body, and knowledge of other minds.
  3. Contributions include
  4. The only reader of its kind, Self-Knowledge fills a major gap in the history of philosophy and will be an accessible addition to a wide range of courses.

  • OUP Oxford (13 Jan 1994) - Oxford Readings in Philosophy
  • Note: I had thought that all the papers in this collection had been copied / downloaded, but:-
    → I couldn’t find anything by Cassam, nor
    → the Introduction by Ryle, nor
    → the unhighlighted papers by Shoemaker & Strawson (nor could I find these on-Line).

"Anscombe (G.E.M.) - The First Person"

Source: Rosenthal - The Nature of Mind


"Cassam (Quassim), Ed. - Self-Knowledge"

Source: Cassam - Self-Knowledge

"Castaneda (Hector-Neri) - On the Phenomeno-Logic of the I"

Source: Proceedings of the 14th International Congress of Philosophy, iii, 1969, pp. 260-6

COMMENT: Also in "Cassam (Quassim), Ed. - Self-Knowledge".

"Chisholm (Roderick) - On the Observability of the Self"

Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Sept 1969; 30: 7-21

COMMENT: Also in "Cassam (Quassim), Ed. - Self-Knowledge".

"Perry (John) - The Problem of the Essential Indexical"

Source: Martinich - The Philosophy of Language

Author’s Introduction
  1. I once followed a trail of sugar on a supermarket floor, pushing my cart down the aisle on one side of a tall counter and back the aisle on the other, seeking the shopper with the torn sack to tell him he was making a mess. With each trip around the counter, the trail became thicker. But I seemed unable to catch up. Finally it dawned on me. I was the shopper I was trying to catch.
  2. I believed at the outset that the shopper with a torn sack was making a mess. And I was right. But I didn't believe that I was making a mess. That seems to be something I came to believe. And when I came to believe that, I stopped following the trail around the counter, and rearranged the torn sack in my cart. My change in beliefs seems to explain my change in behavior. My aim in this paper is to make a key point about the characterization of this change, and of beliefs in general.
  3. At first characterizing the change seems easy. My beliefs changed, didn't they, in that I came to have a new one, namely, that I am making a mess? But things are not so simple.
  4. The reason they are not is the importance of the word "I" in my expression of what I came to believe. When we replace it with other designations of me, we no longer have an explanation of my behavior and so, it seems, no longer an attribution of the same belief. It seems to be an essential indexical. But without such a replacement, all we have to identify the belief is the sentence "I am making a mess". But that sentence by itself doesn't seem to identify the crucial belief, for if someone else had said it, they would have expressed a different belief, a false one.
  5. I argue that the essential indexical poses a problem for various otherwise plausible accounts of belief. I first argue that it is a problem for the view that belief is a relation between subjects and propositions conceived as bearers of truth and falsity. The problem is not solved merely by replacing or supplementing this with a notion of de re belief. Nor is it solved by moving to a notion of a proposition which, rather than true or false absolutely, is only true or false at an index or in a context (at a time, for a speaker, say). Its solution requires us to make a sharp distinction between objects of belief and belief states, and to realize that the connection between them is not so intimate as might have been supposed.


"Shoemaker (Sydney) - Introspection and the Self"

Source: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10, 1986, pp. 101-120

COMMENT: Also in "Cassam (Quassim), Ed. - Self-Knowledge".

"Davidson (Donald) - Knowing One's Own Mind"

Source: Davidson - Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Chapter 2

Philosophers Index Abstract
    A number of philosophers have argued that if the contents of thoughts are in part determined by social or other factors external, and perhaps unknown, to the thinker, then the intuition that we know what we think, special cases aside, must be false. This is a mistake; externalism neither shows that meanings ain't in the head' nor that we do not know what we think. The argument to this conclusion depends on the view that thinking does not require inner objects before the mind. Is an attempt to resolve the following apparent difficulty: given that the contents of our minds are in part determined by external factors of which we are ignorant, how is it possible for us to know these contents without the need to appeal to evidence? Davidson resolves this difficulty by, among other things, giving up the idea of 'objects before the mind', for the attributes of such objects cannot be hidden from the agent.


"Evans (Gareth) - Self-Identification"

Source: Evans - Evans - The Varieties of Reference, 1982, Chapter 7

  1. Introductory
  2. Immunity to error through misidentification
  3. Bodily self-ascription
  4. Mental self-ascription
  5. Memory
  6. The possibility of reference-failure
  7. Conclusions

COMMENT: Also in "Cassam (Quassim), Ed. - Self-Knowledge".

"Armstrong (David) - Introspection"

Source: Armstrong - A Materialist Theory of the Mind, Chapter 15

  1. Recapitulation – 323
  2. Introspection as inner sense: objections – 328
  3. Introspection and behaviour – 333
  4. Mental states and the mind – 336

COMMENT: Also in "Cassam (Quassim), Ed. - Self-Knowledge".

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