Identity, Personal Identity and the Self
Perry (John)
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BOOK ABSTRACT:

Synopsis

    This volume collects a number of Perry's classic works on personal identity as well as four new pieces, 'The Two Faces of Identity', 'Persons and Information', 'Self-Notions and The Self' and 'The Sense of Identity'. Perry's Introduction puts his own work and that of others on the issues of identity and personal identity in the context of philosophical studies of mind and language over the past thirty years.

BOOK COMMENT:

Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, June 1, 2002;



"Olson (Eric) - Review of Perry's 'Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self'"

Source: European Journal of Philosophy (To appear in …)


Author’s Introduction
  1. Anyone who has studied the topics listed in the title of this book will know the work of John Perry. The volume collects seven important papers from the 1970s and early 80s, along with four previously unpublished essays on similar themes and a substantial glossary. It is a welcome addition to an earlier collection of Perry’s work (Perry 20001).
  2. The first two essays, "Perry (John) - The Same F" and"Perry (John) - Relative Identity and Relative Number", defend the Fregean view that things are identical or distinct simpliciter against Geach’s view that identity is always relative to a sort: that this thing and that one might be the same F or different Gs, but it is meaningless to say they are one or two without qualification. The final two pieces, both new, concern the semantics of first-person judgments, pursuing the theme of Perry’s famous paper "Perry (John) - The Problem of the Essential Indexical". In between are a fascinating series of papers on the nature of identity over time in general and personal identity over time in particular. I will focus on these.
  3. Perry’s discussion of identity over time is based on the idea, derived from Carnap and Quine, that things identified at different times are identical just when the momentary ‘stages’ of those objects by which we identify them at those times stand in the appropriate unity relation ("Perry (John) - Can the Self Divide?" and "Perry (John) - Personal Identity, Memory, and the Problem of Circularity"; see also "Perry (John) - The Problem of Personal Identity"). Suppose R is the unity relation for people: the relation things stand in just when they are stages of the same person. Then a person we identify at an earlier time is the same person as someone we identify at a later time if and only if the person-stage identified at the earlier time bears R to the person-stage identified at the later time. To ask under what circumstances people identified at different times are the same person is therefore to ask under what circumstances person-stages occurring at different times stand in R. Given all this, an account of what personal identity over time consists in will be an analysis of relation R.


COMMENT:




In-Page Footnotes ("Olson (Eric) - Review of Perry's 'Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self'")

Footnote 1:
The Problem of the Essential Indexical and Other Essays. University of Chicago Press.




"Perry (John) - Identity, Personal Identity and the Self: Introduction"

Source: Perry - Identity, Personal Identity and the Self, 2002



"Perry (John) - The Same F"

Source: Perry - Identity, Personal Identity and the Self, 2002, Chapter 1


Sections
  1. Geach versus Frege
  2. A Counterexample?
  3. Must We Ever Choose Identity?
  4. In Defense of Identity
  5. Same Clay, Different Statue1
  6. Conclusion


COMMENT: Philosophical Review 79, No. 2, Apr., 1970, pp. 181-200



"Perry (John) - Relative Identity and Relative Number"

Source: Perry - Identity, Personal Identity and the Self, 2002, Chapter 2


Sections
  1. Introduction
  2. What is Relative Identity1?
  3. Frege on Criteria of Identity
  4. Frege on Number
  5. A Tension in Frege’s Account?
  6. A Troublesome Passage?
  7. Conclusion


COMMENT: Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 7.1, 1978, 1-14



"Perry (John) - Can the Self Divide?"

Source: Perry - Identity, Personal Identity and the Self, 2002, Chapter 3


Sections
  1. A Problem for the Mentalist?
  2. Idea for a Solution
  3. The Branch Language
  4. Another Strategy
  5. The Person-Stage Language
  6. The Lifetime Language
  7. Conclusion


COMMENT:



"Perry (John) - The Two Faces of Identity"

Source: Perry - Identity, Personal Identity and the Self, 2002, Chapter 4


Sections
  1. How Can Identity Conditions Be a Problem?
  2. The Logical Properties of Identity
  3. Is Identity Identity?
  4. The Circle of Predication and Individuation1
  5. Explaining Identity Conditions
  6. The Circle of Reference and Individuation2
  7. Explaining Identity Conditions
  8. Partial Understanding of Identity
  9. A Regress of Individuation3?
  10. Entity without Identity?
  11. Return to Dividing Selves



"Perry (John) - Personal Identity, Memory, and the Problem of Circularity"

Source: Perry - Identity, Personal Identity and the Self, 2002, Chapter 5


Sections
  1. Grice’s Theory
  2. Circles and Logical Constructions
  3. Three Charges of Circularity
  4. Memory
  5. Logical Constructions and Inferred Entities


COMMENT: Also in "Perry (John), Ed. - Personal Identity"



"Perry (John) - Williams on The Self and the Future"

Source: Perry - Identity, Personal Identity and the Self, 2002, Chapter 6


Sections
  1. Putative Examples of Body Transfer
  2. The Reduplication Argument1
  3. The Nonduplication Argument


COMMENT:



"Perry (John) - Personal Identity and the Concept of a Person"

Source: Perry - Identity, Personal Identity and the Self, 2002, Chapter 7


Sections
  1. Personal Identity from Locke to Shoemaker
  2. Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity
  3. Dividing Selves and Multiplying Minds
  4. Persons and Their Pasts
  5. The Self and the Future
  6. Survival without Identity


COMMENT: Orig. 1983, since revised



"Perry (John) - Information, Action, and Persons"

Source: Perry - Identity, Personal Identity and the Self, 2002, Chapter 9


Sections
  1. Introduction
  2. How Can Circumstantial Attitudes Explain?
  3. Meshing
  4. The Reflexive / Circumstantial Structure of Information
  5. The Reflexive / Circumstantial Structure of Action
  6. Harnessing Information
  7. Indirect Classification and Attunement
  8. Information, Action, and Intentionality
  9. Pains, Pleasures, and Original Intentionality
  10. Conclusions


COMMENT: Orig. 1983, since revised



"Perry (John) - The Self, Self-Knowledge, and Self-Notions"

Source: Perry - Identity, Personal Identity and the Self, 2002, Chapter 10


Sections
  1. “Self” and the Self
  2. Self-Knowledge
  3. Beliefs
  4. Self-Ideas and Self-Notions
  5. Epistemic / Pragmatic Relations and R-Notions
  6. Self-Notions as R-Notions
  7. What’s Special about the Self
  8. Back to Mach
  9. Self-Knowledge Problems Revisited


COMMENT: Orig. 1983, since revised



"Perry (John) - The Sense of Identity"

Source: Perry - Identity, Personal Identity and the Self, 2002, Chapter 11


Sections
  1. The Philosophical Self
  2. The Objective Self
  3. Nagel’s Problem
  4. Against the Objective Self
  5. The Subject of the Impersonal Conception
  6. Information Games


COMMENT: Orig. 1983, since revised



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