| The Human Person: Animal and Spirit | ||||
| Braine (David) | ||||
| This Page provides (where held) the Abstract of the above Book and those of all the Papers contained in it. | ||||
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Cover Blurb
ContentsPreface – xvii
Prologue: What It Is For The Human Being To Be An Animal And For This Animal To Be A Spirit
Introduction – 345
Index Of Names – 553
Book Comment
Duckworth, London, 1993. From a Catholic perspective; Gifford Fellow at University of Aberdeen; acknowledges help of Alvin Plantinga
"Braine (David) - The Human Person: Preface"
Source: Braine (David) - The Human Person: Animal and Spirit, 1993, Preface
"Braine (David) - The Human Person: Prologue - What It Is for the Human Being to be an Animal and for this Animal to be a Spirit"
Source: Braine (David) - The Human Person: Animal and Spirit, 1993, Prologue
Sections
"Braine (David) - The Human Being as an Animal: The Nature of Psychophysical Unity: Overview - The Sameness of Materialism and Dualism and the Need for a Holistic View Opposed to Both"
Source: Braine (David) - The Human Person: Animal and Spirit, 1993, Chapter 1
Sections
… (a) The predicament of explaining knowledge of the external world, 42
… (b) How to get from knowledge of the external world to knowledge of other minds, 47
… (c) The problem of how words referring to the mental have meaning, 49
… (d) The problem of personal identity and knowledge by memory, 51
… (e) The causal theory of knowledge generalized, 55
Conclusion, 67
"Braine (David) - Perception (I): The Shape of a Holistic View"
Source: Braine (David) - The Human Person: Animal and Spirit, 1993, Chapter 2
Sections
… (a) Perception as in internal retrospective and prospective relation to behavioural disposition, 69
… (b) The depth and contours of our rejection of atomism in respect of perception, 72
… (c) The mistaken ‘cinematograph' model of perception, 75
… (d) The proper description of ‘what is seen as it is seen', 78
… (a) Mistakes arising from misconception of the ‘standard' case: the need for a ‘critical realist' account of perception, 82
… (b) The pre-requisites of ‘critical realism' as an account of perception, 86
"Braine (David) - Perception (II): Clarifying the Notion of Real Cognitive Relation and Assessing Contemporary Discussion"
Source: Braine (David) - The Human Person: Animal and Spirit, 1993, Chapter 3
Sections
… (a) State of the problem: the revival of a non-realist conception of perceptual experience despite standing objections, 94
… (b) The incoherence of the conception of experience as inner, 96
… (c) The sameness in the epistemological impasse, 100
… (a) The need for the notion of ‘intentional object', 107
… (b) Fallacious arguments drawing on the ambiguity of the term "object", 109
… (c) Rejecting any explanation of perception in terms of inner objects, and clarifying the contrast between perception and sensation, 114
… (d) Looking as parasitic on the intentionality of seeing, 116
… (e) The fundamental mistake in contemporary treatments of intentionality, 120
Note on the vocabulary of intentionality, 125
"Braine (David) - Action, Emotion, and Sensation"
Source: Braine (David) - The Human Person: Animal and Spirit, 1993, Chapter 4
Sections
… (a) The character of pain, 164
… (b) The emotions in general, 167
"Braine (David) - A Non-Dualist Account of the Meaning of Mind-Involving Statements"
Source: Braine (David) - The Human Person: Animal and Spirit, 1993, Chapter 5
Sections
… (a) Strawson's attempt at systematization, 172
… (b) The sharing of states of knowledge and belief: the character of testimony, 180
… (c) The treatment of memory and identity over time, 182
… (a) The quasi-autonomous or truly mental character
of mental states ascribed on the basis of
behaviour, 188
… (b) How we know mental states from behaviour: the presumption of normality and the stratification of criteria, 189
… (c) Incipient behaviourism: the mistake of identifying mental states with behavioural capacities or practical abilities, 192
"Braine (David) - The Primacy of the Agent Over the Event in Causation"
Source: Braine (David) - The Human Person: Animal and Spirit, 1993, Chapter 6
Sections
Note on the relation of adjectives and adverbs: counting and describing actions, 213
… (a) The significance of objecthood in logic, 215
… (b) The significance of identity statements about events, 216
… (c) Summary of the logical situation, 219
… (d) Rescuing the theory of explanation from the idea of events as objects, 220
"Braine (David) - No Presumption in Favour of Mechanism: the Possible Autonomy of Teleological Explanation"
Source: Braine (David) - The Human Person: Animal and Spirit, 1993, Chapter 7
Sections
… (a) The structure of teleological explanations and their possible empirical backing; two notions of dispositions and natures, 230
… (b) Teleology in the description of ends, and in the description of the conditions of the attainment of ends, 233
… (c) The shape of causal explanation: dispositions and natures are not causes but marks of distinction between different modes of causal agency, 235
"Braine (David) - The First Refutation of Mechanism: Psychophysical Unity at the Level of Explanation and Reality"
Source: Braine (David) - The Human Person: Animal and Spirit, 1993, Chapter 8
Sections
… (a) The limits to the role of convention in deciding questions of identity are set by considerations of explanation, 251
… (b) Note on the concept of substance, 256
… (a) The interdependence of wholes and parts: the Aristotelian conception of a natural whole or non-accidental unity introduced, 259
… (b) The aspectual character of scientific laws, 263
… (c) The status of human beings and other animals as substances, 265
… (a) The form and strengths of the ‘common-sense' position, 267
… (b) The coulter-claims made by physicalism, 270
… (c) The incoherence of compatibilism demonstrated, 273
… (d) The source of the beguiling plausibility of determinism and compatibilism, 280
Conclusion, 289
"Braine (David) - The Community of Human Beings with Other Animals: Five Aspects"
Source: Braine (David) - The Human Person: Animal and Spirit, 1993, Chapter 9
Sections
treatment of animal and human behaviour, 290
… (a) The character of our knowledge of other animals, 297
… (b) The character of psychophysical structures in animals other than human beings, 301
… (a) The way the perceiver is both over against and in the world: some contrasts with understanding, 320
… (b) The way the judger is in the world as a background for considering how he ‘stands above' the world: false models suggested by the consideration of seeing, 323
… (a) The question of the nature of mind-body unity, 326
… (b) The key position of the question of the character of perception, emotion and sensation, 330
… (c) The human body as a ‘body with organs': the importance of a material underpinning of animal function, 336
"Braine (David) - The Human Being as an Animal: Conclusion of Part I"
Source: Braine (David) - The Human Person: Animal and Spirit, 1993, Conclusion of Part I
"Braine (David) - Part II - The Human Being as Spirit: Human Transcendence Revealed in Language - Introduction"
Source: Braine (David) - The Human Person: Animal and Spirit, 1993, Part II Introduction
"Braine (David) - Language and the Understanding of Language"
Source: Braine (David) - The Human Person: Animal and Spirit, 1993, Chapter 10
Sections
… (a) The peculiarity of human language, 352
… (b) Why we pick on language as the differentiating feature of human beings: answers to objections, 355
… … (i) Objection that thinking can be in images, not words, 358
… … (ii) Objection that there are many unverbalizable forms of intellectual experience and activity, 360
… … (iii) Objection that it is the giving of reasons in deliberation which is the key differentiating feature of man, 364
"Braine (David) - The 'Objects' of the Mind In Speaking and Thinking"
Source: Braine (David) - The Human Person: Animal and Spirit, 1993, Chapter 11
Sections
… (a) Preliminary critique of representational theories of meaning and thinking, 401
… (b) Sentences, senses, and facts as ‘cognates', not objects, 405
… (c) Force internal to sense and to thought: no thought without attitude, 409
… (a) Words do not figure as images in thinking, 435
… (b) The unity of the thought, 440
… (c) The ‘allusiveness' or intentionality of thought, 445
"Braine (David) - The Second Refutation of Mechanism: Linguistic Understanding and Thinking Have No Bodily Organ"
Source: Braine (David) - The Human Person: Animal and Spirit, 1993, Chapter 12
Sections
… (a) Key to first proof: thinking in the medium of words is material in its expression, not in its operation, 455
… (b) Key to second proof: the ‘principles' of intellectual operation in speaking and thinking can have no material embodiment or realization, 458
… (c) Key to third proof: the understanding of langue and the understanding of parole can have no material or neural correlate or element internal to it, 461
… (d) Key to fourth proof: the structures of self-reflectivity internal to language, and implicit in every utterance, cannot be exercised through a material organ, 466
Note: The acceptability of speaking about thinking and understanding as ‘operations' or ‘states', 472
"Braine (David) - Animals and Human Souls: Two Non-Dualistic Conceptions"
Source: Braine (David) - The Human Person: Animal and Spirit, 1993, Chapter 13
Sections
… (a) The sense in which the body ‘does not obtrude' in operations of soul, 482
… (b) From ‘operations of soul' to ‘soul', 486
… (c) The non-Cartesian character of this conception of soul, 492
… (d) Conclusion, 495
… (a) Background of the question, 499
… (b) The objection that the identification of the phenomenological soul with the soul as form constitutes a category-mistake, 504
… (c) Response to this objection, 506
"Braine (David) - How Human Beings Transcend the Body: First Explanation - the Transcendence of the Human Soul"
Source: Braine (David) - The Human Person: Animal and Spirit, 1993, Chapter 14
Sections
… (a) The existence of non-bodily operations of soul as the basis for argument to its subsistence, 516
… (b) The idea of the human soul as the ‘least amongst intellectual substances', 519
… (c) Recovery of the phenomenological sense of the ‘doctrine' of soul: the soul as ‘laid bare' to whatever language lays it bare, 522
"Braine (David) - How Human Beings Transcend the Body: Second Explanation - the Transcendence of the Human Being As Such"
Source: Braine (David) - The Human Person: Animal and Spirit, 1993, Chapter 15
Sections
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