Rethinking Identity and Metaphysics: On the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy
Hill (Claire Ortiz)
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BOOK ABSTRACT:

Back Cover Blurb

  1. In this elegant book, Claire Ortiz Hill offers a sophisticated rethinking of the foundations of twentieth-century analytic philosophy.
  2. She carefully uncovers the flaws of the central analytic tenet that philosophical discourse is reducible to identities.
  3. Closely examining the writings of the analytic philosophers Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and Willard Quine, she shows that the extensionalistic treatment of identity initiated by Frege and followed by the others has served as a hidden constraint on subsequent work in the mainstream of analytic philosophy.
  4. The result has been a flawed treatment of a range of philosophical problems, including necessity, objecthood, meaning, the ontology of mathematics, and Russell's paradox.
  5. Hill shows that heroic attempts by philosophers to free philosophical discourse from "intensions" — meanings, concepts, attributes—must fail.
  6. Hill's conclusions have implications not only for logicians but also for all those inquiring into the "ultimate furniture of the universe."
  7. She illustrates her arguments with well-chosen examples from a variety of sources — astronomy, the Kennedy assassination, organ transplantation1 — and shows how lack of clarity in regard to the abstract issue of identity has consequences in such concrete areas as medical ethics and the abortion2 debate, and how clarity in this issue can bring a better understanding to other problems of analytic philosophy.
  8. Claire Ortiz Hill holds a doctorate in philosophy from the Sorbonne. An independent scholar, she was a church social worker in Washington, D.C., and has been a religious hermit with the Diocese of Paris for sixteen years.

BOOK COMMENT:

Yale University Press, 1997



"Hill (Claire Ortiz) - Unfettering Reasoning"

Source: Hill - Rethinking Identity and Metaphysics, 1997, Chapter 1



"Hill (Claire Ortiz) - The Equals Sign"

Source: Hill - Rethinking Identity and Metaphysics, 1997, Chapter 2



"Hill (Claire Ortiz) - Confusing Sign and Object in Identity Statements"

Source: Hill - Rethinking Identity and Metaphysics, 1997, Chapter 3


Sections
  1. Some Sources of the Trouble;
  2. Distinguishing the Name from the Named;
  3. The Principle of Substitutivity of Identicals and Failure of Substitutivity;
  4. Opacity and Quantification



"Hill (Claire Ortiz) - Confusing Names and Descriptions in Identity Statements"

Source: Hill - Rethinking Identity and Metaphysics, 1997, Chapter 4


Sections
  1. Frege on Identifying Names and Descriptions;
  2. Russell on Names, Descriptions, and Identity;
  3. Opacity and Descriptions



"Hill (Claire Ortiz) - Confusing Concepts and Objects in Identity Statements"

Source: Hill - Rethinking Identity and Metaphysics, 1997, Chapter 5


Sections
  1. Some Sources of the Trouble;
  2. The Logical Characteristics of Concepts According to Frege;
  3. Concepts and the Principle of the Substitutivity of Identicals;
  4. The Evolution of Frege's Views on the Differences Between Concepts and Objects



"Hill (Claire Ortiz) - Equating Equality and Identity"

Source: Hill - Rethinking Identity and Metaphysics, 1997, Chapter 6


Sections
  1. Some Differences Between Identity and Lesser Forms of Equivalence;
  2. Logical Abstraction, Classes, and Extensionality;
  3. Marcus on Distinguishing Between Identity and Weaker Forms of Equivalence



"Hill (Claire Ortiz) - Identity and Frege's Foundations of Arithmetic"

Source: Hill - Rethinking Identity and Metaphysics, 1997, Chapter 7


Sections
  1. Identity and Substitutivity in Frege's Theory of Arithmetic;
  2. The Problems Frege Addressed from the Beginning;
  3. On Frege's Way Out;
  4. Strong Extensionality;
  5. The Shaking of Frege's Foundations for Arithmetic



"Hill (Claire Ortiz) - Russell on the Origins of the Set-theoretical Paradoxes"

Source: Hill - Rethinking Identity and Metaphysics, 1997, Chapter 7


Sections
  1. Predicates and the Appearances of Contradiction;
  2. Putting Symbols to Wrong Uses;
  3. Concealed Ambiguity of Type;
  4. The Vicious Circle Fallacy;
  5. The Vicious Circle Principle and the Distinction of Logical Types;
  6. Classes Away



"Hill (Claire Ortiz) - Russell's Paradoxes and His Theory of Definite Descriptions"

Source: Hill - Rethinking Identity and Metaphysics, 1997, Chapter 9


Sections
  1. Incomplete Symbols;
  2. Having Classes and Deleting Them Too;
  3. The Ultimate Source of the Contradictions;
  4. The Axiom of Reducibility



"Hill (Claire Ortiz) - Propositional Attitudes"

Source: Hill - Rethinking Identity and Metaphysics, 1997, Chapter 10


Sections
  1. Frege Spots the Problem;
  2. Frege's Explanation;
  3. What the Tax Man's Computer Thinks;
  4. What the Body Thinks;
  5. In Propria Persona;
  6. A Concluding Grammatical Postscript



"Hill (Claire Ortiz) - Modalities"

Source: Hill - Rethinking Identity and Metaphysics, 1997, Chapter 11


Sections
  1. Quine's Complaint;
  2. Quine's Riddle about 9 and the Number of the Planets;
  3. Marcus Replies to Quine's Objections;
  4. Quine on Descriptions as "Seeming Names";
  5. Quantification and Metaphysics



"Hill (Claire Ortiz) - Rethinking Identity and Metaphysics: Conclusion"

Source: Hill - Rethinking Identity and Metaphysics, 1997, Conclusion



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  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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