Towards Non-Being
Priest (Stephen)
This Page provides (where held) the Abstract of the above Book and those of all the Papers contained in it.
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BOOK ABSTRACT:

Amazon Product Description1

  1. Towards Non-Being presents an account of the semantics of intentional language - verbs such as 'believes', 'fears', 'seeks', 'imagines'. Graham Priest's account tackles problems concerning intentional states which are often brushed under the carpet in discussions of intentionality, such as their failure to be closed under deducibility.
  2. Drawing on the work of the late Routley (Richard), it proceeds in terms of objects that may be either existent or non-existent, at worlds that may be either possible or impossible.
  3. Since Russell, non-existent objects have had a bad press in Western philosophy; Priest mounts a full-scale defence. In the process, he offers an account of both fictional and mathematical objects as non-existent.
  4. The book will be of central interest to anyone who is concerned with intentionality in the philosophy of mind or philosophy of language, the metaphysics of existence and identity, the philosophy or fiction, the philosophy of mathematics, or cognitive representation in AI.



In-Page Footnotes ("Priest (Stephen) - Towards Non-Being")

Footnote 1:
BOOK COMMENT:

Photocopy of complete book; Filed in "Various - Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 14 (P)".



"Priest (Stephen) - Towards Non-Being: Preface"

Source: Priest - Towards Non-Being, 2005, Preface

COMMENT: Photocopy of complete Book filed in "Various - Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 14 (P)".



"Priest (Stephen) - Intentional Operators"

Source: Priest - Towards Non-Being, 2005, Chapter 1


Author’s Abstract
    Chapter 1 provides a world-semantics for intentional propositional operators. Impossible worlds of various kinds are deployed to ensure that the operators behave in various important ways; notably they fail to be closed under entailment.
Contents
  1. Introduction; Intentionality;
  2. Operators and Predicates;
  3. World Semantics;
  4. Noneism: A First Appearance;
  5. Worlds, Possible and Impossible;
  6. Negation;
  7. Open Worlds;
  8. Conclusion;
  9. Technical Appendix


COMMENT: Photocopy of complete Book filed in "Various - Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 14 (P)".



"Priest (Stephen) - Identity"

Source: Priest - Towards Non-Being, 2005, Chapter 2


Author’s Abstract
    Chapter 2 provides the semantics for identity in the context of intentional operators. The key feature of the semantics is the failure of substitutivity of identicals in intentional contexts. This is used to provide a solution to the Hooded Man and similar paradoxes.
Contents
  1. Introduction: Identity and Intentionality;
  2. Adding Identity;
  3. Eubulides the Paradoxer;
  4. The Hooded Man Paradox;
  5. Descriptions and Rigid Designators;
  6. The Puzzle about Pierre;
  7. Frege and SI;
  8. SI and Open Worlds;
  9. Worlds and Identities;
  10. The De Re Argument;
  11. Conclusion;
  12. Technical Appendix


COMMENT: Photocopy of complete Book filed in "Various - Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 14 (P)".



"Priest (Stephen) - Objects of Thought"

Source: Priest - Towards Non-Being, 2005, Chapter 3


Author’s Abstract
    Chapter 3 provides a semantics for intentional predicates. The semantics proceeds in terms of objects which may or may not exist. An appendix discusses accounts of intentionality in Medieval Logic.
Contents
  1. Introduction: Intentional Predicates;
  2. Non-Existence;
  3. A Formal Semantics;
  4. Substitutivity of Identicals;
  5. Indeterminacy;
  6. Conclusion;
  7. Appendix: Medieval Accounts of Intentionality;
    … 3.7.1 Non-Existence;
    … 3.7.2 Ockham on Indeterminacy;
    … 3.7.3 Ockham on Substitutivity;
    … 3.7.4 Buridan on Indeterminacy and Substitutivity


COMMENT: Photocopy of complete Book filed in "Various - Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 14 (P)".



"Priest (Stephen) - Characterization and Descriptions"

Source: Priest - Towards Non-Being, 2005, Chapter 4


Author’s Abstract
    Chapter 4 provides a formulation of the Characterization Principle (that objects have the properties by which they are characterized), which is both completely general and does not suffer from the problems of standard formulations. A corresponding theory of descriptions is also given.
Contents
  1. Introduction: Sein and Sosein;
  2. The Characterization Principle;
  3. Further Comments;
  4. Identity;
  5. Indefinite Descriptions;
  6. Definite Descriptions and Speaker-Intention;
  7. Properties of Descriptions;
  8. Conclusion;
  9. Technical Appendix


COMMENT: Photocopy of complete Book filed in "Various - Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 14 (P)".



"Priest (Stephen) - On What There Isn't"

Source: Priest - Towards Non-Being, 2005, Chapter 5


Philosophers Index Abstract
    The major problem for a Meinongian theory of objects is to account for the properties that nonexistent objects have. In particular, objects cannot have all the properties that they are characterized as having, on pain of triviality. This paper suggests a solution to this problem. Nonexistent objects do have all those properties they are characterized as having, but not at this world: at the worlds that realize the way things are according to the representation of the cognitive agent who thinks about, or in other ways cognizes, the object. A formal model of this account is given, and some of its consequences explored.
Author’s Abstract
    Chapter 5 provides a discussion of Quine and Russell on non-existent objects. Their arguments aim to show that Meinong’s notion of such objects is incoherent. Quine’s well known argument about the fat man in the doorway is discussed and rejected.
Contents
  1. Introduction: Quine's Critique;
  2. Russell's Meinongianism;
  3. Russell's Critique of Meinong;
  4. On What There Is;
  5. The Possible Fat Man in the Doorway;
  6. Conclusion


COMMENT: Photocopy of complete Book filed in "Various - Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 14 (P)".



"Priest (Stephen) - Fiction"

Source: Priest - Towards Non-Being, 2005, Chapter 6


Author’s Abstract
    Chapter 6 provides a noneist account of fictional objects, and replies to some natural objections to the account.
Contents
  1. Introduction; Fictional Objects;
  2. Fictional Operators;
  3. Creating Objects;
  4. Some Objections;
  5. Conclusion;
  6. Appendix: Sylvan's Box


COMMENT: Photocopy of complete Book filed in "Various - Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 14 (P)".



"Priest (Stephen) - Mathematical Objects and Worlds"

Source: Priest - Towards Non-Being, 2005, Chapter 7


Author’s Abstract
    Chapter 7 provides a noneist account of mathematical and other abstract objects, and of worlds (possible and impossible). It then discusses a number of objections, such as that this is just a form of Platonism in disguise.
Contents
  1. Introduction: Kinds of Non-Existent Object;
  2. Abstract Objects;
  3. Worlds;
  4. Five Objections;
  5. Referring;
  6. Knowing;
  7. The a Priori;
  8. Applying Mathematics;
  9. Platonism;
  10. Conclusion


COMMENT: Photocopy of complete Book filed in "Various - Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 14 (P)".



"Priest (Stephen) - Multiple Denotation"

Source: Priest - Towards Non-Being, 2005, Chapter 8


Author’s Abstract
    Chapter 8 replies to an argument against noneism based on a paradox of denotation, due essentially to Hilbert and Bernays. The solution proceeds in terms of a theory of multiple-denotation.
Contents
  1. Introduction: A Paradox of Denotation;
  2. Semantic Paradoxes of Self-Reference;
  3. The Paradox of Hilbert and Bernays;
  4. Solutions;
  5. Multiple Denotation Semantics;
  6. The Paradox Revisited;
  7. Definite Descriptions;
  8. Conclusion;
  9. Technical Appendix


COMMENT: Photocopy of complete Book filed in "Various - Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 14 (P)".



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