Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Vol XI) - Studies in Essentialism
French (Peter), Uehling (Theodore) & Wettstein (Howard)
This Page provides (where held) the Abstract of the above Book and those of all the Papers contained in it.
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BOOK ABSTRACT: None.



"Ackerman (Diana) - Essential properties and philosophical analysis"

Source: Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Vol XI) - Studies in Essentialism, 1986, pp. 305-313



"Adams (Robert Merrihew) - Time and Thisness"

Source: Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Vol XI) - Studies in Essentialism, 1986, pp. 315-329



"Carter (William) - Mapping semantic paths: is essentialism relevant?"

Source: Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Vol XI) - Studies in Essentialism, 1986, pp. 53-73


Philosophers Index Abstract
    Wittgenstein and Kripke and others have worried about how we know how to go on applying a word in the same way. Intuitively, semantic rules determine semantic 'paths'. I consider, and reject, the proposal that appeals to essentialism help to determine semantic paths.



"Chandler (Hugh S.) - Sources of essence"

Source: Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Vol XI) - Studies in Essentialism, 1986, pp. 379-389



"Chisholm (Roderick) - Possibility without haecceity"

Source: Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Vol XI) - Studies in Essentialism, 1986, pp. 157-163



"Coburn (Robert) - Individual essences and possible worlds"

Source: Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Vol XI) - Studies in Essentialism, 1986, pp. 165-183



"Dau (Paulo) - Part-Time Objects"

Source: Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Vol XI) - Studies in Essentialism, pp. 450-474

COMMENT: See Patton's "Full-Time Objections to Part-Time Objects"



"Dupre (John) - Sex, Gender, and Essence"

Source: Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Vol XI) - Studies in Essentialism, 1986, pp. 441-457


Philosophers Index Abstract
    This paper attacks the thesis that scientific enquiry aims to discover real essences. It is argued that this thesis is inconsistent with an appropriate degree of commitment to empiricism. The argument of the paper is illustrated with detailed discussions of the inappropriateness of essentialist conceptions of sex in general, and of human gender distinctions.



"Enc (Berent) - Essentialism without individual essences: causation, kinds, supervenience, and restricted identities"

Source: Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Vol XI) - Studies in Essentialism, 1986, pp. 403-426



"Fales (Evans) - Essentialism and the elementary constituents of matter"

Source: Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Vol XI) - Studies in Essentialism, 1986, pp. 391-402


Philosophers Index Abstract
    One problem that plagues any doctrine of natural kinds1 is the existence, noted by locke, of unclassifiable borderline cases; another is making sense of the alleged difference between the way a thing has its accidental properties, and the way it is connected to its essential ones. Both problems admit of solution if nature provides us (as seems likely) with a set of elementary constituents of matter, whose monadic properties do not vary in a continuous fashion.



"Forbes (Graeme) - In defense of absolute essentialism"

Source: Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Vol XI) - Studies in Essentialism, 1986, pp. 3-31


Philosophers Index Abstract
    This paper criticizes the view that the essential properties of a thing are in some sense relative to a context. An absolutist alternative is developed, and the case of fictional objects is discussed in detail.



"Freddoso (Alfred) - The necessity of nature"

Source: Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Vol XI) - Studies in Essentialism, 1986, pp. 215-242


Philosophers Index Abstract
    This paper lays out the main contours of an objectivistic account of natural necessity that locates its source within natural substances themselves. The key claims are that what occurs by a necessity of nature constitutes the culmination of deterministic natural tendencies and that these tendencies are themselves rooted in the natures or essences of natural substances. The paper concludes by discussing the notion of a law of nature as it emerges on this account.



"Fumerton (Richard) - Essential Properties and 'de re' Necessity"

Source: Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Vol XI) - Studies in Essentialism, 1986, pp. 281-294


Philosophers Index Abstract
    I argue that there is a sense in which it should be relatively uncontroversial that there are essential properties, but that there are no interesting metaphysical implications of this admission. I analyze the concept of an essential property in terms of the concept of "de re" necessity and then analyze the concept of "de re" necessity in terms of the concept of "de dicto" necessity.



"Hirsch (Eli) - Metaphysical necessity and conceptual truth"

Source: Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Vol XI) - Studies in Essentialism, 1986, pp. 243-256



"Loux (Michael) - Toward an Aristotelian theory of abstract objects."

Source: Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Vol XI) - Studies in Essentialism, 1986, pp. 495-512



"Lycan (William) & Shapiro (Stewart) - Actuality and essence"

Source: Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Vol XI) - Studies in Essentialism, 1986, pp. 343-377


Philosophers Index Abstract
    The authors construct an "ersatz" system of possible worlds taking "worlds" and "nonexistent individuals" to be complex sets of properties. A modal1 language is developed and given a formal model-theoretic semantics. The approach is then compared to competing metaphysical accounts of modality2, and a version of essentialism is defended.



"McKay (Thomas) - Against constitutional sufficiency principles"

Source: Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Vol XI) - Studies in Essentialism, 1986, pp. 295-304



"McMichael (Alan) - The epistemology of essentialist claims"

Source: Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Vol XI) - Studies in Essentialism, 1986, pp. 33-52



"Mondadori (Fabrizio) - Available properties"

Source: Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Vol XI) - Studies in Essentialism, 1986, pp. 257-280



"Myro (George) - Time and essence"

Source: Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Vol XI) - Studies in Essentialism, 1986, pp. 331-341



"Salmon (Nathan) - Modal Paradox: Parts and Counterparts, Points and Counterpoints"

Source: Salmon - Reference and Essence, 2005, Appendix 4


Philosophers Index Abstract
    Paradoxes concerning the essentiality of the origins of artifacts are discussed, and their solution by means of counterpart theory is critiqued. It is argued that the paradoxes reveal that "s5" modal logic1 is fallacious. The approach is defended against criticisms. The relevance of vagueness and sorites2 paradoxes is discussed. An appendix presents a proof that identity is defined for every pair of objects and suggests how other controversial theses concerning identity might be similarly proved.
Sections
    36. Modal3 Paradox
    37. A Modal4 Fallacy
    38. Counterpart Theory
    39. Modal5 Paradox and Sorites6
    40. Some Shortcomings of Counterpart Theory
    41. More Shortcomings of Counterpart Theory
    42. The Solution Refined
    43. Vagueness and Modal7 Paradox
    44. Twin Worlds
    45. Necessity and Apriority
    46. The Determinacy of Identity


COMMENT: Also in "French (Peter), Uehling (Theodore) & Wettstein (Howard) - Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Vol XI) - Studies in Essentialism"



"Schwartz (Robert) - I'm going to make you a star"

Source: Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Vol XI) - Studies in Essentialism, 1986, pp. 427-439


Philosophers Index Abstract
    The claim that we make our world must be false. Lingering doubts are removed by reflecting on stars. There would have been stars had there never been people to think about them or devise astronomical theories. So the story goes. I argue there is a good sense in which we play a role in making our world and little force to the claim that it exists ready-made. Our world, stars included, is as much made as found.



"Stalnaker (Robert) - Counterparts and Identity"

Source: Stalnaker - Ways a World Might Be, Chapter 6


Philosopher’s Index Abstract
  1. This paper explores a different version of the counterpart theory - that the actualist can coherently combine a belief in primitive thisness1 and genuine identity across possible worlds with a version of counterpart theory that permits one to make sense of contingent identity2 and distinctness, i.e., if the claims that one thing might have been two, and that distinct things might have been identical.
  2. The thesis called haecceitism is analysed, and it is argued that this doctrine can be reconciled with a version of counterpart theory, and with the coherence of contingent identity3.
  3. The impact of this account of counterparts and identity on the abstract semantics of quantified modal logic4 is considered.

Sections
  1. Introduction
  2. Counterpart Theory
  3. Actualism and Merely Possible Individuals
  4. Haecceitism and Absolute Identity
  5. Worlds and Times
  6. Variable Binding


COMMENT:



"Van Cleve (James) - Mereological Essentialism, Mereological Conjunctivism, and Identity Through Time"

Source: Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Vol XI) - Studies in Essentialism


Author’s Abstract
  1. Mereological essentialism is the doctrine that no whole can change its parts;
  2. Mereological conjunctivism is the doctrine that any two objects form a whole.
  3. In what follows I shall say something about how the two doctrines are related, defend at least a limited version of each, and draw morals for the problem of identity through time.


COMMENT:



"Van Inwagen (Peter) - Two Concepts of Possible Worlds"

Source: Van Inwagen - Ontology, Identity and Modality, Part III: Modality, Chapter 12

COMMENT: Also in "French (Peter), Uehling (Theodore) & Wettstein (Howard) - Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Vol XI) - Studies in Essentialism"



"White (Nicholas) - Identity, modal individuation, and matter in Aristotle"

Source: Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Vol XI) - Studies in Essentialism, 1986, pp. 475-494



Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2018
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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