<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Vol XI) - Studies in Essentialism (French (Peter), Uehling (Theodore) & Wettstein (Howard)) - Theo Todman's Book Collection (Book-Paper Abstracts)</title> <link href="../../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../../TT_ICO.png" /> </head> <a name="Top"></a> <BODY> <div id="header"> <HR><H1>Theo Todman's Book Collection (Book-Paper Abstracts)</H1></div> <hr><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950><tr><td colspan =2><A HREF = "../BookSummary_1430.htm">Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Vol XI) - Studies in Essentialism</A></td></tr><tr><td colspan =2><A HREF = "../../../Authors/F/Author_French (Peter).htm">French (Peter)</a>, <A HREF = "../../../Authors/U/Author_Uehling (Theodore).htm">Uehling (Theodore)</a> & <A HREF = "../../../Authors/W/Author_Wettstein (Howard).htm">Wettstein (Howard)</a></td></tr><tr><td colspan =2>This Page provides (where held) the <b>Abstract</b> of the above <b>Book</b> and those of all the <b>Papers</b> contained in it.</td></tr><tr><td><A HREF="#ColourConventions">Text Colour-Conventions</a></td><td><A HREF = "../BookCitings_1430.htm">Books / Papers Citing this Book</A></td></tr></tr></TABLE></CENTER><hr> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>BOOK ABSTRACT: </B>None.</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_07/PaperSummary_7242.htm">Ackerman (Diana) - Essential properties and philosophical analysis</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Vol XI) - Studies in Essentialism, 1986, pp. 305-313<BR></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_07/PaperSummary_7243.htm">Adams (Robert Merrihew) - Time and Thisness</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Vol XI) - Studies in Essentialism, 1986, pp. 315-329<BR></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_07/PaperSummary_7255.htm">Carter (William) - Mapping semantic paths: is essentialism relevant?</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Vol XI) - Studies in Essentialism, 1986, pp. 53-73<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Philosophers Index Abstract</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">Wittgenstein and Kripke and others have worried about how we know how to go on applying a word in the same way. Intuitively, semantic rules determine semantic 'paths'. I consider, and reject, the proposal that appeals to essentialism help to determine semantic paths.</ol></FONT></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_07/PaperSummary_7248.htm">Chandler (Hugh S.) - Sources of essence</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Vol XI) - Studies in Essentialism, 1986, pp. 379-389<BR></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_07/PaperSummary_7235.htm">Chisholm (Roderick) - Possibility without haecceity</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Vol XI) - Studies in Essentialism, 1986, pp. 157-163<BR></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_07/PaperSummary_7236.htm">Coburn (Robert) - Individual essences and possible worlds</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Vol XI) - Studies in Essentialism, 1986, pp. 165-183<BR></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_06/PaperSummary_6625.htm">Dau (Paulo) - Part-Time Objects</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Vol XI) - Studies in Essentialism, pp. 450-474<BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>See Patton's "Full-Time Objections to Part-Time Objects"</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_07/PaperSummary_7252.htm">Dupre (John) - Sex, Gender, and Essence</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Vol XI) - Studies in Essentialism, 1986, pp. 441-457<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Philosophers Index Abstract</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">This paper attacks the thesis that scientific enquiry aims to discover real essences. It is argued that this thesis is inconsistent with an appropriate degree of commitment to empiricism. The argument of the paper is illustrated with detailed discussions of the inappropriateness of essentialist conceptions of sex in general, and of human gender distinctions.</ol></FONT></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_07/PaperSummary_7250.htm">Enc (Berent) - Essentialism without individual essences: causation, kinds, supervenience, and restricted identities</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Vol XI) - Studies in Essentialism, 1986, pp. 403-426<BR></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_07/PaperSummary_7249.htm">Fales (Evans) - Essentialism and the elementary constituents of matter</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Vol XI) - Studies in Essentialism, 1986, pp. 391-402<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Philosophers Index Abstract</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">One problem that plagues any doctrine of <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_27.htm">natural kinds</A><SUP>1</SUP> is the existence, noted by locke, of unclassifiable borderline cases; another is making sense of the alleged difference between the way a thing has its accidental properties, and the way it is connected to its essential ones. Both problems admit of solution if nature provides us (as seems likely) with a set of elementary constituents of matter, whose monadic properties do not vary in a continuous fashion.</ol></FONT></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_07/PaperSummary_7244.htm">Forbes (Graeme) - In defense of absolute essentialism</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Vol XI) - Studies in Essentialism, 1986, pp. 3-31<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Philosophers Index Abstract</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">This paper criticizes the view that the essential properties of a thing are in some sense relative to a context. An absolutist alternative is developed, and the case of fictional objects is discussed in detail.</ol></FONT></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_07/PaperSummary_7237.htm">Freddoso (Alfred) - The necessity of nature</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Vol XI) - Studies in Essentialism, 1986, pp. 215-242<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Philosophers Index Abstract</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">This paper lays out the main contours of an objectivistic account of natural necessity that locates its source within natural substances themselves. The key claims are that what occurs by a necessity of nature constitutes the culmination of deterministic natural tendencies and that these tendencies are themselves rooted in the natures or essences of natural substances. The paper concludes by discussing the notion of a law of nature as it emerges on this account.</ol></FONT></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_07/PaperSummary_7240.htm">Fumerton (Richard) - Essential Properties and 'de re' Necessity</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Vol XI) - Studies in Essentialism, 1986, pp. 281-294<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Philosophers Index Abstract</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">I argue that there is a sense in which it should be relatively uncontroversial that there are essential properties, but that there are no interesting metaphysical implications of this admission. I analyze the concept of an essential property in terms of the concept of "de re" necessity and then analyze the concept of "de re" necessity in terms of the concept of "de dicto" necessity.</ol></FONT></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_07/PaperSummary_7239.htm">Hirsch (Eli) - Metaphysical necessity and conceptual truth</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Vol XI) - Studies in Essentialism, 1986, pp. 243-256<BR></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_07/PaperSummary_7254.htm">Loux (Michael) - Toward an Aristotelian theory of abstract objects.</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Vol XI) - Studies in Essentialism, 1986, pp. 495-512<BR></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_07/PaperSummary_7247.htm">Lycan (William) & Shapiro (Stewart) - Actuality and essence</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Vol XI) - Studies in Essentialism, 1986, pp. 343-377<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Philosophers Index Abstract</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">The authors construct an "ersatz" system of possible worlds taking "worlds" and "nonexistent individuals" to be complex sets of properties. A <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_121.htm">modal</A><SUP>1</SUP> language is developed and given a formal model-theoretic semantics. The approach is then compared to competing metaphysical accounts of <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_121.htm">modality</A><SUP>2</SUP>, and a version of essentialism is defended.</ol></FONT></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_07/PaperSummary_7241.htm">McKay (Thomas) - Against constitutional sufficiency principles</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Vol XI) - Studies in Essentialism, 1986, pp. 295-304<BR></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_07/PaperSummary_7246.htm">McMichael (Alan) - The epistemology of essentialist claims</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Vol XI) - Studies in Essentialism, 1986, pp. 33-52<BR></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_07/PaperSummary_7238.htm">Mondadori (Fabrizio) - Available properties</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Vol XI) - Studies in Essentialism, 1986, pp. 257-280<BR></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_07/PaperSummary_7245.htm">Myro (George) - Time and essence</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Vol XI) - Studies in Essentialism, 1986, pp. 331-341<BR></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_07/PaperSummary_7560.htm">Salmon (Nathan) - Modal Paradox: Parts and Counterparts, Points and Counterpoints</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Salmon - Reference and Essence, 2005, Appendix 4<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Philosophers Index Abstract</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">Paradoxes concerning the essentiality of the origins of artifacts are discussed, and their solution by means of counterpart theory is critiqued. It is argued that the paradoxes reveal that "s5" <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_121.htm">modal logic</A><SUP>1</SUP> is fallacious. The approach is defended against criticisms. The relevance of vagueness and <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1172.htm">sorites</A><SUP>2</SUP> paradoxes is discussed. An appendix presents a proof that identity is defined for every pair of objects and suggests how other controversial theses concerning identity might be similarly proved. </ol></FONT><U>Sections</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">36. <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_121.htm">Modal</A><SUP>3</SUP> Paradox<BR>37. A <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_121.htm">Modal</A><SUP>4</SUP> Fallacy<BR>38. Counterpart Theory<BR>39. <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_121.htm">Modal</A><SUP>5</SUP> Paradox and <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1172.htm">Sorites</A><SUP>6</SUP><BR>40. Some Shortcomings of Counterpart Theory<BR>41. More Shortcomings of Counterpart Theory<BR>42. The Solution Refined<BR>43. Vagueness and <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_121.htm">Modal</A><SUP>7</SUP> Paradox<BR>44. Twin Worlds<BR>45. Necessity and Apriority<BR>46. The Determinacy of Identity</ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>Also in "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1430.htm">French (Peter), Uehling (Theodore) & Wettstein (Howard) - Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Vol XI) - Studies in Essentialism</A>"</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_07/PaperSummary_7251.htm">Schwartz (Robert) - I'm going to make you a star</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Vol XI) - Studies in Essentialism, 1986, pp. 427-439<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Philosophers Index Abstract</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1">The claim that we make our world must be false. Lingering doubts are removed by reflecting on stars. There would have been stars had there never been people to think about them or devise astronomical theories. So the story goes. I argue there is a good sense in which we play a role in making our world and little force to the claim that it exists ready-made. Our world, stars included, is as much made as found.</ol></FONT></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3456.htm">Stalnaker (Robert) - Counterparts and Identity</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Stalnaker - Ways a World Might Be, Chapter 6<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><u>Philosopher s Index Abstract</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>This paper explores a different version of the counterpart theory - that the actualist can coherently combine a belief in primitive <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_102.htm">thisness</A><SUP>1</SUP> and genuine identity across possible worlds with a version of counterpart theory that permits one to make sense of <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_63.htm">contingent identity</A><SUP>2</SUP> and distinctness, i.e., if the claims that one thing might have been two, and that distinct things might have been identical. </li><li>The thesis called haecceitism is analysed, and it is argued that this doctrine can be reconciled with a version of counterpart theory, and with the coherence of <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_63.htm">contingent identity</A><SUP>3</SUP>. </li><li>The impact of this account of counterparts and identity on the abstract semantics of quantified <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_1/Notes_121.htm">modal logic</A><SUP>4</SUP> is considered.</li></ol></FONT><BR><u>Sections</u><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Introduction</li><li>Counterpart Theory</li><li>Actualism and Merely Possible Individuals</li><li>Haecceitism and Absolute Identity</li><li>Worlds and Times</li><li>Variable Binding </li></ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B><ul type="disc"><li>Part III - Identity in and across Possible Worlds. </li><li>Also in "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1430.htm">French (Peter), Uehling (Theodore) & Wettstein (Howard) - Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Vol XI) - Studies in Essentialism</A>", </li><li>And in "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_647.htm">Noonan (Harold), Ed. - Identity</A>", </li><li> Photocopy filed in "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_05/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_5975.htm">Various - Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 17 (S2: Sm+)</A>". </li></ul></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3435.htm">Van Cleve (James) - Mereological Essentialism, Mereological Conjunctivism, and Identity Through Time</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Vol XI) - Studies in Essentialism<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Author s Abstract</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Mereological essentialism is the doctrine that no whole can change its parts; </li><li>Mereological conjunctivism is the doctrine that any two objects form a whole. </li><li>In what follows I shall say something about how the two doctrines are related, defend at least a limited version of each, and draw morals for the problem of identity through time.</li></ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B><ul type="disc"><li>Also in "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_06/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_6307.htm">Hales (Steven D.), Ed. - Metaphysics: Contemporary Readings</A>", and</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_647.htm">Noonan (Harold), Ed. - Identity</A>", </li><li>Photocopy filed in "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_05/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_5976.htm">Various - Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 18 (T-V)</A>".</li></ul></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_03/PaperSummary_3663.htm">Van Inwagen (Peter) - Two Concepts of Possible Worlds</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Van Inwagen - Ontology, Identity and Modality, Part III: Modality, Chapter 12<BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>Also in "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1430.htm">French (Peter), Uehling (Theodore) & Wettstein (Howard) - Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Vol XI) - Studies in Essentialism</A>"</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_07/PaperSummary_7253.htm">White (Nicholas) - Identity, modal individuation, and matter in Aristotle</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Vol XI) - Studies in Essentialism, 1986, pp. 475-494<BR></P> <a name="ColourConventions"></a><hr><br><B><U>Text Colour Conventions</U> (see <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</B><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL> </center> <BR><HR><BR><center> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-02T23:58" pubdate>02/08/2018 23:58:50</time> <br><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A> </TD></TR><TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>