<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Ontology, Causality and Mind (Bacon (John), Campbell (Keith) & Reinhardt (Lloyd)) - Theo Todman's Book Collection (Book-Paper Abstracts)</title> <link href="../../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../../TT_ICO.png" /> </head> <a name="Top"></a> <BODY> <div id="header"> <HR><H1>Theo Todman's Book Collection (Book-Paper Abstracts)</H1></div> <hr><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950><tr><td colspan =2><A HREF = "../BookSummary_1438.htm">Ontology, Causality and Mind</A></td></tr><tr><td colspan =2><A HREF = "../../../Authors/B/Author_Bacon (John).htm">Bacon (John)</a>, <A HREF = "../../../Authors/C/Author_Campbell (Keith).htm">Campbell (Keith)</a> & <A HREF = "../../../Authors/R/Author_Reinhardt (Lloyd).htm">Reinhardt (Lloyd)</a></td></tr><tr><td colspan =2>This Page provides (where held) the <b>Abstract</b> of the above <b>Book</b> and those of all the <b>Papers</b> contained in it.</td></tr><tr><td><A HREF="#ColourConventions">Text Colour-Conventions</a></td><td><A HREF = "../BookCitings_1438.htm">Books / Papers Citing this Book</A></td></tr></tr></TABLE></CENTER><hr> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>BOOK ABSTRACT: </B><BR><BR><U>Inside Cover Blurb</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>D. M. Armstrong is an eminent Australian philosopher whose work over many years has dealt with such subjects as the nature of possibility, concepts of the particular and the universal, causes and laws of nature, and the nature of human consciousness. </li><li>This collection of essays, all specially written for this volume, explores the many facets of Armstrong's work, concentrating on his more recent interests. </li><li>There are four sections to the book: <ul type="disc"><li>Possibility and identity, </li><li><a name="1"></a><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">Universals</A><SUP>1</SUP>, </li><li>Laws and <a name="2"></a><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_39.htm">causality</A><SUP>2</SUP>, and </li><li>Philosophy of mind. </li></ul></li><li>The contributors comprise an international group of philosophers from the United States, England, and Australia. </li><li>An interesting feature of the volume is that Armstrong himself has written responses to each of the essays. </li><li>There is also a complete bibliography of Armstrong's writings. </li><li>The volume will be essential reading for metaphysicians and philosophers of mind, as well as for epistemologists and philosophers of science. </li><li><b>John Bacon</b> is Reader in the Department of Traditional and Modern Philosophy at the University of Sydney </li><li><b>Keith Campbell</b> is Challis Professor of Philosophy at the University of Sydney </li><li><b>Lloyd Reinhardt</b> is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Traditional and Modern Philosophy at the University of Sydney </li></ol></FONT><BR><U>Contents</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><B>I. Possibility and identity</B><li><a name="5"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20448.htm">Lycan (William) - Armstrong's new combinatorialist theory of modality</A>",<BR><a name="6"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20449.htm">Armstrong (David) - Reply to William Lycan's 'Armstrong's new combinatorialist theory of modality'</A>".</li><li><a name="7"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1239.htm">Lewis (David) - Many, But Almost One</A>",<BR><a name="8"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_09/Abstract_9495.htm">Armstrong (David) - Reply to David Lewis's 'Many, but Almost One'</A>".<BR><B>II. The theory of <a name="3"></a><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>3</SUP>. </b></li><li><a name="9"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20450.htm">Forrest (Peter) - Just like quarks? The status of repeatables</A>",<BR><a name="10"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20451.htm">Armstrong (David) - Reply to Peter Forrest's 'Just like quarks? The status of repeatables'</A>".</li><li><a name="11"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20452.htm">Bigelow (John) - Sets are haecceities</A>",<BR><a name="12"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20453.htm">Armstrong (David) - Reply to John Bigelow's 'Sets are haecceities'</A>".</li><li><a name="13"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1101.htm">Mellor (D.H.) - Properties and Predicates</A>",<BR><a name="14"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20458.htm">Armstrong (David) - Reply to D.H. Mellor's 'Properties and Predicates'</A>".<BR><B>III. <a name="4"></a><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_39.htm">Causality</A><SUP>4</SUP> and laws of nature.</B></li><li><a name="15"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20454.htm">Fales (Evans) - Are causal laws contingent?</A>",<BR><a name="16"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20455.htm">Armstrong (David) - Reply to Evans Fales's 'Are causal laws contingent?'</A>".</li><li><a name="17"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20456.htm">Smart (J.C.C.) - Laws of nature as a species of regularities</A>",<BR><a name="18"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20457.htm">Armstrong (David) - Reply to J.J.C. Smart's 'Laws of nature as a species of regularities'</A>".</li><li><a name="19"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20459.htm">Martin (C.B.) - Power for realists</A>",<BR><a name="20"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20460.htm">Armstrong (David) - Reply to C.B. Martin's 'Power for realists'</A>".</li><li><a name="21"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20461.htm">Menzies (Peter) - Laws of nature, modality and Humean supervenience</A>",<BR><a name="22"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20462.htm">Armstrong (David) - Reply to Peter Menzies's 'Laws of nature, modality and Humean supervenience'</A>".<BR><B>IV. Consciousness and secondary qualities. </B></li><li><a name="23"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20463.htm">Jackson (Frank) - Block's challenge</A>",<BR><a name="24"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20464.htm">Armstrong (David) - Reply to Frank Jackson's 'Block's challenge'</A>".</li><li><a name="25"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20465.htm">Campbell (Keith) - David Armstrong and realism about colour</A>",<BR><a name="26"></a>"<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20466.htm">Armstrong (David) - Reply to Keith Campbell's 'David Armstrong and realism about colour'</A>".</li></ol></FONT></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_16/PaperSummary_16044.htm">Bacon (John), Campbell (Keith) & Reinhardt (Lloyd) - Ontology, Causality and Mind: Preface</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Bacon, Campbell & Reinhardt - Ontology, Causality and Mind<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Full Text</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>David Armstrong was born in 1926 into a naval family in Melbourne, Australia. After schooling in England and at Geelong Grammar School in Victoria, and a period of service in the Royal Australian Navy, he entered the University of Sydney in 1947. </li><li>The Sydney Philosophy Department was at that time dominated by John Anderson, the charismatic and idiosyncratic Scottish philosopher. While Armstrong never adopted many of Anderson's views on particular issues in logic, metaphysics, epistemology and ethics, he has always regarded Anderson as the crucial influence in his intellectual formation. In common with his teacher, he has steadily pursued the classic substantive issues of metaphysically motivated philosophizing. Both engaged in the search for a synoptic, rationally compelling world view framed by a naturalism of empiricist inspiration. </li><li>From Sydney, Armstrong went on to Exeter College, Oxford, and took the then recently established B.Phil, degree in 1954. Oxford was at that time the heartland of the linguistic analytic movement in philosophy, with Ryle and Austin as pre-eminent figures. Armstrong worked principally with H. H. Price, the specialist in the philosophy of perception, who was always more traditional in his approach to the problems of philosophy. While Armstrong picked up analytic tools in Oxford, he never adopted the view that all, or even many, of philosophy's conundrums are mere symptoms of linguistic pathology rather than genuine questions. </li><li>After Oxford, he spent a brief period (1954-55) teaching at Birkbeck College in the University of London, then seven years at the University of Melbourne, earning the Ph.D. there while teaching at the same time. Since 1964 he has held John Anderson's chair as Challis Professor of Philosophy in Sydney. His imminent retirement is the occasion for this tribute. </li><li>Armstrong's philosophy, presented now in ten books and nearly fifty major papers, has ranged over many of the main issues in epistemology and metaphysics. Rather unusually, it has tended to move from the more specific and concrete to the more abstract and general. He has been concerned throughout to elaborate and defend a philosophy which is economical, unified and compatibly continuous with the established results of the natural sciences. Several themes run through it all: a naturalism that holds all reality to be spatiotemporal, a materialism that aims to account for all mental phenomena without appeal beyond the categories of physical being, and an empiricism that both vindicates and draws strength from the methods and successes of the natural sciences. </li><li>In <em>Perception and the Physical World</em> (1961), Armstrong confronted then fashionable phenomenalist tendencies with a direct realism that had no place for mentalistic items. He urged the various objections to sense-data and the identification problem they face. He developed an account of perceiving in terms of inclinations to belief, which took him farther away from the classic empiricist doctrines of perception by way of ideas. </li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_63.htm">Armstrong (David) - A Materialist Theory of the Mind</A>" (1968) was the first full-dress presentation of central-state materialism, an equally naturalist, scientifically more plausible successor to behaviorism in the philosophy of mind. This major and highly influential work presented an analysis of mental phenomena in terms of what they are apt to cause or be caused by. It proceeded to point out that the most likely items to fit those places in the causal networks of human perception, feeling, memory and action had recently come to light: they are structures, states and processes in the central nervous system. </li><li>Belief and knowledge were treated only lightly in "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_63.htm">Armstrong (David) - A Materialist Theory of the Mind</A>". In "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_274.htm">Armstrong (David) - Belief, Truth and Knowledge</A>" (1973), Armstrong developed an idea of Ramsey's that beliefs are maps by which we steer, sub-maps of one great action-guiding belief map in our head. Against causal theories, he made a significant contribution to the development of the reliabilist account of the distinction between knowledge and mere true belief. </li><li>During the seventies, Armstrong turned his attention to the classical problem of <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>1</SUP>. In the two volumes of <em><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">Universals</A><SUP>2</SUP> and Scientific Realism</em> (<U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P16044_3">1978</A></U><SUB>3</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P16044_3"></A>), he built a case for an immanent realism about <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>4</SUP> with three main themes, of profound originality and considerable influence: <ul type="disc"><li>first, that contemporary confidence in set theory to sustain some version of nominalism is unjustifiable, and nominalism is desperately implausible; </li><li>second, that an empiricist philosophy need not, and should not, bear the nominalist burden; and </li><li>third, that the identification of actually existing <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>5</SUP> is a task for which the fundamental sciences alone are equipped. </li></ul>There are far fewer <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>6</SUP> than one might suppose, and to determine which ones there are calls for a substantive piece of contingent scientific theorizing. </li><li>This scientific realism about <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>7</SUP> was promptly put to work in developing a philosophy of the laws that apparently govern the cosmos. "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1192.htm">Armstrong (David) - What is a Law of Nature?</A>" (1983) argues that the regularity theories of law, deriving from Hume, are all fatally flawed, mainly in their incapacity to account for the accidental-nomic distinction. It goes on to urge that laws relating (classes of) particular events or occurrences rest on a relation of necessitation holding between the <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>8</SUP> involved, thus setting forth one variant of what is now known as the Dretske-Tooley-Armstrong theory of laws. </li><li>The concern with necessity provides a linking thread to Armstrong's next major project, <em>A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility</em> (1989a). Here he attempts to build - upon a foundation in the Tractarian thought of Wittgenstein, Cresswell and Skyrms - an account of nonactual possibilities as fictive reorderings of strictly actual cosmic constituents. Thus possible-world realism is repudiated, ersatzism is skirted, and naturalism is upheld. Here again, Armstrong's view of <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>9</SUP>, as abstractions from states of affairs on an equal footing with particulars, stands him in good stead. </li><li>In the theory of perception, the analysis of knowledge, the philosophy of mind, the problem of <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1008.htm">universals</A><SUP>10</SUP>, the question of laws, and now the philosophy of possibility, Armstrong has not only contributed to the discussion but played a large part in establishing philosophy's agenda and setting the terms of its debates. </li><li>Philosophy is a very hard subject with a very long history. It is very hard to say something new and important on any one major question. This makes it all the more remarkable that anyone should have had new and important things to say on a whole range of questions. But Armstrong has done more than make a massive contribution to philosophical doctrine; he has also shown us a way of doing philosophy. He has made an admirable contribution to the style in which we philosophize. It is easy when tackling very hard problems to lapse into obscurity or hide behind it. Armstrong's philosophical writings are examples of how to discuss the hardest questions in philosophy without sacrificing the kind of clarity that makes progress possible. We have him to thank for bringing us so much interesting and important philosophical news, and for doing it with such style and <U><A HREF="#On-Page_Link_P16044_11">clarity</A></U><SUB>11</SUB><a name="On-Page_Return_P16044_11"></A>. </li><li>For some of us, working with Armstrong has meant acquiring respect and affection for a fellow intellectual with whom we disagree deeply on both philosophical and political matters, which must be among the most rewarding experiences of academic life. We call Armstrong an 'intellectual' in his own sense, embracing an interest in social and political matters that goes well beyond theory to advocacy. Although often referred to as a conservative or a right-winger, Armstrong characterizes himself as a liberal conservative. He has always championed human rights and he has always opposed tyranny. He has always taught, even when it was less fashionable than it now is, that these ends could best be served by a free market and free trade. </li><li>In the academy, Armstrong's 'politics' - motivated by scrupulous support for the highest standards - led him to oppose many of the changes that have overtaken universities in recent decades. This stance has cost him friends. It has also done much to sustain a self-respecting and livable departmental environment. </li><li>It would be quite anomalous if our differences with Armstrong did not extend also to philosophy. For example, one of us is deeply attracted to the work of the later Wittgenstein. While Armstrong does not go so far as Russell in condemning that work, he is annoyed by its influence and does not think very highly of its main themes. Yet despite these areas of difference, which have occasioned a fair number of sharp exchanges, and despite Armstrong's pre-Kantian proclivities (as some might see them), his place in our philosophical and intellectual life is cherished and unforgettable. </li><li>As will be evident from the introductions to Armstrong's replies herein, his impact upon his fellow philosophers has not been limited to published disputation or academic statesmanship. Quite apart from the influence of his substantive views and the example of his clear style, those of us who have been affected by him value almost more than anything else the inspirational force of his personality. In his presence, philosophy feels important. This has been his priceless gift to colleagues and students, the secret of the coherence of the Department of Traditional and Modern Philosophy, aptly called 'Armstrong's department' in most of the world. It is our hope that this volume will convey a sense of that presence to the reader, along with our gratitude to the honoree. </li><li>We thank our contributors for agreeing to provide the substance of this <em>Festschrift</em>, for getting their papers in on time and for brooking occasional editorial queries gracefully. Our thanks go likewise to David Armstrong for the care and despatch with which he wrote his replies to each contributor. Finally, we should like to acknowledge the support of Greg Currie, whose suggestion helped initiate this book.</li></ol></FONT></P><BR><HR><BR><U><B>In-Page Footnotes</U> ("<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_16/Abstract_16044.htm">Bacon (John), Campbell (Keith) & Reinhardt (Lloyd) - Ontology, Causality and Mind: Preface</A>")</B><a name="On-Page_Link_P16044_3"></A><BR><BR><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P16044_3"><B>Footnote 3</B></A></U>: Ie. <ul type="disc"><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_275.htm">Armstrong (David) - Universals and Scientific Realism (Vol. 1: Nominalism and Realism)</A>", and</li><li>"<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_00/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_276.htm">Armstrong (David) - Universals and Scientific Realism (Vol. 2: A Theory of Universals)</A>".</li></ul><a name="On-Page_Link_P16044_11"></A><U><A HREF="#On-Page_Return_P16044_11"><B>Footnote 11</B></A></U>: <FONT COLOR = "800080">This paragraph is a modified version of Frank Jackson's remarks on introducing Armstrong's last appearance as Challis Professor before the Australasian Association of Philosophy in Melbourne, 10 July 1991. </FONT><BR><BR> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20448.htm">Lycan (William) - Armstrong's new combinatorialist theory of modality</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Bacon, Campbell & Reinhardt - Ontology, Causality and Mind<BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>See "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20449.htm">Armstrong (David) - Reply to William Lycan's 'Armstrong's new combinatorialist theory of modality'</A>" for a Reply.</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20449.htm">Armstrong (David) - Reply to William Lycan's 'Armstrong's new combinatorialist theory of modality'</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Bacon, Campbell & Reinhardt - Ontology, Causality and Mind<BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>Response to "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20448.htm">Lycan (William) - Armstrong's new combinatorialist theory of modality</A>".</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_01/PaperSummary_1239.htm">Lewis (David) - Many, But Almost One</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Lewis - Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><U>Philosophers Index Abstract</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>It is arbitrary where a cloud leaves off. Thanks to boundary vagueness, there are many equally good candidates to be the cloud. Yet we have "one" cloud up there, not many. How so? </li><li>The method of supervaluation yields one answer. </li><li>Armstrong's observation that extensive overlap approximates to identity yields another: we have a cloud up there to which all clouds up there are approximately identical. </li><li>The two answers do not compete; they may usefully be combined.</li></ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B><ul type="disc"><li>Also in "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1438.htm">Bacon (John), Campbell (Keith) & Reinhardt (Lloyd) - Ontology, Causality and Mind</A>", </li><li>See "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_09/Abstract_9495.htm">Armstrong (David) - Reply to David Lewis's 'Many, but Almost One'</A>" for a Response. </li></ul></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_09/PaperSummary_9495.htm">Armstrong (David) - Reply to David Lewis's 'Many, but Almost One'</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Bacon, Campbell & Reinhardt - Ontology, Causality and Mind<BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>Response to "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1239.htm">Lewis (David) - Many, But Almost One</A>".</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20450.htm">Forrest (Peter) - Just like quarks? The status of repeatables</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Bacon, Campbell & Reinhardt - Ontology, Causality and Mind<BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>See "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20451.htm">Armstrong (David) - Reply to Peter Forrest's 'Just like quarks? The status of repeatables'</A>" for a Reply.</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20451.htm">Armstrong (David) - Reply to Peter Forrest's 'Just like quarks? The status of repeatables'</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Bacon, Campbell & Reinhardt - Ontology, Causality and Mind<BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>Response to "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20450.htm">Forrest (Peter) - Just like quarks? The status of repeatables</A>".</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20452.htm">Bigelow (John) - Sets are haecceities</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Bacon, Campbell & Reinhardt - Ontology, Causality and Mind<BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>See "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20453.htm">Armstrong (David) - Reply to John Bigelow's 'Sets are haecceities'</A>" for a Reply.</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20453.htm">Armstrong (David) - Reply to John Bigelow's 'Sets are haecceities'</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Bacon, Campbell & Reinhardt - Ontology, Causality and Mind<BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>Response to "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20452.htm">Bigelow (John) - Sets are haecceities</A>".</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_01/PaperSummary_1101.htm">Mellor (D.H.) - Properties and Predicates</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Mellor & Oliver - Properties - Oxford Readings<BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B><ul type="disc"><li>Also in "<A HREF = "../../../BookSummaries/BookSummary_01/BookPaperAbstracts/BookPaperAbstracts_1438.htm">Bacon (John), Campbell (Keith) & Reinhardt (Lloyd) - Ontology, Causality and Mind</A>", </li><li>See "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20458.htm">Armstrong (David) - Reply to D.H. Mellor's 'Properties and Predicates'</A>" for a response.</li></ul></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20458.htm">Armstrong (David) - Reply to D.H. Mellor's 'Properties and Predicates'</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Bacon, Campbell & Reinhardt - Ontology, Causality and Mind<BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>Response to "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_01/Abstract_1101.htm">Mellor (D.H.) - Properties and Predicates</A>".</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20454.htm">Fales (Evans) - Are causal laws contingent?</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Bacon, Campbell & Reinhardt - Ontology, Causality and Mind<BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>See "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20455.htm">Armstrong (David) - Reply to Evans Fales's 'Are causal laws contingent?'</A>" for a Reply.</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20455.htm">Armstrong (David) - Reply to Evans Fales's 'Are causal laws contingent?'</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Bacon, Campbell & Reinhardt - Ontology, Causality and Mind<BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>Response to "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20454.htm">Fales (Evans) - Are causal laws contingent?</A>".</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20465.htm">Campbell (Keith) - David Armstrong and realism about colour</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Bacon, Campbell & Reinhardt - Ontology, Causality and Mind<BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>See "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20466.htm">Armstrong (David) - Reply to Keith Campbell's 'David Armstrong and realism about colour'</A>" for a Reply.</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20463.htm">Jackson (Frank) - Block's challenge</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Bacon, Campbell & Reinhardt - Ontology, Causality and Mind<BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>See "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20464.htm">Armstrong (David) - Reply to Frank Jackson's 'Block's challenge'</A>" for a Reply.</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20459.htm">Martin (C.B.) - Power for realists</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Bacon, Campbell & Reinhardt - Ontology, Causality and Mind<BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>See "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20460.htm">Armstrong (David) - Reply to C.B. Martin's 'Power for realists'</A>" for a Reply.</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20461.htm">Menzies (Peter) - Laws of nature, modality and Humean supervenience</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Bacon, Campbell & Reinhardt - Ontology, Causality and Mind<BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>See "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20462.htm">Armstrong (David) - Reply to Peter Menzies's 'Laws of nature, modality and Humean supervenience'</A>" for a Reply.</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20456.htm">Smart (J.C.C.) - Laws of nature as a species of regularities</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Bacon, Campbell & Reinhardt - Ontology, Causality and Mind<BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>See "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20457.htm">Armstrong (David) - Reply to J.J.C. Smart's 'Laws of nature as a species of regularities'</A>" for a Reply.</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20460.htm">Armstrong (David) - Reply to C.B. Martin's 'Power for realists'</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Bacon, Campbell & Reinhardt - Ontology, Causality and Mind<BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>Response to "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20459.htm">Martin (C.B.) - Power for realists</A>".</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20464.htm">Armstrong (David) - Reply to Frank Jackson's 'Block's challenge'</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Bacon, Campbell & Reinhardt - Ontology, Causality and Mind<BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>Response to "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20463.htm">Jackson (Frank) - Block's challenge</A>".</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20457.htm">Armstrong (David) - Reply to J.J.C. Smart's 'Laws of nature as a species of regularities'</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Bacon, Campbell & Reinhardt - Ontology, Causality and Mind<BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>Response to "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20456.htm">Smart (J.C.C.) - Laws of nature as a species of regularities</A>".</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20466.htm">Armstrong (David) - Reply to Keith Campbell's 'David Armstrong and realism about colour'</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Bacon, Campbell & Reinhardt - Ontology, Causality and Mind<BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>Response to "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20465.htm">Campbell (Keith) - David Armstrong and realism about colour</A>".</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_20/PaperSummary_20462.htm">Armstrong (David) - Reply to Peter Menzies's 'Laws of nature, modality and Humean supervenience'</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Bacon, Campbell & Reinhardt - Ontology, Causality and Mind<BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>Response to "<A HREF = "../../../Abstracts/Abstract_20/Abstract_20461.htm">Menzies (Peter) - Laws of nature, modality and Humean supervenience</A>".</P> <a name="ColourConventions"></a><hr><br><B><U>Text Colour Conventions</U> (see <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</B><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL> </center> <BR><HR><BR><center> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-02T02:58" pubdate>02/08/2018 02:58:05</time> <br><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A> </TD></TR><TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>