Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion
Peterson (Michael) & VanArragon (Raymond)
This Page provides (where held) the Abstract of the above Book and those of all the Papers contained in it.
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BOOK ABSTRACT:

Cover Blurb

  1. Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Religion features newly commissioned debates on some of the most controversial issues in the field. For example:
    … Is evil evidence against belief in God?
    … Does science discredit religion?
    … Is God's existence the best explanation of the universe?
    … Is eternal damnation compatible with the Christian concept of God?
    … Is morality based on God's commands?
    This first title in Blackwell's Contemporary Debates in Philosophy series presents important philosophical issues in a stimulating and engaging manner. Twelve central questions are posed, with each question addressed by a pair of opposing essays. The debates range from vigorous disagreements between theists and their critics to arguments between theists of different philosophical and theological persuasions. Both students and scholars in the philosophy of religion will readily sense the value of rigorous debate for sharply defining the issues and paving the way for further progress.
  2. Michael L. Peterson is Professor of Philosophy at Asbury College. His publications include The Problem of Evil: Selected Readings (1992), and Reason and Religious Belief (co-authored, 20021). He is also series editor of Blackwell's Exploring the Philosophy of Religion.
  3. Raymond J. VanArragon is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Asbury College. He specializes in epistemology and philosophy of religion.
  4. "This lively volume brings together excellent authors to debate major topics in the philosophy of religion. The result is concise exchanges that are both accessible to students and valuable for professional readers in the field."
    … Robert Audi, University of Notre Dame
Preface (Full Text)
  1. This is the first book in Blackwell's "Contemporary Debates" textbook series. It is designed to feature some of the most important current controversies in the philosophy of religion. In the Western philosophical tradition, theism – the belief that an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good God exists – has been the focus of much philosophical debate and discussion. Although not a living religion itself, theism forms a significant conceptual component of three living religions: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Moreover, beliefs within living religions – particularly beliefs of the historic Christian faith – have also occupied the attention of philosophers of religion. So, in staking out the territory for this book, we selected some issues related to classical Theism and some related to Christian faith in particular.
  2. Most Anglo-American philosophy is oriented toward the rigorous analysis of ideas, arguments, and positions – and this orientation certainly flourishes in the philosophical treatment of religion. Since the analytic approach lends itself to crisp, straightforward debate, we have made "debate" the central motif of the book. With Its most notable origins in Socratic dialectic, debate is essentially the interplay between opposing positions. Each debate here is organized around a key question on which recognized experts take drastically different positions. For each question, one expert on the subject presents an affirmative position and develops his or her argument, and another presents a negative position with a corresponding argument. Brief responses are also included to allow writers to clarify further their own positions, identify weaknesses in the opposing position, and point out directions for further discussion. Each debate on a given question has a short editorial introduction, and then the following structure:
    … affirmative essay,
    … negative essay,
    … reply to negative position,
    … reply to positive position.
  3. Teach the conflicts! We are convinced of the pedagogical value of teaching vigorous, well-argued debate for encouraging students to sharpen their own critical abilities and formulate their own points of view. The noteworthy growth and vibrancy of contemporary philosophy of religion provide a wide range of exciting topics for debate. From this rich vein of discussion, we have chosen topics that fall into three general categories:
    … 1. Those involving attacks on religious belief,
    … 2. Those involving arguments for religious belief, and
    … 3. Those involving internal evaluation of the coherence or appropriateness of certain religious beliefs.
    In the first two categories, the debates are waged between theists and non-theists; in the last category, the debates are largely between religious believers who differ over the implications of their faith commitments. In all, these debates provide an ideal format not simply for students but also for professional philosophers and interested non-professionals to explore issues in the philosophy of religion.
Contents
    Notes on Contributors – viii
    Preface – xi
    PART I ATTACKS ON RELIGIOUS BELIEF – 1
  1. Is Evil Evidence against Belief in God? – 3
    … Evil Is Evidence against Theistic Belief (William L. Rowe) – 3
    … Evil Does Not Make Atheism More Reasonable than Theism (Daniel Howard-Snyder and Michael Bergmann) – 13
    … Reply to Howard-Snyder and Bergmann – 25
    … Reply to Rowe – 27
  2. Does Divine Hiddenness Justify Atheism? – 30
    … Divine Hiddenness Justifies Atheism (J. L. Schellenberg) – 30
    … Divine Hiddenness Does Not Justify Atheism (Paul K. Moser) – 42
    … Reply to Moser – 54
    … Reply to Schellenberg – 56
  3. Does Science Discredit Religion? – 59
    … Science Discredits Religion (John Worrall) – 59
    … The Demise of Religion: Greatly Exaggerated Reports from the Science/Religion "Wars" (Del Ratzsch) – 72
    … Reply to Ratzsch – 87
    … Reply to Worrall – 90
    PART II ARGUMENTS FOR RELIGIOUS BELIEF – 95
  4. Is God's Existence the Best Explanation of the Universe? – 97
    … Explanation and the Cosmological Argument (Bruce R. Reichenbach) – 97
    … Why Traditional Cosmological Arguments Don't Work, and a Sketch of a New One that Does (Richard M. Gale) – 114
    … Reply to Gale – 130
    … Reply to Reichenbach – 132
  5. Does Religious Experience Justify Religious Belief? – 135
    … Religious Experience Justifies Religious Belief (William P. Alston) – 135
    … Do Mystics See God? (Evan Fales) – 145
    … Reply to Fales – 158
    … Reply to Alston – 161
  6. Is It Rational for Christians to Believe in the Resurrection? – 164
    … It Is Rational to Believe in the Resurrection (Stephen T. Davis) – 164
    … It Is Not Rational to Believe in the Resurrection (Michael Martin) – 174
    … Reply to Martin – 184
    … Reply to Davis – 186
    PART III ISSUES WITHIN RELIGION – 189
  7. Can Only One Religion Be True? – 191
    … How to Sink in Cognitive Quicksand: Nuancing Religious Pluralism (Keith E. Yandell) – 191
    … It Is Not Reasonable to Believe that Only One Religion Is True (Peter Byrne) – 201
    … Reply to Byrne – 211
    … Reply to Yandell – 215
  8. Does God Take Risks in Governing the World? – 218
    … God Takes Risks (William Hasker) – 218
    … God Does Not Take Risks (Paul Helm) – 228
    … Reply to Helm – 238
    … Reply to Hasker – 240
  9. Does God Respond to Petitionary Prayer? – 242
    … God Responds to Prayer (Michael J. Murray) – 242
    … God Does Not Necessarily Respond to Prayer (David Basinger) – 255
    … Reply to Basinger – 264
    … Reply to Murray – 266
  10. Is Eternal Damnation Compatible with the Christian Concept of God? – 268
    … Eternal Hell and the Christian Concept of God (Jerry Walls) – 268
    … No Hell (Thomas Talbott) – 278
    … Reply to Talbott – 287
    … Reply to Walls – 288
  11. Is Morality Based on God's Commands? – 290
    … Divine Commands Are the Foundation of Morality (Janine Marie Idziak) – 290
    … Ethics Is Based on Natural Law (Craig A. Boyd and Raymond J. VanArragon) – 299
    … Reply to Boyd and VanArragon – 310
    … Reply to Idziak – 313
  12. Should a Christian Be a Mind-Body Dualist? – 315
    … Christians Should Affirm Mind-Body Dualism (Dean W. Zimmerman) – 315
    … Christians Should Reject Mind-Body Dualism (Lynne Rudder Baker) – 327
    … Reply to Baker – 338
    … Reply to Zimmerman – 341
    Index – 344



In-Page Footnotes ("Peterson (Michael) & VanArragon (Raymond) - Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion")

Footnote 1: See "Peterson (Michael), Hasker (William), Reichenbach (Bruce) & Basinger (David) - Reason and Religious Belief: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion".


BOOK COMMENT:

Blackwell Publishing, 2004



"Rowe (William L.), Howard-Snyder (Daniel) & Bergmann (Michael) - Debate: Is Evil Evidence against Belief in God?"

Source: Peterson (Michael) & Van Arragon (Raymond) - Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion, 2004


Editors’ Introduction
    In his essay, William Rowe claims that the existence of pervasive and horrendous evil provides strong evidence that God does not exist. He argues that we have good reason to think that at least some of the evils in our world are such that God would have no justifying reason for permitting them. Since God would only permit evils if he had a justifying reason for doing so, it follows that we have good reason for thinking that God does not exist. Daniel Howard-Snyder and Michael Bergmann argue that this is not so. They agree that God would only permit evils if he had a justifying reason for doing so, but they contend that our failure to see God's reasons does not constitute evidence that there are none.
Contents
  • Evil Is Evidence against Theistic Belief (William L. Rowe) – 3
    1. The Issue
    2. The Argument
    3. Evaluating Two Responses
      … First Response: We just don’t know God’s purposes
      … Second Response: Theodicy.
  • Evil Does Not Make Atheism More Reasonable than Theism (Daniel Howard-Snyder and Michael Bergmann) – 13
    1. Preliminary Questions
    2. Noseeum Arguments
      … 3.1 Noseeum Arguments in General
      … 3.2 The Anti-Extraterrestrialist’s Noseeum Assumption
    3. Noseeum Arguments from Evil
      … 4.1 Standard Noseeum Arguments from Evil
      … 4.2 Considerations Against the Atheist’s Noseeum Assumption
      … 4.3 Considerations In Favour of the Atheist’s Noseeum Assumption
      … 4.4 Summing Up
    4. Rowe’s New Bayesian Argument
    5. Conclusion
  • Reply to Howard-Snyder and Bergmann – 25
  • Reply to Rowe – 27
My Response
  1. This debate filled me with dreariness. Rowe is surely right that there’s a case to answer here – and that it ought to be answered by a theodicy of some sort – the usual candidate being the logical constraints of granting free will, combined with the practical considerations of the fecundity of the earth as configured having unfortunate consequences in the form of natural disasters.
  2. But Howard-Snyder and Bergmann’s response isn’t a theodicy, but a rather smug suggestion that our tiny minds cannot fathom why God works the way he does, nor why he hides himself and fails to provide consolation when allowing all this nastiness.
  3. The debate is supposed to be orthogonal to any positive arguments in favour of theism. So, we are to imagine there are none, and still to consider that the argument from evil fails as an argument for atheism. This reminds me of the “dogs are Venusian spies” analogy in "Law (Stephen) - Darwin, Creationism and Evidence", where a position can be maintained as logically possible by continuing to invent fixes to objections, when in fact there’s no positive reason to believe the proposal in the first place.
  4. Additionally, the standard argument against pseudo-science is that if there’s no conceivable evidence that would refute a theory, then it’s pseudo-scientific. This seems to be the case here. Given that positive theistic argument is excluded, then (as Rowe points out) the argument from evil would still fail (on the noseeum objection) even if everyone’s life was utterly miserable from cradle to grave.
  5. The issue here seems to be that as soon as we posit an omnipotent being, then anything that’s logically possible is – well – possible. It could well be that God has goods and grounds that make it all morally justifiable and make everything come out all right in the end. But, in the absence of positive evidence for the existence of such a being, why should we believe any such thing – and especially believe in a good God? In the absence of positive evidence for the existence of a good God (accepted for the sake of the argument), why is the existence of all this evil not evidence against the existence of an omnipotent good God. As Hume said … “Is He able, but not willing? Then He is malevolent.”. A theodicy can (we may suppose) explain why appearances are deceptive. But in the absence of any evidence for a good God, why isn’t the existence of horrendous evil evidence for a malevolent God – or again, as Hume says, for a good but impotent one?
  6. But this isn’t really an answer – hence the dreariness … the arguments need to be taken apart piece by piece, when I have a moment.



"Schellenberg (J.L.) & Moser (Paul) - Debate: Does Divine Hiddenness Justify Atheism?"

Source: Peterson (Michael) & Van Arragon (Raymond) - Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion, 2004


Editors’ Introduction
    For many people, it is not at all obvious that God exists. They simply do not find the traditional arguments for God's existence compelling. What may be worse, some people search for God with apparent sincerity but come away feeling unfulfilled and disillusioned. "Divine hiddenness" is the label philosophers have given to these phenomena. Recently, nontheists have appealed to divine hiddenness as a basis for atheism. If God exists, the argument goes, God's existence would be more obvious to people than it is. In this debate, J. L. Schellenberg argues that divine hiddenness justifies atheism. Paul Moser argues, on the contrary, that divine hiddenness is just what the Judeo-Christian tradition leads us to expect, given the kind of God who is purportedly hidden.
Contents
  • Divine Hiddenness Justifies Atheism (J. L. Schellenberg) – 30
  • Divine Hiddenness Does Not Justify Atheism (Paul K. Moser) – 42
  • Reply to Moser – 54
  • Reply to Schellenberg – 56



"Worrall (John) & Ratzsch (Del) - Debate: Does Science Discredit Religion?"

Source: Peterson (Michael) & Van Arragon (Raymond) - Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion, 2004


Editors’ Introduction
    In this debate, John Worrall argues that there are irreconcilable differences between science and religion. A fundamental difference pertains to methodology: science evaluates candidates for belief only on the basis of evidence, while religion patently does not. So, Worrall concludes that a properly scientifically minded person cannot give credence to religious belief. Del Ratzsch argues that the relation between religion and science is much less clear than that, and that the arguments that science discredits religion are not nearly so powerful as some have believed.
Contents
  • Science Discredits Religion (John Worrall) – 59
  • The Demise of Religion: Greatly Exaggerated Reports from the Science/Religion "Wars" (Del Ratzsch) – 72
  • Reply to Ratzsch – 87
  • Reply to Worrall – 90



"Reichenbach (Bruce) & Gale (Richard) - Debate: Is God's Existence the Best Explanation of the Universe?"

Source: Peterson (Michael) & Van Arragon (Raymond) - Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion, 2004


Editors’ Introduction
    Theists have often claimed that God's existence best explains the existence of our contingent universe. One famous argument (or family of arguments) offered in support of this claim is known as "the cosmological argument." In his essay, Bruce Reichenbach presents and defends several sophisticated versions of this argument, including one of his own. Richard Gale offers some broad objections to cosmological arguments generally and then attacks Reichenbach's version of it. Gale goes on to present his own rendition of the argument, one which purports to establish the existence of a contingent, limited being who is responsible for the existence of the universe, rather than the existence of the omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good, necessarily existent Being of classical theism.
Contents
  • Explanation and the Cosmological Argument (Bruce R. Reichenbach) – 97
  • Why Traditional Cosmological Arguments Don't Work, and a Sketch of a New One that Does (Richard M. Gale) – 114
  • Reply to Gale – 130
  • Reply to Reichenbach – 132



"Alston (William) & Fales (Evan) - Debate: Does Religious Experience Justify Religious Belief?"

Source: Peterson (Michael) & Van Arragon (Raymond) - Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion, 2004


Editors’ Introduction
    In this exchange, William Alston argues that religious or mystical experiences can provide prima facie rational support for the beliefs about God that are based on them. This support can, however, be overridden by other considerations, as when the believer is given a reason to think that the religious beliefs based on an experience are false or that the experience is for some other reason untrustworthy. Evan Fales disagrees, arguing that if religious experiences are to justify religious belief, such experiences must be cross-checked and thereby shown to be genuinely from God. He argues, however, that most religious experiences cannot be appropriately cross-checked and that the ones which can - namely, experiences yielding prophetic beliefs - almost inevitably fail any attempt to authenticate them. Fales concludes that religious experience does not in fact justify religious belief.
Contents
  • Religious Experience Justifies Religious Belief (William P. Alston) – 135
  • Do Mystics See God? (Evan Fales) – 145
  • Reply to Fales – 158
  • Reply to Alston – 161



"Day (Allan) & Martin (L. Michael) - Debate: Is It Rational for Christians to Believe in the Resurrection?"

Source: Peterson (Michael) & Van Arragon (Raymond) - Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion, 2004


Editors’ Introduction
    The belief that Jesus rose from the dead is central to the Christian faith. If it were irrational to believe in the Resurrection, this would seriously call into question the rationality of Christian belief. Stephen T. Davis argues that it is indeed rational for Christians to believe that the Resurrection occurred. Michael Martin opposes this position, contending that it is not rational for anyone to believe that it took place.
Contents
  • It Is Rational to Believe in the Resurrection (Stephen T. Davis) – 164
    1. Introduction
    2. The Meaning of the Christian Resurrection Claim
    3. Probability and the Christian Expectation of Resurrection
    4. What Caused the Initial Christian Belief in the Resurrection?
      … Hoax
      … Vision or Hallucination
      … Applied Jewish Belief
      … Applied Greek Belief
      … The Truth
    5. Evidence for the Resurrection of Jesus
      …5.1 The Empty Tomb
      …5.2 The Appearances of the Risen Jesus
  • It Is Not Rational to Believe in the Resurrection (Michael Martin) – 174
    1. Introduction
    2. Overcoming Initial Improbabilities
    3. Problems with the Historical Evidence
    4. Need We Know What Happened?
    5. Davis’s Case for the Resurrection
      … 5.1 Evidence of the Empty Tomb
      … 5.2 The Evidence of the Conduct of the Disciples
      … 5.3 The Evidence of the Agreement Between the Gospels
      … 5.4 Evidence that the Resurrection Appearances Were Not Hallucinations
      … 5.5 Evidence of the Rise of Christianity
    6. Conclusion
  • Reply to Martin – 184
    1. The Historical Evidence
    2. The Epistemic Situation
  • Reply to Davis – 186



"Yandell (Keith E.) & Byrne (Peter) - Debate: Can Only One Religion Be True?"

Source: Peterson (Michael) & Van Arragon (Raymond) - Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion, 2004


Editors’ Introduction
    Keith Yandell and Peter Byrne agree that it is possible that only one religion is true, but there agrrement ends. Yandell believes that one religion is true, and he argues that the view known as "religious pluralism" — which rejects that belief – is fraught with contradiction and slyly sets up its own exclusivist religion which claims all others to be false. On the other side, Byrne argues that, given the plurality of world religions, it is most reasonable to suppose that there is some divine reality to which each is responding, but that each religion is strictly false in its exclusivist claims, or at any rate that none has anything like a complete picture of this reality.
Contents
  • How to Sink in Cognitive Quicksand: Nuancing Religious Pluralism (Keith E. Yandell) – 191
  • It Is Not Reasonable to Believe that Only One Religion Is True (Peter Byrne) – 201
  • Reply to Byrne – 211
  • Reply to Yandell – 215



"Hasker (William) & Helm (Paul) - Debate: Does God Take Risks in Governing the World"

Source: Peterson (Michael) & Van Arragon (Raymond) - Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion, 2004


Editors’ Introduction
    In this debate, William Hasker and Paul Helm both assume that if human beings have genuine libertarian freedom, freedom to do other than what they in fact do, then God leaves himself open to the possibility of surprise as well as disappointment. In other words, if God has given human beings libertarian freedom then God is a risk-taker. But Hasker and Helm disagree on whether human beings have libertarian freedom. Hasker argues that we do have it, and thus that God takes risks. He contends that his view fits better with both the biblical portrayal of God and a common-sense understanding of what kind of creatures God would want to create. Helm, on the other hand, argues that God does not take risks. God exerts strong providential control over his creation, but does so without at the same time being morally culpable for the evil that arises within it.
Contents
  • God Takes Risks (William Hasker) – 218
  • God Does Not Take Risks (Paul Helm) – 228
  • Reply to Helm – 238
  • Reply to Hasker – 240



"Murray (Michael J.) & Basinger (David) - Debate: Does God Respond to Petitionary Prayer?"

Source: Peterson (Michael) & Van Arragon (Raymond) - Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion, 2004


Editors’ Introduction
    It is clear that petitionary prayer can have many benefits - it can impact on the one praying and on the person prayed for, if she is aware of it. But does prayer have an effect on what God does? The common religious view is that it does. Prayer can prompt God to perform actions that God would not otherwise have performed. In the following debate, Michael Murray defends the common view by arguing that there are goods that God can attain only by acting in response to prayer. David Basinger rejects the common view, arguing that God would not give what is bad for us even if we ask for it, and that God would not make our petitioning a necessary condition for giving us what we actually need.
Contents
  • God Responds to Prayer (Michael J. Murray) – 242
  • God Does Not Necessarily Respond to Prayer (David Basinger) – 255
  • Reply to Basinger – 264
  • Reply to Murray – 266



"Walls (Jerry) & Talbott (Thomas) - Debate: Is Eternal Damnation Compatible with the Christian Conception of God?"

Source: Peterson (Michael) & Van Arragon (Raymond) - Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion, 2004


Editors’ Introduction
    Jerry Walls and Thomas Talbott both agree that God is perfectly loving and that he desires the salvation of all the persons he has created. But they disagree as to whether God's desire will be fulfilled. Walls argues that God has given human beings libertarian freedom and the opportunity to use it to accept or reject salvation. In so doing, God leaves open the possibility that some persons will freely and decisive reject him, a possibility which Jesus' own words lead us to believe will be actual. On the other side, Talbott contends that God's desire for the salvation of all will be fulfilled. He argues that it is not possible for one freely to reject God forever and that, even if it were, God's love would not permit anyone to do so.
Contents
  • Eternal Hell and the Christian Concept of God (Jerry Walls) – 268
  • No Hell (Thomas Talbott) – 278
  • Reply to Talbott – 287
  • Reply to Walls – 288



"Idziak (Janine), Boyd (Craig) & Van Arragon (Raymond) - Debate: Is Morality Based on God's Commands?"

Source: Peterson (Michael) & Van Arragon (Raymond) - Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion, 2004


Editors’ Introduction
    This set of essays considers two major theistic views on the relation between God and morality. The first view, endorsed by Janine Marie Idziak, is known as the "divine command theory." It answers the above question affirmatively: an act is morally right because God commands it and morally wrong because God forbids Craig Boyd and Raymond VanArragon defend a view known as the "natural law theory." It answers the question negatively: human nature determines what is right or wrong so that, roughly, an act is morally right because it helps to fulfil human nature and morally wrong because it prevents this fulfilment. Idziak and Boyd a VanArragon draw out their theories and define them against popular objections.
Contents
  • Divine Commands Are the Foundation of Morality (Janine Marie Idziak) – 290
  • Ethics Is Based on Natural Law (Craig A. Boyd and Raymond J. VanArragon) – 299
  • Reply to Boyd and VanArragon – 310
  • Reply to Idziak – 313



"Zimmerman (Dean) - Christians Should Affirm Mind-Body Dualism"

Source: Peterson (Michael) & Van Arragon (Raymond) - Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion, 2004


Editors’ Introduction
    Few questions in the philosophy of religion have received as much recent attention as this one. Many Christians answer it in the affirmative, believing that some form of mind-body dualism has the weight of Christian tradition on its side and that it is the view that makes best sense of the doctrine of life after death1. Yet an increasing number of Christians reject mind-body dualism in favor of some version of materialism, claiming that dualism is an illegitimate import from Greek philosophy and that its place in Christian thought should be re-evaluated. They argue, moreover, that materialism yields most of the advantages that dualism was supposed to provide while avoiding many of dualism's problems. In these essays, Dean Zimmerman argues in favor of mind-body dualism, while Lynne Rudder Baker defends a version of materialism.


COMMENT:



"Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Christians Should Reject Mind-Body Dualism"

Source: Peterson (Michael) & Van Arragon (Raymond) - Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion, 2004


    Through the ages, Christians have almost automatically been Mind-Body dualists. The Bible portrays us as spiritual beings, and one obvious way to be a spiritual being is to be (or to have) an immaterial soul. Since it is also evident that we have bodies, Christians naturally have thought of themselves as composite beings, made of two substances — a material body and a nonmaterial soul. Despite the historical weight of this position, I do not think that it is required either by Scripture or by Christian doctrine as it has developed through the ages. So, I want to argue that there is a Christian alternative to Mind-Body Dualism, and that the reasons in favor of the alternative outweigh those in favor of Mind-Body Dualism.


COMMENT:



"Zimmerman (Dean) - Reply to Baker's 'Christians Should Reject Mind-Body Dualism'"

Source: Peterson (Michael) & Van Arragon (Raymond) - Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion, 2004


Hard copy contains my annotations.

COMMENT:



"Baker (Lynne Rudder) - Reply to Zimmerman’s 'Christians Should Affirm Mind-Body Dualism'"

Source: Peterson (Michael) & Van Arragon (Raymond) - Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion, 2004


Editors’ Introduction
    Dean Zimmerman defends a version of Substance Dualism “Emergent Dualism” as a view for Christians. Is there any reason philosophical or religious to prefer Emergent Dualism to the (nondualistic) Constitution View1?


COMMENT:



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