Dream, Death, and the Self
Valberg (J.J.)
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BOOK ABSTRACT:

Back Cover Blurb

  1. "Might this be a dream?" In this book, distinguished philosopher J. J. Valberg approaches the familiar question about dream and reality by seeking to identify its subject matter: what is it that would be the dream if "this" were a dream? It turns out to be a subject matter that contains the whole of the world, space, and time but which, like consciousness for Sartre, is nothing "in itself." This subject matter, the "personal horizon," lies at the heart of the main topics - the first person, the self, and the self in time - explored at length in the book.
  2. The personal horizon is, Valberg contends, the subject matter whose center each of us occupies, and which for each of us ceases with death. This ceasing to be presents itself solipsistically not just as the end of everything "for me" but as the end of everything absolutely. Yet since it is the same for everyone, this cannot be. Death thus confronts us with an impossible fact: something that cannot be but will be.
  3. The puzzle about death is one of several extraphilosophical puzzles about the self that Valberg discusses, puzzles that can trouble everyday consciousness without any contribution from philosophy. Nor can philosophy resolve the puzzles. Its task is to get to the bottom of them, and in this respect to understand ourselves - a task philosophy has always set itself.



"Valberg (J.J.) - Philosophical Discovery and Philosophical Puzzles"

Source: Valberg (J.J.) - Dream, Death, and the Self, 2007, Introduction


Sections
  1. Discovering What We Already Know – 1
  2. The Socratic Conception of Philosophical Discovery – 2
  3. Wittgenstein: Insidership and Philosophical Discovery – 3
  4. Philosophical Discovery and Resistance – 6
  5. The Presumptuousness of a Claim to Philosophical Discovery – 7
  6. Conceptual Analysis and the Communal Horizon – 9
  7. The Personal Horizon – 11
  8. Philosophical Anticipations of the Personal Horizon – 13
  9. Two Types of Philosophical Puzzle – 18
  10. The Extraphilosophical Puzzles – 20


COMMENT: Printout filed in "Various - Papers on Identity Boxes: Vol 18 (T-V)".



"Valberg (J.J.) - The Dream Hypothesis and the Argument from Internality"

Source: Valberg (J.J.) - Dream, Death, and the Self, 2007, Chapter 1


Sections
  1. Our Purpose in Raising the Dream Hypothesis – 27
  2. That the Dream/Reality Contrast Is Extrinsic to the Subject Matter of the Dream Hypothesis – 28
  3. The Argument from Internality – 31
  4. Dream and the Law of Excluded Middle – 34
  5. The Dream Hypothesis and Space – 40
  6. The Dream Hypothesis and Time – 43
  7. The Dream Hypothesis and the World – 48



"Valberg (J.J.) - The Dream Hypothesis: Identity and the First Person"

Source: Valberg (J.J.) - Dream, Death, and the Self, 2007, Chapter 2


Sections
  1. A Puzzle about Identity – 53
  2. Representation and Identity – 54
  3. A Way out of the Puzzle – 57
  4. The Dream Hypothesis and the First-Person Singular – 61
  5. The Subject versus the Dreamer of a Dream; The Positional Conception of the Self – 64
  6. Emerging from a Dream and the First Person – 68



"Valberg (J.J.) - The Confusion of Standpoint"

Source: Valberg (J.J.) - Dream, Death, and the Self, 2007, Chapter 3


Sections
  1. Dreams and the Infinity of Time – 71
  2. Time and the Confusion of Standpoint – 74
  3. Descartes and the Dream Hypothesis – 76
  4. Dream Skepticism versus Memory Skepticism – 78
  5. Real-Life Uncertainty about the Dream Hypothesis – 80



"Valberg (J.J.) - The Subject Matter of the Dream Hypothesis"

Source: Valberg (J.J.) - Dream, Death, and the Self, 2007, Chapter 4


Sections
  1. Is the Argument from Internality Valid? – 84
  2. The Subject Matter of the Dream Hypothesis and Grammatical Illusion – 86
  3. Alternative Formulations of the Dream Hypothesis – 88
  4. Reality – 91
  5. What Is the Subject Matter of the Dream Hypothesis? – 94
  6. The Horizonal versus Phenomenal Conception of Mind – 97



"Valberg (J.J.) - The Dream Hypothesis and the Skeptical Challenge"

Source: Valberg (J.J.) - Dream, Death, and the Self, 2007, Chapter 5


Sections
  1. The Skeptical Argument – 101
  2. The Usual Argument for Dream Skepticism; Immanent versus Transcendent Dream Skepticism – 105
  3. The Uniqueness of Transcendent Dream Skepticism – 108
  4. Dream Skepticism and the External World – 110
  5. Nozick on the Tank Hypothesis – 113



"Valberg (J.J.) - Responding to Dream Skepticism"

Source: Valberg (J.J.) - Dream, Death, and the Self, 2007, Chapter 6


Sections
  1. Is the Dream Hypothesis a Pseudo Hypothesis? – 119
  2. Whether It Would Matter if THIS Were a Dream – 122
  3. The General Form of My Response to the Dream Hypothesis – 126
  4. I Am with Others: Metaphysical Equality and the Claim to Preeminence – 128
  5. The Commitment to (O) – 131
  6. Raising the Dream Hypothesis in Conversation: Forcing a Withdrawal to the First Person – 134
  7. Withdrawing to the First Person and the Horizonal Use of the First Person – 136
  8. Why It Is Rationally Impossible to Believe the Dream Hypothesis – 138
  9. The Space of Horizons – 141
  10. Other Minds – 144
  11. Skepticism and Solipsism – 146



"Valberg (J.J.) - I Will Die"

Source: Valberg (J.J.) - Dream, Death, and the Self, 2007, Chapter 7


Sections
  1. Dream and Death; Discovering the Meaning of Death – 153
  2. Being Disturbed by the Prospect of Death – 154
  3. That the Prospect of Death Holds Up Something Not Just Awful but Incomprehensible; Death and Self-Deception – 157
  4. Reacting to the Prospect of Death: A Text – 160
  5. Philosophical Reflection and Real-Life Disturbance – 165



"Valberg (J.J.) - The Subject Matter and 'Mineness' of My Death"

Source: Valberg (J.J.) - Dream, Death, and the Self, 2007, Chapter 8


Sections
  1. The Prospect of Death – 168
  2. I Will Cease to Be – 171
  3. Death and the Stream of Mental States – 173
  4. The World and the Subject Matter of Death – 177
  5. The "Mineness" of My Death and the Horizonal Use of the First Person – 181



"Valberg (J.J.) - Solipsism"

Source: Valberg (J.J.) - Dream, Death, and the Self, 2007, Chapter 9


Sections
  1. My Horizon and the Horizon – 185
  2. The Solipsism of Wittgenstein's Tractatus – 188
  3. Solipsism and Self-Consciousness1 – 192
  4. Kripke on the Solipsism of the Tractatus – 195
  5. Negativism – 198



"Valberg (J.J.) - Death and the Truth of Solipsism"

Source: Valberg (J.J.) - Dream, Death, and the Self, 2007, Chapter 10


Sections
  1. Solipsism and My Life with Others – 201
  2. Relativized Solipsism – 204
  3. Solipsism and the Meaning of Death – 206
  4. Qualifying the NOTHINGNESS of Death – 209



"Valberg (J.J.) - The Awfulness and Incomprehensibility of Death"

Source: Valberg (J.J.) - Dream, Death, and the Self, 2007, Chapter 11


Sections
  1. The Awfulness of Death – 215
  2. The Two Forms of the Impossibility of Death – 219
  3. The Temporal Impossibility of Death – 220
  4. Consciousness and Causation1 – 222
  5. The Solipsistic Impossibility of Death – 227
  6. The "Aloneness" of the Dying Subject – 228
  7. The Puzzles of Death and the Causation2 of Consciousness – 232



"Valberg (J.J.) - Imagination and the Cartesian Self"

Source: Valberg (J.J.) - Dream, Death, and the Self, 2007, Chapter 12


Sections
  1. What Is "the Self"? – 237
  2. The Cartesian Argument – 237
  3. Imagination and Proof – 240
  4. Exhibiting Possibilities in Imagination – 242
  5. Imagination and Experiential Possibility – 245
  6. Experiential Possibilities and Possibilities of Essence – 247
  7. The Paralogism of Imagination – 249
  8. The Cartesian Reply – 251



"Valberg (J.J.) - Metaphysical Possibility and the Self"

Source: Valberg (J.J.) - Dream, Death, and the Self, 2007, Chapter 13


Sections
  1. Metaphysical Possibility – 255
  2. Metaphysical Possibility and the Self – 257
  3. The Logic of the Self – 259
  4. Naturalizing the Self – 261



"Valberg (J.J.) - Preliminary Reflections on the Positional Conception of the Self"

Source: Valberg (J.J.) - Dream, Death, and the Self, 2007, Chapter 14


Sections
  1. Nagel's Puzzle about "Being Me" – 264
  2. Individual Essence: Frege on Our "Particular and Primitive" Mode of Self-Presentation – 265
  3. My Body and Me (the Human Being That I Am) – 269
  4. The Multiplicity of the Phenomenology of the Subject Position – 271
  5. The Standing/Operative Ambiguity – 273
  6. Causal Centrality – 275
  7. Causation1 and the Phenomenology of the Subject Position – 279
  8. Orientational Centrality – 281
  9. The Sense in Which the Positional and Horizonal Conceptions of the Self Are "Always in Play" – 282



"Valberg (J.J.) - The Phenomenology of the Subject Position"

Source: Valberg (J.J.) - Dream, Death, and the Self, 2007, Chapter 15


Sections
  1. Perceptual Centrality: The Visual and Tactual Appearing of My Body – 286
  2. Perceptual Centrality: The Visual Appearing of Myself – 290
  3. Perceptual Centrality: Views of Myself – 293
  4. Centrality of Feeling: Figuring as the Space of Feeling – 297
  5. The Centrality of Feeling: The Sense in Which the Space of Feeling (My Body-Space) Is a "Space" – 299
  6. Centrality of Feeling: The Ontological Dependence of My Body-Space on My Body – 304
  7. Volitional Centrality: Acting/Will and the Phenomenology of the Subject Position – 307
  8. Volitional Centrality: The Phenomenology of Will – 309
  9. Volitional Centrality: The "Mineness" of My Actions – 315
  10. Volitional Centrality: Phenomenology and Causality1 – 319



"Valberg (J.J.) - The Uses of the First Person"

Source: Valberg (J.J.) - Dream, Death, and the Self, 2007, Chapter 16


Sections
  1. Introduction – 321
  2. The Referential Use of the First Person – 322
  3. Reference and the Use of "I" as Subject/Object – 324
  4. "I Am Thinking . . . /I See . . ." – 329
  5. The Positional Use of the First Person – 334
  6. The Horizonal Use of the First Person – 337



"Valberg (J.J.) - What Makes First-Person Reference First Personal?"

Source: Valberg (J.J.) - Dream, Death, and the Self, 2007, Chapter 17


Sections
  1. The Meaning of the Question We Are Asking – 342
  2. Following the Rule for the Use of "I" – 343
  3. Inner First-Person Reference – 346
  4. Attitudes de Se – 351
  5. First-Person Reference and the Positional Conception of the Self – 354
  6. The First Person and Emptiness at the Center – 355



"Valberg (J.J.) - Temporalizing the Self"

Source: Valberg (J.J.) - Dream, Death, and the Self, 2007, Chapter 18


Sections
  1. Introduction – 359
  2. Tense and the Phenomenology of the Subject Position – 360
  3. The Tense Asymmetry in the Phenomenology of the Subject Position – 364
  4. Tense and the Horizonal Self – 366



"Valberg (J.J.) - The Problem of Personal Identity"

Source: Valberg (J.J.) - Dream, Death, and the Self, 2007, Chapter 19


Sections
  1. The Special Philosophical Problem of Personal Identity: The Problem of First-Person Identity – 370
  2. Imagining Myself Persisting through a Change of Human Beings (Bodies) – 373
  3. Locke's View of Personal Identity – 376
  4. Persistence and the Horizon – 380
  5. Remembering; The Past-Self Ambiguity – 382
  6. Possibility, Personal Identity, and Naturalizing the Self – 387



"Valberg (J.J.) - Time and the Horizon"

Source: Valberg (J.J.) - Dream, Death, and the Self, 2007, Chapter 20


Sections
  1. The Oneness of the Horizon – 394
  2. Skepticism about the Oneness over Time of My Horizon – 397
  3. Kant's Third Paralogism: The Self "in Time" and the Self That "Time Is In" – 400



"Valberg (J.J.) - My Past"

Source: Valberg (J.J.) - Dream, Death, and the Self, 2007, Chapter 21


Sections
  1. The Availability in Memory of Past Events – 408
  2. The Argument from Pastness – 410
  3. Being Open to the Availability of the Past – 413
  4. Memory Images – 417
  5. Letting the Past Be Past – 420
  6. Moving from Inside to Outside the Sphere of Phenomenological Reflection – 422
  7. The Puzzle of Memory and the Puzzle of Experience – 426
  8. The Puzzle of Memory and the Problems of First-Person Identity – 429



"Valberg (J.J.) - My Future"

Source: Valberg (J.J.) - Dream, Death, and the Self, 2007, Chapter 22


Sections
  1. My Future versus the Future – 432
  2. My Future and My Brain: Jumping over Death – 434
  3. Parfit1 on My Future Self – 439
  4. Nozick's "Closest Continuer2" Theory – 444



"Valberg (J.J.) - My Future: The Puzzle of Division"

Source: Valberg (J.J.) - Dream, Death, and the Self, 2007, Chapter 23


Sections
  1. Personal Identity and Possibility (Review) – 450
  2. The Possibility of Division – 451
  3. Parfit1 on Division – 454
  4. Other Responses to the Puzzle of Division: Nozick and Lewis – 458
  5. The Puzzle of Division and the Identity-Framework – 463
  6. Horizonal Doubling versus Splits within the Horizon – 465
  7. The Impossibility of Horizonal Doubling – 468
  8. The Unity of Consciousness – 470
  9. The Puzzle of Division – 472



"Valberg (J.J.) - Conclusion: The Extraphilosophical Puzzles"

Source: Valberg (J.J.) - Dream, Death, and the Self, 2007, Chapter 24


Sections
  1. The Extra- versus Purely Philosophical Puzzles – 474
  2. The Puzzle of Division and the Puzzle of the Causation1 of Consciousness – 478
  3. Our Causal Entrapment in the World – 480
  4. The Extraphilosophical Puzzles and the Horizonal Subject Matter – 482



Text Colour Conventions (see disclaimer)
  1. Blue: Text by me; © Theo Todman, 2019
  2. Mauve: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); © the author(s)



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