<!DOCTYPE html><HTML lang="en"> <head><meta charset="utf-8"> <title>Neuroscience and the Person (Russell (Robert John), Murphy (Nancey), Meyering (Theo C.), Arbib (Michael A.)) - Theo Todman's Book Collection (Book-Paper Abstracts)</title> <link href="../../../TheosStyle.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"><link rel="shortcut icon" href="../../../TT_ICO.png" /> </head> <a name="Top"></a> <BODY> <div id="header"> <HR><H1>Theo Todman's Book Collection (Book-Paper Abstracts)</H1></div> <hr><CENTER><TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950><tr><td colspan =3><A HREF = "../BookSummary_2921.htm">Neuroscience and the Person</A></td></tr><tr><td colspan =3><A HREF = "../../../Authors/R/Author_Russell (Robert John).htm">Russell (Robert John)</a>, <A HREF = "../../../Authors/M/Author_Murphy (Nancey).htm">Murphy (Nancey)</a>, <A HREF = "../../../Authors/M/Author_Meyering (Theo C.).htm">Meyering (Theo C.)</a>, <A HREF = "../../../Authors/A/Author_Arbib (Michael A.).htm">Arbib (Michael A.)</a></td></tr><tr><td colspan =3>This Page provides (where held) the <b>Abstract</b> of the above <b>Book</b> and those of all the <b>Papers</b> contained in it.</td></tr><tr><td><A HREF="#ColourConventions">Text Colour-Conventions</a></td><td><A HREF = "../BookCitings_2921.htm">Books / Papers Citing this Book</A></td><td><A HREF = "../BooksToNotes_2921.htm">Notes Citing this Book</A></td></tr></tr></TABLE></CENTER><hr> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>BOOK ABSTRACT: </B><ul type="disc"><li>University of Notre Dame Press; 1st edition (28 Feb 2000), </li><li> From the "Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action" series.</li></ul><U>Cover Blurb</U><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>This collection of twenty-one essays explores the creative interaction among the cognitive neurosciences, philosophy, and theology. It is the result of the fourth of five international research conferences co-sponsored by the Vatican Observatory, Rome, and the Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences, Berkeley. The overarching goal of these conferences is to support the engagement of constructive theology with the natural sciences and to investigate the philosophical and theological elements in on-going theoretical research in the natural sciences.</li><li>In <B>Section One</B>, essays on biblical accounts of human nature (Joel B. Green) and on the role of philosophical theories of human nature in recent theology (Fergus Kerr) are paired with "snapshots" of neuroscientific research (Joseph E. LeDoux, Peter Hagoort, Marc Jeannerod, and Leslie A. Brothers) to set the poles between which the volume s dialogue proceeds. </li><li>In <B>Section Two</B>, essays of two types bridge the fields of cognitive neuroscience and philosophy of mind: the first begin with findings in science that raise philosophical issues (Michael A. Arbib, LeDoux, Jeannerod); the second type address current philosophical accounts of human nature, focusing especially on reductionism (William R. Stoeger, Nancey Murphy, Theo C. Meyering). </li><li>Essays in <B>Section Three</B> proceed from neuroscientific or philosophical accounts of human nature to theological interpretations: three essays provide comprehensive accounts of human nature consistent with both theology and science (Philip Clayton, Arthur Peacocke, Ian G. Barbour); others relate findings and general trends in neuroscience to phenomenological and Thomistic accounts of human experience (Stephen Happel), to Christian teaching on <a name="1"></a><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_9/Notes_978.htm">life after death</A><SUP>1</SUP> (Ted Peters), and to religious experience (Fraser Watts, Wesley J. Wildman, and Leslie Brothers). </li><li><B>Section Four</B> offers conflicting answers to the question whether or not a theistic account is needed to make sense of the various dimensions of human nature canvassed in this volume.</li><li>This series of conferences builds on the initial Vatican Observatory conference and its resulting publication, <I>Physics, Philosophy, and Theology: A Common Quest for Understanding</I> (1988), and on previous jointly-sponsored conferences and their publications: <I>Quantum Cosmology and the Laws of Nature</I> (1993), <I>Chaos and Complexity</I> (1995); and <I>Molecular and Evolutionary Biology</I> (1998). A future conference will focus on quantum physics and quantum field theory.</li></ol></FONT></P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_13/PaperSummary_13214.htm">Arbib (Michael A.) - Crusoe s Brain: Of Solitude and Society</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Russell (Robert John), Murphy (Nancey), Meyering (Theo C.), Arbib (Michael A.) - Neuroscience and the Person<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>In the first part of  Crusoe s Brain: Of Solitude and Society, Michael A. Arbib develops a thesis regarding social influences on brain function and hence on brain structure. Social schema theory attempts to understand how social schemas, constituted by collective patterns of behavior in a society, provide an external reality from which a person acquires schemas  in the head. There is thus a top-down influence of social interaction on the microstructure of the brain through evolutionary processes, with brain action effectuated through perceptual and motor schemas. Conversely, it is the collective effect of behaviors that express schemas held by many individuals that constitutes and changes this social reality.</li><li>The learning of language provides an example of how individuals interiorize social schemas. Current research on mirror neurons (neurons that are active not only when an action is performed but also when the action is being perceived) provides a hypothesis that language specialization in humans derives from an ancient mechanism related to the observation and execution of motor acts. Arbib rejects Noam Chomsky s hypothesis that language learning depends on innate universal grammar. Instead, based on work with Jane Hill, he argues that language in children begins with repetition of words and phrases, shaped by the use of very rudimentary grammatical schemas that develop by means of ( neo-Piagetian ) assimilation and adaptation. The richness of the metaphorical character of language can be interpreted in terms of schema theory: a word or phrase is an impoverished representation of some schema assemblage. Thus, extraction of meaning is a virtually endless dynamic process.</li><li>In the second part of Arbib s essay he applies social schema theory to a discussion of ideology and religion. Social schemas include those that we take to be representations of the world, but others that we do not, such as ideals of human life that are never realized and models that are false but useful. While schema theory has no implications for the question of the existence of God, it does offer new and useful vocabulary for discussing the projection theory of religion, found already in the writings of Ludwig Feuerbach and Sigmund Freud. An ideology can be viewed as a very large social schema. It is, like language, something that the child comes to as an external reality and internalizes to become a member of society. While it is central to schema theory to analyze the mechanisms whereby social construction and reality depiction are dynamically interlinked, it is important to note that many  realities are socially defined rather than  physical. Thus, social schema theory provides a way of asking whether the  reality of God is both external reality and social construction, or whether  God is merely a social construct. Arbib suggests that the wide variation among religious beliefs argues for the latter conclusion. He offers this argument as an antidote to the  unabashedly Christian worldview of many other contributors to this volume, for whom the reality of divine action is taken as a given. </li></ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>University of Notre Dame Press; 1st edition (28 Feb 2000); Abstract from <A HREF = "http://www.counterbalance.net/ctns-vo/neuro-frame.html" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>.</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_13/PaperSummary_13213.htm">Arbib (Michael A.) - Towards a Neuroscience of the Person</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Russell (Robert John), Murphy (Nancey), Meyering (Theo C.), Arbib (Michael A.) - Neuroscience and the Person<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Michael A. Arbib, in his essay  Towards a Neuroscience of the Person, provides an excellent framework for relating the neurosciences to the concerns of the human sciences and theology. The organizing idea of his essay is the following: a discussion of what neuroscience has to contribute to an emerging science of the person will provide a bridge between the narrow foci of individual researchers efforts in the cognitive neurosciences, on the one hand, and the far broader but less scientifically grounded considerations of humanists, including theologians, as they seek to explicate the nature of the person.</li><li>Arbib begins with a survey of topics on which neuroscience has offered insights into mental phenomena such as memory, emotion and motivation, social behavior, and language. This sampling of scientific developments raises the question whether the cognitive neurosciences will eventually provide a framework for understanding all of the phenomena that define human nature. In particular there is the question whether the study of the brain can explain the religious dimension of human life, or whether the subject-matter of theology will always elude neuroscientific investigation. Arbib maintains that a complete science of the person must take account of theology, but argues that theology ought to be understood not as the science of God but as the study of human belief in God. This latter understanding would open the discussion for nonbelievers (such as Arbib himself) but would incorporate the former understanding of theology if God in fact exists. Neuroscience cannot address the concept of God directly but can make progress toward theological questions, especially if theology is defined in the broad sense.Another important issue is the relation of neuroscience to questions of morality. Arbib notes that both religion (even on a nontheistic account) and neuroscience can provide insight. Neuroscience cannot answer questions of right and wrong, but it can elucidate aspects of morality such as decision-making, empathy, and social behavior.Arbib then sketches the possible role of computational neuroscience in bridging levels between neuron and person. Schema theory provides a link between  cognition-level and  neuron-level descriptions of the person. Basic schema theory operates at the level of cognitive science, and explains mental operations and behavior in terms of functional units. There are schemas for recognition of objects, planning and control of actions, and more abstract operations as well. Mental life and behavior result from the dynamic interaction, cooperation, and competition of many schema instances. The individual can be understood as a self-organized  schema encyclopedia. Schema theory provides a bridge between neuroscience and the humanities: it can be extended  downward by studying the neural realizations of simple schemas; it can be extended  upward by recognizing that schemas have an external social reality in collective patterns of thought and behavior. Arbib claims that while schema theory can contribute to many open questions regarding the dependence of aspects of the person on the brain, Christian teaching parts company with science on the issue of the resurrection.</li></ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>University of Notre Dame Press; 1st edition (28 Feb 2000); Abstract from <A HREF = "http://www.counterbalance.net/ctns-vo/neuro-frame.html" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>.</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_13/PaperSummary_13215.htm">Barbour (Ian) - Neuroscience, Artificial Intelligence, and Human Nature: Theological and Philosophical Reflections</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Russell (Robert John), Murphy (Nancey), Meyering (Theo C.), Arbib (Michael A.) - Neuroscience and the Person<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Ian Barbour, in  Neuroscience, Artificial Intelligence, and Human Nature: Theological and Philosophical Reflections, develops a three-stranded argument, in which he sets out to show that it is consistent with neuroscience, computer science, and a theological view of human nature to understand a person as a multilevel psychosomatic unity who is both a biological organism and a responsible self. He considers the themes of embodiment, emotions, the social self, and consciousness.</li><li>Barbour surveys biblical and theological accounts of the person that emphasize the integration of body and mind, reason and emotion, individual and social groups. He then cites work by neuroscientists that highlights these same features, including Arbib s action-oriented schema theory, LeDoux s work on emotions, and Brothers work on the neural bases of social interaction. The ways in which computers fall short of human capacities provides additional insight into human nature: to approach the level of human functioning, computers require analogues to embodiment, learning and socialization, and emotion. The question of the possibility of consciousness in a computer is particularly problematic. Barbour shows that the concepts of information, dynamic systems, hierarchical levels, and emergence are valuable for integrating insights from neuroscience and AI research with that of theology in a theory of human nature.</li><li>Barbour argues that process philosophy provides a supportive metaphysical framework for understanding the concept of human nature that he has developed in this essay. Alfred North Whitehead s philosophy emphasizes processes or events rather than substances. These events are all of one kind (thus, monism) but are all dipolar - they have both an objective and a subjective phase. Thus, in attenuated form, experience can be attributed not only to humans and animals, but also to lower forms of life, and even to atoms. In its own way, process philosophy emphasizes the same themes that Barbour traced through theology, neuroscience, and AI research. So Barbour concludes that a dipolar monism based on process philosophy is supportive of a biblical view of the human as a multilevel unity, an embodied social self, and a responsible agent with capacities for reason and emotion.</li></ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>University of Notre Dame Press; 1st edition (28 Feb 2000); Abstract from <A HREF = "http://www.counterbalance.net/ctns-vo/neuro-frame.html" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>.</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_13/PaperSummary_13216.htm">Brothers (Leslie A.) - A Neuroscientific Perspective on Human Sociality</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Russell (Robert John), Murphy (Nancey), Meyering (Theo C.), Arbib (Michael A.) - Neuroscience and the Person<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>In  A Neuroscientific Perspective on Human Sociality, Leslie A. Brothers describes recent findings on the neural substrate of social behavior. A wide variety of evidence points to the role of the amygdala in processing information crucial for social interactions: (1) Monkeys with experimental lesions of the anterior temporal lobes (where the amygdala is located) have particular difficulty responding to the social signals of other monkeys. (2) Human patients with lesions of the amygdala have difficulty interpreting facial expressions, direction of eye gaze, and tone of voice. (3) Tests during neurosurgery show that a person s ability to identify facial expressions can be disrupted by electrical stimulation to temporal-lobe regions. (4) Researchers studying vision in monkeys found temporal-lobe neurons that seemed to be responsive only to social visual stimuli such as faces. Brothers own research involved recording the activity of individual neurons in the region of the amygdala while monkeys watched video clips of other monkeys engaged in a number of activities. Her results showed that some nerve cells are particularly attuned to respond to movements that bear social significance, such as the specific yawn that males use to signal dominance.</li><li>The picture that is emerging from human and monkey studies, says Brothers, is that representations of features of the outside social world are first assembled in the temporal lobe cortices of the primate brain. Meaningful social events are registered when a host of signals and relevant contextual information are integrated. Our brains need to tell us the difference between someone approaching with friendly intent and someone whose aims are hostile, for example. The visual features of a face have to be put together to yield an image of a particular individual so that past interactions with this individual can be recalled. Next, movements of the eyes and mouth indicate the person s disposition. Information from head position and body movement tell where this person is looking or going, providing raw material for the representation of a mental state such as his or her goal or desire. As these processes are taking place, the neural representation of others social intentions must be linked to an appropriate responsive behavior in the perceiver. Response dispositions should be set into play  downstream from the temporal cortices, where face-responsive neurons have been found, in structures such as the amygdala. The amygdala, together with several other interconnected structures, receives sensory information and in turn projects directly to somatic effector structures such as the hypothalamus, brainstem, and primitive motor centers, making it a candidate for the link between social perception and response.</li><li>Brothers notes that human social interaction depends on the ability to employ the concept of person - a mind-body unit. What the research summarized here suggests is that the evolution of our brains has made it possible for us to construct and participate in the language-game of personhood; we have brains specially equipped for social participation.</li></ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>University of Notre Dame Press; 1st edition (28 Feb 2000); Abstract from <A HREF = "http://www.counterbalance.net/ctns-vo/neuro-frame.html" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>.</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_13/PaperSummary_13217.htm">Clayton (Philip) - Neuroscience, the Person, and God: An Emergentist Account</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Russell (Robert John), Murphy (Nancey), Meyering (Theo C.), Arbib (Michael A.) - Neuroscience and the Person<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Philip Clayton, in  Neuroscience, the Person, and God: An Emergentist Account, provides a fine overview of issues spanning the range from neuroscience, through philosophy of mind, to theology. Beginning, as does Arbib, with a list of some of neuroscience s achievements in understanding human phenomena, Clayton points out that either of two extreme positions, if true, would block any significant dialogue between the neurosciences and theology. On the one hand, strong forms of dualism that make mind into a separate substance remove mental phenomena forever from the realm of scientific study. On the other hand, eliminative materialism - the view that  folk psychological entities such as beliefs and desires do not exist - resolves the debate with theology by removing theology altogether from the realm of possible theories. For this reason, Clayton s essay challenges the  Sufficiency Thesis, according to which neuroscientific explanations will finally be sufficient to fully explain human behavior.</li><li>Once these two extreme views, ontological dualism and radical reductionism, have been dismissed, a wide range of interesting possibilities remains for integrating neuroscientific results and theological interpretations into a theory of the person. One set of issues hinges on how one understands the epistemological status of theology. Clayton advocates the view that while religious beliefs are not subject to proof or confirmation from science, they need to be answerable to scientific advances in the weaker sense of not being counter-indicated by the empirical sciences.The more difficult issues have to do with interpretation of the results of neuroscience. It is clear that neural states are major determinants of subjective experience and thought, yet Clayton takes the  structural couplings between the conscious organism and its environment, the phenomena of reference and meaning, and the experience of  qualia (the subjective side of conscious experience) to suggest that mental events or properties are not thoroughly reducible to neural states. Clayton, along with others in this volume, understands mental events as supervenient on their physical substrates; however, along with Murphy, he challenges the standard accounts of <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1263.htm">supervenience</A><SUP>1</SUP> that seem inevitably to result in causal reduction of the mental to the physical. Clayton s version of  soft or  emergentist <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1263.htm">supervenience</A><SUP>2</SUP> defines a property F as emergent if, and only if, there is a law to the effect that all systems with this microstructure have F, but F cannot, even in theory, be deduced from the most complete knowledge of the basic properties of the components of the system. If mental properties <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1263.htm">supervene</A><SUP>3</SUP> on physical properties in this manner, Clayton concludes, there is room for genuine mental <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_39.htm">causation</A><SUP>4</SUP> - not all causes of human behavior are purely neuronal causes. Clayton s account of <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1263.htm">supervenience</A><SUP>5</SUP> leads to an emergentist-monist account of the person:  monist because, while there are many types of properties encountered in the world, there is only one natural system that bears all those properties;  emergentist because, while mental phenomena result from an (incredibly complex) physical system, the brain, they represent a genuinely new causal and explanatory level in the world. He notes that emergentist monism is open to theological applications and interpretations, although it does not require a theistic outlook.</li></ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>University of Notre Dame Press; 1st edition (28 Feb 2000); Abstract from <A HREF = "http://www.counterbalance.net/ctns-vo/neuro-frame.html" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>.</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_13/PaperSummary_13218.htm">Ellis (George F.R.) - Intimations of Transcendence: Relations of the Mind to God</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Russell (Robert John), Murphy (Nancey), Meyering (Theo C.), Arbib (Michael A.) - Neuroscience and the Person<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>In  Intimations of Transcendence: Relations of the Mind to God, George F.R. Ellis explores a strongly theistic interpretation of religious experience. He aims to show the logical coherence of a particular  kenotic theological position, as well as its consistency with current views within both physics and neuroscience. After outlining the position he takes on fundamental issues such as the role of models in science, the hierarchical structuring of science, and the relations between causal explanations from different levels, Ellis presents a summary of the theological-ethical position that he developed with Nancey Murphy (Nancey Murphy and George F.R. Ellis, <I>On the Moral Nature of the Universe</I> (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996)).  Kenosis is a term from Christology that referred originally to Christ s  emptying himself of divine attributes. Ellis and Murphy extend the meaning of the term, using it to describe God s loving self-sacrifice as revealed in the life and death of Jesus. On this view, kenosis is an overall key to the nature of creation because it is the nature of the Creator. A kenotic ethic of self-giving love reflects the ultimate nature and power of God, manifest most clearly in the resurrection of Jesus.</li><li>Evidence for the theological vision proposed here comes from a variety of human experiences, which Peter Berger has termed  intimations of transcendence. Ellis argues that while there may be evolutionary or functional explanations of moral behavior, human creativity, aesthetic appreciation, love and joy, in all of these cases there seems to be an excess. Humans, for example, sacrifice themselves not only for kin but for strangers, and human love goes beyond the bounds of the practical. However, none of these intimations is sufficient to yield a detailed account of the nature of the transcendent. Thus, Ellis asserts the need for a channel of revelation. A major goal of this essay is to argue that a view of divine action (revelation) through the mediation of the human brain is consistent with contemporary neuroscience. He speculates that the causal gap revealed by quantum theory allows for a  causal joint whereby information may be made available to human consciousness without violation of energy conservation. However, Ellis s argument does not depend critically on the role of quantum phenomena in consciousness, but rather on the coherence and explanatory scope of the theological vision he proposes.</li></ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>University of Notre Dame Press; 1st edition (28 Feb 2000); Abstract from <A HREF = "http://www.counterbalance.net/ctns-vo/neuro-frame.html" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>.</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_13/PaperSummary_13212.htm">Green (Joel B.) - Restoring the Human Person: New Testament Voices for a Wholistic and Social Anthropology</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Russell (Robert John), Murphy (Nancey), Meyering (Theo C.), Arbib (Michael A.) - Neuroscience and the Person<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>New Testament scholar Joel B. Green was asked to write an essay reflecting current scholarship on biblical views of human nature. In  Restoring the Human Person: New Testament Voices for a Wholistic and Social Anthropology, Green laments the fact that recent investigations of  biblical anthropology have focused either on the question of body-soul dualism or on a series of topics oriented around human sin and its remedies. This is unfortunate because Scripture is largely unconcerned with speculative questions about human nature; the attempt to find answers to current philosophical questions can obscure the biblical writers own central concerns.</li><li>Green focuses his investigation on the writings of Paul and Luke - Paul because he is regarded as the most important theologian of the apostolic age; Luke because he is arguably the only Gentile author represented in the New Testament. This suggests that if any New Testament material were to reflect the dualism alleged to characterize Hellenistic thought, it would be that of Luke. Luke s concern with human nature arises within the context of his understanding of salvation. Luke raises questions about what needs to be saved, and what  saved existence would look like. Answers to these two questions point to his understanding of authentic human existence. Green examines as paradigmatic Luke s narrative of Jesus healing of the woman with the haemorrhage (Luke 8:42b - 48). Green finds here a holistic and social anthropology, evidenced by the fact that healing involves not merely reversal of her physical malady, but also restoration of her place in both the social world and the family of God. The importance of this (and other relevant texts) is to call into question two closely related tendencies in the twentieth-century West: to think of salvation fundamentally in  spiritual terms, and, with respect to issues of healing and health, to think primarily in terms of bodies. Green supports his claim for the holistic and social anthropology of the Bible by examining other Lukan texts, as well as many of the Pauline and Genesis texts that have been used in the past to warrant body-soul dualism. In addition, he criticizes the popular  word study method of biblical interpretation that has allowed body-soul dualism to achieve a prominence in Christian thought far out of proportion to the scriptural evidence. Such an approach too easily lends itself to reading contemporary meanings into biblical terms. Green concludes that Christians today who embrace a monistic account of humanity place themselves centrally within a biblical understanding. At the same time, he says, biblical faith resists any suggestion that our humanity can be reduced to our physicality. Furthermore, an account of the human person that takes seriously the biblical record will deny that human nature can be understood  one person at a time, and will focus on the human capacity and vocation for community with God, with the human family, and in relation to the cosmos.</li></ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>University of Notre Dame Press; 1st edition (28 Feb 2000); Abstract from <A HREF = "http://www.counterbalance.net/ctns-vo/neuro-frame.html" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>.</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_13/PaperSummary_13219.htm">Hagoort (Peter) - The Uniquely Human Capacity for Language Communication: From POPE to [po:p] in Half a Second</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Russell (Robert John), Murphy (Nancey), Meyering (Theo C.), Arbib (Michael A.) - Neuroscience and the Person<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Peter Hagoort specializes in the study of the neural underpinnings of language. In  The Uniquely Human Capacity for Language Communication: From POPE to [po:p] in Half a Second, he points out that the sophisticated capacity for language unique to humans and performed in various forms such as speaking, listening, writing, reading, and sign language, rests on a tripartite architecture: coding for meaning, for syntax, and for sound structures. A central component of language skills is the mental lexicon, a part of declarative memory that stores the meaning, syntactic properties, and sounds of roughly 40,000 words.</li><li>Hagoort has studied the order in which information is retrieved from the mental lexicon - for example, when one recognizes the image of a well-known person. Words are not discrete units, each to be found localized in some small circuit in the brain; the various components of the ability to use words are all stored differently. First there is a conceptual selection and specification process, followed by retrieval of syntactic information, and then by retrieval of a sound pattern - all of this resulting in the utterance  pope. The different retrieval processes occur with high speed, and are temporally orchestrated with millisecond precision.</li><li>One of the ways in which the sequence of events involved in word retrieval has been studied is by recording electrical brain activity, using a series of electrodes attached to the scalp. The brain regions involved (mainly in the left hemisphere) have been localized by means of neurological data and brain imaging techniques.</li><li>Hagoort notes that the understanding of the neural substrate of language is an essential ingredient in an understanding of the human person, not only because sophisticated linguistic ability is unique to humans, but also because language itself mediates our sense of self.</li></ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>University of Notre Dame Press; 1st edition (28 Feb 2000); Abstract from <A HREF = "http://www.counterbalance.net/ctns-vo/neuro-frame.html" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>.</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_13/PaperSummary_13220.htm">Happel (Stephen) - The Soul and Neuroscience: Possibilities for Divine Action</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Russell (Robert John), Murphy (Nancey), Meyering (Theo C.), Arbib (Michael A.) - Neuroscience and the Person<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>In  The Soul and Neuroscience: Possibilities for Divine Action, Stephen Happel puts three notions into conversation with one another: Edmund Husserl s philosophical interpretation of inner time-consciousness; Thomas Aquinas s theological language of the soul; and contemporary neuroscientific analyses of human agency, memory, and bodily knowing.</li><li>Happel argues that medieval soul-language is not simply a devotional leftover from a discredited dualist substance philosophy. The concept of soul was a medieval attempt to explain the living experience of the cognitive, embodied subject. In his analysis of the role of the soul in human knowledge, Aquinas makes a variety of philosophical claims that are relevant to current research and discussion: First, human knowing is an active as well as a receptive process, dependent on the empirical world, yet critical in relationship to the world and to its own operations. Second, this knowing only takes place with the intimate cooperation of the individual s body. Third, intelligence is open-ended; it wonders and inquires about everything within its horizon. Fourth, this intelligence can reflect upon itself. Fifth, open-ended human intelligence can go beyond the senses, intending and estimating, even understanding the reality of God. Sixth, human intelligence rightly apprehends reality through its senses and makes correct judgments on the basis of the evidence provided.</li><li>Time-consciousness is central to Husserl s phenomenological description of human subjectivity. The agency of human consciousness is found in the retention, present awareness, and expectation that allow humans to be aware of temporally-extended objects of consciousness. There is a flow of interactions among memories, present consciousness, and future expectations that gives consciousness its unity. Happel shows that Husserl s notion of subjective time consciousness coheres with Aquinas s metaphysical vocabulary regarding intellectual powers: the world of interiority that Husserl examines turns from the consciousness of the subject to a self- reflexive knowledge of that subject; the unified body and soul, for Aquinas, becomes a self- conscious subject, examining itself introspectively.</li><li>Contemporary neuroscience examines time-memory, embodiment, and human initiative in the empirical subject, the knower who examines both self and the world through models and experiments. Reflecting on current theories of long-term and working memory, schema theory, somatic markers, and the hermeneutics of sense perception, Happel raises questions about human agency. He sees Husserl s analysis of time-consciousness as a possible hypothesis for experiment and verification in the neurosciences, and he challenges the neurosciences to think about mind and consciousness not only as initiators but as radically open to their constitution as a social reality.</li><li>The examination of human consciousness in three major disciplines - philosophy, theology, and neuroscience - has as its goal the criticism of modern individualistic (solipsistic, autonomous) concepts of the human subject. Happel reasons that if the subject can be conceived as open to finite transcendence (that is, to the reality of the other in and to the subject) this should shed light on how God operates through the interaction of finite subjects in our world to bring about divine ends.</li></ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>University of Notre Dame Press; 1st edition (28 Feb 2000); Abstract from <A HREF = "http://www.counterbalance.net/ctns-vo/neuro-frame.html" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>.</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_13/PaperSummary_13222.htm">Jeannerod (Marc) - Are There Limits to the Naturalization of Mental States?</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Russell (Robert John), Murphy (Nancey), Meyering (Theo C.), Arbib (Michael A.) - Neuroscience and the Person<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>In  Are There Limits to the Naturalization of Mental States? Marc Jeannerod brings further neuropsychological research to bear on the topic of intentional action and its role in constituting self-awareness. He notes that humans are social beings, and that communicating with others is a basic feature of human behavior. A long-standing philosophical question is how it is possible for one person to recognize the mental states of others. A key insight here comes from neuroscience: the neural system one uses for detecting intentions of other agents is part of the neural system that generates one s own intentions. Evidence for this comes from studies with monkeys showing the existence of neuronal populations in several brain areas that selectively encode postures and movements performed by conspecifics. Much of this population of neurons overlaps with those involved in the generation of the monkey s own movements. This same sort of overlapping of function is suggested by PET-scan studies in humans. When subjects were told to watch an action with the purpose of imitating it, parts of the motor cortex were activated, whereas this was not the case if subjects were told to watch only for the purpose of later recognition.</li><li>The research summarized here sheds light on the problem of other minds, but in so doing raises a new philosophical problem: if the intention of another s action is represented in my neural system by means of the same neural activity as my own intention to act, how does this intention get attributed to the right agent? Jeannerod shows that having a neural representation of an intention and attributing it to myself are two different processes, which are not automatically linked. Jeannerod reports further research that highlights this problem. Experimental situations have been devised in which it is not obvious to the subjects whether they are seeing an image of their own hand or that of the experimenter, moving in response to instructions. When the experimenter s hand movement departed from the instructions, subjects had no difficulty recognizing it was not their own. But in thirty percent of cases when the experimenter s hand followed the instructions, normal subjects mistook it for their own. Schizophrenic patients misattributed the experimenter s movements to themselves eighty percent of the time. This is consistent with clinical reports that schizophrenics suffer from a tendency to incorporate external events into their own experience.</li><li>Jeannerod ends his essay with a reflection on the limits of human abilities to know other minds. A person s individuality resides in the fact that no two individuals ever share all of the same experiences. Thus, no two people s global neural states will ever be the same. If neuroscientific understanding is based on similar or identical neural representations, then some aspects of personal identity are beyond the realm of scientific inquiry.</li></ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>University of Notre Dame Press; 1st edition (28 Feb 2000); Abstract from <A HREF = "http://www.counterbalance.net/ctns-vo/neuro-frame.html" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>.</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_13/PaperSummary_13221.htm">Jeannerod (Marc) - The Cognitive Way to Action</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Russell (Robert John), Murphy (Nancey), Meyering (Theo C.), Arbib (Michael A.) - Neuroscience and the Person<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>In  The Cognitive Way to Action, Marc Jeannerod describes research on the generation of voluntary action. He begins with an historical overview of theories in the field. Already in the 1930s researchers noted that even the simplest movements produced by the nervous system of a frog appeared to be organized purposefully. So the question was, How are these actions represented in the brain? An important advance was the recognition that behavior is guided by internal models of the external world, with predictions built in as to how the external world will be modified by the organism s behavior and how the organism itself will be affected by the action. The existence of such models is supported by ethological studies showing that certain behavioral sequences unfold blindly and eventually reach their goal after they have been triggered by external cues. Localized brain stimulation can also trigger similarly complex actions.</li><li>Early accounts hypothesized serial steps in the neural generation of actions. However, current brain studies suggest simultaneous activation in cortical and subcortical levels of the motor system. This distributed model of action-generation raises the issue of a central coordinator to determine the temporal structure of the motor output. The behavior of patients with damage to the frontal lobes suggests to Jeannerod that the supervisor system is associated with this region.</li><li>New light is now being shed on the problem of the neural substrates of action-generation by the study of mentally-simulation action. Jeannerod and his colleagues instructed subjects to imagine themselves grasping objects. Using Positron Emission Tomography (PET) and functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI), they identified the cortical and subcortical areas involved. They were then able to show that forming the mental image of an action produces a pattern of cortical activation that resembles that involved in intentionally executing the action.</li><li>Jeannerod expects research such as this to shed light on the neural underpinnings of central aspects of the self such as intentionality and self-consciousness. He notes that there is now neuropsychological evidence for the moral dictum that  to intend is to act. </li></ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>University of Notre Dame Press; 1st edition (28 Feb 2000); Abstract from <A HREF = "http://www.counterbalance.net/ctns-vo/neuro-frame.html" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>.</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_13/PaperSummary_13223.htm">Kerr (Fergus) - The Modern Philosophy of Self in Recent Theology</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Russell (Robert John), Murphy (Nancey), Meyering (Theo C.), Arbib (Michael A.) - Neuroscience and the Person<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li> The Modern Philosophy of Self in Recent Theology by Fergus Kerr is reprinted here from Kerr s book, Theology after Wittgenstein (Fergus Kerr, Theology after Wittgenstein, 2nd ed. (London: SPCK, 1997), chap. 1)) because it ably demonstrates the extent to which Christian theology carries a  metaphysical load - an account of the human person derived from Cartesian philosophy. It is ironic that the modern philosophical conception of the self sprang, as Kerr notes, from explicitly theological concerns. In the process of demonstrating the existence of God and the immortality of the soul, Descartes articulated a conception of human nature according to which the self is essentially a thinking thing, thus redefining what it is to be human in terms of consciousness. Descartes, together with Immanuel Kant, bequeathed a picture of the self-conscious and self-reliant, self-transparent and all-responsible individual, which continues to permeate contemporary thought even where Descartes s substance dualism has been repudiated.</li><li>Kerr examines a number of authors to show how this picture of the self shows up in recent theology, and this despite the fact that some eminent theologians, such as Karl Barth and Eberhard Jngel, have argued that the Cartesian turn to the subject has nearly ruined theology. Kerr considers the role of the Cartesian ego in the works of Karl Rahner, Hans Kng, Don Cupitt, Schubert Ogden, Timothy O Connell, and Gordon Kaufman.</li><li>It is always as the cognitive subject that people first appear in Rahner s theology.  Students alerted to the bias of the Cartesian legacy would suggest that language or action, conversation or collaboration, are more likely starting points. Rahner s theology depends heavily on the notion of self-transcendence: when self-conscious subjects recognize their own finitude, they have already transcended that finitude. This process of self-reflection produces a dynamic movement of  ceaseless self-transcendence towards the steadily receding horizon which is the absolute: in effect, anonymously, the deity. While Kerr recognizes the theological payoff of this move, making arguments for the existence of God redundant, it is at the expense of an account of humans as  deficient angels - that is, as attempting to occupy a standpoint beyond immersion in the bodily, the historical, and the institutional.</li><li>From his survey of Rahner and other examples, Kerr concludes that  in every case, though variously, and sometimes very significantly so, the model of the self is central to some important, sometimes radical and revisionary, theological proposal or program. A certain philosophical psychology is put to work to sustain a theological construction. Time and again, however, the paradigm of the self turns out to have remarkably divine attributes. The philosophy of the self that possesses so many modern theologians is a view which philosophers today are working hard to destroy. Kerr s essay ends with a brief survey of the post-Wittgensteinian philosophers who pursue this task - most notably, Bernard Williams and Charles Taylor.</li></ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>University of Notre Dame Press; 1st edition (28 Feb 2000); Abstract from <A HREF = "http://www.counterbalance.net/ctns-vo/neuro-frame.html" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>.</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_13/PaperSummary_13225.htm">LeDoux (Joseph E.) - Emotions: A View through the Brain</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Russell (Robert John), Murphy (Nancey), Meyering (Theo C.), Arbib (Michael A.) - Neuroscience and the Person<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>In his second essay for this volume,  Emotions: A View through the Brain, Joseph E. LeDoux provides an argument for his claim that the scientific investigation of emotion requires a distinction between emotional behavior or associated physiological responses and the subjective feelings experienced by humans. Emotional behavior can be understood by the evolutionist in terms of the function it serves in human and animal life. Emotional feelings must be seen as secondary since emotional behavior is present in organisms that do not have the capacity for conscious awareness. LeDoux defines emotional feelings as a result of sophisticated brains being aware of their own activities - in this case, being aware that an emotion system, such as the fear system, is activated. The problem of explaining emotional feelings is a part of the single problem of the explanation of consciousness. However, different emotional behavior or response systems may involve different brain mechanisms. Here LeDoux is critical of the  limbic-system theory, a theory that sought to identify a single set of brain structures involved in all emotional responses.</li><li>LeDoux summarizes in more detail here the results of research on fear conditioning in rats (see above), and notes that studies of the effects of damage to the amygdala in humans, as well as fMRI studies, show that the amygdala is the key to the fear-conditioning system in humans, as well. However, the association of fear not with the original stimulus but with the environmental context in which the stimulus was encountered appears to depend on the hippocampus.</li><li>The persistence of learned fear responses is obviously valuable for survival. However, the inability to inhibit unwarranted fear responses can have devastating consequences, as in phobias and post-traumatic stress disorder. Thus, research on the probable role of neocortical areas in extinction of fear responses may be of great value in treating these disorders.</li><li>Less is known about other basic emotion such as anger or joy; it remains to be seen whether the amygdala is involved in these as well. Far less is known about  higher-order emotions such as jealousy. And, as mentioned above, an account of emotional feelings awaits an adequate account of consciousness in general. However, LeDoux notes that working memory receives a greater number and variety of inputs in the presence of an emotional stimulus than otherwise, due to the variety of neural pathways involved; he speculates that this excess stimulation is what adds the affective charge to representations in working memory that we associate with felt emotions.</li></ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>University of Notre Dame Press; 1st edition (28 Feb 2000); Abstract from <A HREF = "http://www.counterbalance.net/ctns-vo/neuro-frame.html" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>.</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_13/PaperSummary_13224.htm">LeDoux (Joseph E.) - Emotions: How I ve Looked for Them in the Brain</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Russell (Robert John), Murphy (Nancey), Meyering (Theo C.), Arbib (Michael A.) - Neuroscience and the Person<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Joseph E. LeDoux specializes in the use of animal models for studying emotion. In  Emotions: How I ve Looked for Them in the Brain, LeDoux describes his work on fear conditioning in rats. The rats are conditioned to associate a sound with a noxious stimulus. This sound then elicits the behavioral responses accompanying the emotional experience of fear: muscle tension, release of stress hormones, and so forth. Note that LeDoux distinguishes between the behavioral system and subjective feelings. It is the former, he argues, that should be seen as essential to understanding the function of emotions.</li><li>LeDoux uses a variety of techniques to relate fear behavior to specific circuits in the brain. First, lesion studies (selective damage to parts of the brain) and brain imaging techniques make it possible to locate the general regions involved. Next the circuits activated in fear responses can be followed by injecting tracer substances into those areas and recording the  firing patterns of neurons in relation to various emotional states under a variety of learning paradigms. In this way, LeDoux has confirmed the crucial role of the amygdala, a distinctive cluster of neurons found deep in the anterior temporal lobe of each hemisphere. Inputs to the amygdala from sensory processes in the thalamus and cortex are key to processing fear stimuli, while projections from the amygdala to brainstem areas are involved in control of the behavioral, autonomic, and hormonal responses that constitute fear behavior. LeDoux notes that a variety of other brain systems are also involved in the various feeling states we term  emotions in humans; only empirical research will show whether his work on fear generalizes to other emotions.</li></ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>University of Notre Dame Press; 1st edition (28 Feb 2000); Abstract from <A HREF = "http://www.counterbalance.net/ctns-vo/neuro-frame.html" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>.</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_13/PaperSummary_13226.htm">Meyering (Theo C.) - Mind Matters: Physicalism and the Autonomy of the Person</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Russell (Robert John), Murphy (Nancey), Meyering (Theo C.), Arbib (Michael A.) - Neuroscience and the Person<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>Theo C. Meyering, in  Mind Matters: Physicalism and the Autonomy of the Person, takes yet a third approach to the issue of reduction. He states that  if (true, downward) mental <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_39.htm">causation</A><SUP>1</SUP> implies nonreducibility [as Stoeger and Murphy argue] and physicalism implies the converse, it is hard to see how these two views could be compatible. Meyering distinguishes three versions of reductionism: radical (industrial strength) physicalism; ideal (regular strength) physicalism, and mild or token physicalism. Radical physicalism asserts that all special sciences are reducible to physics in the sense that their laws can be deduced via bridge laws from those of physics. Ideal physicalism asserts that while it is practically impossible to reduce the special sciences, such reduction would be possible were there an ideally complete physics" (Note: This distinction parallels Stoeger s recognition that epistemological reducibility is relative to the meaning of  laws of nature). Token physicalism is ontologically reductionist: there are no events that are not  token-identical with some physical event or other (Note: See above, sec. 3.3). However, there are no identities between higher-level and lower- level types of events; consequently some events described by the special sciences have no physical explanation at all.</li><li>All of these reductionist positions are to be contrasted with compositional (milder than mild) physicalism, which asserts that some higher-level events are not even token-identical with physical events because the higher-level event (say, a crash in the stock market) is constituted by innumerable physical particulars in all sorts of states and interactions.</li><li>Meyering then surveys some of the existing arguments for the nonreducibility of the special sciences. One of the most important is the argument from multiple realizability. The claim is that economics, for example, is not reducible to physics because economic concepts (for example, monetary exchange) are  wildly multiply realizable (for example, using coins, strings of wampum, signing a check). Thus, there can be no bridge laws and no reduction. Such an argument, however, only cuts against radical physicalism, not the weaker (and a priori more plausible) ideal physicalism.</li><li>A stronger argument for the indispensability of special-science explanations is based on the role of functional explanations. For example, the functional description of aspirin as an analgesic is in some instances a more useful explanation of its causal role (relieving a headache) than is its description as the chemical level.</li><li>Meyering s own contribution focuses neither on multiple realizability of supervenient properties nor on multiple  fillers of functional roles, but on  multiple <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1263.htm">supervenience</A><SUP>2</SUP>. In particular, a single subvenient state of affairs (for example, a cloud of free electrons permeating the metal of which a ladder is constructed) may realize a variety of supervenient dispositional properties (in this case, electrical conductivity, thermal conductivity, opacity). An explanation (say, of the cause of a deadly accident) requires reference to the dispositional property (electrical conductivity), not merely to the subvenient property. Meyering argues that it is this possibility of multiple <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1263.htm">supervenience</A><SUP>3</SUP>, not multiple realizability, that gives arguments against reduction based on functional properties their real force. Downward <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_39.htm">causation</A><SUP>4</SUP>, then, can be understood in terms of selective activation of one of several dispositional properties of a lower-level state, and thus can be assigned a stable place in our picture of how the world is organized without upsetting our conception of physics as constituting a closed and complete system of physical events.</li></ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>University of Notre Dame Press; 1st edition (28 Feb 2000); Abstract from <A HREF = "http://www.counterbalance.net/ctns-vo/neuro-frame.html" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>.</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_13/PaperSummary_13207.htm">Murphy (Nancey) - Neuroscience and the Person: Introduction</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Russell (Robert John), Murphy (Nancey), Meyering (Theo C.), Arbib (Michael A.) - Neuroscience and the Person<BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>University of Notre Dame Press; 1st edition (28 Feb 2000)</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_13/PaperSummary_13227.htm">Murphy (Nancey) - Supervenience and the Downward Efficacy of the Mental: A Nonreductive Physicalist Account of Human Action</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Russell (Robert John), Murphy (Nancey), Meyering (Theo C.), Arbib (Michael A.) - Neuroscience and the Person<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>In  <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1263.htm">Supervenience</A><SUP>1</SUP> and the Downward Efficacy of the Mental: A Nonreductive Physicalist Account of Human Action, Nancey Murphy sets out to answer the question: If mental events are intrinsically related to <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1263.htm">(supervene</A><SUP>2</SUP> on) neural events, how can it not be the case that the contents of mental events are ultimately governed by the laws of neurobiology? The main goal of her essay, then, is to explain why, in certain sorts of cases, complete causal reduction of the mental to the neurobiological fails. To do so, she first considers the concept of <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1263.htm">supervenience</A><SUP>3</SUP>, offering a definition that runs counter to the  standard account. The concept of <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1263.htm">supervenience</A><SUP>4</SUP> was introduced in ethics to describe the relation between moral and nonmoral (descriptive) properties; the former are not identical with the latter, but one is a  good person in virtue of possessing certain nonmoral properties such as generosity. Supervenient properties are multiply realizable; that is, (in the moral case) there are a variety of lifestyles each of which constitutes one a good person. Murphy criticizes typical attempts at formal definitions of  <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1263.htm">supervenience </A><SUP>5</SUP> for presuming that subvenient properties alone are sufficient to determine supervenient properties. She argues that many supervenient properties are codetermined by context - this move recognizes constitutive relationships not only at the subvenient level but also at the supervenient level itself or between the level in question and even higher levels of organization.</li><li>Murphy argues that it is this participation of entities in higher causal orders by virtue of their supervenient properties that accounts for the fact of downward <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_39.htm">causation</A><SUP>6</SUP>. In Donald Campbell s original example, it is the functional properties of the termites jaw structure - their relation to a higher-level causal order - that allows for environmental feedback, resulting in modifications at the (subvenient) genetic level. These modifications are a result of selection among lower-level causal processes (Note: While Murphy takes feedback and selection among lower-level causal processes to be the essential ingredient in downward <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_39.htm">causation</A><SUP>7</SUP>, Arthur Peacocke, in his essay in this volume, assimilates it to  whole-part influence ). </li><li>Murphy then turns to the issue of mental <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_39.htm">causation</A><SUP>8</SUP>: How do reasons get their grip on the causal transitions among neural states? The key to answering this question is the fact that neural networks are formed and reshaped (in part, at least) by feedback loops linking them with the environment; the environment selectively reinforces some neural connections but not others. Murphy points out that it is not only the physical environment that plays a downward causal role in configuring neural nets, but also the intellectual environment. It is the fact that mental states <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1263.htm">supervene</A><SUP>9</SUP>, in Murphy s sense of the term, on brain-states - that is, that they are co-constituted by both brain-states and their intellectual context - that makes the occurrence of the brain-states themselves subject to selective pressures from the intellectual environment.</li></ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>University of Notre Dame Press; 1st edition (28 Feb 2000); Abstract from <A HREF = "http://www.counterbalance.net/ctns-vo/neuro-frame.html" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>.</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_13/PaperSummary_13228.htm">Peacocke (Arthur) - The Sound of Sheer Silence: How Does God Communicate with Humanity?</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Russell (Robert John), Murphy (Nancey), Meyering (Theo C.), Arbib (Michael A.) - Neuroscience and the Person<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>In  The Sound of Sheer Silence: How Does God Communicate with Humanity? Arthur Peacocke advocates an emergentist-monist account of the natural world: its unity is seen in the fact of its hierarchical ordering such that each successive level is a whole constituted of parts from the level below. This world exhibits emergence in that the properties, concepts, and explanations relevant to higher levels are not logically reducible to those of lower levels. An emergentist-monist account of the human person fits consistently within this worldview. It is important to note that, unlike many philosophers, Peacocke does not identify mental properties with brain properties. Rather, he recognizes the mental or personal as an emergent level above the (purely) biological, and attributes mental properties to the unified whole that is the  human-brain-in-the- body-in-social-relations (Note: Brothers and other authors in this volume would agree in emphasizing both the embodied and social character of mind and personhood).</li><li>More important than the logical irreducibility of levels in the hierarchy of complex systems is causal irreducibility. Peacocke discusses the concept of downward <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_39.htm">causation</A><SUP>1</SUP> and a variety of related concepts of causal processes in complex systems, one of which is the distinction between structuring and triggering causes. A structuring cause is an ongoing state of a system (for example, the hardware conditions in a computer) that makes it possible for an event (the triggering cause; for example, striking a key) to have the effect that it does. Peacocke concludes that the term  whole-part influence best captures what is common to all of these insights.</li><li>This essay elaborates on Peacocke s earlier work on divine action, which regards the entire created universe as an interconnected system-of-systems, and adopts a panentheistic account of God s relationship to the world such that God is understood as immanent within the whole of creation, yet the world is seen as  contained within the divine. Thus, God s action is to be understood on the analogy of whole-part influence.</li><li>The foregoing account of divine action lays necessary groundwork for an account of revelation: until we can postulate ways in which God can effect  instrumentally particular events and patterns of events in the world, we cannot hope to understand how God s intentions and purposes might be known  symbolically. There are a variety of ways God is taken to be made known: general revelation through the order of nature; through the resources of religious traditions; through the  special revelations that serve as the foundation of religious traditions; and in the religious experience of ordinary believers. While dualist anthropologies allowed for direct contact between God and the soul or spirit, Peacocke concludes that when the person is understood in an emergentist-monist way it is more consistent with what we know of God s relation to the rest of creation to suppose that God s communication is always mediated, even if only by affecting the neural networks that subserve human memories and other sorts of experience, including the feeling of God s presence. Thus, all of these forms of revelation can be understood as the result of God acting through the mediation of the human and natural worlds.</li></ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>University of Notre Dame Press; 1st edition (28 Feb 2000); Abstract from <A HREF = "http://www.counterbalance.net/ctns-vo/neuro-frame.html" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>.</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_13/PaperSummary_13229.htm">Peters (Ted) - Resurrection of the Very Embodied Soul?</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Russell (Robert John), Murphy (Nancey), Meyering (Theo C.), Arbib (Michael A.) - Neuroscience and the Person<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>In  Resurrection of the Very Embodied Soul? Ted Peters argues that the Christian understanding of eternal salvation is not threatened by the rejection of substance dualism. In fact, the rejection of dualism by both the cognitive neurosciences and the Christian tradition represents an important area of consonance between theology and science - namely, that human reality is embodied selfhood. Peters notes that this issue deserves attention because some theorists, in both cognitive science and philosophy, claim two things: first, the findings of the neurosciences regarding the brain s influence on the mind demonstrate that the human soul cannot be thought to exist apart from a physical body and, second, that this physicalist interpretation so undermines the doctrine of the immortal soul that the Christian view of eternal salvation becomes counter- scientific.</li><li>Peters points out that until recently theologians have not been forced to clarify the distinction between two overlapping ways of conceiving personal salvation: One, rooted primarily in the ancient Hebrew understanding, pictures the human person as entirely physical, as dying completely, and then undergoing a divinely effected resurrection. The other, a later view influenced by Greek metaphysics, pictures the human person as a composite of body and soul; when the body dies the soul survives independently until reunited with a body at the final resurrection. In both pictures, however, the resurrection of the body is decisive for salvation. Now, however, to the extent that the dualistic vocabulary and conceptuality inherited by Christian theology from the Platonic tradition begins to look too much like Cartesian substance dualism, theology is in error.</li><li>In approaching the constructive question of how best to relate cognitive theory and theology, Peters first examines and rejects two  blind alleys : the notion of the  humanizing brain developed by James Ashbrook and Carol Albright, and the artificial intelligence model of the human soul as <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_0/Notes_69.htm">disembodied</A><SUP>1</SUP> information processing developed by Frank Tipler. In contrast to Tipler s view, Peters notes that belief in the resurrection, for Christian theology, does not depend on any natural process identifiable by science or philosophy, but on the witnessed resurrection of Jesus Christ at the first Easter. The Christian promise points toward an eschatological transformation - a new creation - to be wrought by God. Peters follows Wolfhart Pannenberg in connecting the resurrection to God s eschatological act wherein time is taken up into eternity, and wherein God provides for continuing personal identity even when our bodies disintegrate.</li></ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>University of Notre Dame Press; 1st edition (28 Feb 2000); Abstract from <A HREF = "http://www.counterbalance.net/ctns-vo/neuro-frame.html" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>.</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_13/PaperSummary_13230.htm">Stoeger (William R.) - The Mind-Brain Problem, the Laws of Nature, and Constitutive Relationships</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Russell (Robert John), Murphy (Nancey), Meyering (Theo C.), Arbib (Michael A.) - Neuroscience and the Person<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>In  The Mind-Brain Problem, the Laws of Nature, and Constitutive Relationships, William R. Stoeger, S.J. argues that a correct understanding of the meaning of  laws of nature is essential for clarifying issues associated with the mind-brain problem. He distinguishes between  the laws of nature as the regularities, relationships, and processes that obtain in nature, and  our laws of nature as our provisional, incomplete, and imperfect models of these regularities. In some areas of science our models give fairly adequate accounts of the actual regularities and relationships; in others adequate models are still lacking. Modeling mental processes and their relations to brain processes seems especially problematic due to the subjective and holistic character of mental phenomena; in fact, it is not yet clear what would count as an adequate model for explaining the mental in terms of brain processes.</li><li>The sense of  laws of nature that one intends has a bearing on the meaning of essential terms in the philosophy of mind, such as  emergence and  <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_12/Notes_1263.htm">supervenience</A><SUP>1</SUP>, and on an even deeper issue underlying the mind-brain problem: the very meaning of  physical or  material, versus  nonphysical or  immaterial.  Matter is not a scientific term and the meaning of  material is historically contingent. In common usage, Stoeger takes it to refer to that which we can model, describe, and understand using the resources of the natural sciences. Correlatively, the immaterial is that which transcends the regularities known by science. Thus, the identification of the mental with the immaterial does not mean that the mental could not be a property of neurologically highly organized matter. Stoeger draws attention to the  constitutive relationships that account for the hierarchical structure of reality, such that higher levels are composed by complex ordering of lower-level entities. The constitutive relationships of a complex whole are all of those connections, relationships, and interactions that either incorporate its lower-level components into that more complex whole, relate that whole to higher-level unities in such a way as to contribute essentially to its character, or maintain its connection to the Ground of its existence. Stoeger s insight is that insofar as there are constitutive relationships of the sort that relate an entity to higher-level systems, those entities are not reducible either causally or mereologically (that is, as mere aggregates are reducible to their parts). Thus, Stoeger concludes that mental states cannot be reduced to brain-states: there are constitutive relationships not just among the brain-states that realize them, but also relating the mental states they determine with one another and with historical and environmental conditions. These external constitutive relations play a role in determining the sequences and clustering of mental states. Stoeger ends by reflecting on the Aristotelian and Thomist accounts of form and soul as that which makes an entity to be what it is. He notes that a scientifically accessible correlate of these notions is his own account of constitutive relationships.</li></ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>University of Notre Dame Press; 1st edition (28 Feb 2000); Abstract from <A HREF = "http://www.counterbalance.net/ctns-vo/neuro-frame.html" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>.</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_13/PaperSummary_13231.htm">Watts (Fraser) - Cognitive Neuroscience and Religious Consciousness</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Russell (Robert John), Murphy (Nancey), Meyering (Theo C.), Arbib (Michael A.) - Neuroscience and the Person<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>In  Cognitive Neuroscience and Religious Consciousness, Fraser Watts notes that when divine action is considered in relation to the physical sciences the rationality of Christian faith may be at stake, but when God s action is considered in relation to the cognitive neurosciences the credibility of daily religious life and practice may be at stake as well: How do humans relate to God as persons who are not mere minds, souls, spirits? Two major issues raised are the validity of revelation and the nature and possibility of religious experience.</li><li>There are both scientific and theological reasons for attending to the brain when attempting to understand religious experience. However, Watts resists the question of whether religious experience is caused by the brain or by God. Theological and neurological explanations are complementary; one is free to privilege the level of explanation that is most relevant in a particular context. Watts considers two developments in attempts to understand the involvement of neural processes in religious experience. The first is based on claims that temporal lobe epilepsy (TLE) patients have more religious preoccupations than others; this has given rise to the further claim that religious experience should be linked with the neural basis of TLE. However, Watts disputes both the data and this interpretation. A second attempt to link religious experience and the cognitive neurosciences is that of Eugene d Aquili and colleagues. Watts finds this research of more interest in that it involves a somewhat more sophisticated theory of religious experience and ties it to a theory of more general cognitive functioning - d Aquili s theory of  cognitive operators. Watts s own thesis is that a truly adequate cognitive theory of religious experience would benefit from attention to analogies between religious and emotional experience. The most valuable cognitive theories of emotion are multi-level, for example, distinguishing the sensory-motor aspects from the interpretation of the experience, and further distinguishing between intuitive perceptions of meaning and the ability to describe the experience propositionally. Watts speculates that this latter distinction, in particular, will shed light on the phenomena of religious life. An attempt to understand the role of God in religious experience will be hampered, according to Watts, by too narrow a focus on  divine action. Any analogy with human  action needs to be balanced with other metaphors that keep before our mind the fact that God s action is constant rather than episodic, interactive rather than controlling. He suggests the concept of  resonance or  tuning as an image for understanding the divine-human interaction. Conscience might then be understood in terms of resonance with the will of God.</li></ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>University of Notre Dame Press; 1st edition (28 Feb 2000); Abstract from <A HREF = "http://www.counterbalance.net/ctns-vo/neuro-frame.html" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>.</P> <P ALIGN = "Justify"><FONT Size = 2 FACE="Arial"><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><HR><BR>"<B><A HREF = "../../../PaperSummaries/PaperSummary_13/PaperSummary_13232.htm">Wildman (Wesley J.) & Brothers (Leslie A.) - A Neuropsychological-Semiotic Model of Religious Experiences</A></B>"<BR><BR><B>Source</B>: Russell (Robert John), Murphy (Nancey), Meyering (Theo C.), Arbib (Michael A.) - Neuroscience and the Person<BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "800080"><ol type="1"><li>In  A Neuropsychological-Semiotic Model of Religious Experiences, Wesley J. Wildman and Leslie A. Brothers observe that the neurosciences have largely succeeded, through their analyses of brain structure and function, in portraying that which is distinctively human as continuous with the laws and forms of complexity observed throughout the natural world. This generally accepted conclusion about human beings reconfigures the whole theory of religious experience by proposing explanations for them that are independent of the assumption that they are experiences of anything properly called a religious object. This reductionistic challenge is not different in philosophical terms from earlier challenges, but it does invite theories of religious experience that attend to the neurosciences.</li><li>As Fraser Watts points out in his essay, religious experience is notoriously difficult to define and delimit. Wildman and Brothers choose the term  experiences of ultimacy both to focus their study on a subset of the broader category of religious experience, and also to avoid prejudicing their treatment in favor of theistic religions that focus on (putative) experiences of God.</li><li>The goal of this essay, then, is to present a richly textured interpretation of experiences of ultimacy. The authors develop this interpretation in two phases. First, they describe these experiences as objectively as possible, combining the descriptive precision of phenomenology, informed by the neurosciences, with a number of more obviously perspectival insights from psychology, sociology, theology, and ethics. Their hope is that the resulting taxonomy will be compelling enough to support constructive efforts in theology and philosophy that depend on an interpretation of religious experience - including those in this volume that attempt to speak of divine action in relation to human consciousness (Note: See especially the essays by Watts, Peacocke, and Ellis).</li><li>The authors make two constructive ventures on the basis of this description. In the first, inspired by existing social processes used to identify authentic religious experiences, they describe a procedure whereby genuine experiences of ultimacy can be distinguished from mere claims to such experiences. They recognize a variety of  markers that together point toward authenticity: subjects descriptions (considered within their socio-linguistic contexts), phenomenological characteristics, judgments by experts in discernment or psychology, conformity with theological criteria, and ethical transformation. Judgments of this sort bring such experiences into the domain of public, scientific discussion as much as they can be, and the authors speculate that this will encourage more mainstream discussion of such experiences by scientists and others.</li><li>The second constructive venture is the authors attempt to evaluate claims made concerning the cause and value of experiences of ultimacy. The modeling procedure they adopt makes use of semiotic theory to plot the  traces of causal interactions in the form of sign transformations, though not the causal interactions themselves. In the language of semiotic theory, these causal traces take the form of  richly intense sign transformations. This proposal keeps ontological presuppositions to a minimum by focusing on causal traces rather than the causes themselves. Nevertheless, the authors contend, it does offer a religiously or spiritually positive way of interpreting authentic ultimacy experiences. At the end of the essay the authors offer a suggestion about the nature of the ultimate reality that might leave such causal traces.</li></ol></FONT><BR><BR><FONT COLOR = "0000FF"><B>COMMENT: </B>University of Notre Dame Press; 1st edition (28 Feb 2000); Abstract from <A HREF = "http://www.counterbalance.net/ctns-vo/neuro-frame.html" TARGET = "_top">Link</A>.</P> <a name="ColourConventions"></a><hr><br><B><U>Text Colour Conventions</U> (see <A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1025.htm">disclaimer</a>)</B><OL TYPE="1"><LI><FONT COLOR = "0000FF">Blue</FONT>: Text by me; &copy; Theo Todman, 2018</li><LI><FONT COLOR = "800080">Mauve</FONT>: Text by correspondent(s) or other author(s); &copy; the author(s)</li></OL> </center> <BR><HR><BR><center> <TABLE class = "Bridge" WIDTH=950> <TR><TD WIDTH="30%">&copy; Theo Todman, June 2007 - August 2018.</TD> <TD WIDTH="40%">Please address any comments on this page to <A HREF="mailto:theo@theotodman.com">theo@theotodman.com</A>.</TD> <TD WIDTH="30%">File output: <time datetime="2018-08-02T03:38" pubdate>02/08/2018 03:38:17</time> <br><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_10/Notes_1010.htm">Website Maintenance Dashboard</A> </TD></TR><TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="#Top">Return to Top of this Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="40%"><A HREF="../../../Notes/Notes_11/Notes_1140.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Philosophy Page</A></TD> <TD WIDTH="30%"><A HREF="../../../index.htm">Return to Theo Todman's Home Page</A></TD> </TR></TABLE></CENTER><HR> </BODY> </HTML>